ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida, Chairman

EDWARD J. PATTEN, New Jersey GLENN R. DAVIS, Wisconsin

CLARENCE D. LONG, Maryland BURT L. TALCOTT, California

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin ROBERT C. McEWEN, New York





Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations


21-007 0 WASHINGTON : 1978


GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, Chairman

JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi



OTTO E. PASSMAN, Louisiana

JOE L. EVINS, Tennessee

EDWARD P. BOLAND, Massachusetts


DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania

TOM STEED, Oklahoma


JOHN M. SLACK, West Virginia

JOHN J. FLYNT, JR., Georgia


ROBERT N. GIAIMO, Connecticut



JOHN J. McFALL, California





FRANK E. EVANS, Colorado

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin

EDWARD R. ROYBAL, California













SILVIO O. CONTE, Massachusetts

GLENN R. DAVIS, Wisconsin



JOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania

MARK ANDREWS, North Dakota

LOUIS C. WYMAN, New Hampshire

BURT L. TALCOTT, California





JOHN T. MYERS, Indiana



EARL B. RUTH, North Carolina

VICTOR V. VEYSEY, California


KEITH F. MAINLAND, Clerk and Staff Director









































NOTE.-This Surveys and Investigations supervisory staff is supplemented by selected

personnel borrowed on a reimbursable basis for varying lengths of time from various

agencies to staff up specific studies and investigations. The current average annual full-

time personnel equivalent is approximately 42.




















































DR. S. KOSLOV, OASN, (R. & D.)











Budget plan (amounts for

construction actions programed) Obligations

1972 1973 1974 1972 1973 1974

actual estimated estimated actual estimated estimated

Program by activities:


1. Major construction.................. 293, 885 445, 830 627, 600 391,817 480, 600 548, 200

2. Minor construction------ - 12, 500 14,600 15, 000 11,793 17, 500 15, 00

3. Pla nning----------------------34, 534 54, 900 53, 800 35, 159 54, 900 53, 800

4. Supporting activities....-....... - 1,050 3,000 1,000 762 1,000 1,000

Total direct...................... 341,969 518, 330 697, 400 439, 531 554, 000 618, 000

Reimbursable (total)....................... 113,797 100, 000 100, 000 101,384 100, 000 100, 000

Total.................................. 455,766 618,330 797,400 540, 915 654,000 718,000


Receipts and reimbursements from:

Federal funds ......................... -----------------92,838 -80,000 -80,000 -92,757 -80,000 -80,000

Non-Federal sources.-................. --20,959 -20,000 -20,000 -20,959 -20,000 -20,000

Unobligated balance available, start of year

for completion of prior year budget plans.--........--................. --387, 457 -328, 827 -292, 657

Reprograming from (-) or to prior year

budget plans----.....-----......------.....-------. 26,600 -500 -12,000 .................... .......

Unobligated balance transferred from other

accounts .............---------------------...---. -13, 069 ------.................... -13, 069 ...........

Unobligated balance available, endof year............................---------------------------- 328, 827 292, 657 360,057

Budget authority (appropriation)-----.......---. 355, 500 517,830 685,400 355, 500 517, 830 685,400

Relation of obligations to outlays:

Obligations incurred, net....__..........-..-.-.--.......... . . 427,199 554,000 618, 000

Obligated balance, start of year............................169, 520 258, 871 504,871

Obligated balance, end of year-..... - ..-....-........-.... ... . -258, 871 -504, 871 -745,871

Outlays---....------....... ------- - -----------............. 337, 848 308,000 377,000




1972 1973 1974

actual estimated estimated


Personnel compensation:

Permanent positions... ........... . . .

Positions other than permanent.-._......___ .... . . .

Other personnel compensation...-.-__.........................

Total personnel compensation .............................

Direct obligations:

Personnel compensation ... ...... . .

Personnel benefits---..-....... ..

Benefits for former personnel- .... .. __..... . .__

Travel and transportation of persons... ......... . __...

Transportation of things_... .

Rent, communications, and utilities .........................

Printing and reproduction........_ ______...._._______

Other services -........ ..... -

Supplies and materials-......... .....

Equipment... ..........

Lands and structures - .... ..

Total direct obligations.........-..........................

Reimbursable obligations:

Personnel compensation .... - -

Personnel benefits, civilian......... .............

Travel and transportation of persons ................. ... ..

Transportation of things....

Rent, communications, and utilities

Printing and reproduction .. ...................... ....

Other services -_ ___.. .. ...... _.. ............-.. ..

Supplies and materials.... ...... . . . .

Equipment .. . ..... ............ ............ .. ..

Lands and structures_ ...__ _____.._.. _______ ______

Total reimbursable obligations_...... ..... _

Total obligations, Department of the Navy ........ .........

Allocation to Department of Transportation:

Permanent positions ... ..._..... ...........................

Other personnel compensation..~.. . .. . .

Total personnel compensation.......... _ .. ......

Personnel benefits, civilian. ...___. _ ......_ . .. ....... __

Other services ........................ ._ . . . __ ---------.

Lands and structures .._...________._____.......

Total allocation obligations to Department of Transportation......

Total obligations ..-_.. _ - -_ _____ _ -- - -.

$35,740 $35,513 $39,575

869 176 --

1,012 1, 445 1,562

37,621 37,134 41,137

31, 846 30,650 35, 017

3,437 2,638 3,019

6 _...........-... .. . . .. . .

2,239 1,934 1, 854

4, 012 3, 450 4, 816

1,061 394 512

1,000 355 460

17,516 22, 088 18,613

14,279 12,114 15,704

56, 487 47, 943 62, 148

306, 889 430, 059 474,857

438,772 551,625 617,000

5,775 6,484 6,120

624 557 528

273 185 434

6,298 4,653 5,996

233 139 188

192 188 190

4,888 3,563 4,370

3,148 2,292 2,290

3,047 2,226 2,844

76,906 79,713 77,040

101,384 100,000 100,000

540,156 651,625 717,000








540, 915






2, 205

2, 375

654, 000







1, 000

718, 000



Total number of permanent positions................................

Full-time equivalent of other positions_ _ _______._-_._________

Average paid employment ___________________________________

Average GS grade-- --- --- - - - - - --- - - - - -

Average GS salary._ _ _......... ......... .

Average salary of ungraded positions. ..... .......

2, 743 2, 989 2, 887

97 39

3, 229 2, 955 2, 767

9.4 9.3 9.3

$13,495 $13,360 $13,360

$13,829 ..


Mr. SIKES. The committee will come to order.


Secretary Sanders, the committee extends to you a very warm wel-

come. We are pleased that you could be here to discuss with us the

trends in the Navy, which will affect military construction and base


Of course, it is always a pleasure to have Frank Sanders appear

before a committee of Congress and in particular to appear before

this committee, because Mr. Sanders and I have many memories of

the years when we both sat on this side of the table working with

Harry Sheppard and with others in developing military programs.

We are always conscious of your superb knowledge of the military

construction programs and requirements, and of defense generally. We

were fortunate when we had you with us here.

We feel that our Nation has been fortunate in your service here

and in the Pentagon.

Mr. PATTEN. If the chairman would yield.

Mr. SIKEs. I will be glad to yield.

Mr. PATTEN. I would like to join with the statement of the Chair.

I did have the pleasure of working with Frank in this room, and I

have had the pleasure of observing him these last few years since

he has been in the top spots in the Navy, which is always dear to our


Frank, I told you that Lew Compton, who was Acting Secretary

of the Navy when Pearl Harbor happened, pushed the button and

put everybody to work. If you have his picture up there, you will

see his collar frayed and his cuffs. Lew died of ulcers. The job killed

him. I don't think that is going to happen to you.

It has been a pleasure to be able to say we know you well, Frank,

and to wish you the best of luck.

Mr. SANDERS. Thank you, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. Frank sitting over on that side of the table is just the

opposite of where he sat 20 years ago this year when he was sitting

where Bob Nicholas is sitting now. Those were the days when Korea

was hard upon us, and the people in the construction facilities

field in all branches of the services didn't know whether they were

supposed to prepare for World War III or what they were supposed

to do.

Those were some hectic days, and Frank lived through that with us,

and I suspect he has had a few hectic days since then on both sides of

this table. The only thing that spoils his appearance before us this

morning is the knowledge that he is probably doing so for the last


He has been an outstanding, devoted public servant in two branches

of the Government and is one in whom I know every one with whom he

has ever served has had a great deal of confidence and continues to

have a great deal of respect, and I guess the only happy part of it is

that Frank has earned a rest, and Frank, I hope you will take a good

one and you will just plain loaf until you get sick of it.

Mr. SANDERS. Thank you very much.

Mr. SIKES. Thank you, Mr. Davis.

Former Secretary of Defense Laird knew exactly what he was doing

when he tapped Frank Sanders to go from Capitol Hill to the Penta-

gon to help in the work of the Department of the Navy.

Mr. Secretary, you have with you a group of able witnesses. We want

to recognize Admiral Marschall who has recently taken over the re-

sponsibility of Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command.

We welcome you, Admiral Marschall.

We have worked with you for a long time. We know of your great

abilities and your work. You follow a long line of very dedicated and

able men in this post. We look forward to working with you.

General Jannell is here representing a very important component

of the naval forces, the Marine Corps, and, of course, we also have had

the pleasure of working with you in the past, General, and we appre-

ciate the very competent contributions that you have made.

We trust that the Marines are going to insist on getting their part

of the military construction budgets from the Navy. Do you have

any trouble with that, General?

General JANNELL. NO, sir.

Mr. SANDERS. I assure you, sir, they insist.

Mr. SIKES. Secretary Sanders, you have maintained your close ties

to this committee while undertaking a series of difficult responsi-

bilities in the Navy. The excellence with which you have carried out

these jobs is familiar to all of us. We hope, if you leave your position

of Under Secretary, and we hope that you won't, but if you do do that

you will continue to keep close contact with all of us. We wish you

God speed in your future endeavors. It has been suggested that you

take a long rest. We know you better than that.

Are you ready to proceed ?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, may I just say thank you for the kind remarks by

you, Congressman Patten and Congressman Davis. If I have had

any success in the Navy and up here it has been due to the training

which I received from many, beginning with Congressman Davis as

a subcommittee chairman including yourself and Mr. Sheppard, and

Mr. Mahon.

I'm humbled by your statements and deeply appreciative of them.

I would like to point out that Admiral Marschall is appearing be-

fore you for the first time as Chief of the Naval Facilities Engineer-

ing Command, an event that I have looked forward to for some 12 or

15 years. I think he is a very worthy successor to the men who have

gone before him and I am sure that he will not only lead the Naval

Facilities Engineering Command and the Civil Engineer Corps to

new heights, but also that the continuing coordination, contact, and

rapport with this committee will probably increase even more than

it has in the past.

General Jannell, of course, with the Marines has already proven

himself to you all through working here for a year. He, too, is well

aware of the importance of this committee to us. I don't know of any

committee that scrutinizes the military construction program more

thoroughly than this committee, nor any one which is more fair. We

are most appreciative of the interest you have shown in our problems

and the manifest actions you have taken. We hope we can live up to

the trust you have placed in us.

Sir, I have a statement which I can read or summarize or lay

aside, whichever you would like.

Mr. SIKEs. I leave that entirely in your discretion.

Mr. SANDERS. Thank you.


Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I am particularly

pleased to have an opportunity to appear before you and present my

views on our military construction facilities posture and some brief

comments on this year's military construction budget.


First, I would like to put this year's military construction budget

in perspective by comparison with prior year budgets. The new obli-

gational authority requested for military construction for the depart-

ment of the Navy in fiscal year 1974 is $697.4 million. This represents

an increase of $143.2 million over the fiscal year 1973 budget request.

The Marine Corps portion is $54.8 million or approximately 8 percent

of this year's program.


To accommodate the planned shore establishment realinement, the

program includes 25 projects totaling $45,499,000. Current planning in-

dicates the realinement will result in the cancellation of 20 prior-year

projects totaling $33,788,000, which have not yet been placed under

contract. At installations effected by the realinement, there are seven

projects under contract with appropriations totaling $13,606,000. A

review of these projects is underway to determine whether the most

economical course of action is to complete the construction or termi-

nate the contract. After my comments on general topics, I would like

to go into more detail on the criteria and rationale employed in making

decisions on which installations were to be closed, operations reduced

or relocated.


The military construction program is developed to augment and

supplement the remainder of the Navy budget. An examination of the

program will show that the shore facilities requested are essential to

fleet readiness.

The Secretary of the Navy has stated that "people are vital to readi-

ness." This year's program reflects the Navy's interest in people by

allocating one quarter of the program to those facilities that will ma-

terially contribute to maintaining an all-volunteer force.

Projects that are directly associated operationally or logistically

with the Navy's strategic and general purpose forces constitute about

33 percent of the program. Some examples follow of projects asso-

ciated with the mission of these forces.

Under our mission of strategic deterrence, we are requesting appro-

priations to initiate construction of logistic support facilities for the

Trident weapon system support complex at Bangor, Wash. and mis-

sile flight test facilities at the Air Force Eastern Test Range, Cape

Kennedy. A briefing is scheduled later for this project that will pro-

vide complete details on the requirement for this project and the need

to obtain this year's facilities construction authorization and appro-


For the purpose of my discussion today I would like to divide our

general purpose forces into three basic categories, which are: forward

deployed forces, rapid reaction (power projection) forces, and sea

control forces.


The forward deployed force centers around the carrier task group

composed of the multimission carrier CV, with its mixed air group of

fighter attack and ASW aircraft. The carrier task force includes es-

corts at well as the Navy-Marine Amphibious Force which will be

centered in the future around the amphibious assault ship (LHA).

The high-speed nuclear attack submarine provides support for for-

ward deployed forces in the attack, surveillance, and early warning

roles and similar support for our sea control forces. The projects asso-

ciated with this weapon system are included under sea control forces.

This year's program contains $29 million for projects that will provide

direct operational or logistic support for our forward deployed forces.

The projects outside the United States supporting the 6th Fleet

in the Mediterranean are projects at Souda Bay, Crete, Sigonella,

Sicily, and Rota, Spain. At our vital eastern Mediterranean base in

Souda Bay, Crete, the aircraft parking apron is needed for P-3C

ASW patrol aircraft, carrier-on-board delivery aircraft, logistic sup-

port aircraft, and transient carrier-based aircraft. The other signif-

icant project at Souda Bay is an air passenger cargo terminal to meet

the increased logistic support requirements imposed on this base. At

Sigonella, this year's program includes six projects for supporting fa-

cilities needed to complement the operational facilities provided over

the past 2 years.

Inside the United States, a berthing pier is requested for the Naval

Station, Norfolk, Va., that will be used primarily for berthing the

larger fleet replenishment ships (fleet oilers and repair ships) servic-

ing the 6th Fleet. At the Naval Air Station, Oceana, aircraft sys-

tems training buildings are requested for maintenance and flight train-

ing on the F-14 fighter aircraft. This aircraft will provide the air

defense umbrella over the carriers of the 6th Fleet.

Outside the United States for the Pacific Fleet, we are requesting a

wharf utilities project and a collimation town project at the Naval

Station, Guam. At the naval magazine Guam, a rocket maintenance and

assembly facility is requested to provide an environmentally controlled

and safe working area for periodic maintenance, inspection, and assem-

bly of destroyer-launched antisubmarine rockets. All of the projects

in Guam are needed for effectively homeporting ships of the 7th


For support of the Pacific Fleet, inside the United States, avionics

facilities are requested for the naval air stations, North Island and

Lemoore. The avionics facility at North Island is for work on the

E-2A and E-2C carrier-based early warning aircraft, and the S-2 and

the new S-3A carrier-based ASW aircraft. At Lemoore, the avionics

facility will service the A-4 and A-7 attack aircraft.

The remaining project for forward deployed forces is the pier utili-

ties project at the naval station, San Diego, where ships are replen-

ished and prepared for deployment to the 7th Fleet.


Rapid reaction forces, include nuclear carrier (CVN) and nuclear

guided missile frigate escorts, which are U.S.-based forces. The proj-

ect this year that will provide support to the powerful striking force

is a pier utilities project at the naval air station, Alameda, which is

the homeport for the nuclear carrier, Enterprise.


Projects associated with the final category of general purpose forces,

our sea control forces, are those identified with Navy fleet units en-

gaged in searching out and destroying enemy forces that would im-

pede Navy ships in carrying out assigned logistical or tactical mis-

sions. Sea control forces include shore based ASW (P-3 patrol air-

craft) squadrons, and will include in the future the sea control ship

with its embarked helicopters and VSTOL aircraft, and the patrol

frigate with an organic multipurpose helicopter capability. Although

I have directed some remarks to the future composition of sea control

forces the facilities associated with sea control forces are needed this

year for the personnel and ships currently performing this role.

For the Atlantic fleet, outside the United States, this year's request

includes four projects for support of antisubmarine warfare squad-

rons at the naval air stations, Bermuda and Keflavik and the naval

station, Rota. An air/underwater weapons compound facility at naval

air station, Bermuda will provide facilities for handling the ordnance

utilized by the P-3 ASW aircraft. Bachelor housing facilities are re-

quested at the naval air station, Keflavik where under terms of our

country-to-country agreement, bachelors are not allowed to live off-

base. At the naval station, Rota, Spain, we have a small dollar proj-

ect for a tactical support center, but an important project for pro-

viding an operational link to P-3C aircraft conducting antisubmarine

warfare operations for the sea control forces.

For the Atlantic fleet, inside the United States, there are also five

projects identified with sea control forces. At the naval air station,

Brunswick, Maine, an operational training building is requested for

relocating a directional Jezebel Sonobouy system trainer from the

naval air station, Patuxent River, Md. The Sonobouv system trainer

is required for training flight crew personnel of P-3C antisubmarine

warfare aircraft. At the naval communications station, Cheltenham,

Md., modifications are proposed to the very low frequency antenna that

will be used for communicating with strategic forces ballistic missile

submarines and the nuclear attack submarines of the Atlantic fleet

sea control forces. Other projects supporting nuclear attack submarines

are the pier utilities project at the naval station, Norfolk, and the

MK48 torpedo overhaul shop at the naval weapons station, Yorktown,

Va. The remaining project for a communication facility at the naval

station, Charleston, will provide support to the commander, mine war-

fare force.

There are eight projects identified with the sea control forces of

the Pacific Fleet. Outside the United States, a mine assembly facility

at the naval magazine Guam is requested to provide a safe working

environment for making periodic inspections, maintenance and assem-

bly of a significant portion of the mine inventory of the Pacific area.

At the Naval Air Station, Cubi Point, a project for a tactical sup-

port center will provide an operational link to the P-3 antisubmarine

warfare aircraft squadrons.

Inside the United States there are five projects in support of the

Pacific Fleet. Three projects will support P-3 antisubmarine war-

fare aircraft squadrons and two projects will provide facilities to sup-

port nuclear attack submarines. The facilities that will support anti-

submarine warfare aircraft operations are taxiway overlay and an

avionics shop at the Naval Air Station, Moffett Field, Calif., and a

runway/taxiway at the Naval Station, Adak, Alaska. The facili-

ties that will support the nuclear attack submarines are pier utilities

at naval submarine support facility, San Diego and the modifica-

tions to the very low frequency antenna at the Naval Communications

Station, Honolulu, Hawaii,

In summary this year's program requests $29 million for forward

deployed forces, $4 million for rapid reaction forces, and $29 million

for sea control forces.

The point I wish to stress is that our military construction pro-

gram is not prepared in isolation of the overall needs of the Navy.

The program incorporates facilities that form vital links in logistic

support of weapons systems utilized by the Navy's strategic and gen-

eral purpose forces in carrying out worldwide missions. The remainder

of the program is associated with facilities such as training, modern-

ization of shipyards and naval air rework facilities, research, develop-

ment test and evaluation, pollution abatement and utilities. I want to

stress that these facilities are also essential for effective support of

strategic and general purpose forces.


In the past, we have provided information on the Navy's efforts to

improve the quality of Navy life, and thereby increase the first term

and career reenlistment rates. The reality of an All-Volunteer Mili-

tary Force increases the need to improve service life for career candi-

dates. Last year we reported that the first-term reenlistment rate for

the Atlantic Fleet Force was 2.8 percent in fiscal year 1970 and that

the overall Navy first-term reenlistment rate was 10 percent. I am

happy to report the first-term reenlistment rate for fiscal year 1972

for the Atlantic Fleet was 18 percent and the overall first-term re-

enlistment rate was 23.2 percent. This improvement is encouraging,

but as you can see, additional efforts will be required if we are to

bring first-term reenlistments up to the target rate for fiscal year 1974

or 31 percent. Reenlistment of career personnel was 91 percent

through March 31, 1973, which is right on the target rate for fiscal

year 1974.

The projects that will enhance service life are those in the bachelor

housing and community support area, medical facilities, and shore-

side utility systems, which enable the shutting down in port of a

ship's boilers and generators and other machinery. Admiral Mar-

schall, in his statement, will discuss projects associated with an All-

Volunteer Force.


Prior to this year's program, medical facilities construction was

developed under the guidance of requesting one hospital per year and

with dispensaries and dental clinics competing for funding against

other operational and logistic support requirements. A recognition

by the Secretary of Defense of a need to accelerate the rate of cor-

recting medical deficiencies has lead to the development of a medical

construction plan of some $685 million. This plan, approved by the

Secretary of Defense, will be initiated with the fiscal year 1974 mili-

tary construction program. The accelerated health facility moderniza-

tion and construction program will make possible the replacement

or upgrading of all Navy hospitals and clinics to comparable civilian

standards by the mid-1980's.


This year we are requesting $92 million for water and air pollution

abatement facilities at Navy and Marine Corps installations.

For water pollution abatement facilities, $64.7 million is requested

for shore facilities for collection of ship-generated wastes, oil pollu-

tion control, water treatment waste control, municipal sewer connec-

tions, sewage distribution systems, industrial waste treatment, a

demilitarization facility and sewage treatment plant improvements.

Air pollution abatement facilities total $27.6 million and include

facilities for control of emissions from sand or abrasive blasting and

painting operations, fuel conversions, and a variety of installations

for abatement of smoke, asbestos, particulates, and chemical fumes.

With $198 million devoted from fiscal year 1968 through fiscal year

1973 for military construction pollution abatement facilities, we have

achieved substantial compliance with directives concerning the envi-


Nevertheless, our pollution abatement efforts must continue. We

must now focus on: (1) facilities that have been deferred pending

development of the necessary technology, or deferred pending avail-

ability of regional systems to connect to; (2) additional facilities for

shoreside disposal of sanitary wastes from ships; (3) application of

forthcoming noise standards to naval facilities; and (4) facilities

needed to meet increasingly stringent local, State, and Federal pollu-

tion abatement standards. These new standards are being developed,

in large measure, as a response to recent congressional actions such as

the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, the

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, and the Noise Control Act of

1972. Each of these acts contains a specific requirement that Federal

agencies comply with Federal, State, interstate, and local standards.


The Marine Corps portion of this program continues to reflect their

concentrated effort to provide modern living quarters for marines.

Forty-six percent, or $25.4 million of the Marine Corps' request of

$54.8 million will provide bachelor housing and messing facilities for

enlisted marines.


Next, I would like to comment briefly on family housing. As in past

years, this program has been given careful attention because of its

imunportance to the well-being and morale of Navy and Marine Corps

personnel with dependents. These men constitute over 62 percent of our

career servicemen.

The Navy strongly supports and recommends approval of the in-

creases in space and cost limitations requested by the Secretary of

Defense for the construction of new family quarters. With the cur-

rent and rising costs of new construction, these increases are necessary

if we are going to provide service families with Government quarters

comparable to community housing standards.

In order to provide housing at locations where significant deficits

still exist, the funds allotted for new housing construction in the fiscal

year 1974 program under consideration have been augmented by $20

million from the regular Navy budget authority. This action was also

taken for the fiscal years 1972 and 1973 programs.

The funds requested under title V for Navy and Marine Corps hous-

ing are reasonable and justified for the purposes stated. They will pro-

vide for a balanced annual program to maximize military use of hous-

ing in the private economy; provide new construction where private

investors are unable or do not elect to meet military needs; and to

support the operations and maintenance of our existing family quar-

ters at modest standards.

The large housing deficits that have been a serious problem for so

long are being significantly reduced by completion of our construction

programs, and by the improved ability of servicemen to obtain private

housing due to the recent increases in compensation. Reduction of the

family housing maintenance backlog, which accumulated largely dur-

ing the Vietnam period, started in fiscal year 1972. We expect further

reductions of 5 percent and 8. percent in fiscal years 1973 and 1974, re-

spectively. If present trends continue, we can begin to direct our at-

tention and resources increasingly in follow-on years to correcting the

obsolescence and deficiencies which exist in our older quarters. Eco-

nomic analysis may dictate replacement construction for some of the


This committee has been especially mindful of the importance of

providing adequate housing for our servicemen and their families.

We sincerely appreciate this interest and concern, and earnestly solicit

your continuing support of this vital program.


In summation, I would like to emphasize that the projects in this

year's military construction budget are all required for the mainte-

nance of a high state of readiness of Naval and Marine Corps forces.


I am most appreciative once more of the opportunity to appear be-

fore this committee and provide these personal observations on our

military construction program.

[The attachments follow:]

Fiscal year 1974 military construction projects-modern general purpose forces

[In thousands of dollars]

Forward deployed forces, nonnuclear war:

6th Fleet:

Outside United States: Amount

ND, Souda Bay, Crete, Greece, 4 projects-------------- $4, 153

NAF Sigonella, Sicily, Italy, 6 projects----------------- 3, 086

Total-------------------------------------------- 7, 239

Inside United States:

NS Norfolk, berthing pier---------------------------- 9, 624

NAS Oceana, aircraft systems training buildings (F-14) -___-- 3, 386

Total ------------------ ------------------- 13, 010

Total, 6th Fleet__-------------------------------- 20, 249

7th Fleet:

Outside United States:

NS, Guam-Collimation

Tower---------------------------------------- 167

Wharf utilities__ _------------------------- - 2, 782

NM Guam, rocket maintenance and assembly facility- __ 241

Total---------- ------------------------------ 3, 190

Inside United States:

NAS North Island, avionics facility (E-1, E-2, S-2, S-3A)_ 1, 640

NS, San Diego, pier utilities__ --------------------- 1, 996

NAS Lemoore-integrated avionics shop (A-4, A-7) .----- 1, 933

Total----------------------------------------- 5,569

Total, 7th Fleet----_______________________________ 8, 759

Total, forward deployed forces --------------------- 29, 008

Rapid reaction forces, rapidly deployed power projection-U.S. based:

NAS Alameda, pier utilities______________________________ _ 3, 827

Total, rapid reaction forces_ _ ________________________ _ 3, 827


Fiscal year 1974 military construction projects--modern general purpose forces-


[In thousands of dollars]

Sea control forces, national security, links w/allies, ocean heartland:

Atlantic Fleet:

Outside United States: Amount

NAS Bermuda, air/underwater weapons compound --. $1, 725

NAS Keflavik, Iceland:

BEQ__ ----------------------------------------2,834

BOQ ---------------------------------------- 3, 258

NS Rota, Spain, tactical support center-----------------... 85

Total___--------- ------------------------------- 7,902

Inside United States:

NAS Brunswick, operational trainer building. -----------135

NCS Cheltenham, VLF antenna modifications. 1,300

NS Norfolk, Pier utilities. _ ---------------------------2, 057

NWS Yorktown, torpedo overhaul shop. - 1, 327

NS Charleston, communication facility----------------- 1, 321

Total--------------------------- ------------- 6,140

Total Atlantic Fleet___-----------------------------14, 042

Pacific Fleet:

Outside United States:

NM Guam, mine assembly facility.. ------------------3, 229

AS Cubi, tactical support center__------------------------ 161

Total----------------------------------------- 3,390

Inside United States:

NSSF San Diego, pier utilities------_ ------------------ 1,253

NAS Moffett Field:

Taxiway overlay ------------------------------- 2, 115

Avionics shop___ --------------------------------- 1,600

NS Adak, runway taxiway overlay-----------------4, 158

NCS Honolulu, Wahiawa: VLF antenna modification-- 850

Total ------------------------------------- 11,846

Total, Pacific Fleet..... --------------------------15, 236

Total, sea control forces__----------------------- 29, 278

Grand total, general purpose forces__-------------- 62, 113

Percent of program-----------__ ---------------- -- 8. 9

Mr. SIgEs. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and let me assure you again

that your observations are welcome. Your statement is a very useful

and very comprehensive one. I have a few questions that I will ask you

and then we will hear from Admiral Marschall.


Is the division of naval forces into forward deployed, rapid reaction,

and sea control forces something that is new, or is it somewhat of a

modification of what we have been doing ?

Mr. SANDER. Mr. Chairman, this is a little bit of editorializing to

try to present the Navy's basic missions and to divide our budget into

an emphasis on these forces.

Of course, there is nothing new in this. The missions of the Navy's

general purpose forces still center around our classic concepts of sea-

power. We have attempted or are attempting to isolate our rapid reac-

tion, our power projection forces. These are of course built around the

nuclear task force and do not require the extensive logistics train of a

conventional carrier task force.

Our forward deployed forces are forces which have always been used

for naval presence, and of course our sea control forces, which will be a

composite really of our forward deployed forces and rapid reaction

forces, are there to protect the sea lines of communication, which is

our third basic mission.

Mr. SIKEs. How do you allocate forces among these three primary


Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, we do not really attempt to allocate

forces among these three primary missions. We examine each mission

or the multiple missions that we have, or are called on to execute, and

try to strike a balance-to hit the very best ones that we can.


Mr. SIKEs. There appears to be a contradiction between the desire

so frequently expressed in the United States to reduce overseas com-

mitments and forces, and the Navy's apparent increase in forward de-

ployed forces.

Will you discuss this ?

Mr. SANDERS. Our overseas commitments and support of national

policies have remained relatively constant with the exception, of course,

of our surge in Southeast Asia, and I would like to make very clear

that forward deployed forces have always been there in the Navy.


For example, in 1964 we had 49 ships homeported overseas. In 1965

we had 56. Currently we have 48. Now, forward deployed forces really

consist of those homeported and those that are rotationallv deployed.

What we are trying to do with the so-called forward deployed forces

we are talking about now is part of our effort to increase personnel

enlistments and retention.

We found that one of the principal reasons people were not reen-

listing has been the long family separation. We found that our over-

seas commitments are the things that drive the location of Navy ships

and Navy forces. We found that the tempo of operation as the Navy

has become smaller-and I think you will see this when we discuss the

realinement package this afternoon, dropping from something like

917 ships in 1964 to 523 this year without appreciable change in com-

mitments-that the tempo of operation is putting a strain not only on

the personnel but on the ships and hurting our maintenance program.

So we are trying to increase our homeporting overseas in an effort to

keep the family closer to the sailor and the officer and to provide more

deployment time for the ship and cut out the lengthy transit time.

We are trying to do this by placing very limited reliance on shore

support facilities; that is, living off the local economy without building

additional bases.

In most cases ships are being homeported in areas where facilities

are already in existence. What we are trying to do is to continue to

maintain our commitments, not increase force levels, or numbers of

military personnel overseas, since the homeported units are really

going to replace similar units now rotationally deployed.

The only real new element is the introduction of additional Ameri-

can families in homeported areas. We could provide for the record,

sir, or I could discuss now some of the first-term reenlistment rates

that we are getting from homeported units and also some of the home-

port time that these ships are getting.

Our reenlistment rate, for example, in Athens on the destroyer

squadron is 9 percent higher than it is for the rest of the destroyers in

the Atlantic. Destroyers in Yokosuka have twice the retention rate

of the other destroyers in the Pacific area.

Mr. SIKEs. Have you evaluated the economies of homeporting versus

the system in use prior to homeporting, evaluated the gains in reten-

tion rates, the savings in the training costs, et cetera ?

Mr. SANDERS. We haven't enough data yet to work it out in a finite

fashion. Our preliminary judgment on this, and this is the reason we

went this route, was that it would show an increase in retention.

This has been borne out so far. We have been able to hold our costs

down. The proof of the pudding is going to be when we deploy the

first aircraft carrier over there with its squadrons and see exactly

what happens.

We are doing this, as you know, in Yokosuka, Japan, where we

do have facilities available left over from prior work.

Mr. SIKEs. Are there any cost comparisons on homeporting as against

other alternatives.

Mr. SANDERS. We estimate, sir, that we have now about a $4 million

one-time cost land something like an annual cost increase of about $15

million. These are for the Athens, Naples, La Maddalena, Yokosuka

and Sasebo initiatives.

Mr. SIKES. Those are additional costs?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir, something of that magnitude.

Mr. SIKEs. What you are doing, in effect, is trying to give to the

Navy, through homeporting, something of the privilege which has

been enjoyed for years by other services. They have been able to take

their dependents with them to overseas bases.

Mr. SANDERS. This is true, sir.

Mr. SIKES. It is as simple as that, isn't it?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir, that is all it is, nothing more, without pro-

viding on-shore facilities of a domiciliary type for anyone. This I

want to stress very carefully.

Mr. SIKEs. It is a change from the system employed by the other


Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir, we have no facilities ashore for barracks

or anything of that type for enlisted personnel. We will have in certain

areas clubs, recreation facilities, things of this type.

There are some facilities at Yokosuka in Japan which are left

over from prior work there which may become available for the men

in-port on a ship, to go off to, just as for the rotationally deployed

ships, but this is catch-as-catch-can.

At Athens, for example, there is absolutely nothing.

Mr. SIKEs. The homeporting is relatively small in comparison with

the total Navy overseas operation, is it not?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIKEs. How many naval personnel are involved?

Mr. SANDERS. I would have to supply that for the record, sir. I

don't think I have the actual number.

Mr. SrKES. Please supply it for the record.

[The information follows:]

There are presently 13,727 naval personnel homeported overseas.

Mr. SIXES. In 'how many areas are you homeporting and in how

many areas do you plan subsequently a homeporting program ?

Mr. SANDERS. As of the moment we are homeporting or have home-

porting approved in Athens, Greece; Naples, and Gaeta, Italy; La-

Maddalena, Sardinia; Rota, Spain; Holy Loch, Scotland; Bahrain,

Persian Gulf; Guam; and Yokosuka and Sasebo, which are in Japan.

We are presently exploring a couple of additional homeporting

areas, particularly in the Pacific area, but no approval has been forth-

coming, and since foreign governments are involved I would rather

not put that in the record.

MIr. LONG. What were the others besides Athens and Naples ?

Mr. SANDERS. Naples, Gaeta, Athens, Rota, Holy Loch, Bahrain,

Guam, Yokosuka, Sasebo, and LaMaddalena.

Mr. LONG. Where is that ?

Mr. SANDERS. LaMaddalena is in Sardinia. Running through, the

different locations we have six destroyers at Athens and are talking

in terms of a carrier as well. We have one destroyer tender, four

PGM's and a PG support ship at Naples. At Gaeta, there is one cruiser.

We have one submarine tender each at LaMaddalena, Rota, Holy

Loch, and Guam. Bahrain has one amphibious transport dock. We have

one cruiser and six destroyers at Yokosuka and two service force ships

at Sasebo. Sasebo is in the southern part of Japan.

There are adequate facilities at Sasebo, Yokosuka and at Naples

for this homeporting. LaMaddalena and Athens require the leasing

of some facilities, particularly family housing in LaMaddalena.

Mr. TALCorr. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIKES. Yes, sir.


Mr. TALCOTT. May I ask-perhaps you will want to elaborate for

the record-why it is better to do this than to close the foreign bases

instead of the ones at home ?

Because of the base closure announcement many people, chambers

of commerce, and Senators have suggested that it is wrong to close

home bases when there are so many foreign bases. They say the for-

eign bases ought to be closed first.

Mr. SANDERS. In a nutshell, we are not putting any more ships over-

seas.than we have deployed overseas now. The carrier is going to be

deployed in WESTPAC.

Mr. TALCOTT. We are closing many large installations in the United

States; for instance, Hunters Point, in San Francisco.

Mr. SANDERS. Yes; we would close Hunters Point regardless of


Mr. TALCOTrr. Let us go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. TALCOTT. Some Senators are saying you should close foreign

bases first and you would save a lot of money.

Mr. SANDERS. In the Navy we have closed numerous overseas bases,

particularly Sangley Point, which is in the Philippines, some time ago.

We have one base left in the Philippines for fleet support at Subic Bay.

We have concentrated everything there.

There is a communications station with which you are familiar just

north of Subic Bay. In Okinawa we have cut back on our forces, par-

ticularly with the reversion. The only thing we have now are the Ma-

rines there with one small Naval support facility for ships coming and

going through that area. We have concentrated on Guam, as we always

have, with no real buildup.

We have continued to operate in Yokosuka as we have in the past.

Sasebo is just a small base which has been there for some time. We

have cut back on it drastically. In Japan we have given up one air base

completely and part of another one, sir.

Moving to the Mediterranean, which is our other basic large fleet

concentration, we have always had the base at Naples. We have cut

back on the number of people there and I can supply that for the rec-

ord if you would like.

[The information follows:]

Our support organization at Naples now has 35 percent less personnel than it

had in 1968.

Mr. SANDERS. The committee is well aware of the support facilities

we have built in a very minor fashion at Sigonella in Sicily and Souda

Bay, which is on the Island of Crete, in an effort to protect our for-

ward area operations in the Mediterranean when we have to move in

those areas.

The homeporting we will do at Athens, the homeporting we will do

at La Maddalena, will be with only a modicum of expenditure of

leased funds to provide necessary support facilities for the families.

There is nothing being done by way of constructing facilities for

the overhaul and repair of the ships or things of this type.

Mr. TALCOTT. The 'argument is that at San Francisco you are firing

or "riffing" many thousands of workers who are good, solid Ameri-

cans, and that we should perhaps close Subic Bay first because we are

employing Filipinos over there to do the work. I think I am putting

it as strongly as they are putting it.

Mr. SANDERS. The U.S. Navy at the moment, with the missions it

has to go forward with in the Western Pacific, the commitments which

we have to protect, couldn't possibly exist without a forward deployed

base such as Subic. We have proven this on many, many occasions not

only in the recent Vietnam conflict, but during the peacetime opera-

tions, both before and after Vietnam.

We have no desire to put ia large amount of military construction

funds and a large amount of our resources in overseas bases.

We are holding them to the very minimum. This is one reason why

we are pursuing the homeporting policy as we are.

Mr. SIRES. Mr. Secretary, coming down to basics, isn't the require-

ment for overseas facilities a part of our worldwide commitments

which haven't basically changed, other than the direct involvement in

Indochina? We have the same general worldwide commitments we

have had heretofore and to carry out those commitments we have to

maintain forces overseas ?


Mr. SANDERS. This is quite true, sir; and we are attempting merely

to take some of these forces that we have to maintain overseas and

utilize them in a proper fashion so that we can improve their first term

reenlistment rate and so that we can improve the reenlistment rate

throughout the Navy. This is where the money is, I would like to con-

firm this figure, but, I think, it costs something like $24,000 or $25,000

to train a highly qualified Navy technician.

If we can protect that $25,000 by having a man with his experience

reenlist, you and I are way ahead of the game as American taxpayers

who support the Defense Establishment. The results so far have shown

that we are increasing this retention rate because of forward


As a matter of fact, one of the very interesting things is that on our

initial deployments we have tried to send only volunteers and in a

number of instances we have had 100 percent volunteers in both officer

and enlisted personnel.

As a matter of fact, the lowest number of volunteers we had has been

82 percent at one homeport.

Mr. SIRES. Mr. Secretary, basically you are trying to provide for a

limited number of Navy dependents the same privilege of being over-

seas with their member who is in uniform that the Army and the Air

Force have enjoyed for a long time.

In the other services it has been customary to provide the facilities

that they need overseas. Other than for strict reasons of economy and

gold flow, what is the rationale behind the fact that you do not provide

facilities for Navy personnel? The number who would benefit from

homeporting is comparatively limited compared to the other two


Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, the Navy is a very flexible instrument

of our foreign policy and of our national security forces. We cannot

be tied down by foreign bases, so that we must operate only in certain

specific locations.

We also have a dollar constraint problem to live with. We feel that

there are adequate facilities existing in the locations where we are

going to provide most of the facilities which our military family


In many instances, and thanks in large part to the help of this com-

mittee, we are leasing other facilities, but we can walk away from

these very easily and return them to the local economy without any

difficulty at all, without having hanging over our heads the large

overhead cost of running a shore establishment.

There is a side issue to this, sir, to be quite frank with you. We have

noticed a payoff in many areas already. These people are living with

the local people. They are getting to know the local economy, the local

people. They are communicating. They are translating the American

way of life to other countries and at the same time absorbing local

culture and mores. They are benefiting by their contacts with many of

these local people and as a result our communications are being


Mr. SIKEs. There are, of course, advantages in that, but would it not

be logical to provide at least certain basic facilities such as clubs, even

commissaries ?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir. We are providing certain support facilities for

both enlisted men and officers, primarily recreation, commissaries

where it is necessary, and medical

Mr. TALCOTr. Schools ?

Mr. SANDERS. Schools are provided by the Defense Department. I

don't think we are building any schools, at all, Mr. Talcott. Arrange-

ments are being made for schools without very much cost, sir.

Mr. SIKES. Are you providing commissaries ?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir, in certain areas. In certain areas we are not.

In Naples we already have facilities of that type. Commissaries will

be supplemented in the Athens area. We will have to work out some-

thing with reference to the one ship at La Maddalena. There it will be

the very minimum.

They will all be in leased facilities that we can walk away from.

Mr. SIRES. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. SIES. What impact will overseas homeporting have on the U.S.

international balance of payments?

Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, we estimate that the effect on the

international balance of payments it will be roughly about $28 million,

which is approximately one-half of 1 percent of our total IBOP.


Mr. SIRES. Is an effort being made to reduce naval commitments

overseas to conform with reduction in the size of the fleet ?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir. The best evidence of this is that since 1968

we have reduced our NATO commitment by some 60 active ships.

By the end of this calendar year we anticipate an additional reduction

of some 36 ships. This is something that is watched very carefully by

the Navy and we are in constant discussion with the Secretary of

Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this particular matter.

Mr. SIKES. Percentagewise are we basing more of the ships that are

commissioned in the United States or overseas with the reduced fleet ?

Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I don't think I can quite answer that


Mr. SIKES. Provide the answer for the record.

[The information follows:]

Present plans for the numerically reduced fleet will ultimately result in 42

ships being homeported overseas, which is 8 percent of the present fleet of 532

ships. By comparison, in 1965 there were 56 ships homeported overseas, 6 per-

cent of a fleet of over 900 ships.

Mr. SIKEs. By basing some of our naval forces overseas, are we in-

creasing their vulnerability? Are we opening ourselves to increased

commitments to protect foreign bases or to support the countries in

which they are located ?

Mr. SANDERS. NO, sir; in no way at all. As I pointed out, by basing

naval forces-that is, homeporting forces-overseas, we are merely

homeporting ships that are going to be there, anyway, overseas, and

keeping a few others from coming out on a long transit voyage.

With the exception of Spain, in every country in which ships are

forward deployed, we have separate and unrelated mutual security

arrangements, thus the commitments exist regardless of whether we

have homeports there.

In Greece and Italy, NATO commitments apply. In Japan, the

mutual security agreement defines the U.S. obligation. No mutual

security agreement exists with Spain for the sub tender homeport at

Rota and it is a matter of record, very clearly, that the utilization of

Rota in no way implies a mutual defense commitment with Spain.

We see no way in which we are increasing the vulnerability of our

forces by stationing them overseas. If anything, I think we are helping.


Mr. SIKES. The Navy is introducing modern weapons systems such

as Trident submarines, nuclear carrier task forces, sea control ships,

and small fast patrol craft such as hydrofoils and air-cushion vehicles.

The Trident with its longer range missiles and nuclear carriers and

their escorts, which have higher speed and less reliance on logistics,

lend themselves to being based in the United States, but have a need

for rather extensive facilities to support them. Has it been determined

whether sea control ships, surface effects ships, and the new weapons

will be based in the United States or overseas, or what special support

requirements they may have ?

Mr. SANDERS. At the present time, sir, we have no plans, don't en-

vision homeporting sea control ships or some of the others you have

referred to such as the hydrofoils or the surface effect ships overseas.

Needless to say, this is going to remain under continuing study. It

will depend largely, particularly in the case of surface effects ships

and hydrofoils, which are well out into the future, on what reaction

we have from the homeporting effort we are making now.

At the present time, we are programing the support for the sea con-

trol ships and for the small, fast patrol craft from existing U.S. shore

facilities. We probably will have to have some specialized facilities

down the line. They are not included in the program yet. I don't mind

telling you frankly that with the NATO nations also procuring the

PHM or the hydrofoil, that there could be some cooperative type

arrangement worked out for this small craft in certain locations.


Mr. SIKES. To what extent do we and can we in the future rely .upon

our allies to provide us the facilities which we require to support Navy

forces overseas?

Mr. SANDERS. Of course, we have not really relied on our allies to

any appreciable extent to provide facilities for us, except for those

called for under our treaties and mutual security arrangements. The

leasing we are doing is basically with the approval and sometimes

through the local government directly or indirectly with local busi-

nessmen, just as you would do in this country.

Our reliance on our allies depends on formal defense treaties such

as NATO; or in the case of Spain, on the complete lack of formal

defense agreement for homeporting the sub tender at Rota.

We really don't have to rely that much on them, sir.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Is there a possibility, for instance, within the NATO

infrastructure plan of getting more facilities from our allies than we

are at the present time, or do we need more facilities?

Mr. SANDERS. Under our NATO infrastructure program, we are

trying to obtain more infrastructure funds from NATO than we have

received in the past.

We are making a very valiant effort in this area. As this committee

is well aware, it takes a great deal of time to work through the NATO

bureaucracy. We are making some progress, but these are facilities

and dollars generated by NATO, not by any specific country apart

from NATO.


Mr. SIKES. Of course, there are additional costs associated with

forward deployed forces. Is there any appreciable change in the rela-

tive cost ? Is it down in this fiscal year, or about level, or is it higher ?

Mr. SANDERS. In this fiscal year, sir, our cost for forward deployed

forces should be slightly higher than it was last year because we now

will have had the destroyer squadron in Athens a full year.

Further, the AS has deployed to La Maddalena-that is a submarine

tender--on a homeported basis. If I could repeat, for the Athens,

Naples, La Maddalena, Yokosuka, and Sasebo homeported ships, we

are talking about a one-time cost of about $4 million, an annual cost

increase of about $15 million.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Mr. Secretary, in general, looking at the question of

the forward deployed forces, it obviously takes more ships to support

a given commitment in a particular area if those ships are based in the

United States.

Is there any rough figure you can use ? Would it take a third more

ships in order to support our Pacific commitments, if everything were

based in Hawaii and Conus. Are there rough figures on how much

larger the Navy would have to be if it were to be a totally U.S.-based

Navy and still had to maintain its basic commitments?

Mr. SANDERS. Captain Nicholson is our resident expert on that.

Captain NICHOLSON. As an example, since carrier task groups are

the key element in peacetime presence, I will use carriers in explaining

backup requirements. The Navy is currently planning on maintaining

a minimum peacetime ship deployment rotation of 1 in 3, that is, 6

months deployed with 12 months between deployments. A force level

of -- carriers is necessary to support the requirement for one

carrier constantly deployed in the Mediterranean on a 1 in 3 rotation.

carriers are necessary to keep one carrier deployed in the

Western Pacific on a 1 in 3 rotation, the difference being the longer

transit time in the Pacific. However, if one carrier homeports over-

seas-Atlantic or Pacific-only - carriers are required to sustain

this level. These figures do not take into account the requirement for

ready carriers to meet emergency contingency requirements, and so

forth, and should therefore not be utilized to develop force levels.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Does this mean there would have to be more ships in

the Navy in order to support a given deployment if they were all U.S.

based and conversely if you put a ship in overseas homeport such as

Athens you can reduce the number of ships in the Navy ?

Captain NICHOLSON. Yes, sir.

That is why we are forward deploying, because with a reduction of

forces with no reduction of requirements we must do it with less ships.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Can you provide more details and examples of the

type of increases in ships or decreases in ships you mean ?

Captain NICHOLSON. Yes, sir. I would like to do that for the record,

if I may.

[The information follows:]

[Deleted.] Therefore, it is essential that we homeport at least one carrier task

group in the Mediterranean and one in the Pacific in order to meet our commit-


Mr. TALCOTT. Is it anything more than the waste of time going back

and forth?

Captain NICHOLSON. We save quite a bit of money in transit costs.

As the Secretary stated, if we retain our qualified personnel we

save money in training costs. If we can retain those qualified people we

don't have to train new people. Those are our big savings.


Mr. SIXES. Mr. Secretary, there has been discussion of a require-

ment for the development of additional forward bases, particularly

in the Pacific.

Do I take it there is nothing in the fiscal 1974 program looking

toward the development of new bases in areas such as the Marianas.

Mr. SANDERS. There is nothing in the fiscal 1974 program in this re-

spect at all unless we have some forward deployment that we may be

called upon to do later, sir.


Mr. SIKES. Dr. Long.

Mr. LONG. We are putting great emphasis on a volunteer force, and

we hear an awful lot about how much more it is costing us. It seems

to cost an enormous sum of money, at least in certain areas.

I got the impression here from you that we were saving some money

but I gather that this is only saving in a certain area; that the net

cost of a volunteer force is much greater than a conscripted force.

Mr. SANDERS. Dr. Long, I would personally disagree with you there

as far as the Department of the Navy is concerned which is the only

area in which I have any expertise.

Mr. LONG. When you take all into consideration ?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir. I think if we could develop in the Navy an

All-Volunteer Force with the proper percentages of retention, espe-

cially skill retention, in the long run we are going to be so far


Mr. LONG. In the long run.

Mr. SANDERS. Costwise, professionalwise, and every way I can think


Mr. LONG. That leads to the next question.

Is this really a matter of cost, because it would seem to me even if

you could get the job done more cheaply by having a rapid turnover,

it still wouldn't be satisfactory because you want an efficient opera-

tion; and you can only get an efficient operation by having trained

people over the long term. Right ?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. I think that is where we made a lot of mistakes in Viet-

nam from what people tell me-that we turned people over too fast.

Mr. SANDERS. Let me say this very clearly.

Obviously we would have a more efficient force. I personally feel

we will have a less costly force.

Mr. LONG. So that we can get both advantages ?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. It is not a matter of greater cost for more efficiency,

but possibly even less cost.

Mr. SANDERS. For example, this is a very simple pen. It has four

colors in it. Someone gave it to me. It cost $1. It took me about 3

weeks to figure out how to replace one of these cartridges when the

first one ran dry. Now I can do it in a few seconds and I have pretty

darn good utilization.

This is about the third or fourth set of pens that have been in that

one holder. The first one I had is all broken up from my trying to

learn how to replace the thing. If you magnify this simple example

by the complex radar equipment, the sophisticated electronics, the

weapons systems that we have on board, the poor condition of mainte-

nance in our fleet left over from the increased tempo of operations

we had in Vietnam, then your savings are just going to magnify like

a snowball rolling downhill.

It is very difficult to quantify it. But as that experienced man comes

into the Navy, knows what to do with a piece of sophisticated equip-

ment, and he puts the right gidget or gadget in there instead of the

wrong one, and it operates better, then the dollar savings are going

to be astronomical.

Mr. LONG. Which do you feel is the more important, lower cost or

greater efficiency ?

Mr. SANDERS. Both, sir. They go hand in hand.

Mr. LONG. To me it would be greater efficiency.

Mr. SANDERS. Yes; I would be willing to pay a cost for greater

efficiency but the point I am making is I don't think we are going to

have to pay that cost.

Mr. LONG. But in the short run we will.

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. Is there any time when you feel these savings will begin

to show up in decreased costs, rather than increased costs as they seem

to be doing right now ?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir. I can relate one specific example. We have

been able in the last 6 months to begin to stabilize the tours of duty

and to stabilize the people out on the carriers in the Pacific Fleet.

The other day I was talking with a commander of Naval Air Forces

in the Pacific.

He can already see his maintenance cost begin to come down as

maintenance gets better on ships, as he inspects them, as these boys

settle down, as they spend a longer time on the job, as they begin to

know what they are doing.

Mr. LONG. I saw a television review on the volunteer concept, and

I thought they tried to do a balanced job, but the whole theme of the

examination of our volunteer force was that volunteers are good, aver-

age people; but you don't get a lot of bright people the way you might

under conscription. Consequently, we are getting kind of a mediocre

Armed Force as far as personnel are concerned.

They didn't mention this business of greater efficiency, because it

seems to me even a mediocre man is going to be a more effective if he

knows his work, and spends a number of years at it than some bright

guy out of a university who has to learn it too quickly and some other

bright guy comes along a little later and has to learn it after he has


I wonder if you would comment on that.

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir, I would be happy to. Actually, we have heard

this criticism leveled at the all-volunteer effort. We have heard a

great deal of this criticism leveled at us. Our actual experience shows

that if anything the level of intelligence and the type of young man

we are getting is higher, and I can speak for the Navy and for the

Marine Corps here. It is higher today than we were getting under the

draft, much higher.

Now that represents-and with your background as an educator

you can appreciate it-that represents one of the greatest challenges

to Navy-Marine Corps management that we have seen. One, we have

to train better, both in our actual basic training in our specialty train-

ing. Two, we have to train better in the fleet when a man gets out

there on the job. Three, we have to learn to manage our manpower

better. This is probably the greatest challenge that we face in the

Navy today.

In the Defense Department in 1964, roughly 42 percent of our

dollars went for manpower. Today 56 percent goes into manpower

and related items. We have to learn to manage that manpower better.

We are spending a great deal of time on just this simple fact. That is

the challenge for us.

There is no question but what the American youngster coming out

of school today is highly educated, a better educated person than he

has ever been before. That young man or woman, motivated to be in

the military service and properly trained, is going to give us the best

fighting man this country has ever seen.

It is going to be a challenge to supplement the improved education

he is getting at the high school level today, even junior high school,

provides a background much more advanced than we got when we

went to school.

Mr. LONG. You know, the armed services made a complete 180 degree

turn on this. When I first came to Congress, 10 years ago, I was on

the Armed Services Committee, and at that time it would have been

rank heresy to suggest a volunteer force. We were snowed under by

arguments, statistics, on the opposite side.

I am just wondering what has caused the complete 180-degree turn.

Most people think it is because the disaffection among the young people

has been so great that the military have finally decided well, gee, the

heck with all these agitators, unwilling people, all that; they have

now decided to try to get a volunteer force. But having done that, now

they are looking at things differently.

I am a little worried when the people suddenly give me exactly the

opposite arguments from what they used to give on the same question.

Mr. SANDERS. No, sir. We are talking about an All-Volunteer Force

in an era where there are no major conflicts.

Mr. LONG. I think that was 10 years ago, that was roughly true.

Mr. SANDERS. NO, sir. We were just coming out of Korea, we had

just had the unrest in Southeast Asia, the unrest in Russia.

Mr. LONG. I do not think we had as much unrest in Southeast Asia

in those 10 years as we do at this moment. We had some volunteers

over there, but we did not have any people bombing and fighting.

Mr. TALCOTT. It looked ominous. More young men started going to


Mr. LONG. Looking back now, it did not look ominous.

Mr. TALCo r. The kids knew the answer.

Mr. SIKEs. Mr. Secretary, please provide a brief answer.

Mr. SANDERS. There is another factor, briefly. Due to the sophistica-

tion of our weapons systems, we are able to maintain a smaller force

now. We have the smallest Navy since Korea, but it is as good -a Navy

as, or better than, we have ever had because of its modernity.

Mr. TALCOTT. One thing about personnel management, the Navy

has a policy-I am not exactly sure how it originated-that some of

the young officers who are getting graduate degrees, increasing their

career advancement, cannot go to certain universities, such as Stan-

ford, Dartmouth, Yale, Harvard, Columbia, Tufts, some universities

that are considered quite excellent, simply because they abandoned


That seems to me to be a very short-sighted personnel practice,

something that is cutting off your nose to spite your face.

Mr. SANDERS. Might I point out, Mr. Congressman, that this is a

policy dictated by the Congress of the United States.

Mr. SIKEs. Mr. Davis, you have questions at this point ?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes.


There is one thing that I wish you would clear up for me, Mr. Secre-

tary. It is something on which I do not have any background. That

is on page 14 of your statement where you mention the augmentation

of your family housing program with $20 million from the regular

Navy budget authority. That was also in 1973. I am not familiar with


Would you update me on that ?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir. The family housing program is funded un-

der a Department of Defense appropriation. It is managed by them.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense allocates funds to the Navy

for family housing as part of the overall family housing program.

This is in addition to the allocation of millions of dollars to operate

the regular programs of the Navy other than family housing.

Regarding the $20 million. For 3 years, I believe the Secretary of

the Navy has taken money out of his regular appropriations, in the

amount of $20 million, and supplemented the allocation made for

family housing by the Secretary of Defense.

Do I make myself clear ?

Mr. DAVIs. Tell me how that is done.

Mr. SANDERs. This is done within the Department of Defense budget.

In our program planning budget cycle, we receive certain guidelines

each year.

Those guidelines provide for x amount of money to operate the

Navy, construction, everything else-ships, some $25 billion this year.

There is another account managed at the Secretary of Defense level

for, among other things, family housing. The Secretary of Defense

allocates from this family housing account so much for each one of the

military services. The Navy has said for the last 3 years that we would

like to supplement that allocation for family housing by $20 million

out of the larger Navy appropriations. And the Secretary of Defense

has permitted us to do that.

Mr. DAVIS. But what was that money originally appropriated for?

Mr. SANDERS. This was in the planning cycle before the appropria-

tion was made. The only thing that you have seen appropriationwise

has been the $20 million. This was done during the preparation of the


Right now, for example, we are preparing the program and the

budget for fiscal year 1975. We have been told how much money we

will have for family housing out of the Secretary of Defense account.

We are debating now whether once more to ask the Secretary of De-

fense to take $20 million from the other Navy programs which we

control ourselves, and place it in the fiscal year 1975 family housing

program. This is done before the program reaches the Congress, sir.

Mr. DAVIs. Who sees that $20 million .

Mr. SANDERS. YOU see it as you review it here, as you review our..

programs here. The Secretary of Defense sees it and the Office of Man-

'agement and Budget sees it las they review our program before it comes

up to you.

Mr. DAvIs. Are the other branches of the services doing this ?

Mr. SANDERS. I do not know if any of the other services have done it.

We saw family housing deficits in the Navy, which were rather star-

tling when we started this in fiscal year 1970-71. We looked very hard

at why we were not retaining the people. Our retention rates were

down, absurdly low, as I pointed out a moment ago.

When we examined why they were low, and why people were not

staying in the service, lack of adequate family housing was right up

on top of the list. So Secretary Chafee made the decision that re-

tention was so important to his personnel objectives that he would

add to the funds normally made available to him for family housing.

Mr. DAVIS. From what source

Mr. SANDERS. From his overall $25 billion to operate-from the

total amounts assigned to him to program for the Navy, sir, before

the appropriation process. You see, I am talking about the budget

formulation now.

Do I make myself clear ?

Mr. DAVIS. No, I am still a little hazy on it now.

Mr. SANDERS. All right, sir, let me say it this way.

I have a son at home who works. He earns x amount of money and

he uses that money for purposes that he sees fit. I give him, also y

amount to buy shoes with.

Mr. SIKEs. Who is ahead ?

Mr. SANDERS. He is ahead. He says to me, Dad, I want to take some

of my money that I earned and buy an extra pair of shoes. So he goes

ahead and does it.

This is really what we have done in our family housing. We are

taking funds that are normally spent for military personnel, mainte-

nance of the fleet, procurement of weapons, ammunition, what have

you, and said because the overriding program in the Navy is family

housing, we are going to put $20 million more in family housing than

OSD has allocated.

Mr. DAvIS. All right, so you make that decision.

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. Where do you get the money from?

Mr. SANDERS. It comes out of one of these other areas, sir; the whole

gamut of other Navy requirements, military personnel, modernization,

fleet maintenance, what have you.

Mr. DAVIs. All right, now, is the Navy then justifying that $20

million for other purposes ?

Mr. SANDERS. NO, sir; emphatically not.

When it is presented to anyone outside of the Navy from the Secre-

tary of Defense, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Con-

gress, that $20 million is justified only for additional family housing.

Mr. DAVIS. Does it come then out of this subcommittee or out of the

Defense Subcommittee?

Mr. SANDERS. It comes before this subcommittee. It never sees the

Defense Subcommittee at all, sir. This is all done before the budget

is put together and presented to you.

Mr. LONG. Would the gentleman yield ?

Does that mean then that you are asking for less money from the

Defense Subcommittee for these other purposes and asking more

money, $20 million altogether, from this committee ?

Mr. SANDERS. That is right, this is the point. We are asking $20

million more for family housing here than we would ordinarily ask

if we did not have this $20 million in here above the amount allocated

to us by Defense for family housing. There is no reprograming in-

volved, there is no change in appropriations. This is just priority of

projects within the Navy, worked out before the budget is submitted

to the Congress.

Mr. DAVIS. Let me see if I understand: The family housing was pro-

vided in an appropriation to the Defense Department?

Mr. SANDERS. That is right, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. Now, do we have before us two packages of family hous-

ing for the Navy ?

Mr. SANDERS. No, sir, you have one package.

The Defense Department, when they first formulated the program

gave us guidance for the formulation of the 1974 budget and allo-

cated amount in their program for family housing. All right, sir ? The

Navy then said, this is not enough for family housing for our people.

We would like to have you allocate $20 million more than you have

allocated in the Department of Defense appropriation for this pur-

pose. We are offering to make that money available from other Navy

planning dollars that you have given us. That is all it is.

So Defense added $20 million more to the appropriation you have

before you for family housing than they would ordinarily have put in.

We have done this for 3 years now.

Mr. DAvis. And are you the only department that is doing this?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir, I think I am pretty safe in saying that we are

the only department that has done it. I am not too sure about the Air

Force in 1 year. There was some talk that they would. Army has done

it this year, someone tells me.

Mr. TALCOTT. I need to ask a question to satisfy myself on this now.

As I understood it, the Defense Department, when you were arguing

between the services and everything for the various things that you

needed, weapons procurement, military construction, family housing,

the Defense Department allocated to each of the services a certain

amount for family housing. The Navy has said for the last few years

that it feels that Navy housing is very inadequate and it wants to add

$20 million to this ?

Mr. SANDERS. That is right.

Mr. TALCOrr. It was not $20 million 3 years ago.

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, it has been $20 million.

Mr. TALCOTr. I thought it was a lesser amount.

So you have really added this. Now that is part of the budget

presented to us?

Mr. SANDERS. That is right.

Mr. TALCOrr. But it has not taken just an allocation within the

Navy to develop this budget--

Mr. SANDERS. No, sir. This is part of the presentation to you, sir, that

you have now. You have stated it correctly.

Mr. McEWEN. Will you yield ?

Mr. TALCOTTr. Yes, I yield.

Mr. McEwEN. Mr. Secretary, the other services, as far as you

know, have not done this or have done it only to a limited extent.

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir. I do not know how much the Army has added

this year. Maybe someone here can say.

Captain REED. I understand that the Army this year has for the

first time put in about $100 million of their own money. That is the

reason they have such a large number of quarters in their request. It

is the first time that I know of that any of the other services have

done it.

Mr. SIKEs. All right. Are there further questions on my right on the

Secretary's statement ?

Mr. LONG. First I thought I understood this. Now I am not quite

sure. What do you mean by their own money ?

Mr. SANDERS. Let me mention this again.

The President allocates amounts for planning purposes-and let

me underscore planning here-prior to submission of the budget to

the Congress. The President gives us certain fiscal guidance; x amount

of dollars to run the Department of Defense. The Secreary of Defense

breaks that down for the Department of the Navy, the Department

of the Army, the Department of the Air Force, and the defense agen-

cies appropriations. He handles family housing as a defense apnro-


There are no funds given to the individual services to plan with for

family housing. It is controlled at the defense level. The funds made

available to the services are for functions basically other than family

housing; the whole gamut of military requirements.

Mr. LONG. You have just tightened up your belt a little in other

areas and loosened it in family housing, but it is the same total amount ?

Mr. SANDERS. This is right.

Mr. LONG. Congress has been fully consulted on this reprograming,

if you want to call it that.

Mr. SANDERS. It is not a reprograming.

Mr. LONG. It may not be.

Mr. SANDERS. As we have presented it, what we have said is that

we feel so strongly that we need more family housing, that we have

taken $20 million out of this pocket and said, Mr. Secretary, would

you please add that to your family housing request to the Congress

so that we can get more houses in the Navy ?

Mr. SIKES. That is very clear.

Mr. TALCOTT. The only difference I think, gentlemen, is that this

is the first time this procedure has been really discussed with us. They

have just never explained it as clearly to us as they have this time.

Mr. SIKES. Further questions on my right ?

On my left ?

Mr. DAvIS. Just one more. All right. Then the budget that we see

over in the Defense Subcommittee reflects a reduction in other areas

made by the Secretary of the Navy from what the Secretary of Defense

had previously approved.

Mr. SANDERS. No, no, no, definitely not.

Mr. McKAY. Is it increase overall?

Mr. SANDERS. Definitely not. There is no relationship between the

$20 million and the family housing budget and the budget you see. If

we did not have the family housing additional $20 million, hopefully

we would see it in another segment of the budget before you.

Mr. SIKES. This is a shift in Milcon ?

Mr. SANDERS. It is just a shift in total Navy resources. If we got right

down to it, I would have trouble identifying where the $20 million

came from. It is just when we started to say here is $25 billion to run

the Navy, the Secretary of the Navy says one of my top priorities is

$20 million for family housing. So we took that off the top and $20

million went in.

Mr. TALCOTT. In effect, what Mr. Davis is saying is right.

Mr. SANDERS. No; I could take it out of military construction and it

would not affect the amount before that other committee.


Mr. SANDERS. It could come out of anything in the whole gamut of

the Navy.

Mr. SIKES. That is what Mr. Davis said.

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir; but the point I am making is, it would not

necessarily effect the other committee. It could be this committee, too,

in terms of the Milcon. I cannot identify where it came from.

Mr. DAVIS. But the potential is there ?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. I am assuming the Secretary of the Navy prepares his

requirements, and he goes with that to the Secretary of Defense. Then

the Secretary of Defense says "All right, you can develop your budget

within this amount of money" the Secretary of Defense might have

indicated that he wanted 565,000 people in the Navy, we will say, in-

stead of 550,000, but the Secretary of the Navy says no, I would rather

have 15,000 less people-that does not balance up-I would rather take

that money and put it into family housing.

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir; this could be done.

Mr. MCKAY. Then is that a transfer without the necessary approval

of the Defense Committee and this Committee? After you get this

money, do you transfer it to whatever you choose?

Mr. SANDERS. No. This is all done before anything is submitted to

Congress. There are no appropriations involved in this at all. This

is planning before the budget is formulated and put together for your

approval, sir.

Mr. SIKES. You are readjusting your bookkeeping, is that correct?

Maybe I had better not start another possible-


Mr. DAVIs. I will reserve further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIxES. All right.

Mr. LONG. You really started something.

Mr. SIKES. Now we are going to hear the statement of Admiral

Marschall. This is his first appearance in his present capacity.


Again we congratulate you. We will put your biographical sketch

in the record.

[Biography follows:]


Albert Rhoades Marschall was born in New Orleans, La., on May 5, 1921, son

of Albert L. and Halcyon (Rhoades) Marschall. He attended Tulane University

in New Orleans from 1937 until 1940 and in 1941 entered the U.S. Naval Acad-

emy, Annapolis, Md., on appointment from his native State. Graduated with

distinction in the class of 1945 on June 7, 1944 (accelerated course due to

World War II), he was commissioned ensign and subsequently advanced in

rank to that of rear admiral, to date from July 1, 1970. He was transferred

from the line of the Navy to the Civil Engineer Corps in 1948. His selection for

the rank of rear admiral was approved by the President on June 16, 1969.


Following graduation from the Naval Academy in 1944, he joined the U.S.S.

Ross (DD-563) and while on bbard that destroyer participated in the invasion

of Leyte and the occupation of Japan. In June 1946 he reported as first lieu-

tenant on board the U.S.S. Forrest Royal (DD-872). Detached from that destroyer

in July 1946, he next had postgraduate instruction at the Rensselaer Polytechnic

Institute, Troy, N.Y., from which he received the degrees of bachelor of civil

engineering and master of civil engineering. He served as assistant public

works officer and public works officer at the Bureau of Yards and Docks Supply

Depot, Davisville, R.I., from September 1948 to September 1950, after which

he attended the junior course at the Amphibious Warfare School, Marine

Corps Schools, Quantico, Va.

In January 1951, he joined Amphibious Construction Battalion Two and in

April 1953, reported as assistant civil engineer corps detailer in the Bureau of

Naval Personnel, Navy Department, Washington, D.C. From Setember 1955, to

July 1957, he had duty in connection with construction and real estate at the U.S.

Naval Academy, then was assigned to the District Public Works Office, 12th Naval

District, headquartered in San Francisco, Calif., where he remained until July


Completing instruction at the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va., in

January 1961, he returned to the Bureau of Naval Personnel to serve as civil

engineer corps detailer. Transferred in July 1962 to the Bureau of Yards and

Docks, Navy Department, he served as director of weapons and other support

divisions until July 1964, when he became public works officer at the Naval

Academy. In September 1966, he assumed command of the 30th Naval Construc-

tion Regiment and from June 1967, had additional duty as commander 3rd Naval

Construction Brigade.

He reported in October 1967, as commanding officer of the Southeast Division,

Naval Facilities Engineering Command and district civil engineer on the staff

of the commandant of the 6th Naval District, with headquarters in Charles-

ton, S.C.

On March 2, 1970, he became deputy commander of the Pacific Division, Naval

Facilities Engineering Command, Southeast Asia, with headquarters in Saigon,

Republic of Vietnam, with additional duty as officer in charge of construction,

Naval Facilities Engineering Command Contracts, Republic of Vietnam and com-

mander 3d Naval Construction Brigade. In May 1971, he reported as Director

of the Shore Installations Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy

Department and in June 1972 was ordered detached for duty as vice commander

of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command and Deputy Chief of Civil Engi-

neers, Navy Department.

Rear Admiral Marschall's personal decorations include the Distinguished Serv-

ice Medal, Legion of Merit with combat distinguishing device, Meritorious Service

Medal, Combat Action Ribbon, Order of Military Merit, Chung Mu (Korea), and

National Order (Vietnam). He is also entitled to wear the Navy Unit Commen-

dation Ribbon with bronze star; Meritorious Unit Citation with bronze star;

American Defense Service Medal; American Campaign Medal; Asiatic-Pacific

Campaign Medal; World War II Victory Medal; Navy Occupation Service Medal,

Asia Clasp; National Defense Service Medal with bronze star; the Vietnam Serv-

ice Medal; the Philippine Liberation Ribbon with two stars; Philippine Presi-

dential Unit Citation Badge; the Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal and the

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Meritorious Unit Citation (Gallantry Cross).

In 1967 he received the George Goethals Medal from the Society of American

Military Engineers.

His official home address is 2848 State Street, New Orleans, La. He is married

to the former Marie Gamard of New Orleans, and they have five children, Thomas

Rhoades Marschall, David Gamard Marschall, Mrs. Laurel Patterson, Pamela

Joan Marschall and Albert Louis Marschall II.

Rear Admiral Marschall is a member of the Society of American Military

Engineers, Tau Beta Pi, the National Society of Professional Engineers, the

American Public Works Association and the American Society of Civil Engineers.

He is registered as a professional engineer and land surveyor in Louisiana.

Mr. SIKES. We would be glad to hear from you. Please proceed.


Admiral MARSCHALL. Thank you. It is a real treat to be with you

and the distinguished members of your committee.

21-007 (Pt. 3) 0 - 73 --9


Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I am Rear Adm. A.

R. Marschall, commander of the Naval Facilities Engineering Com-

mand. I relieved Rear Adm. W. M. Enger as commander on May 11,

1973. I consider it an honor and privilege to present the Navy's fiscal

year 1974 military construction appropriation budget.

Brig. Gen. M. T. Jannell, U.S. Marine Corps, will present the

Marine Corps portion of the budget.


The total direct program authority requested this year is $697.4

million. A $12 million saving in Southeast Asia and other military

construction appropriations will be utilized to fund some projects this

year; therefore, the new budget authority request is $685.4 million.

The appropriations request for fiscal year 1973 was $554.2 million,

and the amount appropriated was $517.8 million.


The Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations have both

stated the need to tailor shore based logistic support to match the

requirements of our strategic and general purpose forces. The base

closure announcement of April 17, 1973, initiates action to meet the

objective of reducing general support expenditures for shore installa-


I will depart from the procedure used in presenting the program for

the last couple of years. The comparative analyses by categories of

facilities and naval districts are included at the end of my statement

for insertion into the record, if desired. I would like to comment on

the important elements of this program and relate these elements to

other Navy budgets examined by members of the committee.

I will discuss military construction projects associated with: stra-

tegic forces (which is primarily Trident), an All-Volunteer Force,

major weapons systems, pollution abatement, new technology, and

training facilities.


Under strategic forces, approximately 18 percent of this year's

program has been allocated to initiate construction of a Trident refit

complex and facilities for flight testing the Trident missile. The

facilities requested this year are essential for meeting the initial

operational capability date of late calendar year 1978 for this weapons

system. A briefing later will provide details on the requirement for and

the faciltiies construction associated with the Trident facilities pro-



Projects that will assist the Navy in achieving and maintaining all-

Volunteer Force are projects in the categories of bachelor housing,

community support facilities (which are clubs, exchanges, commis-

sary stores, and recreational facilities), medical facilities and cold iron

facilities. Cold iron facilities are shoreside utilities which enable a ship

in port to shut down its boiler plant and electrical generation equip-

ment and literally go cold iron. Projects associated with an All-Volun-

teer Force constitute 26 percent of the program.


Taking each of the programs related to an All-Volunteer Force in

order, this year's bachelor housing program requests $80 million for

providing bachelor housing and messing facilities. This is a reduction

from last year's appropriations for bachelor housing. The emphasis

placed on bachelor housing the last couple of years still exists, with

bachelor housing constitutitng 12 percent of this year's program. This

year's program will provide 5,378 new spaces for the Navy and 3,990

new spaces for the Marine Corps. For the Navy, the program will also

provide 103 new bachelor officer spaces, and the modernization of

29,719 bachelor enlisted and 126 bachelor officer spaces.


Community support facilities-Navy exchanges, commissaries, and

clubs provide some benefits traditional with service life. Facilities for

recreation and welfare are necessary to provide stimulating leisure

activities for Navy personnel comparable to those of their civilian

contemporaries. These facilities have received a minimum of funding

the last several years. The request for community support facilities is

$12 million.


The medical program requested this year represents a significant in-

crease over the program appropriated last year. It has long been rec-

ognized that one of the major benefits of military service is complete

medical care. There is a recognition within the Defense Department of

a serious need to upgrade medical facilities so that the delivery of

medical care will be improved. The quality of medical care has always

remained high, but the delivery of medical care has left something to be

desired for the last several years. Some of the inefficiencies in our pres-

ent health care system stem from the inadequate facilities in which

many of our physicians and dentists are required to practice their

profession. Medical facilities that are undesirable from a professional

standpoint have an adverse effect on medical officer retention. This

year's program of $65.3 million, or 9.4 percent of the program, includes

a replacement hospital at the Naval Training Center, Orlando, a hos-

pital addition at the naval hospital, New Orleans, the upgrading and

modernization of 2 hospitals, the replacement of 11 dispensaries and

dental clinics, 2 dispensary additions and the replacement of 1 pre-

ventive medicine unit. This year's appropriations request is $23 mil-

lion greater than the amount appropriated last year. The improved

delivery of medical care expected when these facilities are completed

should make a significant contribution toward the goal of achieving

and maintaining an all Volunteer Force.


The cold iron program is directed toward reducing watch standing

requirements when a ship is in port, and thereby maximizing the

amount of time ships' personnel may spend with their families. The

provision of utilities from the shore also provides, and this is a very

key item, benefits in shipboard equipment maintenance and fleet readi-

ness. Last year $23 million was appropriated for 14 projects. This

year's program requests $26 million for six pier and berthing wharf

utilities projects, one berthing pier project, and one project for ex-

pansion of a steam distribution system.


Requested for major weapons systems this year is $10 million, ex-

cluding Trident. An aircraft systems training building is requested

at the Naval Air Station, Oceana, Va., for the F-14 supersonic jet

carrier based fighter aircraft. For the A-7E attack aircraft, an inte-

grated avionics shop is requested at the Naval Air Station, Lemoore,

Calif., at the Naval Air Station, North Island, Calif., an avionics facil-

ities project is requested for the S-3A long range antisubmarine war-

fare aircraft. For the mark 48 torpedo, a torpedo overhaul shop is re-

quested at the Naval Weapons Station, Yorktown, Va. This year's

request for major weapons systems is slightly less than the $11 million

appropriated last year. This element is significantly larger than last

year when Trident facilities are included.


This year's request for $92.3 million continues an aggressive pro-

gram initiated by the Navy in 1968 to abate air and water pollution

at Naval and Marine corps installations. The Congress has given

strong support to our requests and appropriated, through fiscal year

1973 $198 million for pollution abatement facilities. The breakdown

between air and water pollution abatement facilities is $52 and $146

million, respectively.

For air pollution abatement the navy had programed $27.6 mil-

lion for 18 facilities at 15 Naval and Marine Corps installations; 8

facilities costing approximately $18 million 'are for control of the

particulate and chemical fume emissions produced in the industrial

operation of coating metal surfaces; 3 facilities will improve boiler

plant emissions through fuel conversions.

Rounding out the 'air pollution abatement facilities are four facil-

ities to improve air emissions, two pipe insulation working facilities,

and smoke-abatement facilities for a firefighting school.

For water pollution abatement, funding is requested in the amount

of $64.7 million for 45 facilities at 39 Naval and Marine corps in-

stallations. A major portion of this request is for construction of

pier sewers for collection of sanitary wastes from ships in port. In

this, the second year of a 5-year program for constructing disposal

ashore facilities, there are 13 facilities costing approximately $34

million. The pier sewers are planned to coincide with scheduled ship

alterations. There are eight facilities for handling of fuels and col-

lection, treatment, and disposal of oils and oily waste products, from

ships and shore installations. There are 3 municipal sewer connections,

11 improvements to sewer systems and treatment plants, 7 facilities

for collection and treatment of industrial wastes, and 2 facilities for

treatment of filter backwash water at water treatment plants.

The other significant and slightly unique facility is the provision of

a facility to dispose of unserviceable ammunition that may no longer

be disposed of by deep water ocean dumping. In looking ahead, we

expect over the next few years to construct additional facilities to

transfer ship wastes ashore. Based on technology now in the research

and development stage, facilities will be required to control smoke and

gases from jet engine test cells. Additional air, water, and for the first

time, noise pollution control facilities will be required to meet stand-

ards now being established under the "best practicable" and "best avail-

able" technology requirements of Federal pollution control acts.

In summary, we have made considerable progress with our pollu-

tion abatement programs, but we also expect, for the reasons provided

above, a significant pollution abatement program for the next several



For the element new technology, this year's program requests $23

million for research, development, test, and evaluation facilities asso-

ciated with underwater acoustic surveillance, communications, manned

underwater systems, and coastal region warfare. This excludes $4 mil-

lion of R.D.T. & E. facilities associated with the Trident missile, since

all Trident facilities are included under the strategic forces element.

To advance basic research in underwater surveillance, an acoustic re-

search facility has been requested for the Naval Research Laboratory,

Washington, D.C. Undersea surveillance research has the objective

of increasing the Navy's capability for acoustic surveillance of sub-

marines. This research is directed toward techniques utilizing large,

high power, low frequency acoustic energy sources and large receiver

arrays. The basic research findings of the Naval Research Laboratory

will be used by personnel of the New London Laboratory of the Naval

Underwater Systems Center. The new engineering building requested

at New London is needed for personnel engaged in the research and

development of sonar systems, and improved underwater acoustic sen-

sors for antisubmarine warfare ships. Sonar, which is an acronym for

sound, navigation, and ranging, is the underwater equivalent of radar.

The development of prototypes of acoustic energy transmitting and

receiving (transducer) components will also be performed in the en-

gineering building. A transducer is a device for converting electric

energy into sound (projector) or sound into electricity (receiver or

hydrophone). Some sonars use the same transducer for generating and

receiving sound. Other R.D.T. & E. to be performed in the engineer-

ing building is in the fields of the generation of spurious signals and

electromagnetic silencing or jamming systems. The acoustic R.D.T.

& E. to be performed in both facilities should find direct application

in the Trident weapon system.

In the communications area, an electronics development and testing

laboratory is requested at the Naval Electronics Laboratory, San

Diego. This Laboratory is needed for effective development and "try-

before-buy" performance testing of electronic command control, com-

munications and surveillance systems for the new guided missile frig-

ates, destroyers, amphibious assault ships, and Trident submarine. A

facility for testing and evaluating airborne electronic equipment and

systems is requested for the Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent

River, Md.

In the field of manned underwater systems, this year's program

requests facilities to perform experimentation with animals to a 3,300-


foot depth so that operational human diving depths may be lowered

from 1,500 feet to 2,000 feet and beyond. The Environmental Health

Effects Laboratory at the Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda,

will provide the facility for this experimentation. The Laboratory will

also provide facilities for personnel engaged in seeking a solution to

medical problems associated with the inhalation of toxic vapors and

the absorption of toxic compounds in weapon systems atmospheres.

The toxic vapors or compounds are those associated with existing

processes such as fueling missiles and torpedoes of the Polaris/Posei-

don submarine fleet. At the Navy Coastal Sytem Laboratory, Panama

City, Fla., an experimental diving facility is requested that will utilize

the results of the basic research completed at the Environmental Health

Effects Laboratory in testing and evaluating diving schedules, excur-

sion diving, crew training, and underwater salvage operations. The

experimental diving facility is a logical adjunct to the ocean simula-

tion facility funded in fiscal year 1969 to provide a facility for devel-

opment, test, and evaluation of the man/equipment interface in and on

excursions from manned diving systems to depths of 2,200 feet.

In the coastal region warfare field, a systems development and test

facility is requested for coastal technology, and amphibious operations

research; the development and testing of vehicles, sensors, and other

equipment utilized in riverine operations and inshore underseas war-

fare, and research, development, and support of Marine Corps inves-

tigations 'of countermeasures for land mines; sensor equipment; and

overland mobility equipment.

There is one project at the Naval Research Laboratory, Washington,

for an Integrated Electromagnetic Test and Analysis Laboratory.

This Laboratory will provide facilities to conduct basic research re-

quired to develop and evaluate countermeasures against threat weapons

systems such as the antiship cruise missile.


The Navy operates one of the largest school systems in the country,

with some 450 schools graduating about 600,000 students per year.

Since trained personnel are the Navy's greatest asset, the Navy is taking

several concurrent actions to strengthen, modernize, and vitalize its

training programs. One action was the establishment in August 1971 of

the Chief of Naval Training with the responsibility of overseeing and

managing all training, whether academic or applied, shipboard, air-

craft, or submarine. Training with a common core curriculum will be

consolidated to the degree feasible at one installation, and efforts are

being undertaken to raise the quality of training in all areas to the

high standard of submarine and aviation training. Seven percent of

this year's programs is devoted to Naval and Marine Corps training

facilities. The majority of the training program is directed toward

applied instruction with facilities for new flight simulators being pro-

vided at three installations.

The new flight simulators with 60 of freedom and visual motion

integration, will enable some of the flight hours of the jet pilot train-

ing syllabus to be transferred to the simulators with a resultant in-

crease in safety. For shipboard personnel, the training program will

provide facilities for: (1) Annually training about 3,000 technicians

and operating personnel who will be deployed aboard nuclear-powered

vessels, (2) facilities for expanding by 350 students annually the train-

ing facilities available for basic electricity and electronics training,

which is a prerequisite course for training in 17 percent of the Navy

rates, (3) machinist mate and boilerman training on the high pressure

(1,200 psi) propulsion plants going into the newer fleet ships. In the

ordnance area, a training building is requested to provide facilities for

nuclear weapons orientation training annually of 3,800 officer and en-

listed personnel of the Atlantic Fleet. In the electronic warfare area,

an electronics warfare training building is requested for conducting

annually advanced training for 700 electronic warfare technicians, 150

naval flight officers and electronic warfare officers, and 400 aviation elec-

tronic warfare equipment maintenance specialists. Electronic warfare

is the reception of electronic signals to identify and locate enemy

weapon systems, the transmission of electronic signals to decoy, de-

ceive, or make ineffective enemy electronically controlled weapons, and

the development of countermeasures, including tactics to defeat enemy

measures to counter our electronically controlled weapon systems.

There is a very serious shortage of personnel with electronic warfare

training, which makes this project so very important to the Navy.

In the field of academic training, facilities are requested for conduct-

ing tactical command and direction systems training at two installa-

tions. At the Naval Academy, the construction proposed will modern-

ize, in consonance with the master plan, an existing building to provide

classrooms, laboratories, and simulation training spaces for weapons

and systems engineering courses.


This year's program provides facilities for those elements with the

greatest need. The projects are required this year to satisfy new and

current missions, and to provide facilities to modernize the Shore

Establishment. We appreciate the past support of the committee and

earnestly seek it for this year's program.

We will be pleased to answer any questions of the committee. Thank


[Attachments follow.]




[All dollars in thousands[


Fiscal ear


1974 Per- appro- Per-

request cent priation cent Change

Strategic forces:

Trident 1..............................-------------------------------------125, 223 18.0 ..............................

Other......----------------------------------------- 177 ..................................

Subtotal, strategic forces - --...........---..------- 125, 400 18.0 ..........---------- +18.0

All volunteer force:

Bachelor housings_.............-..................... 79,880 11.5 112,233 21.7 ..........

Community support facilities as-.............._ 12, 307 1.8 13, 973 2.7 ..........

Medical facilities...----.----............------- 65, 275 9.4 42,440 8.2 ..........

Cold iron facilities .................................. 25, 873 3.7 23, 471 4.5 ..........

Subtotal, all volunteer force...........------.. --- 183, 335 26.3 192,117 37.1 -10.8

Major weapons systems:

F-14 fighter aircraft...........-... 3, 386 .5 726 .1 ..........

A-7E attack aircraft.........................-----------------------------.. 1,933 .3 ...........................

S-3A antisubmarine warfare aircraft ................... 1,640 .2 4,136 .8 ..........

Mark 48 torpedo.____.. ........................ - 1,327 .2 1,064 .2 .........

SSN 688 nuclear attack submarine .....~.~.-----.................... 5,032 1.0 ..........

Airborne mine counter measures........................ 1, 321 .2 ..............................

Subtotal, major weapons systems.._......._ -........ 9,607 1.4 10,958 2.1 -.7

Pollution abatement:

Air------------------....................--------------------........................... 27,636 3.9 24,194 4.7 ..........

Water---------........ ------------------------------..................................... 64, 675 9.3 51,216 9.9 ..........

Subtotal, pollution abatement ....................... 92, 311 13.2 75, 410 14.6 -1.4

New technology

Research development ...t..............

Test and evaluation facilities ... .._. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . ..............

Acoustic surveillance--- -~~............ . .......... 4, 340 .6 - -.- --

Communication systems----------------------....----- 4,198 .6 140 ..-..........

Manned underwater systems-------------~... ... .. 7,735 1.1 4,500 .9 ..........

Coastal region warfare-......... ... .............-... . - 2,100 .3 500 .1 ..........

Aircraft ................----------------------------------------------------- 4,033 .8 ........

Other........... . ---------------------------------------- 4,655 .7 2,695 .5 ----

Subtotal, new technology -.-..........------------- 23, 028 3.3 11,868 2.3 +1.0

Training facilities:

Academic instruction..........................-------------------------- 6,024 .9 17,792 3.4 ..........

Applied instruction..................... ........ ....... ......... ...............

Aviation--------------................... ............------------------ 15, 422 2.2 16, 008 3.1 ..........

Ships --.------------------------------------ 16,018 2.3 6,008 3.1 ----

Ordnance ---------------------------------- 2,470 .3 .-....-.................

Electronic warfare.............. ................. 3,982 .6 4,998 1.0 ..........

Marine Corps---------- ---------------------- 2, 992 .4 ..................

Operational trainer facilities, aviation................ ------------------3,803 .5 ..............................

Other training facilities, Marine Corps- ..--....------ - 544 .1 ................-...........

Subtotal, training facilities. ...--......-..... .------ 51, 255 7.3 44, 816 8.6 -1.3

Subtotal, above elements-.. --.-............. ....... 484, 936 69. 5 355,196 64.7 +4.8

Other operational and logistic support facilities ---....... . 212, 464 30. 5 183, 161 35.3 -4.8

Total, obligational authority ----....... ............... 697,400 100.0 518,330 100.0 ..........

Less prior year funds..---- ---------------------------- 12,000 ........ 500 .................

New obligational authority..-............ ......._________ _ 685, 400 ........ 517, 830 ..................

I Excludes $10,800,000 of planning and design funds.

s Excludes Naval Home-$9,444,000.

s Excludes employees parking structure, NSA, New Orleans, $2,323,000.

d Excludes R.D.T. & E. facilities for Trident and amendments, $6,239,000.



[Dollars in thousands]

Naval district Fiscal year Fiscal 7ear

Naval district 19497

Inside the United States:

1st Naval District ---

3d Naval District----

4th Naval District --

Naval District, Washington, D.C--- ..........

5th Naval District ----

6th Naval District ----

8th Naval District- ........---- ..........

9th Naval District.- ---

11th Naval District---- ........... ............. ..........

12th Naval District---- ...............

13th Naval District- ........................

14th Naval District----.. ... . . . ..........

Marine Corps---- .................

Various locations:

Trident facilities......... __............ . ...................

Pollution abatement-Air ---- ............... .

Pollution abatement-Water ...........----

$367 $21,340

12,695 8,375

1,130 4, 388

25,491 21,186

50,358 22,426

85,476 81,735

23, 181 19,068

19, 908 5, 255

43,853 33,672

22,571 37,967

11,073 16,537

15, 694 9, 584

54,844 61,083

125, 223

27, 636



24, 194

50, 016

Total inside the United States....-...-..-......... .__ ._ ____ 580, 180 416, 835

Outside the United States:

10th Naval District .--- ......-................................- 2, 852 3, 099

15th Naval District..................----------------------------------------------------- 0 0

Atlantic Ocean Area-..-...........-.................- .................. .. 17, 478 5, 699

European Area ----------------------------------------------------... 8, 192 15, 188

Indian Ocean Area--.......-..............-....................... 0 6, 100

Pacific Ocean Area-.--.- --------------------------- .. 14, 903 9, 809

Various locations:

Pollution abatement-Air.- -...-...-..-.................................. 0 0

Pollution abatement-Water.------....---.................--.. .........-- 3, 995 1,200

Total outside the United States- .. ---.... --..-......... . ............ 47, 420 41, 095

Classified programs..----------..........-------.........................................---------------------------------- 0 0

General support programs............... ............................._____ 627,600 457, 930

Urgent minor construction-............................................. -.... 15, 000 14, 600

Planning and design....................................................... 53, 800 42, 800

Access roads.-----..--....-----......-------------...............--------------------............1,000 3,000

Total continuing authorization .._.._-_-_. ......... .. ... ......_ _ 69, 800 60, 400

Total obligational authority ..-----------...........--------------- 697, 400 518, 330

Reductions in total obligational authority.-....-.......................... - 12, 000 500

New obligational authority ..----..-.....--.. --...-..................-- 685, 400 517, 830



[In thousands of dollars]

Fiscal year 1974 budget request Fiscal year 1973 appropriation

Marine Marine

Description Navy Corps Total Percent Navy Corps Total Percent

Operational__---------_. . 71,938 333 72,271 10.4 42,407 2,983 45,390 8.7

Training-------------__ 47, 719 3,536 51,255 7.3 44, 816 0 44,816 8.6

Maintenance production ..... 129,003 3,317 132,320 19.0 44,886 10,210 59,096 11.4

R.D.T. & E__-------__ 29, 267 0 29, 267 4.2 11,868 0 11,868 2.3

Supply.----------... 1,299 747 2,046 .3 47, 578 1,778 9,356 1.8

Medical--..--..-----. -. 61, 450 3, 825 65, 275 9.4 41,180 1,260 42, 440 8.2

Administrative............. 12, 439 5,204 17, 643 2.5 4,963 1,122 6,085 1.2

Housing and community -.- 76,418 27, 536 103, 954 14.9 85, 113 41,093 126,206 24.4

Housing--- .......... .. (63,893) (25,431) (89,324) (12.8) (72,045) (40,188) (112,233) (21.7)

Community support--.....------.... (12, 525) (2, 105) (14, 630) (2.1) (13, 068) (905) (13, 973) (2.7)

Utilities................ 50, 912 9,711 60, 623 8.7 34, 626 2,637 37, 263 7.2

Pollution abatement' 1..... I 92,311 _-...... . 92, 311 13.2 175,410 __ 75,410 14.6

Air-.................... (27,636)-...___-.. (27, 636) (3.9) (24, 194)--....... (24,194) (4.7)

Water. ... ..... ..... (64,675) _.... (64,675) (9.3) (51,216)... . (51, 216) (9.9)

Real estate..--......_.__ 0 635 35 .1 0 0 0 0

Subtotal...__.-__ _ 572, 765 54,844 627,600 90. 0 396,847 61,083 457,930 88.4

Contract authorization ._ 69, 800 . . ___ . 69, 800 10.0 60, 400 .......... 60, 400 11.6

TOA...... ......... 642,556 54, 844 697, 400 100.0 457, 247 61,083 518,330 100.0

Fund adjustments......... 12,000 ._____.. 12,000 _________ 500 .._______ 500 ...

NOA......-- ..--.. 630, 556 54, 844 685,400 .......... 456, 747 61,083 517, 830 ........

1 Includes the pollution abatement portion of the Marine Corps program.



This category represents 10.3 percent of the appropriations request. It contains

projects for essential aviation, communications, and waterfront operational facil-

ities. Included are three Marine Corps projects that will provide airfield approach

lighting, aircraft corrosion control facilities, and a telephone cable. Major Navy

airfield projects include a runway and taxiway overlay at Naval Station, Adak,

Alaska; a taxiway overlay at Naval Air Station, Moffett Field, Calif.; and an

aircraft parking apron at Naval Detachment, Souda Bay, Crete, Greece. Included

in the communications area are: a satellite communications terminal at the Naval

Communication Station, Wahiawa, Hawaii, which will expand the existing

capacity to allow for additional communications satellite equipment; and a com-

munication facility with a classified mission at Naval Station, Charleston, S.C.

Other operational facilities include berthing piers at Naval Station, Norfolk, Va.,

and Naval Station, San Diego, Calif., and a wharf and dredging facilities for the

Trident project. Two projects will provide modernization of VLF antennas at

Naval Communication Stations, Cheltenham, Md., and Wahiawa, Hawaii.


Training facilities included in this construction program cover a wide range

of naval training activities for officer and enlisted personnel. The majority of

the training program will provide applied instruction facilities; in the aviation

field, major projects include new flight simulators to be provided at the Naval

Air Stations, Memphis, Tenn., and Miramar, Calif. In addition, an applied in-

struction building will be provided at the Fleet Combat Direction Systems

Training Center, Dam Neck, Va., and an aircraft systems training buildings

project will be provided at Naval Air Station, Oceana, Va. For shipboard per-

sonnel, the following major applied instruction facilities will be provided: an

applied SONAR instruction building at Naval Station, Norfolk, Va.; a nuclear

power training building and 'a basic electricity and electronics training building

at Naval Training Center, Orlando, Fla.; and a machinist/boilerman instruction

building at Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Ill. Other applied instruction

facilities include a nuclear training building at Nuclear Weapons Training Group,

Norfolk, Va.; an electronic warfare training building at Naval Communications


Training Center, Pensacola, Fla; and applied instruction buildings at Marine

Corps Base, Twenty-nine Palms, Calif.

The second major area of training facilities is the academic instruction facili-

ties. Included under this heading are the Maury Hall rehabilitation project at

Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md., and the academic instruction building at Fleet

Combat Direction Systems Training Center, San Diego, Calif. The Marine Corps

also has a project to provide combat training ranges at Marine Corps Base, Camp

Pendleton, Calif. The training category represents 7.3 percent of the appropria-

tion request.


The maintenance and production category represents 18.9 percent of the

appropriation request. The projects will provide support to aircraft-oriented

engine and avionics maintenance activities, mine assembly and torpedo overhaul

shops, as well as shops to support maintenance of station facilities. The major

portion of this category is for the refit facilities of the Trident submarine

weapons system. Two shipyard modernization projects will provide a service

group building at Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, Calif., and a

machine shop at Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Va. Naval air rework

facilities projects are the avionics building environmental control at Naval

Air Station, Alameda, Calif.; an aircraft final finish facility at Naval Air Station,

Jacksonville, Fla., and the maintenance hangar addition at Naval Air Station,

North Island, Calif. Other projects include the integrated avionics shops at

Naval Air Stations, Moffett Field, Calif., and North Island, Calif.; the mine

assembly shop at Naval Magazine, Guam; the torpedo overhaul shop at Naval

Weapons Station, Yorktown, Va.; the air/underwater weapons compound at

Naval Air Station, Bermuda; a helicopter maintenance hangar at Naval Air

Station, Norfolk, Va.; an intermediate maintenance facility at Naval Air

Station, Cecil Field, Fla.; and the five Marine Corps projects which will provide

a hangar addition, automotive vehicle shops, a parachute and survival equip-

ment shop, an avionics shop, and a hangar modification.


These projects represent an investment in our future security. This segment

of our construction request, representing 4.2 percent of the total request, will

provide the buildings, laboratories, and specialized test structures that are

required in the conduct of a quality research and development program. The

major laboratory projects are the electronics development and test laboratory

at Naval Electronics Laboratory Center, San Diego, Calif., and phase II of

the environmental health effects laboratory at Naval Medical Research Insti-

tute, Bethesda, Md. Other important projects include the engineering building

that will provide space for engineering and scientific support of underwater

sensor systems at Naval Underwater Systems Center, New London, Conn.; a

missile checkout building and launch complex for Trident; and a systems

development and test facility which will provide the special facilities required

to permit effective systems development and testing of coastal region warfare

equipment at Naval Coastal Systems Laboratory, Panama City, Fla. An experi-

mental diving facility at Naval Coastal Systems Laboratory, Panama City,

Fla., will provide laboratory facilities and recompression chambers for the

Navy experimental diving unit which is being relocated from the Washington

Navy Yard. Two amendments are included in this category. One is for the

deep ocean engineering pressure facility at the Naval Coastal Systems Labora-

tory, Panama City, Fla., and the other for the hypervelocity wind tunnel at

Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak, Md.


Supply and storage facilities include two projects for warehouses, one special

purpose storage facility, and one Marine Corps project for a cold storage and

ready issue warehouse. These four projects represent 0.4 percent of the total



This year's program. representing 9.4 percent of the total appropriation pro-

gram, accelerates the replacement of World War II and other substandard medi-

cal facilities. This is a significant increase over prior year programs and will

result in major improvements in the delivery of medical care to Navy and

Marine Corps personnel and their dependents. A new hospital is requested at

Orlando, Fla., where the existing facilities are overcrowded, substandard, and

incapable of providing the required medical services. Other projects in this cate-

gory include modernizing hospitals at Great Lakes, Ill., and Oakfand, Calif., and

a hospital addition at New Orleans, La. Dental clinics will be provided at the

Naval Air Station, Lemoore, Calif.. and Naval Training Center, Orlando, Fla.

Medical/dental clinics will be provided at Naval Air Stations Chase Field and

Kingsville, Tex., Meridian, Miss., Whiting Field, Fla., and at the Naval Amphib-

ious Base, Little Creek, Va. At the Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Ill.,

two projects will provide a dispensary/dental processing facility and a dispen-

sary/dental clinic. In this category there is one Marine Corps project for a dis-

pensary at Marine Corps Recruiting Depot, San Diego, Calif.


The projects in this category represent 2.6 percent of the total program request.

One project will provide facilities for the relocation of the Military Sealift Com-

mand to Military Ocean Terminal, Bayonne, N.J., from the Brooklyn Army Ter-

minal. An administrative complex requested at the Naval Support Activity, New

Orleans, will provide administrative space for relocating the Armed Forces En-

trance Examining Station from leased space in downtown New Orleans, and for

consolidation at one location the Naval Reserve Manpower Center, Personnel

Management Information Center, and Enlisted Personnel Distribution Office. An

administrative building is also requested for the Naval Technical Training Cen-

ter, Naval Air Station, Meridian, Miss., and for the Marine Corps Supply Center,

Albany, Ga.

TROOP HOUSING, $89,324,000

Significant emphasis is again being placed this year on bachelor housing and

messing facilities for improving the living environment for Navy and Marine

Corps personnel. This year's program will provide 9 368 new spaces and will

modernize 2,719 spaces for bachelor enlisted personnel. For bachelor officers,

this year's program will provide 103 new and the modernization of 128 spaces.

The provision of modern facilities, which compare favorably with similar civilian

community facilities, is considered to be a key factor in improving morale and

retention of skilled personnel. This category represents 12.8 percent of the total

appropriation request. The Marine Corps lays great stress on the provision of

modern functional quarters for its personnel with 51 percent of their portion of

the program devoted to bachelor housing and messing facilities.


Community facilities are requested in order to provide for the welfare and

morale of Naval personnel and their dependents, both in the United States and

overseas. This category includes facilities for a dependent school addition,

exchanges, commissaries, gymnasiums, theaters, and EM/CPO and officers clubs.

Including two Marine Corps projects, this category constitutes 2.1 percent of

the program.


This category makes up 8.7 percent of the total request and includes projects

to install the necessary utility support for existing and programed construction.

Many systems are operating under full or overtaxed capacities and will be

replaced. A significant portion of the utility projects, approximately 43 percent,

is devoted to the Navy's "cold iron" program which allows ships to shut down

their shipboard equipment while in port, thus allowing more time for equipment

maintenance and giving more opportunities for shore leave for ship's personnel.

Approximately 20 percent or $9.7 million of the Marine Corps program is

assigned to utilities improvements.


The Navy is continuing its emphasis on pollution abatement by allocating

13.2 percent of the appropriations request for these facilities.

REAL ESTATE, $685,000

Funds are being requested for one real estate acquisition at the Marine Corps

Air Station, Yuma, Ariz. This acquisition will provide the land for an aviation

ordnance missile assembly and storage facility.


Under this category, funding is provided for codified authorization for planning

and design, urgent minor construction, and access road projects.

Mr. SIKES. Thank you, Admiral Marschall, that is a very good


Now would you mind going back through that part about the Naval

Coastal Systems Laboratory at Panama City? I like that better. It

seems like you left out something though. There is not as much there

as I had hoped for.

Mr. LONG. Is that in the United States, Mr. Chairman ?

Mr. SIKES. It is on the edge in the Gulf of Mexico. From there you

can go in any direction, anywhere.

Mr. Secretary, we will have questions on Admiral Marschall's state-

ment at 2 o'clock. I believe that you have a guest you want to introduce.

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir.


If I could introduce to the committee Mr. Jack Bowers, who has been

nominated by the President to be the Assistant Secretary of Navy for

Installations and Logistics. Mr. Bowers comes to us from industry,

having been -a vice president of General Dynamics. He is a man that

several of us have worked with for many years and whom we hold in

high regard.

Mr. SIKES. Glad to have you aboard.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Secretary, let's recess now until 2 o'clock.


Mr. SIKEs. The committee will come to order.

All right, Admiral Marschall, again thank you for your statement.


What is the amount of the Navy's shore facilities construction

deficiency ?

Admiral Marschall, as I am sure you understand here, you have

backup witnesses. Don't hesitate to use them. That is what they are for.

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir.

Right now, Mr. Chairman, the construction deficiency is approxi-

mately $8 billion and this compares with an estimated $9 billion pre-

viously reported. I think we have purged our system through the shore

facilities planning and programing system so that we have a better

handle on what we now have as a backlog.

I think this is a fairly reasonable figure, $8 billion.

Mr. DAvIS. Could you tell us how that was developed and arrived

at, Admiral?


Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir. We have a shore facilities planning

system whereby each station determines its requirements; these sta-

tions then go through a major claimant indicating what construction

projects they need to fill out their base, or what they need to upgrade

the base with replacement facilities.

This all goes into a computer program, a type of inventory of things

we need, and each year from this master list of deficiencies throughout

the system we draw the annual Milcon program.

Now, admittedly, many of the things in this $8 billion we may never

see and hopefully in future years we can continue to purge this system

as we have over this past year, going down from $9 to $8 billion for

facilities, and that was before any shore establishment realinement.

But I think as the world situation stabilizes, and the Navy in par-

ticular stabilizes, we will present much more meaningful figures in the


Mr. DAVIS. Would this be properly called, then, an unscreened shop-

ping list?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Basically, yes, sir, it is, but I'd like to provide

a more detailed description of the process for the record.

[The information follows:]

The Chief of Naval Operations sets missions and allots basic resources for the

accomplishment of these missions. Each activity translates these mission state-

ments and basic resources into facility requirements through use of facility plan-

ning criteria guides. The Engineering Field Divisions of the Naval Facilities

Engineering Command validate these requirements along with the iurrent in-

ventory of facilities at the activity. From comparing the inventory with the re-

quirements a list of excesses and deficiencies is obtained. Excesses are screened

carefully to determine if they can be used to satisfy deficiencies. All remaining

deficiencies make up the construction backlog.

Mr. DAVIs. Based upon existing foreseeable missions that would be

supported at that installation ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir; and I think too often in the past we

have just accepted these. We have really tried now to purge the sys-

tem, as I said, and we are making headway.

Mr. SIKEs. At the present rate of military construction funding, how

much time will be required to eliminate the deficiency ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. At the present rate and based on the figures

which we have just discussed it won't be possible to eliminate this de-

ficiency because the average annual program required for replacement

of our wornout plant and facilities to fulfill new mission requirements

is approximately $870 million.

Again it may be feasible as we purge our system to come to a more

meaningful figure.


Mr. SIRES. Tell us about the progress in modernization. How does

this year's program compare with other recent years ?

Admiral MARSOHALL. This year, sir, $201 million is devoted to re-

placement and modernization, or approximately 29 percent of the total

program, somewhat less than 1973.

However, we hope to continue to peck away at this particular


Mr. SIKEs. Is this year's level a catchup level?

Admiral MARSCHALL. No, sir, it is not.

[Supplementary information follows:]

The $201 milion flzur- above represents a corrected figure from that previously

furnished OSD by the Navy and used by them before this committee. The larger

amount of $343 million contained projects in error which when removed resulted

in the above $201 million.


Mr. SIRES. Can you provide for the record a listing of the Navy 5-

year construction program by facilities category. Also show the cur-

rent deficit above that anticipated at the end of fiscal year 1978.

[The information follows:]


[In millions of dollars]

Fiscal years

Current Balance

Facility class deficit 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 after

Operations-................... ...... 1,014.2 72.3 82.2 37.8 47.2 71.0 703.7

Training............................ 442.6 51.3 27.3 14.0 12.2 21.6 316.2

Maintenance/production--....-..--... .. 1,675.6 132.3 262.3 161.7 102. 8 66.7 949. 8

R.D.T. & E................... ....... 368. 7 29. 3 22. 2 19. 9 19.6 31.4 246. 3

Supply- -.........-.............. ... 423.5 2.0 9.3 15.7 18.3 24.5 353.7

Hospital/medical-..........~. ...-. 847.0 65.3 133.5 167.6 132.1 102.8 245.7

Administration......... ...... 498.1 17.6 5.0 21.8 16.6 39.1 398.0

Ba-racks/personnel support ........... 1,749.8 104.0 151.1 115.3 121.5 119.4 1,138.5

Utilities/ground improvements...---------....... 1,052.0 152.9 135.7 141.7 117.3 80.2 424.2

Real estate........................... 143.8 .6 17.6 4.9 .7 8.1 111.9

Note: The amounts shown on the preceding tabulation for fiscal year 1974 through fiscal year 1978 represent internal

Department of Defense planning estimates only, covering anticipated program levels which have not been approved by

the President.


Mr. SIKES. I note your emphasis in this year's program on personnel

support facilities such as bachelor housing and medical facilities mod-

ernization. How long do you expect to continue this emphasis before

achieving suitable all-volunteer force facilities ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. We feel it necessary to continue the medical

improvement program through fiscal year 1979 before achieving suit-

able all-volunteer force facilities. We feel that we have made signifi-

cant strides forward in improving bachelor housing. We currently

plan a significant amount for bachelor housing improvements in the

75 program but hope to taper off thereafter.


Mr. SixEs. I believe this is the third year of emphasis on "cold iron"

facilities. Do you have evidence that the cold iron program has im-

proved the effectiveness of the fleet or increased volunteer or retention


Admiral MARSCHALL. We have had a cold iron program for some

years, Mr. Chairman, but special emphasis has been applied for only

the past 2 years.

As a result, it is a little bit early to quantify the results.

Mr. SIxEs. Actually has there been any significant completion of

cold iron facilities to this date ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. No significant completion, Mr. Chairman,

and some attempt on our part to use temporary facilities to provide

cold iron which has helped us a great deal, but not the items which

you have approved for the long haul.


Mr. SIKES. Has the Defense medical facilities regionalization pro-

gram been in effect long enough to show results in better utilization

of doctors or increased efficiency in medical facilities ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. In some areas cross-utilization of physicians

and paramedical personnel has been possible, sir. For example, in the

Portsmouth, Va., area an optometry van visits Army and Air Force

installations as well as Navy installations and provides refractions and

spectacle fabrication on the spot.

Also in the Tidewater area some Navy specialist coverage is pro-

vided other services when their normally assigned physician is on

leave or ill.

Mr. SIKES. Can more be achieved in this area ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I certainly think so, sir; and I think the

efforts are continuing to achieve these desired results.

Mr. SIKES. Do you feel that your medical facilities modernization

program will contribute to this ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIKES. In a significant way ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. "Significant" is the key word, sir. For example

in Monterey, Calif., the Navy has been denied permission to replace

a dispensary at the post graduate school because there will be a new

dispensary dental clinic for the Army at the Defense Language School

and I think the combined use of these facilities is driving this par-

ticular decision.


Mr. SIKEs. Please provide for the record the past, present, and pro-

jected workload for each of the major naval hospitals.

[The information follows:]

Workload for the major Naval Hospitals 1/:

HOSPITALS 71 72 73 74 75


Outpatient Visits 417,816 401,578 487,865/ 485,6223) 484,59321

Average DDaly Patient Load 620 511 484 462 461

Required / 775 639 605 578 577


Outpatient Visits 255,831 258,113 290,473 289,902 289,902

Average Daily Patient Load 358 270 279 275 275

Required 448 338 349 344 344


Outpatient Visits 247,657 253,049 235,421 266,077 293,415

Average Daily Patient Load 290 216 217 237 261

Required 363 270 272 296 326


Outpatient Visits 206,797 221,675 239,234 243,807 240,459

Average Daily Patient Load 585 397 357 362 357

Required 731 496 446 453 446


Outpatient Visits 262,995 268,911 279,494 280,457 283,818

Average Daily Patient Load 311 296 256 257 260

Required 389 370 320 322 325


Outpatient Visits 276,323 298,229 254,928 253,116 249,757

Average Daily Patient Load 622 551 498 486 480

Required 778 689 623 608 600


Outpatient Visits 175,419 211,812 226,724 224,088 222,768

Average Daily Patient Load 213 182 162 160 159

Required 266 228 203 200 200

HOSPITALS 71 72 73 74 75


Outpatient Visits 161,153 165,400 169,296 163,197 161,191

Average Daily Patient Load 816 686 672 6495' 63?'

Required 1,020 858 840 806 796


Outpatient Visits 337,783 342,230 322,230 317,901 310,933

Average Daily Patient Load 918 834 793 777 760

Required 1,148 1,043 991 971 950


Outpatient Visits 697,605 746,979 711,316 688,647 675,062

Average Daily Patient Load 1,389 1,137 1,205 1,140 1,118

Required 1,736 1,421 1,506 1,425 1,398


J Of the fourteen Naval Hospitals, with more than 500 personnel, ten provide residency

(specialty) training, a full range of medical capabilities and they have research

responsibilities. The above ten hospitals have the largest staffs and budgets. Re-

flects FY 1974 and FY 1975 base closures plan.

Utilization rate does not reflect unmet need by beneficiary population due to major

alterations and installations of air conditioning in patient care and ancillary

support service area.

Utilization rate reflects anticipated redevelopment impact due to commencement of

modification at present facilities and subsequent construction of new facilities.

This line denotes the actual number of beds required to support the reported average

daily patient load on the preceeding line. It is calculated using the average daily

patient load as 80fo of the needed capacity and is referred to as the dispersion factor

which compensates for peak periods of operation, as well as for unoccupied beds in

restricted specialty care units (i.e., obstetric beds that cannot be used by male

patients and beds used to isolate communicable diseases).



Mr. SIKES. To what extent are you programing hospital space for

retired personnel?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Mr. Chairman, under the current DOD guide-

lines we are allowed to program 5 percent more beds than otherwise

would be provided in a nonteaching hospital and we can provide up

to 10 percent more beds in teaching hospitals.

Mr. SIKEs. What proportion of the Navy's medical requirements

will be provided by the CHAMPUS program rather than by Navy's

own medical resources ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. During fiscal year 1972 the average percentage

utilization of CHAMPUS, that is, average of both inpatient and out-

patient care, was 29 percent of the Navy medical requirement. It is

predicted that CHAMPUS utilization will continue to increase over

the next several years at approximently 1 percent of the current utiliza-

tion per year leveling off at about the midway point .of the accredited

medical 'facilities modernization program. Upon completion of the

modernization program when naval medical facilities can favorably

compete with civilian medical facilities, a 25 percent reduction of

current CHAMPUS utilization is predicted, provided adequate re-

sources, both staff and funds, are available.


Mr. SIKES. What effect will the reduction in the size of the Navy

and the All-Volunteer Force concept have on the need for bachelor


Admiral MARSCHALL. The Navy's bachelor housing requirements

are determined from an annual bachelor housing survey which has

been conducted navywide for 3 consecutive years. The bachelor

housing survey conducted in 1972 to determine valid requirements for

the Navy's fiscal year 1974 program was based on force projections

for fiscal year 1977. Assets were also evaluated for adequacy based

on improved habitability criteria. Navy requirements are; therefore,

based on projections which incorporate long range personnel reduc-

tions as well as increased habitability in keeping with the All-Volun-

teer Force concept.

Mr. SIKES. Does the Navy still plan to change its policy so that men

can live off station and collect basic allowance for quarters rather

than live in bachelor enlisted quarters ? With the All-Volunteer Force,

is such a policy change warranted?

Admiral MARSCHALL. The Navy's current policy of permitting per-

sonnel to live off station and collect a basic allowance for quarters

rather than live in inadequate quarters is based on guidelines promul-

gated by the Department of Defense. DOD policy provides that only

when adequate quarters are not available will commanders issue cer-

tificates of nonavailability, thereby authorizing the payment of basic

allowance for quarters. The Navy is not aware of any planned change

to this policy. Navy's current policy with regard to quarters assign-

ment for personnel without dependents may be summarized as follows :

Navy permits voluntary occupancy of inadequate Government quar-

ters by all pay grades. Pay grades 0-4 and above, by Executive Order

11157 of June 24, 1964, may elect to receive a basic allowance for

quarters and live off base regardless of quality of available accom-

modations. Personnel are not involuntarily assigned to accommoda-

tions not meeting the assignment criteria except by reason of military

or training necessity or in overseas locations for reasons of personal

health, safety, or host country agreement. Involuntary occupancy of

adequate assets is required to the extent necessary to utilize all such


When accommodations meeting the assignment criteria are not avail-

able, members are authorized to live in the civilian community and be

paid a basic allowance for quarters.

The Department of Defense, on May 12, 1972, promulgated a new

criteria for determining adequate quarters. Implementation of this

policy is to be accomplished by the Armed Forces as funds become

available to pay the additional personnel that would no longer have

adequate quarters and thereby are eligible to move off the station. Ex-

ample: The new criteria provides that pay grades E-7 through E-9

will be provided a private bath. Few, if any, of our present adequate

quarters for these top enlisted pay grades meet the new criteria. Meas-

uring our present adequate assets with the pending new DOD criteria,

we have a total deficit of 74,233 adequate spaces. The cost of additional

basic allowance for quarters, if all personnel for whom the Navy does

not have adequate quarters elected to move off the station, would ex-

ceed $50 million. This estimated cost is determined by multiplying

the amount of the basic allowance for quarters for each pay grade by

the space deficit.

The Navy's instruction directs the area coordinators to insure that

commanding officers make liberal rather than restrictive interpreta-

tions of the assignment criteria for the benefit of the individual mem-


While many Navy bachelors desire to live ashore and are authorized

to do so if adequate quarters are not available, they find the cost ex-

ceeds their allowance for quarters and, after a short trial period, re-

turn to the station even though quarters available do not meet the

assignment criteria. It has to be recognized that the majority of our

people seeking housing off the station are having to do so in high cost


We are most desirous of allowing our personnel not required to live

on-station to choose between on-station or off-station housing. To this

end, we are continuing to review this policy, but the current budgetary

restraints make further significant implementation impractical at this


Mr. SIXES. What is your estimate of the Navy's shortage of bachelor

housing units, and how would it be affected by such a revised policy ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Upon completion of fiscal year 1973 bachelor

housing construction, we estimate our bachelor housing deficiency to

be 8,159 officer and 66,074 enlisted. If the 1974 program is funded as

requested these figures would be reduced by 229 for officers and 12,087

for enlisted.

We would expect these deficits to drop by 20 to 25 percent if a more

liberalized off-base housing policy could be implemented.



Mr. SIKEs. We know that Environmental Protection Agency, State,

and local pollution standards are becoming more strict. Is the Navy

able, at the present rate of pollution abatement project funding, to re-

duce the number of its violations of these standards, or is it falling


Admiral MARSCHALL. The Navy, to date, has been able to keep pace

with evolving Federal, State and local standards and due to the ex-

cellent support of Congress, has a program underway tailored to meet

and anticipate the most restrictive standards promulgated, consistent

with available technology. While the Navy has not only kept pace, but

has often led in compliance with standards, much effort still lies ahead

as standards are still evolving in water and air, and the impact of the

noise law. Public Law 92-574, still must be assessed.

Mr. SIKES. Have there been any technological breakthroughs in

shipboard waste disposal which will permit a reduction of disposal

facilities ashore ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. There have not been any major shipboard

waste disposal technological breakthroughs to date, which will permit

reduction of disposal facilities ashore. The Navy is studying its shore

facilities with a view to consolidating and upgrading them to handle

additional waste loads with a minimum of additional operational

costs. Further, the Navy currently has underway extensive test and

evaluation of several marine sanitation devices to insure their per-

formance and reliability. To date, these devices, which are designed

to treat shipboard sanitary wastes and comply with the EPA-pub-

lished no discharge standards, have not proven themselves and the

Navy has proceeded with the ship waste water collection-holding-

transfer system wherein ships at berth will hold their wastes and

transfer them ashore for treatment. It should be noted that marine

sanitation devices, when developed, will have a yet to be evaluated

space-weight impact on densely populated warships. The Navy is

also looking at new packaging materials and techniques to reduce

the volume of solid waste generated as well as installing compactors

and encapsulators and developing a new generation of incinerators

for various ships which will comply with air pollution requirements.

Ship alterations are underway to enable ships to offload oily bilge

wastes for shore treatment and the Navy concurrently is testing and

evaluating state-of-the-art oil water separators, testing Navy modified

commercial units and initiating a major research and development

project to develop oil water separators to enable ships to keep from

discharging oily waste into the seas.


Mr. SIKES. What are the Navy's plans to relocate personnel or

facilities out of the National Capital region ? That, Admiral, is one

matter which has been of very great interest to this committee and,

quite frankly, we haven't seen much in the way of results.

What is the Navy doing this year, if anything, to move people

out of the National Capital area ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. This year, Mr. Chairman, we have made firm

decisions to relocate some 9 activities and 604 personnel out of the

, 'l I " i [

Capital region. Continuing efforts are being made to reduce Navy

space by consolidations and further relocations.

Mr. SIKES. That level, 9 activities and 604 people, is quite small.

I believe you will agree. It still does not appear that you are accom-

plishing very much.

Admiral MARSCHALL. Sir, the staffs in Washington have been re-

duced by 25 percent. As a result of that we anticipate the reduction

of space within Washington by a commensurate amount. We have, I

hope, been able to see our way clear to the goal which Mr. Laird set

of some almost 900,000 square feet of space for the Navy in the Capital

area in the way of a reduction.

We do hope to continue planning along these lines but with the

shore establishment realinement occupying a great deal of the atten-

tion of the Navy in this past year, I am afraid we just haven't

achieved all you would have hoped for.

Mr. SIKES. Well, do you have any more to offer in the future ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Sir, I certainly hope that we can continue

to plan and make an effort to reduce the size of the Navy in the Capital


Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, if I could interrupt for a moment, Mr.

Laird, of course, took the tack as Secretary of Defense in this area of

calling for a reduction in space occupied in the National Capital area.

We met that cut in space by doing something that was called for, re-

ducing the number of people, staffs and otherwise in the Washington

area by roughly 25 percent over a 2-year period.

The new Secretary of Defense had it on his list as something to

look at again, to reexamine it. We have been asked by the Secretary of

Defense to continue to take a look at this problem.

As you are well aware, our difficulty in the Navy is that we have so

much of our, in effect, field activities tied right into the headquarters

activities in the Washington area.


Mr. SIKES. To what extent has the reduction in the size of the Navy

permitted a reduction or consolidation in the number of schools or

training facilities? Can you provide for the record your estimated

workloads, past, present, and future, for each of your major training

facilities ?

[The information follows:]



Fiscal year-

1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

San Diego..-.--.. --.....- - 17,520 14,577 12,063 12,403 12,175 11,690 11,739 11,146 10,255 11, 107

RTC............. 11,375 8, 327 6,490 6,334 6,884 6, 249 6, 257 5,664 4,773 5, 625

SSC..........-........ 4,653 4,866 4,231 4,859 4,266 4,416 4,457 4,457 4, 457 4,457

HC SCOL/NAVDENENCEN _ 1, 492 1,384 1,342 1,210 1,025 1,025 1,025 1,025 1,025 1,025

Great Lakes................ 21,999 17,963 15,257 14, 195 13,772 14,622 16,024 15,234 14,045 15, 181

RTC................... 13,853 9,990 7,968 7,625 7, 392 6, 841 8,243 7, 453 6,264 7,400

SSC..-.....-..... -- 8, 146 7, 703 7,289 6,570 6,380 7,781 7,781 7, 781 7,781 7,781

Orlando.......-... ......... 2,935 3,411 3,867 4,710 5,556 6,487 8,675 9,885 9,378 10, 361

RTC..-.-.-.... 2,935 3,323 3,770 4,103 4,250 4, 904 6, 182 5,590 4,698 5,550

RTC(W)--........ . i 461 1 436 1 471 454 857 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000

SSC............---------- -.... 88 97 153 449 583 260 595 580 566

NUCPWR....-------..--..---..-----------------------------------............................................... 1,233 2,700 3,100 3,245

Memphis................... 10,018 9,520 9,301 8,048 6,382 9,383 8,513 8,507 8,485 8,529

NATTC.....---------.. 7,148 6,395 6,361 5,588 4,282 9,383 8,513 8,507 8,485 8,529

Res. recruit........ ... 2, 870 3,125 2, 940 2, 460 2, 100 ................... . . . . . .

Norfolk..-................. 2,326 2,490 2,299 1,722 1,633 1,779 1,970 1,970 1,970 1,970

NAVGUIDEDMISCOL.... 973 1,026 1,042 722 495 617 617 617 617 617

Scol of music....... ----------442 367 388 308 439 435 435 435 435 435

NSC-................._ 639 825 598 418 425 452 643 643 643 643

AFSC................. 272 272 271 274 274 275 275 275 275 275

Pensacola.................. 4,726 5,078 3,594 2,946 2,586 3,289 3,821 3,720 4,272 4,046

NAVCOMTRACEN....... 1,327 1,628 1,275 745 899 1,023 1,823 2,035 3,035 3,035

Aviation training -...... 3,399 3,450 2,319 2,201 1,687 2,266 1,998 1,685 1,237 1,011

1 Bainbridge.


Mr. SIKES. Is the Navy satisfied with OSD guidance on the use of

turnkey and relocatable construction ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir; very much satisfied with the guidance

on turnkey. As far as relocatable construction, this guidance was re-

ceived last month and we are reviewing it. We see no immediate prob-

lems with it and if there are problems I am sure that we can make an

accommodation with the Department of Defense there.


Mr. SIKES. What construction cost escalation has been used in esti-

mating this year's program? Over what time period have you projected

these costs in the fiscal year 1974 program ? How have your cost esti-

mates compared with actual costs over the past few years ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. The construction cost escalation used in esti-

mating this year's program varies based on location. We rely on each of

our engineering field divisions to establish cost escalation factors based

on conditions in their respective areas. For those projects estimated in

the early part of our programing process, cost escalations averaged 9

to 10 percent; for those projects estimated in the latter portion of the

programing cycle, the average has been 61/2 to 7 percent. We make our

projections from time of estimate to estimated time of award. In the

past few years, our cost estimates have been slightly higher than actual

cost which has resulted from a higher projected escalation than actually



Mr. SIKES. What percentage of Navy land and what amount of acre-

age, if you can determine it, do you expect to declare excess as a result

of the President's Executive Order 11508?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Total Navy and Marine Corps acreage is ap-

proximately 4.5 million acres, sir. Of this, nearly 4 million acres at 180

activities have been surveyed in accordance with the Executive order.

As a result of these individual surveys the Navy has agreed to excess

235,000 acres.

The remaining activities are generally smaller and more compact and

I might add generally located in urban areas and I think the per-

centage of excess may drop off in the future.

Mr. SIKES. Generally this committee has cautioned against too much

zeal in disposing of land. We have had experience in land disposal and

land acquisition and it happens very frequently that we need more

rather than less land. There have been some unhappy experiences

about excessing land too soon.

Has the Navy been given sufficient flexibility or a satisfactory degree

of flexibility in deciding what land is actually needed and what can be

excessed ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I think we have been given a great deal of

flexibility, sir, and I don't think at this point that we have lost any-

thing we need in the way of an operational nature.

Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I should speak to that, I think, and

point out that the Navy has been given its day in court on any piece

of land that has been recommended for disposal either by us or by

those making surveys.

We have absolutely no complaints in this regard.

Mr. SIRES. Very well.

Mr. SANDERS. As you are aware, the House Armed Services Com-

mittee goes over these quite thoroughly. They have held up two or

three that were recommended for disposal, which we still are holding



Mr. SIKES. Are the proposed statutory cost limitations on bachelor

and married housing construction adequate ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir; I think they are. With regard to

bachelor housing, we have had some difficulties with certain recent

limitations. On 21 bid openings that we have had to date we have

awarded 15. Six have required escalations with one of the escalations

being in excess of 25 percent.

Statutory waivers have had to be obtained on two of these projects.

I think as we draw near to the end of the bidding year we will see

prices go up even more, taking the natural course of escalation.

Mr. SIRES. Will the proposed increases provide you wtih more than

just enough to stay even? Will you be able to get more house than

you are getting now with the new limits, or will it be about the same,

or will you actually find that you are having to take less house?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I presume now you are talking about married

housing, sir.

Mr. SIRES. Yes.

\iLI~(EZFi-~- --:i~nlr~asa~ -r~- -

Admiral MARSCHALL. I think that probably we will be able to get

the house we want.

Mr. SIgES. What does that mean ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. In the more recent limitations up until this

year we have had to drop out such things as carports, sidewalks,

patios, landscaping, privacy fencing, and tot lots, such equipment,

TV antennas, and what-not. I think that with the new limitations

expected this year we can achieve the house which we design and get

the full package as opposed to having to delete certain items which

we think are highly desirable.


Mr. SIKES. How much has the family housing deficit decreased as a

result of pay raises and increased community support ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. AS a result of the recent pay increases, which

caused gains in adequate community support, the net affect on the

Navy's programable deficit, from fiscal year 1973 to fiscal year 1974,

was a decrease of about 3,400 units.

Mr. SIKES. What is your current faknily housing deficit, and how

much of this is overseas ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. The currently projected programable deficit,

after the realinements in the naval shore establishment have been

effected, is 17,600 units, of which 2,200 is outside CONUS.

Mr. SIKEs. How much of this deficit realistically should be met by

increased construction, and how much new construction do you plan

over the next 5 years ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. In considering that question, it must be re-

alized that our programable deficit is set after deducting both a 10

percent safety factor from our eligible requirements, and all of our

ineligible requirements. This leaves some 35,000 personnel who actually

require adequate housing but who are not included in our long-range

planning. Additionally, we are currently embarking on a program

to upgrade or replace many of the older units in our existing military

inventory. Specifically then, in view of these factors, I believe that a

new construction program of about 4,000 units annually over the next

5 years, including some replacement units, will effectively satisfy our



Mr. SIKES. What is your improvements backlog? Could you spend

more in this area ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. The improvement backlog is approximately

$183,000,000, of which $147,000,000 is applicable to Navy and $36,-

000,000 is applicable to the Marine Corps. Navy's program for fiscal

year 1974 amounts to $10,600,000. Navy can realistically provide an

improvement program which would entail an expenditure of approxi-

mately $25 million per year.


Mr. SIIEs. What are your plans to house so-called ineligibles and

who is an ineligible under your current procedure ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. At the present time, Mr. Chairman, an in-

eligible is an E-3 or below. The 1974 programing base, as you know,

was expanded to include E-4's. They are now eligibles. We in the

Navy and Marine Corps are supporting a plan for the inclusion of

E-1 to E-3 in future programs, and I think there is some hope of

success here.

Mr. SIKES. When you say "future" are you talking about 5, 2, or 10


Admiral MARSCHALL. We are pressing for it in the next year's pro-

gram if at all possible.

Mr. SIKEs. Will that be a realistic achievement? Even if you get

them included do you have the housing for them ?

Admiral MARsCHALL. At the present time we don't have fully avail-

able housing. Through your good offices we do have section 236 hous-

ing available in some areas now. We have already opened up mobile

home parks. We have our housing referral office actively engaged in

seeking out houses on the civilian economy and I think they are rea-

sonably taken care of but we can certainly do a lot better.


Mr. SIKEs. How is the HUD military preference housing program

working ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Sir, it has been very good where we have had

it. We, as you know, started this program in 1971 when we were

allocated 1,706 units. In 1972 we had 1,950 units, for a total of 3,656,

and for 1,373 we have requested 2,125. However, there has been a

moratorium and the total which we have received has been signifi-

cantly less than the amount we require.

Mr. SIKEs. How many have you received ? Do you know ? You can

provide that for the record if necessary and provide also the time-

table on which you have expected to receive these units had there not

been a moratorium.

[The information follows:]


We received funding for 2,454 units. Navy deleted 202 units due to program-

ing changes, and we expected occupancy of the 1,000 unit balance of the fiscal

year 1972 units caught in the moratorium during the time frame of June-Sep-

tember 1974. Occupancy of the 2.125 units requested for fiscal year 1973 was

expected during January-March of 1975.

Mr. SIKES. Of course, we understand the problem of the


There is in addition some question as to the effect of the higher pay

scale on the eligibility of personnel. It has been indicated there may

be a need to change the eligibility pattern either by designating num-

bers of individuals among those eligible for on-base housing or by

raising the statutory limits under which they participate.

Does the Navy have any suggestions for legislative changes to allow

better use of this progam ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Sir, if you don't mind I would like Captain

Reed, who is our housing expert, to answer this question.

Mr. SIKES. We will be glad to have any comments you want to make

about this program, what future it appears to have, assuming the

moratorium will be decided favorably for some housing of this

" -- - T . ..... .... rf ' ,

general type. Also, whether there will be a need for legislation so

that you can continue to use it.

Captain REED. Sir, the 2,125 units we requested were requested with

the understanding of the new maximum allowable housing code. Of

course, you know that the eligibility is varied by location, in accord-

ance with the local pay scale. I think that legislation which set a range,

say such as an E-3, as eligible regardless of his pay state or his family

state would be very useful because our E-3's typically have a wife

who is working and we do have trouble with 236 because the kid moves

in, his wife goes to work, and he is no longer eligible, this type of


Mr. SIKES. Are there questions on the Admiral's statement?


Mr. DAVIS. Yes; we have been discussing this family housing thing

in a rather general way. I think it would be helpful to me if you could

give us a rundown of the alternatives available to you.

You see a family housing deficiency in X area. What are the alterna-

tives open to you under existing law to meet that deficiency and

why would you decide to go one way or another way, as a general

proposition, in handling it ?

Admiral MARSCIALL. First of all, sir, when you talk about a family

housing deficiency, it means that you have already exhausted the

available housing on the local market which is within the means of

the serviceman.

Then you eliminate the lower pay grades, as I said, the E-3's and

below, and you allow yourself, depending on the area, only somewhere

between 90, 95 percent, sometimes less, of this deficiency, and when

you have done all this you are talking about considerably lower num-

bers of requirements than the true requirement which would exist if

you considered everyone.

Then you have several ways of skinning the cat at this time. We

have a program of rental guarantee housing overseas; we have a leas-

ing program on the local community, both in and out of the United

States; and we have the construction of quarters by one means or


We have had the Wherry, the Capehart, and the normal Milcon

type appropriation in the past.

As far as the rental guarantee, I find this difficult to equate to a

local situation. As far as leasing is concerned, we have been very suc-

cessful in some areas in alleviating temporary housing problems.

To use as an example the chairman's own home district, Pensacola,

we leased an apartment complex there for a surge period and were

able to get rid of it after we didn't need it. This is particularly good

where we don't know the exact future of the business and we must

wait for the permanent satisfaction of the requirements.

But in the long run for a stable community building public quarters

I think is probably the best answer, as I say, after we have considered

all the community assets.

Mr. DAVIS. What alternatives do you have available to you for ac-

tually building quarters?

Admiral MARSCHALL. The only available means we have of build-

ing quarters is by getting them from the Congress. We have no other

way of building them.


Mr. DAvis. You do have turnkey, for instance.

Admiral MARSCHALL. Oh, I beg your pardon, sir. Is that what you


Mr. DAviS. Yes.

Admiral MARSCHALL. I am sorry. In the past, as you know, we is-

sued plans and specifications and took bids. In recent years we have

gone to this turnkey process of buying our housing and have found

it extremely successful. I would say-I don't have the precise figures at

the moment but we have gone to something between 50 and 80 percent

on our turnkey housing and have had good results to date both from

the standpoint of getting the projects within the money and getting

a quality product.

The turnkey thing has turned out extremely well. We are very, very

happy with it.

We anticipate in this year's program 75 percent of the housing

which we plan to do will be turnkey.

Mr. DAVIS. You have the turnkey program. What else?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Normal bidding practices whereby we issue

plans and specifications and bid the job on the market. Those really

are the only basic two.

Overseas I think you have heard of us leasing housing.

Mr. DAVIs. Yes. You talked about that. What about mobile homes ?

Does the Navy use those ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. We have in the past built some pads for

mobile homes, but we don't have the actual units themselves. We pro-

vide facilities for those who do own them.

Mr. DAvIs. And they are individually owned by the serviceman ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SANDERS. And we have built a large number of pads, sir. The

Air Force has done the same thing at various locations on base gen-

erally to meet this requirement. We own none except a few left over

from emergency back in Korea, and then I believe some of the services

have them on Kwajalein.

Mr. MCEWEN. Admiral, you expressed satisfaction with the turnkey

approach for housing. This is new to me, to get involved in this

matter of turnkey as opposed to conventional plans, specifications,

and bids. I want your observation. What are the advantages of

turnkey ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. One of the big advantages as I see it is that

we can go to a homebuilder, for example, who has been in the busi-

ness of developing large tracts of homes on his own. We can take

advantage of a proven design which he has had in the past, his ability

to draw on the commercial market for all the appurtenances, the

whole broad spectrum of equipment and supplies within the house,

from a large organization, and we are dealing with housebuilders

for houses as opposed to the general construction industry which is

prone to bid everything we issue. There is a big difference.

The housebuilders are a different type of constructor, specialized

in that area, and they do quite well at it.


Mr. McEWEN. Normally when you seek proposals on a turnkey

project, how many proposals would you receive for one project?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Here again, sir, it depends on the size of the

project and the location in which we happen to be operating, but

on a statewide project of the order of let us call it 500 units, we would

have competition of anywhere from 8 to a dozen large firms.

Mr. MCEwEN. For one project ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. For one project.

Mr. SIKES. Gentlemen, let us suspend.

[A brief recess.]

Mr. SIKES. Would you proceed, Mr. Davis.

Mr. McEWEN. Mr. Chairman, if I might just conclude, I was asking

the admiral about turnkey.

You said, I believe, that 50 to 80 percent of your family housing

is built under turnkey ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I said in the 1974 program we hope to put

about 75 percent of the awards out under turnkey arrangements.

Mr. McEWEN. The others will be conventional plans and specifica-


Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCEWEN. Bidding. And in what areas and for what reason will

you go to conventional bidding rather than turnkey ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. In some areas it is necessary for us to use site

adaptations of previous jobs for compatibility's sake. In some areas

the jobs are small enough so we feel they should be bid on the open

market and there is a construction market there available in which to

be bid, but by and large we have found that this turnkey method is

much more satisfactory for housing jobs.

Mr. McEWEN. Have you ever encountered the situation, Admiral,

in an area where there was not a great deal of homebuilding or de-

velopment of housing projects, where therefore you didn't have home-

builders who have plans in their inventory, where contractors, if they

were to make a proposal, have to go out and employ an architect and

draw plans specifically for that project? Have you run into that situ-

ation at all?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I personally have not, sir, but in a case of that

sort we certainly would go conventional. It is not our idea to go to the

industry and cause a great deal of expense in preparing proposals just

to satisfy our desire to go one way or another.

Inevitably we examine the market when we go to bid on any of our

work, housing or otherwise, so that should this case occur we certainly

would just go to conventional procedures.

Mr. McEWEN. Then in most of your turnkeys, those who are making

the proposals have plans already on hand, or possibly with some modi-

fication, for your project?

Admiral MARSCHALL. One of the criteria is that this fellow should

have built this particular house before he submits it to us and the re-

sult there is that instead of developing, reinventing the wheel, so to

speak, he does a little architect treatment, a little site development, and

is able to give us a package.

Mr. McEWEN. Thank you very much.

Mr. SIKES. Any further questions, Mr. Davis ?

Mr. DAVIS. No.

Mr. SIKES. Very well. Thank you, Admiral.




We are ready now to hear Brig. Gen. M. T. Jannell discuss the mili-

tary requirements for the Marine Corps for the fiscal year 1974


I am advised, General Jannell, that this will be your last regular ap-

pearance before this subcommittee before reassignment. Is that correct ?

General JANNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIKES. Let me wish you well in what you are doing. You have

been a valiant witness in your appearances here. We have been very,

very appreciative of your help to the committee and the capable testi-

mony that you have given us.

We will insert your biographical sketch in the record.

[The biographical sketch follows:]


(F. & S.), HQMC

Manning Titcomb Jannell was born January 17, 1921, in Farmington, Maine.

He graduated from high school in 1940 in Weymouth, Mass., and attended

Valley Forge Military Academy, Junior College for 2 years. He later received a

BA degree in military science from the University of Maryland.

He enlisted in the U.S. Navy Reserve in March 1942, and was subsequently

assigned to flight training at Corpus Christi, Tex. Upon graduation in April

1943, he was designated a naval aviator and commissioned a second lieutenant in

the Marine Corps Reserve. Immediately following flight training, Lieutenant

Jannell was assigned as an instructor at the Naval Air Training Command,

Corpus Christi, Tex. Lieutenant Jannell sailed for Okinawa in 1944 where he

served as electronics officer with Marine lighter Squadron 441.

Returning from Okinawa, Lieutenant Jannell was assigned to the Marine

Corps Air Infantry School, Quantico, Va., where he was promoted to captain.

Upon graduation, Captain Jannell returned to Corpus Christi, Tex., as a flight


Assigned next to Headquarters Marine Corps, he served as a staff officer with

the Division of Aviation. Captain Jannell saw action in Korea while serving as

a flight officer with Marine All Weather Fighter Squadrons 542 and 513, 1st

Marine Aircraft Wing.

In September 1951, Captain Jannell was ordered to Headquarters, Air, Fleet

Marine Forces, Pacific, Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, Calif., and assumed

the duties as Officer in Charge, Flight Section and Staff Pilot. During this

assignment, he was promoted to major. Returning to Korea in 1954, he com-

manded Marine Fighter Squadron 311 until mid-1955. For the next 3 years, Major

Jannell served as an instructor, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va. During

this period, he attended and graduated from the University of Maryland under

the college degree program. Major Jannell completed helicopter flight training

in 1959 and served as executive officer, and subsequently, commanding officer of

Marine Helicopter Squadrons 363 and 364. He was promoted to lieutenant col-

onel in July 1962 while serving as commanding officer, Marine Helicopter .Squad-

rou 364.

Colonel Jannell graduated from the Armed Forces Staff College in June 1963

and then was assigned duty in Europe where he served as operations staff officer,

Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Camp de Loges, France. In August

1966, he reported to the Republic of Vietnam for duty as the logistics officer

(S-4), Marine Aircraft Group 16, and later, as commanding officer, Marine

Helicopter Squadron 164, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

Returning to the United States in late 1967, he was assigned duty on the staff,

Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va. In this billet, he was promoted to colonel,

and later assigned to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington,

D.C. Graduating in June 1970, he reported again to Headnuarters, Marine Corps,

for duty. Colonel Jannell served as Director, Facilities Division, in the Office of

the Assistant Quartermaster General (Facilities and Services). Upon receiving

his advancement to brigadier general, August 5, 1971, he was assigned as the

Assistant Quartermaster General (Facilities and Services).

\9"Y -~

His personal decorations include the Distinguished Flying Cross with one

Gold Star in lieu of a second award, the Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V,"

the Air Medal with bronze numeral "17," the Joint .Service Commendation Medal

with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Navy Commendation Medal, and the Purple Heart


General Jannell and his wife, the former Lenora B. Jones of Weymouth, Mass.,

have four children: Lenora Kay, Joseph M., Richard E., and Angela J. His

parents are Mr. and Mrs. Joseph L. Jannell of South Weymouth, Mass.

General JANNELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIKEs. Would you proceed ?

General JANNELL. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, it is my pleasure to

again have the opportunity to present the Marine Corps military con-

struction program. This year's request reflects our continuing major

effort to provide new and improved personnel support facilities. In

addition, construction dollars for operational, utility, and combat

training oriented facilities are requested. The Marine Corps appro-

priations request for fiscal year 1974 military construction totals

$54,844,000. Exclusive of our aforementioned request is $7,550,000 for

pollution abatement projects at Marine Corps installations.

In addition to the appropriation dollars requested, the Marine

Corps will request authorization only for the acquisition of interests

in lands contiguous to the Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, Ariz., to

be accomplished through exchange of excess Department of Defense

real estate. The acquisition would provide encroachment protection

of the air station which would assure the unimpaired mission accom-

plishment in addition to protecting the potential homeowner against

overflight hazards and high noise levels.

The backbone of our $54,844,000 request before this committee is

concentrated in our concern to satisfy deficiencies in bachelor enlisted

quarters and other personnel support facilities. The remainder will

provide certain urgent operational facilities essential to our readiness

posture, and for transfer of our inventory control point, Philadelphia,

Pa., to Marine Corps Supply Center, Albany, Ga. Our personnel sup-

port projects represent 57 percent of this $54.8 million. And $25.4

million will provide room configured housing facilities and three

modern messhalls for our bachelor enlisted marines. Additionally,

$5.9 million is requested for, a gymnasium, commissary, and a dis-

pensary, which will provide needed recreational and personnel wel-

fare facilities. The Marine Corps has dedicated a major portion of its

construction efforts to bachelor housing facilities, for the past 5 fiscal

years. We are convinced that the provision of modern and reasonably

comfortable living accommodations for our bachelor marines is in the

best interest of both the marine and the corps. In view of this convic-

tion, we will continue to place personnel support projects to the fore-

ground until we feel we have provided a reasonably sound functional

physical plant for the needs of our men and women. The remaining

$23.5 million request provides $2.7 million for -air and ground opera-

tional facilities, $9.1 million for utilities, $0.07 million for cold storage

warehouse, $1.7 million for roads 'and vehicle maintenance facilites,

$0.06 million for real estate necessary for ordnance storage, and $3.5

million for a combat training complex and applied instruction facili-

ties. Additionally, $5.2 million is required for facilities at Marine

Corps Supply Center, Albany, Ga., to accept movement of the inven-

tory control point from Marine Corps supply activity, Philadelphia,




Gentlemen, that summarizes our program by facility category, which

we believe to be a well-balanced program. I shall attempt to answer

any questions you may have.

Mr. SIKES. Thank you, General Jannell.

Mr. Secretary, soon after you joined the secretariat in the Navy

you called to my attention some deficiencies in Marine Corps facilities

which were disturbing you. I was surprised to find that the Marines

did not seem to be keeping abreast of the other services in the

replacement of older inadequate facilities.

I don't know whether that situation has improved or not. The

Marine share of the budget has never been particularly large. Are

you satisfied with the present progress ?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir. The emphasis the commandants have placed

on replacing and modernizing their personnel facilities, both Gen-

eral Chapman and now General Cushman, is beginning to pay off

very rapidly.

I would ask General Jannell to comment with reference to the defi-

ciencies in this area but there has been a very marked improvement.

Mr. SIKES. General Jannell, do you want to comment on the general

progress and on the elimination of the deficiency ?

General JANNELL. Sir, the deficiency in our total personnel support

facilities currently equates to $360 million. Of this total, $292 million

relates to bachelor housing. At a level of $33 million per year it is

estimated to take 16 years to meet our deficiency.

This projection is based on a 6-percent construction cost escalation

and maintains current construction standards.


Mr. SIKES. Is the Marine Corps meeting its All-Volunteer Force

recruiting objectives ?

General JANNELL. Quantitative requirements are currently being

met and we anticipate continuation of this trend in fiscal year 1974.

The Marine Corps is chiefly concerned today with improving the

quality of the enlisted accessions.

Mr. SANDERS. Let me point out, sir, if I could elaborate that, several

months ago the Commandant took action to increase the standards

governing the recruit he would take into the Marine Corps. We have

been able in these months to meet the quotas with the higher



Mr. SIxHE. What is the Marine Corps policy on off-base housing for

bachelor personnel?

General JANNELL. In general terms the Marine Corps policy is that

officers and staff noncommissioned officers will rely 'on the civilian

community as the primary source of housing and that sergeants and

below will normally be housed on board the Installation.

Mr. SIKEs. Is this policy applied uniformly at all bases?

General JANNELL. Yes, sir, it is. This policy is applied uniformly at

all bases. However, wide differences in both on-base and off-base hous-

ing as well as differences in contingency missions of units will result

in variations in assignment of personnel from one installation to



Mr: SIXES. Is the Marine Corps planning realinements which will

eliminate or consolidate facilities? Has there been a realinement of

Marine Corps forces worldwide as a result of our Southeast Asia

agreement ? Does this change your facilities requirements ?

General JANNELL. The Marine Corps continues to study and reeval-

uate its alinements and posture in light of both qualitative and quan-

titative factors. At present our plans reflect the relocation of the in-

ventory control point from Philadelphia to Marine Corps Supply

Center, Albany, Ga.

In regard to Marine Corps involvement in Southeast Asia, during

the Vietnam buildup, the Marine Corps did not expand its permanent

base posture. Troop strength increases were positioned in combat

zones and were absorbed as transient peak capacities at our existing

installations. In the disengagement period, reductions in forces gen-

erally paralleled withdrawal of Marine units from combat areas. As

a result of absorbing strength reductions in this manner, our perma=

nent facility requirements have remained stable during the disen-

gagement from Southeast Asia.

Mr. SIKES. What requirements do you anticipate as a result of new

missions or new weapons systems ?

General JANNELL. The Marine Corps does not anticipate any major

facility requirements as the result of change in missions or weapons

systems that cannot be accommodated in our existing installation



Mr. SIKEs. Has the Marine Corps had any more serious problems

with Executive Order 11508 actions?

General JANNELL. NO, sir; it has not.

Mr. SIXES. Do you anticipate any in view of the present surveys and

discussions of surplus action ?

General JANNELL. No, sir. The total acreage which has been excessed

as a result of this Executive Order 11508, in addition to that leased to

the State of California, Camp Pendleton, is 34,461 acres, which rep-

resents 3 percent of our total inventory.

Mr. SIKES. There was some discussion about the excessing of some

of the land at Quantico. Has that been dropped ?

General JANNELL. Yes, sir; we have excessed almost 5,000 acres at

the Marine Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC)

at Quantico.

Mr. SIKEs. Is that a sound action ?

General JANNELL. Yes, sir; we believe so.


Mr. SIKES. You have in this budget a request to establish a compat-

ible use zone at Yuma. Are there other instances where you have prob-

lems on compatible use zones around air installations or other instal-


General JANNELL. In our air use zones surrounding our air instal-

lations we have not been successful to date in implementing our land

exchange authorization at Marine Corps Air Station El Toro and

Marine Corps Air Station, helicopter, at Santa Ana.

Mr. 'SIKES. Those two are still up in the air; is that correct?

General JANNELL. That is correct, sir. We are making progress with

the Hunters Point land but as yet we have not made any finalized

agreement on that, sir.

Mr. SIKES. Do you anticipate a change in that situation, or does the

problem look insurmountable ?

General JANNELL. There is a possible break on this. However, we are

now looking at this whole project in detail in order to make this


Mr. SIKES. Are there other instances than these where you have a

problem with use zones?

General JANNELL. NO, sir.

Mr. SIKEs. You seem to be getting a better grip on the housing prob-

lem. What is your next most serious deficiency in Marine Corps


General JANNELL. In our total personnel support facility program,

I think we are getting a handle on the bachelor enlisted housing but I

would suggest possibly the other personnel support facilities such as

the mess halls, and our recreational type facilities. We have a gym-

nasium in this year's program, as well as a commissary. I don't

really see a big problem in that area, though, sir. Those that I have

mentioned are in the personnel support area; however, we recognize

other deficiencies in the operational area, as well as in aging utility


Mr. SIKES. General Jannell, thank you. I believe we should turn to

base realinements.


Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, what I would like to do is very quickly

to give you a general picture of the Navy's recent shore establishment

realinement action.

Mr. SINES. All right.

Mr. SANDERS. What I would propose to do is give you the back-

ground of the problem as we saw it, criteria we used generally for our

actions, touch upon the two major areas of homeporting and the Naval

shipyards, and answer any specific questions you might have.

The Navy witnesses appearing before you in connection with the

MILCON program will be prepared to speak to any specific projects

or any specific installations you might want to discuss.




Fiscal year-

Forces 1964 1969 1974

Active fleet ships-.. -- - -- --_~....... .... ....-.-....-....... .... 917 926 523

Carriers... ... .........--------------------------------------------------- 24 22 15

Active fleet aircraft...... ~... ... _.____......__....._.._ ...... .. 5, 014 5, 051 3, 956

Reserve aircraft- ...-........... ... - ............ . ..... ...... 763 802 447


Active ship home port complexes-....................... --.-... 10 10 10

Active aircraft basing complexes.......-............. .. .. .. 17 17 17

Reserve aircraft airfields ................................. . 13 12 7

Naval shipyards.._..-............ ... . ....... ....... ..... 11 10 10

Naval air rework facilities ........... ... _ ..-...... 7 7 7

Naval hospitals................................. .... -.... . 30 30 30

Mr. SANDERS. Actually, sir, here is how we found ourselves some time

ago: We had reduced the Navy drastically, from 917 ships in 1964 to

523 in fiscal year 1974. Carriers dropped from 24 to 15, and the 15

heading downward in our out-year planning. The same way with ref-

erence to aircraft, 5,000 to under 4,000 and reserve aircraft from 763

to 447, basically, with little or no reduction in shore stations. Now it

is perfectly obvious that in an era of fiscal constraints we were float-

ing with a very significant overhead in our naval shore establishment.

Mr. Packard referred to the shore establishment problem on several

occasions, as far as the Department of Defense was concerned, while

he was Deputy Secretary of Defense. The Navy has had a desire for

some time to bring down the size of its Shore Establishment in line

with the reduced size of the fleet.

I might point out, if you are interested in statistics, that this repre-

sents a reduction of about 42 percent in the number of ships, about 21

percent in the number of aircraft, and something like 15 percent re-

duction in manpower.



Tempo of operations not to exceed 1 in 3 rotation

Minimum conus dispersal

Achieve early savings by accelerated actions

Maximum reductions consistent with fleet support


Shipyards and homeports in close proximity

Personnel support policies will maintain

Navy operational and economic factors govern

Mr. SANDERS. We established certain criteria for a look-see at this

total Shore Establishment. This has been going on in one form or an-

other since 1969. It is not something hastily put together. These are

the basic assumptions that we had, including trying to maintain the

tempo of our operations so we get our traditional 1-in-3 rotation and

let the man on the ship spend time at home with his family.

We made the sacrifice of minimum dispersal in continental United

States. This did not present a problem to us. Obviously in our situa-

tion with fiscal constraints and with this problem having lagged for

so many years, we did push for the achievement of early savings by

accelerated actions to the maximum extent that we could. Of course,


we continued to put fleet support first and made maximum reduc-

tions consistent with fleet support.

We continued the policies with which you are familiar of trying to

keep our shipyards and homeports in close proximity, again to hold

down a permanent change of station costs and to keep the men close

to their families and to their normal sphere of operation.

We did continue to maintain our personnel support policies to the

best of our ability and, finally, of course, to have naval operational

and economic factors override almost anything.


At least two homeports on each coast capable of homeporting Forrestal and

later class aircraft carriers.

At least two homeports on each coast capable of homeporting surface com-


At least two homeports on each coast capable of homeporting submarines.

At least two homeports on each coast capable of homeporting auxiliaries.

At least one homeport on each coast capable of homeporting amphibious ships.

FBM submarine training support on each coast.

Mr. SANDERS. Now, let me discuss first, if I might, our homeport

criteria, and the way we took a look at the homeport situation.

We found that we needed, after careful review of our operational

requirements and the size of our projected Navy, at least two home-

ports on each coast capable of homeporting the Forrestal, the Enter-

prise, or the later class attack carrier, the Nimitz. We wanted two

homeports on each coast capable of homeporting our surface com-

batants, two on each coast capable of homeporting submarines, two

capable of homeporting the service force or the auxiliary fleet, and

one on each coast capable of homeporting the amphibious ships, work

with the Marines, and one on each coast for fleet ballistic missile


Mr. DAvIS. Was there any doubling up of those ?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes. I will show you these.

These were basically the criteria we used and I will show you what

we did


Narra- New

gansett London Charles-

Required Available Bay (Groton) Norfolk ton Mayport Key West

Carriers...---------------................ 2 3 X X--------- XX .....-----X

Surface combatants ___..... 2 5 X .......... X X X X

Submarines----------------..2 4 ----.......... X X X .......... X

Auxiliaries-----------------..2 6 X X X X X X

Amphibious-------................ 1 1 ----------------............X

FBM submarine training..... 1 1 ......------------------------ X .........


Mr. SANDERS. This is the east coast homeport matrix worked out in

very short order applying those criteria. You will see that for the car-

riers, we required two homeports and we had three; the surface com-

batants, two against five; the subs, two against four; auxiliaries, two

against six, and the amphibious force and FBM training support, we

had one base for each one.

~L~rraQ r

You can see that the driving factor in our homeporting is the car-

rier, particularly the large Nimitz-class and the Forrestal-class car-


We had three carrier ports, Narragansett Bay, Norfolk and May-


Any two of these three locations had the capability together with

Charleston of meeting the requirements for surface combatants, sub-

marines, and auxiliaries.

I think that answers your question.

Mr. DAVIs. Yes.

Mr. SANDERS. We looked very carefully at the entire picture. Nor-

folk is very much a must for us, Hampton Roads is a large area with

considerable Navy investment.

Actually, what we looked at in the final analysis, really was Nar-

ragansett Bay and Mayport.


Nlon/Groton Norfolk Charleston Mayport

(fiscal year) (fiscal year) (fiscal year) (fiscal year)

1969 1974 1969 1974 1969 1974 1969 1974

Ships/mix (total)...................... 55 43 162 116 71 59 34 29

Carriers .................................. 0 0 5 4 0 0 3 2

Combatants...-............................ 1 0 48 44 16 24 23 17

Auxiliaries................................. 4 3 46 23 34 11 8 10

Amphibious--..-... --..-..... ------------ 0 0 53 30 0 0 0 0

Submarines............... ................. 50 40 10 5 21 24 0 0

Mr. SANDERS. Looking at this, we made a conscious decision to take

the fleet out of Narragansett Bay, consolidate submarine work at New

London-Groton, Norfolk, Charleston, which is a must because of our

capability of our fleet ballistic-missile operations there as well as the

submarine, and then Mayport with its carrier complex.

It is obvious that our problem was with reference to Mayport

versus Narragansett Bay. We looked very carefully again at the cost

involved in this respect. We found that we had taken the ASW car-

rier, the so-called CVS, out of Narragansett Bay. We then decided to

take the CVS's completely out of the Navy. So we are projecting no

CVS-ASW-type carrier. Our entire concept is based on turning the

large attack carrier into what we call a CV.

Narragansett Bay and Quonset Point will not handle the large car-

rier. We estimate a cost of something like $25 million in order to

dredge the channel, build the piers, and other necessary facilities at

Quonset Point in order just to provide the facilities for the large at-

tack carrier.

In addition, we like to have near the carrier a master jet field or

a jet-capable field. The carrier aircraft can offload, practice, do their

training while the carrier is in port.

The naval air station at Quonset, due to geographical problems

and other restrictions, is impossible to expand into the capability to

handle our modern high-performance jet attack aircraft. So what we

have done is consolidated on the east coast at Norfolk, Charleston, and

Mayport. We have had to increase some of the ships numbers at


Charleston, some of the destroyers at Norfolk in order to meet our

total requirement.

Now the question is often asked: All right, you took the carriers out

of Narragansett Bay some time ago, why take the other ships out ?

Simply stated, we have enough facilities in existence with some

slight, slight construction at Norfolk, Charleston, and Mayport to

handle all of the surface combatants and the auxiliaries now stationed

in Narragansett Bay. So, rather than keep the large overhead neces-

sary to support the surface combatants in Narragansett Bay other

than carriers, we moved them and dispersed them to Norfolk, Charles-

ton and a few down in Mayport. This basically eliminated the over-


Of course, when we did this, the requirement for many of our fa-

cilities in the Boston area, the shipyard, to a lesser extent the hospital

and other things, also went by the board.



Number San Long Pearl

required Available Diego Beach Alameda Harbor

Carriers---------------------------- 2 3 X X X

Surface combatants---. .... 2 3 X X ........--------... X

Submarines...-----...---------... ---.... ------..... 2 2 X X

Auxiliaries......... ..........------------------------- 2 4 X X X X

Amphibious-------.........--..........-------- 1 2 X X -----------

FBM submarine training..------------- 1 1 ............----------- .....--------...... .......------------- X

Mr. SANDERS. Now, if I could turn to the west coast for the moment.

We see virtually the same situation. We had homeports at San Diego,

Long Beach, Alameda, in San Francisco Bay and Pearl Harbor.

Again we had the same criteria, same problem; two carrier homeports

with three available, two surface combatant homeports with three

available, two submarines with two available, two auxiliaries with

four available; one amphibious with two available; and one, with one

available for FBM training.

We examined this in exactly the same fashion as we did the east

coast, having the capability to consolidate all of the activities on the

west coast, exclusive of Pearl Harbor, into two locations.


San Diego, fiscal year- Alameda, fiscal year- Pearl Harbor, fiscal year--

1969 1974 1969 1974 1969 1974

Ships/mix (total).-------------- 187 120 7 9 89 58

Carriers...---------------------------- 2 2 4 5 0 0

Surface combatants----------........------- 70 46 0 O 36 21

Submarines.....------------------------ 19 15 0 0 24 21

Auxiliaries.......------------------------- 43 24 3 4 29 16

Amphibious.....................------------------------... 53 33 0 0 0 0

Mr. SANDERS. We did this by eliminating the homeporting in Long

Beach and consolidating basically at San Diego, Alameda in the

bay area, and with a slight buildup still over in Pearl Harbor. You

"---'-- i~iiiT -I- "? ....

can see that this gives us a large number of ships down at San Diego.

We have been criticized, and questioned about how the Navy can

get that many ships homeported in San Diego.

I want to point out that our projection for San Diego shows 67

less ships homeported there under the realinement package than

we had in fiscal year 1969. We anticipate no problem.

[Supplemental information follows:]

Of the 120 ships which will be homeported in San Diego, 31 require deep draft

berthing space when in port. Eventually, five of these ships will be nuclear

powered surface ships, so the new pier will be designed to support nuclear ships

though the majority of its requirement is for nonnuclear deep draft ships.

Mr. SANDERS. There are certain military construction requirements,

particularly at San Diego, that you will see in here which are neces-

sary in order to accomplish this, particularly with reference to the

homeporting of the nuclear noncarrier surface fleet at San Diego.

There is a large pier required.



Two naval shipyards on each coast for carrier overhaul/drydocking; one

naval shipyard on each coast for surface nuclear ship overhaul: three naval

shipyards on each coast for nuclear submarine overhaul; three naval shipyards

on each coast for sophisticated electronics, fire control.

Drydocks; utilize facilities ; homeport.

Mr. SANDERS. Taking a look at the shipyards, if I might, another

large area of controversy. We examined our shipyard requirements.

Could I go off the record for a moment, sir ?

Mr. SIXES. Yes.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. SIKES. Proceed.

Mr. SANDERS. In looking at our shipyard requirements, if I may

mention the criteria that we worked out on what was required: Two

Navy shipyards on each coast for carrier overhaul and drydocking

capability, feeling that we had to have two versus one, in case there

was an accident and closed down one; one on each coast for surface

nuclear ship overhaul; three on each coast for nuclear submarine

overhaul, primarily because of the buildup, and three on each coast

for our sophisticated electronics, fire control, other things that 'we

have on our surface forces.

We had the other criteria for drydock problems, utilizing existing

facilities which are available with a minimum of military construc-

tion and, of course, trying to locate the shipyard as close to a homeport

as we could get with these other criteria overriding, as you will see

in just a moment.



Number Philadel-

required Charleston Norfolk phia Boston Portsmouth

Carrier overhaul/drydock. .-...-... 2 ........_ s X ...........

Surface nuclear ship overhaul........ 1 ............ X .------ ---------------------------

Nuclear submarine overhaul ._.. 3 X X .---------------------- X

Sophisticated electronics fire control._ 3 aX 4 X X X ' X

Carrier drydocks (Forrestal class/CVN). 2 .......... 1 2 ........................

Other large drydocks---. ---....____ 11 3 3 2 3 2

Total drydocks------------------____ 20 6 7 5 5 3








Mr. SANDERS. This basically is what we had before the realinement.

With reference to the carrier overhaul, two required, one present at

Norfolk and, of course, Philadelphia, with a nonnuclear capability

there. Surface nuclear ship overhaul, one at Norfolk, the nuclear sub-

marine overhaul, three required, with three, Charleston, Norfolk, and


Then the sophisticated electronics and fire control, three required,

with basically all five in whole or in part capable of meeting the


The carrier drydocks, of the Forrestal class other than some of the

others, the large ones, you see the explanation there.



required Charleston Norfolk Philadelphia Portsmouth

Carrier overhaul drydock.-------------------- - 2 __________ X X .......--------

Surface nuclear ship overhaul.................... 1 .......... X ......----------------

Nuclear submarine overhaul .................... 3 X X ........... X

Sophisticated electronics fire control............... 3a X a X X X X

Carrier drydocks (Forrestal class/CVN)............. 2 - - --..- -.. .1 2 ...

Other large drydocks-------.------------------- 11 3 3 2 2

Total drydocks............. ............... 20 6 7 5 3

7 Nuclear.

* Nonnuclear.

a AAW, ASW, Sub, SSBN.

4 AW, AAW, ASW, Sub, SSBN.


e Sub, SSBN.

Mr. SANDERS. Then of course our other large drydocks available.

A total of some 20 drydocks required with 26 available.

We again examined very carefully our capability of putting the

workload and the requirements of these shipyards into the minimum

number essential. As a result of that, bearing in mind our homeport-

ing, we dropped Boston, retained our capability at Charleston, Nor-

folk, Philadelphia, with Portsmouth of course being a peculiar sub-

marine yard.

This of course dropped Boston out of the east coast.

\L l~aa~.~


Number Long Hunters Mare Puget Pearl

required Beach Point Island Sound Harbor

Carrier overhaul/drydock..----.... . 2 1X X -----------... X X

Surface nuclear ship overhaul... 1- ................_ ...... X X ...

Nuclear submarine overhaul.......... 3 .......... ---- X X X

Sophisticated electronics fire control.. 3 aX 4 X 6 X s X X

Carrier drydocks (Forrestal class/

CVN)--------..........----... ...... ....-------------------- 2 1 1 ........... 2 1

Other large drydocks................ 11 3 2 3 3 4

Total drydocks------- -------------- 24 6 6 5 6 5

1 Nonnuclear.

9 Nuclear.



6 AW, Sub, SSBN.

6AAW, ASW, Sub.

Mr. SANDERS. Going to the west coast, we have the same type of

situation, but a little more complicated in that we had capability at

Long Beach, and Hunters Point in the Bay area, Mare Island a sub-

marine yard with a nuclear surface capability, also in the Bay area,

Puget Sound up in the Seattle area and of course Pearl Harbor over

here. Again it is perfectly apparent from these figures that we had

additional, excess capability in our shipyard plants on the west coast.

We examined very carefully this entire matter. Mare Island,

peculiarly submarine and therefore very much required; Pearl Har-

bor, because of its forward position, the ability to homeport the fleet

there, the obvious advantage, pretty well set; Puget Sound, a nuclear

capability with the carriers up there, a capability also for nuclear

FBM submarine overhaul, also with the Trident program and all

these other things beginning to go in.

We really got down to Long Beach versus Hunters Point, or we

were really talking nonnuclear surface ship drydock.

After a great deal of analysis, that we can go into as much as you

like, we made a decision to close Hunters Point and maintain the

shipyards as you can see at Long Beach, Puget Sound on the west

coast, with Mare Island continuing as a submarine yard and Pearl

Harbor out here.


Number Long Mare Puget Pearl

required Beach Island Sound Harbor

Carrier overhaul/drydock.....---.. ------------- 2 X ............ X X

Surface nuclear ship overhaul.................... 1 ............ X X ---

Nuclear submarine overhaul_-...-- - ..-... ------- 3 ............ X X X

Sophisticated electronics, fire control.----------- 3 X 2 X aX 4 X

Carrier drydocks (Forrestal class/CVN).-.. ------- 2 e 1 ......... 6 2 61

Other large drydocks---........----......-.... - - 11 3 3 3 4

Total drydocks.......-----------.-- 24 6 5 6 5


r AW, Sub, SSBN.

a AW, Sub, SSBN.

SAW, ASW, Sub.


e Nuclear.

Mr. SANDERS. Now, the question is often asked: Why Long Beach

and why maintain a shipyard at Long Beach, at the same time you

take the fleet out of Long Beach and put it at San Diego


Two problems there: No. 1, there is grossly insufficient capacity at

Long Beach to satisfy the homeporting and the requirements compared

to that which we have down at San Diego.

San Diego is a large naval base, built up, requires some additional

construction which you will see later on; much more economic to do

than to build up Long Beach.

No. 2, Long Beach is within a few hours of San Diego. For home-

porting purposes, when the ship is in Long Beach for overhaul and

repair, homeported at San Diego, 'we have always considered that a

homeport overhaul.


Now, what about the economics of the situation in gross? The ques-

tion is asked: Well, with all your costs of doing this, your one-time

costs, how does that tie into the savings ? We estimate gross one-time

costs, military construction, severance pay, everything else that goes

with it, relocation pay, of roughly $277 million. We estimate at a

minimum annual savings on a comparable basis of $200 million. So

we should in effect amortize the costs with the savings basis in less than

2 years with this type of action.

I will be happy, sir, to try to answer any questions that you might


Mr. SIKES. This has been a very interesting presentation and one

that is helpful to the committee, Mr. Secretary. Are these charts avail-

able for the record ?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir; they are. I believe the committee has a copy

of them.


Mr. SIKES. What effect will the shore establishment realinement

decisions have on the Navy's total construction deficit ?

Mr. SANDERS. The shore establishment realinement will reduce the

Navy's total construction deficit by approximately $100 million.

Mr. SIKEs. How many bachelor and family housing units will you


Mr. SANDERS. I would like to provide a table for the record.

[The information follows:]




Sub- Sub- Family

standard standard

can be can be Excess Excess

Adequate modernized Adequate modernized adequate substandard

NSY, Hunters Point-..... 51 ............ 427 37 128 11

NAS Imperial Beach...... 84 -------... ..... 717

NS, Long Beach.... 30 ------------.......... 1,000 -- 588

NS Key West--------------------- ----------- 0 584 ..------------------..................--

NAS, Abany------------------------ 72 13 1,295 255 270 ...----....-----

NAS, Glynco----------------------- 306 ------------........ 997 ------------... 437 .......--------

NAD, Oahu........................---------------- 3 ---------.. ------...--------------------------

NSA/NSY, Boston...--- -------------------------------------------- 142 49 ...--..-------

NH, Chelsea....------------------------ 77 ------------......... 351 _.........

NTC Bainbridge--..--........... . .......... 206 357 ------------------.................----

NS, Newport....................... 357 ---........ 472 535 735 .....----

NAS, Quonset Point...------------... ---........... 140 ...------------..... 1,578 7 468

NH, St. Albans..---------------------------------------- 176 -- ---------------------........... ......

Total---......------------------- 1,120 13 7, 219 1,910 1,626 1,067

" -- '- ....................... 7 7[177TT- 71


Mr. SIKES. How much will the backlog of maintenance be reduced

as a result of the planned base closures?

Mr. SANDERS. Approximately $23 million.


Mr. SIKEs. I note from your statement, Mr. Secretary, that this

year's program contains $45 million for projects related to base clos-

ures. How much military construction do you anticipate will be re-

quired as a result of base closures in fiscal year 1975 and beyond until

a stable short establishment condition is reached?

Provide details of projects required and avoided in all programed

years and the out years as a result of these realinements.

[The information follows:]

Projects Required to Support Realinements


Activity and project amount

Fiscal year 1974: (thousands)

NSA Brooklyn, BEQ modernization -- ---------------------- $1, 056

NSA Brooklyn, relocate telephone switchboard -------------------- 75

NSY Philadelphia, computer support facility-------------------- 180

NSY Philadelphia, electronics equipment facility ----------------- 735

FCDSTC Dam Neck, applied instruction building----------------5, 959

NAS Norfolk, helicopter maintenance hangar------------------- 2, 525

NS Norfolk, relocation of fleet landing-------------------------- 803

NS Norfolk, dredge south side pier 2---------------------------- 314

NS Norfolk, vehicle parking area-------------------------------- 310

NS Norfolk, applied instruction building----------------------- 3, 950

MCSC Albany, administration building------------------------ 5, 204

NAS Cecil Field, intermediate maintenance facility--------------- 2, 845

NAS Cecil Field, weapons system training facility ---------------- 791

NAS Jacksonville, BOQ modernization--------------------------- 850

NAS Jacksonville, bachelor enlisted quarters-------------------- 1, 494

NAS Memphis, applied instruction building-----------------_ 4, 478

NS San Diego, berthing pier------------------------------ 10, 000

NAS Miramar, avionics shop addition--------------------------- 331

NAS Miramar, applied instruction building-----.1---------------- , 123

NAS North Island, applied instruction building ------------------ 476

NSY Hunters Point, drydock support facility -------------------- 250

NSY Mare Island, electronics shop alterations------------------- 200

NAS Moffett Field, BEQ modernization------------------------- 500

NAS Moffett Field, parking apron------------------------------ 750

NAS Moffett Field, fuel storage------------------------------- 300

Total --------------------------------------------------- 45, 499

Fiscal year 1975:

NATF Lakehurst, engineering/development and shop space------... 5, 030

NATF Lakehurst, administrative space---..------------------------ 1, 260

SPCC Mechanicsburg, ADP facility----------------------------- 300

NATC Patuxent River, engineering/development and shop space---- 1, 337

FCDSTC Dam Neck, bachelor officers quarters------------------- 1, 685

FCDSTC Dam Neck, bachelor enlisted quarters--- 1---------------- , 095

NAS Norfolk, runway--------------------------------- 1, 530

NABS Norfolk, parking apron-----......---------------------------- 1, 364

NS Norfolk, fleet staff operations facility---------------------- 1, 214

NS Norfolk, BEQ modernization---------- 2, ------------------- 2,680

NAS Jacksonville, maintenance hanger modernization------------ 632

NAS Jacksonville, helicopter training facility------------------- 1, 200

NABS Memphis, bachelor enlisted quarters------------------------ 2, 760

NAS Pensacola, aircraft parking ramp1----------------------- , 260

NAS Pensacola, hanger 1-------------------------------- , 500

Projects Required to Support Realinements-Continued


Activity and project amount

Fiscal year 1974-Continued (thousands)

NAS Pensacola, bachelor enlisted quarters----------------------- $1, 200

NS San Diego, applied instruction building---------------------- 476

NS San Diego, bachelor enlisted quarters------------------------ 500

NAS San Diego, aircraft facility-------------------------------- 3, 6683

NAS San Diego, aircraft hanger--- -------------------------- 4, 700

NAS San Diego, EM club------------------------------------ 300

NAS Miramar, electrical distribution improvements---------------. 1, 800

NAS Miramar, aircraft hanger--- --------------------------- 3, 669

NAS Miramar, aircraft apron------------------------------- 1, 123

NAS Miramar, bachelor enlisted quarters------------------------ 822

NAS Moffett Field, aircraft hanger---------------------------- 2, 400

NAS Moffett Field, supply facility----------------------------- 400

NWS Concord, quality evaluation laboratory addition-------------............ 368

Total ------------------------------------------------ 46, 268

Projects avoided in fiscal year 1974 and future programs due to realinements




Activity and project thousandsa)

NSY Boston, fuel conversion------------------------------------- $937

NSY Boston, ground improvements/landscaping---------------------- 195

NSY Boston, BEQ with mess....---------------------------------- 10, 648

NDISCOM Portsmouth, bachelor enlisted quarters-------------------........ 1, 077

NS Newport, BEQ modernization-------.. ----- ---- ...----------------.. 492

NS Newport, BEQ modernization-.....------------------------------ 1, 191

NS Newport, berthing pier No. 3------------------------------------- 6, 261

NS Newport, land easement------------------------------------- 326

NS Newport, berthing pier No. 13----------------------------------- 5, 207

NS Newport, pier 9 utilities----- .------------------------------2, 346

NS Newport, bachelor officers quarters (5th increment) --------------- 2, 465

NPWC Newport, ship wastewater collection ashore- .----------------- 3, 521

NPWC Newport, salt water service piers 1 and 2---------------------- 993

NPWC Newport, electric facilities improvements (1st increment) ------ 1, 402

NPWC Newport, utilities for ADM (2d increment) ------------------- 863

NPWC Newport, water distribution system-------------------------- 696

NPWC Newport, compressed air, piers 1 and 2-----------------------919

NPWC Newport, electric service berthing piers----------------------- 1, 916

NPWC Newport, POL pipeline to heating plant----------------------- 151

NSC Newport, renovate fuel oil handling facility---------------------- 441

NSC Newport, fuel containment structure-------------------------- 777

NSC Newport, fuel facility vapor recovery-------------------------- 264

NSC Newport, relocate fuel lines..--------------------------------- 140

NSC Newport, relocate fuel lines---------------------------------- 160

NSC Newport, oil waste collection and reclaim---------------------- 2, 392

NSC Newport, north fuel pier improvement------------------------2, 816

COMSYSTO Newport, commissary store .--------------------------- 2, 306

NCS Newport, communication center------------------------------- 524

NCS Newport, registered publications issue office vault--------------- 371

NAS Quonset Point, corrosion control facility------------------------- 98

NAS Quonset Point, aircraft fire/crash station----------------------- 483

NAS Quonset Point, air passenger terminal-------------------------- 834

NAS Quonset Point, general service equipment facility------------- 1, 048

NAS Quonset Point, additional well___-------------------------------- 95

NAS Quonset Point, steam distribution system____------------------------ 826

NARF Quonset Point, S3A environmental control__--------------------- 752

NS Brooklyn, bachelor officers quarters with mess--------------------- 285

NS Brooklyn, addition/rehabilitation, EM barracks------------------ 867

NS Brooklyn, personnel support facility _---------------------------- 373

NAS Lakehurst, bachelor enlisted quarters__------------------------ 2, 801

NAS Lakehurst, bowling alley ------------------------------------ 769

I- i:~ ] ...T . . ' ss] ..

Projects avoided in fiscal year 1974 and future programs due to





Activity and project (thousands)

NAS Lakehurst, bachelor officers quarters. .------------------------ $2, 000

NAB Lakehurst, substation__ ---_----------------------- 392

NABS Lakehurst, aircraft washrack-------------------------------- 165

NABS Lakehurst, fire protection system, hangar area------------------ 462

NABS Lakehurst, perimeter road_______---------------------------------- 565

NAS Lakehurst, storm sewer extension_______----------------------------- 362

NABS Lakehurst, water/fire protection----------------------------- 168

NTC Bainbridge, bachelor officers quarters without mess--------------...... 516

NABS Albany, electrical distribution ---------------------------- 139

NABS Albany, bachelor enlisted quarters --------------------------- 1, 550

NABS Glynco, bachelor officers quarters modernization-_--------____ -252

NABS Glynco, maintenance hangar/apron_------------------------- 2, 489

NAB Glynco, photo school building------------------------------ 4, 478

COMSYSTO Glynco, commissary store----------------------------- 677

NS Key West, cold storage warehouse----------------------------- 1, 200

NB Key West, small arms/pyro magazines----------------------- 181

NS Key West, modify 5 bachelor enlisted quarters-------------------__ 995

NB Key West, enlarge primary electric feeder.___-------------------- 80

NS Key West, incinerator-classified material-__------------------ - 81

NS Key West, cold iron berthing improvements -------.----....____.. 1, 173

NS Key West, water system fire protection .----------------------___ 382

NS Key West, improve electrical distribution system_-- __ _______ 89

NS Key West, paving magazine, area roads------------ ---------- - 148

NS Key West, parking area/bituminous------------------------ 71

NAS Imperial Beach, medical/dental facility . ________-----------3, 499

NABS Imperial Beach, structural fire/crash station____________________ 731

NAS Imperial Beach, aircraft maintenance facility-------------____ 3, 707

NAS Imperial Beach. general aviation warehouse --------__________ 2, 042

NABS Imperial Beach, aircraft maintenance hangar-________________ 4, 742

NABS Imperial Beach, radio building/GCA crew addition____-_________ 273

NABS Imperial Beach, roads/grounds------------------------- ----- 534

PAMI San Diego, data processing center--------------------_ _ 6, 411

NS Long Beach, ship wastewater collection______------------------- _ 2, 076

NS Long Beach, pier 15 utilities .--------------------------- - - 911

NS Long Beach, military personnel complex----------------_......._ 1, 146

NS Long Beach, new pier 15-----------------------------------______ 4, 621

NS Long Beach, berthing pier 13---------------------------------- 5, 207

NS Long Beach, pier 9 utilities---- --___________ -__________-_ 2, 346

NS Long Beach. berthing pier 17 ------------------------------- 2, 964

NSC Long Beach cold storage warehouse (s1t increment) --------- 1, 403

NSC Long Beach, dike and catchment facilities__--- _______________ --296

NSC Long Beach, modernization of fuel facilities_________________ _ 1, 343

NSC Long Beach, bachelor enlisted quarters without mess____________ 2, 671

NSC Long Beach, supply management and storage building___________ 6, 976

NSC Long Beach, flammable warehouse -----..--------------------- 1,000

NSY Hunters Point, radar antenna test range -------------- -1, 739

NSY Hunters Point, mess hall___________------------------------------- 1, 358

NSY Hunters Point, marine barracks without mess ------____-____ 887

NSY Hunters Point, alterations, building 130-------- ----- 103

NSY Hunters Point, steam system improvements--------------_-- _ 2, 111

NSY Hunters Point, slope stabilization__-_____------------ - -__ 398

NSY Hunters Point, alterations,, building 123 ----------------------- 153

NSY Hunters Point, alterations, building 128 ------------__-____- __ 146

NSY Hunters Point, alterations, building 366 ------------------_ 113

NSY Hunters Point, salt water system---------------------------- 1, 726

NSY Hunters Point, replace wharf 1 ----__---------------- 2, 932

NSY Hunters Point, bachelor officers quarters ------------------- 2, 757

NSY Hunters Point, EM barracks_____----- __-- ----------- __ 6, 690

NSY Hunters Point, fresh water system-_---------__-___________ 760

NAD Oahu, bachelor enlisted quarters with mess------------------.___ 968

NAD Oahu, HERO shield ordnance facility -------------__-__- _ _ 2, 255

NAD Oahu, weapons evaluation/engineer facility (1st increment)--..-- 1, 720

Projects avoided in fiscal year 1974 and future programs due to






NAD Oahu, water main ------------------------------------- $89

MCSA Philadelphia, air conditioning------------------------ --------2, 112

MCSA Philadelphia, emergency generator plant--------------------- 191

MCSA Philadelphia, alterations to central air-conditioning (2d

increment) ----------------------------------------------------- 1,115

MOSA Philadelphia, alterations to central air-conditioning (3d

increment) ----------------------------------------------------- 574

MOSA Philadelphia, alterations to central air-conditioning (4th

increment) -----------------------------------------------------932

Total --------------------------------------- -------------166, 371


Mr. SIKEs. When do you expect that major savings will begin to

be achieved as a result of the shore establishment realinement ?

Mr. SANDERS. The last year in which the Navy will have any sub-

stantial one-time costs associated with this realinement will be fiscal

year 1976.

Mr. SIKES. Although the anticipated savings in future years may

be large, have you properly discounted these to adequately compare

them to the one-time costs which will occur this year and in the sub-

sequent 2 years?

Mr. SANDERS. The discounting technique was not utilized as the

ratio of one-time costs of $277 million to future annual cost avoidance

of over $200 million is so high and the overall amortization period is

so short.


Mr. SIRES. What determines the need for the number and location

of ship homeports and shipyards on each coast of the United States,

and what were the Navy criteria used in the determination ? Provide

that for the record.

[The information follows:]

The overriding consideration in numbers of ship homeports and shipyards is

numbers of ships and ship work versus capacities of homeports and capabilities

of shipyards. A list of specific criteria is provided elsewhere in the testimony.

However, judgment was applied throughout the decision process. The criteria

cannot be quantified or expressed in absolute terms. Another complication is that

the Navy is continually studying its base structure in relation to its force levels

and requirements. Additional bases will probably be closed in the next couple of

years. To state now what the optimum or long term base structure should be

would be premature. The following lists contain the number of homeports and

shipyards considered necessary under present conditions within planned budgets.

It is an interim base structure only.


(a) Two homeports capable of berthing and supporting large Forrestal class

and later class aircraft carriers.

(b) Two homeports capable of berthing and supporting surface combatants and

service ships.

(c) Two homeports capable of berthing and supporting nuclear submarines.

(d) One homeport capable of berthing and supporting amphibious ships.

(e) One SSBN training and support complex.

\5r~------ -------~


(a) Two shipyards capable of drydocking, overhauling, and repairing large

Forrestal and later class aircraft carriers, one of which must be nuclear capable.

(b) Three nuclear capable shipyards for the overhaul and repair of nuclear


(c) One shipyard capable of overhauling and repairing nuclear surface ships.

(d) Three shipyards to install, maintain, and checkout sophisticated electronics

and missile systems.

Mr. SIKEs. How many officer, enlisted, and civilian positions will be

eliminated as a result of the Navy base realinements ?

Mr. SANDERS. Based on June 30, 1972 actual on-board figures, the

Department of the Navy realinement package will eliminate 1,228 of-

ficer, 5,969 enlisted and 14, 552 civilian positions.


Mr. SIKES. Was dispersal of bases considered to be an important

factor in the base closure decisions ?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir.

As I mentioned, this is an important factor. It was not an overriding


Mr. SIKES. What allowance was made in the economic and strategic

analysis of the distance of alternate bases from expected ship opera-

tion areas?

Mr. SANDERS. This was a factor looked at very carefully. I do not

have a map here, sir, but if you could picture the east coast-this is

where it really comes into play and the deployment to the Mediter-

ranean area. The Mediterranean is obviously a closer point, distance-

wise, from Narragansett. However, naval operating procedures have

the ships going to the Mediterranean, rendezvousing with the carrier

going over, somewhere in the Atlantic, and then going over as a group.

So, the key is not the distance from the homeport to the Mediter-

ranean, but the key is the distance from the homeport to the carrier


Now we cannot place carriers in Narragansett Bay without major

expenditures. If we left the destroyer force in Narragansett Bay, they

would still not go straight to the Mediterranean, but come .down to the

capes of Virginia, rendezvous with the carriers out of Mayport or

Norfolk. So the actual geographical distance to the Mediterranean

is not a very salient factor, sir.


Mr. SIKES. I notice that the number of ships will have been reduced

by 40 percent between 1964 and 1975.

By what percentage will the shore establishments be reduced during

the same period ?

Mr. SANDERS. Upon completion of the realinement actions underway,

the number of active ship 'homeport complexes will have been reduced

30 percent; active aircraft basing complexes will have been reduced

30 percent; naval shipyards will have been reduced 20 percent; and

air rework facilities 14 percent.



Mr. SIKEs. Please provide for the record the criteria used in decid-

ing which bases to close.

[The Navy's criteria follow:]

In the development of the Navy's shore establishment realinement proposals the

following significant factors were considered.

1. 1974-1980 force levels/mi-.-Includes the numbers and type of each ship

and aircraft, their weapon systems and specialized support required.

2. Ship homeporting/aircraft basing excess capacities.-Includes the identity

of requirements for pier spaces, anchorages, boat landings, runways, taxi strips,

parking aprons, hanger spaces and ship and aircraft support.

3. Navigational limitations.-Includes, restrictive drafts (depth of water),

transit time, shipping congestion, length and breadth of channel, specialized navi-

gational aids required, periods of reduced visibility and seasonal weather con-


4. Air space restrictions.-Includes, approach patterns, air space congestion

(civilian), noise factors, civilian encroachment, periods of reduced visibility and

seasonal weather conditions.

5. Nuclear clearances.-Includes nuclear area clearances existing by type and

future clearances required.

6. Shipyard locations and capabilities.-Includes nuclear surface/sub-surface

repair capabilities and requirements, weapon and electronic systems repair capa-

bilities and requirements, specialized drydock requirements by number and type,

civilian work force availability and general repair/design capabilities.

7. Accessibility to operating areas.-Includes, transit time, air and surface

congestion, periods of reduced visibility, seasonal weather conditions and avail-

ability of services.

8. BEQ/BOQ requirements.-Includes increases in base complex population

entitlements, availability and desirability of private rentals and adequacy of

messing requirements.

9. Cold iron facilities.-Includes availability of steam, water, air, and elec-

tricity including nuclear ship electrical power requirements, pollution abatement

and nuclear waste disposal requirements.

10. Aviation support facilities.-Includes air frame and engine rework require-

ments, new and future aircraft introductions and contractor operations.

11. Medical and supply support.--Includes active and retired triservice mili-

tary populations, CHAMPUS/military hospital cost comparison, location of

supply centers vis-a-vis force concentrations, supply control centers, usage data,

and type, depth of supply support requirements.

12. Personnel support facilities.-Includes availability and adequacy of social

and recreational facilities, public transportation, and distances from quarters to

facilities, commissaries and exchanges.

13. Private and public family housing.-Includes availability and adequacy of

public quarters and public rentals/sales. Excesses and short-falls have been


14. Impact on the civilian economy.-Includes loss of job availability, payroll

reductions, housing surpluses and unemployment.

15. Environmental impact.-Includes, decreases in solid waste, water, air,

and noise pollutants at losing complexes.

16. Costs to implement.-Includes, severance pay and unused leave pay to dis-

charged civilian employees, transportation costs for relocated employees, PCS

costs for military personnel and dependents, preservation and caretaker costs,

equipment transportation costs, and Milcon requirements at gaining activities.

17. Savings achievable.-Includes eliminated military and civilian salary avoid-

ances, overhead and maintenance costs and approved Milcon costs avoidance.


Mr. SIKEs. What minimum facilities and depth of water are re-

quired for homeporting your largest aircraft carriers ?

Mr. SANDERS. The largest aircraft carriers require minimum water

depths of 40 feet, a pier having a minimum width of 100 feet for

berthing on only one side; a nearby master jet base and an airfield

capable of handling carrier aircraft squadrons composed of modern

high-performance jet aircraft during loading operations.

Mr. SIKES. What is the cost estimate for providing these facilities

in the Narragansett Bay ?

What were the comparable costs at other locations considered ?

Mr. SANDERS. The cost estimate for dredging a channel, turning

basin and carrier berth and pier improvements in Narragansett Bay is

$25,400,000. Norfolk and Mayport already have the capability and

no investment cost is required.

Mr. SIRES. Having determined that Newport was not a suitable car-

rier homeport, why did the Navy necessarily move destroyers, air-

craft maintenance, supply and other facilities out of the area?

Mr. SANDERS. On the east coast, active fleet ships required to be

homeported decreased some 38 percent since 1969 and other east coast

homeports which have the special capability to homeport carriers and

submarines also have the excess capacity to homeport other New-

port based ships. Supply and other fleet support facilities in Newport

are located in Newport because fleet ships are based there. When

the ships move, the supply and other fleet support facilities are not

required in Newport. Fleet aircraft forces have reduced also and are

being co-located into fewer complexes having the capability to op-

erate high performance tactical aircraft at or near carrier homeports.

Aircraft maintenance is moved to the areas of major concentration

of carriers, tactical and antisubmarine warfare aircraft in these



Mr. SIRES. What factors led you to close Naval Air Station Glynco

as opposed to other naval air stations with similar missions on the

east coast?

Mr. SANDERS. We looked at our naval air training stations very

carefully, sir, primarily because of the buildup in naval aviation train-

ing. We found that we did have excess capacity. We looked at what

would have the least effect on the training load, which would be the

most economical to close down.

We found at Glynco that, except for the naval flight officer training,

no actual flight training took place at Glynco.

We also found that this advanced flight officer training could be

quite easily combined without additional facilities cost with the basic

naval flight officer training takng place at our very permanent installa-

tion at Pensacola, sir.

We also found that Glynco ranks within the lower 30 percent of the

10 naval air bases as far as plant account was concerned, meaning we

had more military construction programs looking at us in the future

there than we would elsewhere.

We also found, again, that the other naval air training bases had

the capacity to supply all the operational support without any increase

in fixed airfield overheads and with a minimum in military construc-



Mr. SIKES. Will you provide for the record an up-to-date economic

analysis of the costs and savings of relocating the remaining functions


from Naval Training Center, Bainbridge, with the exception of the

Naval Academy Prep School?

[The information follows:]


1. Submitting DOD component: SECNAV.

2. Date of submission : June 11, 1973.

3. Project title: Closure of NTC Bainbridge.

4. Description of project objective: Reduction of Navy operation resource

requirements :

5a. Present alternative: A note 1.

b. Proposed alternative: B note 1.

6a. Economic life : Note 2.

b. Economic life : Note 2.

7. Project year, 1-25.

8. Recurring (operations) costs (thousands of dollars) :

a. Present alternative, note 3.

b. Proposed alternative, $7,038.

9. Differential cost (thousands of dollars), $7,038.

10. Discount factor, $9.524.

11. Discounted differential cost (thousands of dollars), $67,030.

12. Totals, $67,030.

13. Present value of new investment:

a. Land and buildings and equipment, note 4.

b. Other relocation costs, $2,759.

14. Total present value of new investment (that is, funding requirements),


15. Plus value of existing assets to be employed on the project, note 4.

16. Less value of existing assets replaced, note 4.

17. Less terminal value of new investment, note 5.

18. Total new present value of investment, $2,759.

19. Present value of cost savings from operations (paragraph 11), $67,030.

20. Plus present value of the cost of refurbishment or modifications eliminated,

note 4.

21. Total present value of savings, $67,030.

22. Savings/investment ratio (paragraph 21 divided by paragraph 10), 24.3.

23. Source/derivation of cost estimates: Recurring cost (operations) : Data

and cost estimations obtained from activity functional commander and major

claimant levels.

Note 1:

Alternate A-Continue operations at NTC Bainbridge.

Alternate B-Relocate operations and close NTC Bainbridge.

Note 2: Economic life is assumed at expected life of replacement facilities of

25 years for both alternates.

Note 3: Alternate A is the base case in this incremental economic analysis.

Costs/savings displayed are additions/reductions from the base case.

Note 4: Facilities at Bainbridge are considered as past economic usefulness

and replacements must be provided either at Bainbridge or at another location.

Land buildings and equipment are; therefore, offsetting between the alternates

and are not included in this analysis.

Note 5: New investments considered to be utilized to extent of economic life.



1. Submitting DOD component: SECNAV.

2. Date of submission: June 11, 1973.

3. Project title: Closure of NTC Bainbridge.

4. Description of project objective: Reduction of Navy operating resource


5. Alternative: B.

6. Economic life: 25 years.

7. Outputs :

To outputs-expected benefits, output, and indicators of effectiveness:

In addition to the significant annual operating savings which will occur in

the outyears as a result of the disestablishment of NTC Bainbridge, the fol-

lbwing actions occasioned by the closure will significantly benefit the Navy:

1. The radioman (RM) school at Bainbridge will consolidate with the

RM school at San Diego, pooling scarce resources and expertise.

2. A necessary dislocation of clerical schooling from San Diego to

NAS meridian in order to accommodate the Bainbridge RM personnel

in San Diego, brings about a desirable pooling of clerical skill training

with attendant resource conservation.

3. The nuclear power school, Bainbridge will move to NTC Orlando, a

previously planned move, to be joined at a later date by nuclear power

school, Mare Island.

4. Fiscal and manpower economics will be achieved by a consolidated

Reserve personnel activity designated as the Naval Reserve Personnel

Center (NRPC) to be colocated with the chief of naval reserves in New


5. Savings in personnel and overhead expenditures will be realized by

combining three existing personnel and manpower accounting installa-

tions (PAMI) into a Personnel Management Information Center



Mr. SIKES. According to your criteria, why is Long Beach, which has

a shipyard, less adequate as a naval station than San Diego, which does


Mr. SANDERS. San Diego is the largest naval complex on the west

coast. The complexity and completeness of support facilities and the

availability of ships berthing does not exist at any other naval station

or combination of west coast, including Hawaii, naval stations. There

are no restrictions on size or type of ship. While San Diego does not

have a naval shipyard in San Diego Bay, the Long Beach Naval Ship-

yard is within reasonable distance and is considered to be within over-

haul in homeport criteria.


Mr. SIKEs. What amount of projects, including family housing proj-

ects, for which funds were provided in prior years will not be required

as a result of base realinements ?

When will you determine this more exactly ?

Please provide that for the record.

[The information follows:]

The following listing includes projects for which there is authorization and

appropriation and on which some savings may be achievable. Completed projects

are not shown. It is anticipated that the projects under review will be resolved

in 90 days.


Family housing

Activity Cost

Fiscal year 1973: thousandsa)

NC Newport (150 units)------------------------------------$4, 800

NAS Lakehurst (200 units) ____________----- ---------------5, 130

NC Long Beach (400 units) ------------------------------------- 9, 430

Total --------------------------------------------------- 19, 360

Fiscal year 1972:

NC Long Beach (300 units) -----------------------------------$6,900


Military construction

Activity and project Cost

Fiscal year 1973: (thousands)

NS Newport, dock basin for floating drydock_-------------------- $2, 050

NH Newport, BEQ modernization --------------------------------- 423

NPWC Newport, utilities for floating drydock------------------- 546

NAS Quonset Point, weapon system training facility------------- 791

NAS Quonset Point, intermediate maintenance facility ------------ 2, 845

NARF Quonset Point, engineering and systems analysis addition.-_- 1, 460

NEST&EF St Inigoes, communication equipment R.D.T. & E. bldg___ 140

NAS Glynco, BEQ modernization-------------------------------- 1, 213

NAS Imperial Beach, bachelor enlisted quarters----------------- 1, 252

NAD Oahu, electrical substation------------------------------ 89

Total ------------------------------------------------------ 10,809


Family housing


Military construction


Fiscal year 1973: (thousands)

FTC Newport, firefighter school relocation and smoke abatement- .. $3, 987

NPWC Newport, ship wastewater collection ashore-------------- 1, 430

NS Key West, incinerator-- ---------------------------- 1,648

NS Long Beach, ship wastewater collection ashore-------------- 1, 459

NSY Hunters Point, storm sewer---------- ------------------ 3, 195

NSY Hunters Point, interceptor industrial waste treat facility-.. 3, 942

NSY Hunters Point, storm sanitary sewer separator------------- 1, 995

Total ----------------------------- 17, 656

Fiscal year 1972:

NAS Quonset Point, refuse disposal-------------------------$3, 181

NAS Quonset Point, industrial waste treatment facility --------1, 369

NS Long Beach, sewer connection to mole pier ------------------- 773

Total .-.....----_ __ ------------------------------------------- 5, 323



Family Housing


Military Construction

Fiscal year 1972:

NAS Quonset Point, bachelor enlisted quarters modernization- .. $3, 511

NAS Glynco, bachelor enlisted quarter/WAVES ----------------- 469

NAS Glynco, bachelor enlisted quarters w/mess ------------------- 2, 776

NAS Glynco, dispensary/dental clinic____ 1---------------------------, 878

NSC Long Beach, industrial wastewater collection---------------... 225

TotaFiscal a-- 1----------------------------------------------------.. 8, 859

Fiscal year 1971:

NS Newport: bachelor enlisted quarters___-------------------------- 2, 409

Fiscal year 1969:

NPWC Newport, incinerator__________------------------------------------ 2, 338


Mr. SIKES. Provide for the record the amount of authorization

and appropriations in the last 5 years at installations which will

be closed or reduced significantly.

[The information follows:]


Activity and project: os(he


NSY Boston, abrasive blast facility______________________________ $365

NSY Boston, air pollution abatement incinerator ______________ 2, 280

NSY Boston, sewage systems, drydocks _______________________ 223

NSY Boston, public works facility...--____________________________ 7, 682

Total . . ---- --- ---- --- 10,550

Ttl----------------------------------------10 5

NS Newport, commissioned officers mess (open)__________________ 685

NS Newport, bachelor.enlisted quarters___________________________ 2, 409

NS Newport, enlisted men's club---_____________________ _ ___ 1, 660

Total ..------------------------------------------------- 6, 804

FTC Newport, firefighters school relocation and smoke abatement__ 3, 987

NPWC Newport, incinerator _____________________________ 2, 874

NPWC Newport, secondary sewage treatment plant-_______________ 500

NPWC Newport, sanitary sewerage system improvements-------___ 144

NPWC Newport, storm/sanitary sewer improvements------------- 1, 203

NPWC Newport, utilities for floating drydock -------------------- 546

NPWC Newport, ship wastewater collection ashore ---___________ 1, 430

Total ------------------------------------------------- 6, 697

NH Newport, bachelor enlisted quarters modernization------------... 423

NAS Quonset Point, aircraft carrier pier utilities________________ 519

NAS Quonset Point, bachelor enlisted quarters modernization--______ 3, 511

NAS Quonset Point, refuse disposal ____________________________ 3, 181

NAS Quonset Point, industrial waste treatment facility -------1--- , 369

NAS Quonset Point, weapons system training facility______________ 791

NABS Quonset Point, intermediate maintenance facility------------ 2, 845

Total --------- --------------------------------------- 12,216

NARF Quonset Point, helicopter transmission shop_______________ 633

NARF Quonset Point, engine parts coating shop- 1________________ , 063

NARF Quonset Point, engineering and systems analysis addition___ 1, 460

Total ------------------------------------------------- 3, 156

NH St. Albans, boiler fuel conversion________--------- ________ _ 214

NS Brooklyn, commissary store rehabilitation_-------------------- 370

NAS Lakehurst, control tower----------------- ____ 274

NAS Lakehurst, messhall_____________________________ 1, 010

NABS Lakehurst, aircraft fuel system alteration__________________ 50

NABS Lakehurst, dispensary air-conditioning ------------------- 107

Total --------------------------------- 1, 441

NAEC Philadelphia, electric power to laboratory------------------222

MCSC Philadelphia, computer facilities expansion----------------- 200

NEST&EF St. Inigoes, communication equipment R.D.T. & E. build-

ing -----------------------------------------140

NABS Albany, photographic laboratory alterations --------__-- ___ 181

NAS Glynco, sewage treatment system------------------------ 252

NABS Glynco, aircraft fuel system modifications _______________-__ 47

NAS Glynco, air traffic control school addition __________________ 533

NABS Glynco, dispensary/dental clinic___________-__________ _ 1, 878

NAS Glynco, bachelor officers quarters w/mess-----------------2, 776

NAS Glynco, bachelor officers quarters w/WAVES_ ____-_________ 469

NAS Glynco, bachelor enlisted quarters modernization ----------- 1, 213

Total ..----... -------------------------------------------- 7, 168

NS Key West, bachelor enlisted quarters ___-_-----.. ---___ 2, 130

NS Key West, incinerator_---___________________ 1, 648

Total -------------------------------------------------, 778




NSUS Key West, training tank----------------------------------- $100

NESO Great Lakes, Air-conditioning for ESO building---------- 323

NAS Imperial Beach, Aircraft maintenance hangar (2d

incinerator) ------------------------------------------- 1,250

NAS Imperial Beach, barracks-------------------------------- 734

NAS Imperial Beach, sewage system......---------------------------- 137

NAS Imperial Beach, land acquisition-------------------------- 6, 396

NAS Imperial Beach, aircraft fuel system modifications-----------.......... 20

NAS Imperial Beach, bachelor enlisted quarters----------------- 1, 252

Total -------------...............----------------------------------- 9, 789

NS Long Beach, sewerage system expansion------------------------- 470

NS Long Beach, sewer connection to mole pier-------------------- 773

NS Long Beach, ship wastewater collection ashore--------------------- 1, 459

Total ------------------------------------------------ 2, 702

NSC Long Beach, industrial wastewater collection------------------- 225

NSY Hunters Point, abrasive blast facility.------------------------- 684

NSY Hunters Point, electronic weapons precision facility-------------- 3, 885

NSY Hunters Point, waterfront fire protection.--------------------- 987

NSY Hunters Point, compressed air dehydration system--------------- 80

NSY Hunters Point, sheet metal shop------------------------------ 2,983

NSY Hunters Point, paint bake oven afterburners------------------- 80

NSY Hunters Point, electrical distribution system improvement- ...-- 3, 906

NSY Hunters Point, electrical distribution system improments (2d

incinerator) ---------------------------------------------- 2, 370

NSY Hunters Point, waterfront utilities service station-------------- 2, 638

NSY Hunters Point, boiler fuel conversion_----------------------- -- 50

NSY Hunters Point, storm sewer interceptor---------------------- 3, 195

NSY Hunters Point, industrial waste treatment system------------- 3, 942

NSY Hunters Point, storm/sanitary sewer separation----------------........ 1, 995

Total ----------------------------------------------- 26, 795

NAD Oahu, electrical substation addition------------.---------------- 89


Mr. SIRES. Now, is there going to be sufficient capacity to meet

Navy shipbuilding overhaul, and repair needs in the yards that will

continue to operate?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir, not only will there be sufficient capacity, but

in the opinion of some people, there will still be excess capacity, sir.

This' is something we must keep under constant review, particularly

with reference to the capacity in the private shipyards.

Mr. SIKES. IS that due in large part to the reduction in the number

of ships in the operating fleet ?

Mr. SANDERS. Reduction in the number of ships; yes, sir.

Mr. SIKES. Is there to be additional construction required in the

yards that will continue to operate as the result of consolidations?

Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, there will be a minimum amount of

construction in the yards. Our total bill construction-wise for this

whole program is $45 million in the 1974 program and it looks to be

now somewhere around a maximum of $50 million in the 1975 program.

Little if any of this is geared to the yards, sir.

I would have to ask someone else to give the specific figure. It is very



[The information follows:]

In the 1974 budget are four projects with a total of $1.365 million related to the

closure of Naval Shipyards.

Mr. SIKES. IS there any significant construction that would be re-

quired which would not have been required in the normal operation

of the yard ?

Mr. SANDERS. No, sir, definitely not.


Mr. SIRES. We have had some questions raised about Long Beach.

Talking about the costs of the transfer of Navy ships from Long

Beach to San Diego, the question is, whether it was sound economy

and good strategy.

Costs alleged include the construction of a $10 million deep water

pier, redesigning Navy ships to enable them to pass under the bridge

from San Diego to Coronado, additional dredging of the harbor, and

moving 20,000 families and household effects from Long Beach to

San Diego.

Are those valid criticisms ?

Mr. SANDERS. NO, sir, they are not.

I know of no redesign of a ship, sir. We will have to build a new

pier at San Diego which is included in this military construction pro-

gram at a cost of around $10 million, no question about that.

Mr. SIKES. IS that because of the move ?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, directly related to the move.

Our one-time closure costs, which include some of those transfers,

relocations that you mentioned, will run a little over $16 million.

Our annual savings from Long Beach are estimated at $11.4 mil-

lion per year, sir, an adequate offset without any question in my


Mr. SIgES. $11 million annually ?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir, $11.4 million annually.

We have, if you want it, a cost-

Mr. SIRES. Will it require additional dredging ?

Mr. SANDERS. This includes everything.

Mr. SIKEs. Do you require moving 20,000 families and household


Mr. SANDERS. Yes. Twenty thousand is awfully high. Our one-time

closure costs, which include families and things of this kind, total

about $16.3 million.

Mr. SIKES. IS San Diego asking for money from HEW to construct

schools for Navy children and housing for personnel who are now

accommodated in schools or housed in Long Beach?

Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I know nothing of this. We will have

to check it and supply that answer for the record.

[The information follows:]

There is no requirement that the Navy certify requests by local jurisdictions

for HEW funds for school construction. However, we understand that the San

Diego school system has requested HEW assistance in school construction in

nearly every year since 1968. The Navy has learned of no requests for hous-

ing construction assistance.

Mr. SANDERS. We anticipate no difficulty.

Mr. SIKES. Do you have questions, gentlemen, on the base

realignment ?


Mr. DAvis. Mr. Sanders, could you comment on the relationship be-

tween the shipyard closures which have been announced and your

policy with respect to the allocation of work for repair, overhaul and

conversion to private yards, particularly work on non-nuclear ships ?

Mr. SANDERS. The Navy policy on allocation of ship work to the pri-

vate sector has been and will continue to be in accordance with De-

partment of Defense directive 41,51.1. This, specifically, calls for a

minimum of 30 percent of conversion, alterations, and repair work to

be assigned to the private sector. For the period fiscal year 1962-fis-

cal year 1972 the Navy has maintained an average of 34.3 percent,

this work is in the private sector. With the completion of the SSBN

and DLG conversion programs in fiscal year 1974 and considering the

large percentage of nuclear ships, aircraft carriers, and complex mis-

sile ships in the fleet, maintaining the required allocation to the pri-

vate sector with a 10 Naval shipyard complex would have been vir-

tually impossible in the future. With the closure of two non-nuclear

qualified Naval Shipyards, more non-nuclear ship repair and altera-

tion work will be assigned to the private sector and it is anticipated

that the distribution of conversion, alteration, and repair work re-

quired by Department of Defense directive 4151.1 can be maintained

in the future. The increased non-nuclear alteration and repair work

assigned private in the future will be most heavily distributed in or

near fleet homeport areas, as in the past, to minimize the adverse im-

pact of out of homeport overhaul and crew morale.

Mr. SIKES. Thank you again for your appearance Mr. Sanders. We

will recess until 1 o'clock tomorrow.

FRIDAY, JUNE 8, 1973.


Mr. SIKEs. The committee will come to order.

Admiral Lyon, you have appeared before this committee as the

Trident project manager before.

We appreciate your dedication to, and knowledge of, this important

program. We also appreciate your forthright approach. This is a

very new program and one which has attracted a great deal of interest.

This committee feels it is an important program. Of course, it is

important that we also have a good working knowledge of the program

and what is involved. We are going into a little further than would

normally be required for construction purposes so that our record

will be complete and we will have more intimate knowledge of the

details of the program.

You may proceed in your own way.

Admiral LYON. Before I proceed with my summary, Admiral

Marschall has a short statement he would like to present.

Mr. SIKES. Admiral Marschall, we are glad to hear from you.


Admiral MARSCHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, before we proceed with the Trident briefing, I

would like to point out some changes that are being proposed by the

Navy to the fiscal year 1974 military construction program. These

changes if approved will be submitted to the Armed Services Com-

mittees prior to the start of their hearings. Since these changes will

impact on the Trident project and three other projects in this years

program I would like to point out the changes under consideration.

Two projects will be reduced, the hospital replacement project at

the naval hospital Orlando, and the various locations Trident facili-

ties project.

A recent reevaluation of bed requirements at the naval hospital

Orlando reveals that the number of beds may be reduced from 310 to

235. This reduction is feasible by the removal of the fifth floor of the

hospital and will result in a cost reduction of $1,331,000.

For the Trident facilities project, a reduction of $6,903,000 is

feasible, because land acquisition requirements are smaller than were

originally anticipated.

An equal dollar substitution will be made for these reductions by

increasing the scope and cost of two fiscal year 1974 projects, the

addition of two other projects, and a request for appropriations for

amendments to three prior year projects.

If I may, I would like to submit a complete listing of the proposed

changes for the record and then we may discuss the projects being

modified in the fiscal year 1974 program as we come to them in the

general project review. The new projects and amendments we are

prepared to discuss at your convenience.


[The list follows:]


[In thousands of dollars]

New authorization, title II From To Change

Installation/project, Inside the United States:

Ist Naval District: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, N.H.,

additional crane rail system_ _ -_-..-. ... ... . . 0 2, 817 2, 817

6th Naval District:

Naval hospital, Orlando, Fla., hospital replacement.. ... . 22, 312 20,981 (1,331)

Naval Coastal Systems Laboratory, Panama City, Fla., systems

development and test facility______________........ ... 2,100 2, 300 200

Naval Aerospace Regional Medical Center, Pensacola, Fla., medi-

cal/dental support facilities.__....... 0 1,084 1,084

1th Naval District: Naval Air Station, Miramar, Calif., applied in-

struction building _ _-_...-..-.-.-.. 1,123 1, 542 419

12th Naval District: Naval Air Station, Moffett Field, Calif., opera-

tional trainer building addition__ _ 0 430 430

Various locations-Inside United States, Trident facilities: Trident sup-

port complex and flight test facilities phase I ..... ......... ..... 125, 223 118, 320 (6,903)

Net, title II new authorization changes -............ ------------150, 758 147, 474 (3, 284)

Authorized Current work-

Amendments to prior authorization cost ing estimate Change

Fiscal year 1971 authorization law:

Naval Weapons Laboratory, Dahlgren, Va., sewage treatment system_. 530 779 249

Fiscal year 1972 authorization law:

Naval Air Station, Meridian, Miss., installation total (note 1)........ 3, 266 3, 859 593

Fiscal year 1973 authorization law:

Naval Ammunition Depot, McAlester, Okla., bomb loading plant

modernization ..- - - - - - - - - - --.. 5,946 8,388 2,442

Total amendment changes.__......-- -.-....-......------ 9,742 13, 026 3,284

Note (1): An amendment is needed primarily because of the escalation of the Bachelor Enlisted Quarters

(BEQ) project. Since there is a more urgent requirement for the BEQ, than the Enlisted Mens (EM) club it was

decided to proceed with the BEQ construction and defer the EM club construction until enactment of the fiscal

year 1974 authorization and appropriation laws.

Mr. SIKES. Thank you very much, Admiral.

We will discuss these matters in detail as we come to them in the

discussion of the line items, but we are glad to have this advance notice

of the changes.

They had been discussed, of course, previously, and we had antici-

pated that there would be some changes necessary. Admiral Lyon,

would you please proceed.


Admiral LYON. Mr. Chairman, I am most pleased to have the op-

portunity to appear before your committee for the second year in a

row. I am also pleased to report to you today, sir, that the Trident

program has successfully completed all of the critical scheduled mile-

stones in the intervening period since I last saw you. I have with me

today Rear Admiral Kaufman, who is the Trident program co-

ordinator on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, and Captain

Stacey, who is the designated officer in charge of construction for

the Trident program.

I have prepared, Mr. Chairman, an unclassified statement on the

Trident program which I would like at this time to submit for the


Mr. SIKES. Very well.

[The statement follows:]

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee : I am Rear Adm. Harvey Lyon,

Project Manager, under The Chief of Naval Material, for the Trident system. I

am pleased to have an opportunity to appear again before this committee and

present the military construction required for logistically and operationally sup-

porting the Trident weapon system.


The Trident system has three basic elements: A new improved submarine, a

new long-range Trident missile, and a support site. The strategic considerations

for the development of the weapon system have been provided in prior hearings

so I'll basically limit my statement to military construction support. I would like

to discuss briefly though some of the differences in this weapon system and the

Polaris/Poseidon weapon system and how these differences are reflected in the

logistic and operational support facilities.

The Trident submarine, which incorporates new quieting technology, increased

mobility, and improved defensive combat system, will be longer, and will have a

greater beam and deeper draft than the Polaris/Poseidon submarines. The exact

dimensions and other classified data about the submarine and missile system

have been provided to the committee staff.

The Trident weapon system allows for planned growth to an eventual larger

missile. The initial Trident I missile will provide significant range improvements

over Poseidon. This missile is physically restricted in size to be compatible with

our latest SSBN's. The projected growth missile will be larger physically, capable

of delivering larger payloads to longer ranges. Because of the increased size it

will be capable of larger payloads and will have a significantly larger rocket

propellant explosive hazard zone. The explosive safety distance zone of this

growth missile will be used in siting supporting facilities at the Trident support


The Trident growth missile, which can [-- ] the approximate 2000-mile

range of the Poseidon submarine missile, increases sixfold the area of possible

submarine patrol. This of course significantly increases the projected surviva-

bility of the weapon system, and provides greater confidence in our Nation's

strategic deterrence capability.


The initial operational capability date of the weapon system is late calendar

year 1978, which requires the initiation of facilities construction in calendar year

1974. Some facilities are included this year because they are essential for deploy-

ment of the weapon system. Other facilities are included in order to obtain a

logical (least cost) construction sequence over the 4-year construction period

which is available prior to deployment of the weapon system. Environmental

impact studies are underway. The filing and acceptance of the environmental

impact study will pace the start of construction.


The assessment and refinement of Trident requirements is a continuous proc-

ess during this early stage of development of a definitive master plan for shore

facilities. As a result of this assessment and the selection in February of Bangor,

Wash., as the support site, it has been determined that only $118.3 million is re-

quired and may be effectively utilized for Trident facility construction from the

fiscal year 1974 military construction program. This reduction from the $125.2

million included in the Trident project justification document results from de-

tailed land use studies which identified smaller land acquisition requirements

than were originally anticipated. The estimated cost for the land is $5 million.

Under the various locations, Trident facilities project we are therefore re-

questing at two sites $118,320,000 for Trident facilities construction. Within

this total are facilities at the Trident support site, Bangor, Wash., with an esti-

mated cost of $83 million. One requirement at Bangor is the acquisition of about

150 acres of land to assure that the necessary explosive safety zone arcs are

within Government-owned land. This years' project includes a covered explosive

handling pier which is essential to the deployment of the weapon system and a


refit pier to provide logical sequencing of construction. A weapon/navigation

training building is included to permit early crew training by naval personnel

at naval facilities. This will enable the Navy to eliminate the more costly con-

tractor factory crew training for all crews except those of the lead ship. The

other facilities requested will initiate road and utilities construction required

to assure timely utilization of Trident support facilities.


At the Air Force eastern test range, Cape Kennedy Fla., we are requesting $35

million for missile flight test facilities. The facilities to be provided are a

wharf and dredging, alterations to a launch complex, missile checkout build-

ings, guidance and telemetry building and a lifting device proofing building.

These facilities will support an initial flight test of the Trident I missile in

late calendar year 1975.

Explosive quantity safety distance requirements preclude the use of existing

water front facilities for the Trident missile. A new wharf, with associated

dredging for a turning basin, located a safe distance away is required. The

wharf and turning basin are the high cost facilities at Cape Kennedy with an

approximate cost of $30 million. The Trident submarines as they are delivered

will operate and train here until deployment to the Pacific.


The future military construction program identified with the deployment of

10 Trident submarines is expected to extend through fiscal year 1979 with a

total facilities cost, excluding family housing, of about $510 million. With the

addition of $33 million for planning and design, the total cost will be about $543

million. The reduction, from the approximately $1 billion figure provided last

year is the result of :

The elimination of depot level submarine maintenance at the Trident sup-

port complex site and the transfer of this support to shipyards.

The reduction of the military manning level by the transfer of some func-

tions to civilian personnel with resultant reduction in bachelor and family

housing facilities requirements.

The reduction of the facility support level from 15 to 10 ships lowered the

facilities requirements.

A reexamination of a requirement for concurrent high explosive opera-

tions and reductions in some of the explosive safety factors internal to the

base permitted a reduction in the land required at the Bangor support


A more detailed examination of the facilities cost for the Bangor site vice

the use of an estimate that would approximate the costs at any one of four

candidate sites.

A tabulation of the types of facilities to be included in future programs is ap-

pended to my statement for insertion in the record, if desired.


In summary, Trident offers the best technical, most cost effective program

available to provide future seabased strategic force capability. Although the

facilities associated with the weapon system represent only 5 percent of the

total cost of the system, the facilities are vital to deployment and economic

life cycle maintenance of the weapon system. I would like to stress the fact that

the construction of the Trident support complex ashore will not only result in

the lowest total cost for deployment of Trident, but that it is also the most cost

effective alternative over the life cycle of the weapon system.

I respectfully solicit your full support for the appropriations requested for

the Trident facilities.

Thank you. I am prepared to respond to any questions that you may have on

Trident facilities.

Admiral LYoN. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I will briefly

summarize the Trident program for the committee and its current

status. The goals of Trident remain unchanged. The general specifica-

tions and the contract design of the submarine are complete. The full

funding for the Trident submarine lead ship construction has been

submitted to the Congress in the budget this year.

The goals of the Trident system are, as you see here. The strategic

weapon system has completed definition and technology development

has met all requirements and milestones. The system support site,

which is the third major factor of the Trident system, has been

elected after a year, or after over a year, of tradeoff studies and


Environmental impact studies have been filed for the test facilities

to be constructed at Cape Canaveral and such studies are now com-

mencing at Bangor for the support site statement.


Several changes, Mr. Chairman, have recently occurred in program

objectives as a result of continuing DOD program reviews.

The Trident I missile, which is designed to be compatible with

installation on our newest SSBN's has been slowed down somewhat

in development for a period of about 140 months to be in phase with

deployment on the first Trident submarine.

The development goal of the - designed to provide a flexi-

bility option for the missile front end, has been changed from a ready

for deployment status to demonstration of feasibility and compati-

bility. Both of these have reduced near-term funding and overall

total program cost.


The support complex operational (IOC)-initial operational capa-

bility-has been delayed about 1 year as a result of the selection of

the site on the West Coast. The Trident system will be supported

out of the Cape Canaveral site and the building yard as necessary

during the test and evaluation period in the first year of operation.

In the system design work, we have developed a high assurance

that we can attain and maintain the system availability. That avail-

ability is designed to assure an operational cycle of . Both

crews will be utilized to outfit the Trident submarine during its

time in port. The submarine will normally go into a drydocking once

a year to insure good hull preservation. Past history of our SSBN's

indicates 1.3 drydockings per year has been the norm with 30 percent

of those drydockings unscheduled.

Mr. PATTERN. What does 1.3 mean?

Admiral LYON. That means on an average each submarine has to be

drydocked 1.3 times a year.

Mr. LONG. In other words, four times in 3 years.

Admiral LYON. Yes, sir, in developing our system support site plans,

we have critically examined all possible alternatives to optimize over-

all system cost effectiveness, both for the submarine, the missile, and

the base. A summary of these studies has been provided to the com-

mittee staff.

I might mention, Mr. Chairman, that the British Navy, in inde-

pendent studies several years preceding ours, arrived at essentially

the same conclusions that our studies arrived at and have built a simi-

lar facility on the Clyde in Scotland to base their SSBN's. As has been

announced, Mr. Chairman, the Trident support site has been located

at the Naval Weapons Station, Bangor, Wash.

The Naval Weapons Station is located on the Hood Canal, an estu-

ary off Puget Sound and within close proximity to the Bremerton

Navy Yard. It is also located close to Keyport where we have a Navy

Torpedo Test Station.

Mr. McKAY. If I may ask, aren't you a little inland ? Can't you get

trapped inside as we did in Pearl Harbor ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. No, sir, I will talk to that later, if you wish.

Admiral LYON. In addition, Mr. Chairman, to operational advan-

tages-which Admiral Kaufman will talk to later in the hearing-the

site here also offers logistic advantages for maintenance and to assure

the reliability of the system by the near proximity of the Navy Yard.

You remember, last year one of our criteria was to have a Navy Yard

as close as possible to the selected site. There also is a Navy hospital

located just outside the Navy Yard. The distance from Bremerton to

the Bangor site is about 15 miles.

There is an Air Force base located just south of Bremerton which

provides logistic support and is capable of flying missile components

in and out.

The Navy Torpedo Station at Keyport is our primary test station

for the Mark-48 and Mark-46 torpedoes and will be capable of pro-

viding the Mark-48 torpedo support necessary for the Trident system.

Associated with the naval shipyrad is a large naval supply depot

which will be utilized to store and to issue spare components as neces-

sary to the Trident system.


The maximum utilization of these and other resources in the area,

Mr. Chairman, are being addressed in the development of an area

master plan along with the Trident support site master plan.

Last year, Mr. Chairman, you provided us with $13 million in

planning funds to commence the project. This year we are requesting

construction funds of $118 million, reduced down from the figure

that has been submitted to you, to accomplish work both at the Bangor

site and at the missile test facility in Cape Canaveral, Fla. An addi-

tional $10.8 million in planning money is also requested for this next

fiscal year.

I respectfully ask the committee's support for this request.

Captain Stacey will now continue the briefing and go into the details

of the plans.

Mr. SIRES. Very well.

Captain STACEY. Mr. Chairman, I will give you a short rundown on

the facilities we have included in the program.

This first map is of the Bangor Annex of the Naval Torpedo Station,

Keyport. Shown in heavy print are facilities in the 1974 program.

[Insert chart.]

















--- -- ------- V La

-. . .... - TA - " - . .EXISTING PROPERTY LINE/








We are pointing north here. This is the Hood Canal on the left. We

have waterfront facilities located in this area, including the explosive

handling piers, refit piers, and a drydock. In the 1974 program we

have one refit pier and one explosive handling pier.

In addition we have the weapon support and missile assembly areas,

which will expand upon the existing Polaris facility area. We have

the personnel training and the base support area in this vicinity, and

a submarine support area in this vicinity.

The training facility in the 1974 program is located in this area.

In addition we have site improvement and utilities. Included in the

utilities are electric powerlines, coming into the base, substations and

a sewage treatment plant at this point. We have included in the site

improvement, an extension of roads here, a missile haul road and

a railroad spur in this area. We also have a requirement for land in

the 1974 program. The covered explosive handling pier is an all-

purpose pier to provide offloading and onloading missiles without in-

terruption in order to comply with the established operation schedule.

The refit pier and slip is a standard pier alongside which the Trident

submarine will tie up during its refit period. The weapon navigational

training facility is a training facility for the training of the crews

of the Trident submarine.

This is one of the most critical projects in the program. The ware-

house will receive and store the Government-furnished equipment and

material that will be received early in the program. Utilities, as I in-

dicated previously, include a sewage treatment plant, heating and

cooling plant and other associated utilities, to tie in with the facilities

that are provided in the first-year program.

We do have land acquisition and site improvement efforts as I in-

dicated, the latter will extend the existing missile haul road, construct

new roads and will include various earthwork in the functional areas.


Mr. SIKES. Let me interrupt you for a moment.

Captain STACEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIKES. How much of this material has been published and how

much is classified secret, and cannot be released ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. The material here ?

Mr. SIRKES. Yes.

Admiral KAUFMAN. That is all unclassified.

Captain STACEY. All that I have covered is unclassified.

Mr. LONGo. If this is an unclassified situation, why is this session


Admiral KAUFMAN. Sir, there will be informaton brought out which

will be very classified in response to some of your questions.

Mr. SIKEs. What we are talking about now are construction details.

Mr. LONG. Yes.

I would hope in the future that we could have these sessions mixed,

the secret part dealt with, and then move into open session for unclassi-

fied aspects of construction details. I like my staff here; I feel strongly

these things should be in the open.

All this business of holding secret sessions does, if we are not dealing

with really secret information, is to make it very difficult to get a

decent open discussion. The papers, the magazines all discuss this very

freely, and we Congressmen are supposed to go around hush-hush

very quiet because we don't know what is secret and what is not and,

naturally, we don't want to tell tales out of school.

Admiral MARSCHALL. Dr. Long, I think you will find as we go along

this morning that it will be very necessary to have this a closed session

because of the nature of things that Admiral Kaufman will address.

He will make it clear just what is classified and what it not.

Mr. LONG. I understand there are aspects of Trident that are classi-


Mr. SIKEs. The construction schedule which has been published

is not classified. But it would be difficult in this session-we keep all

the sessions open which we can-to switch back and forth. It is difficult

to segregate the two, so that a part would be fully open and a part

closed. I think it is better that way for this session.

Go ahead.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I may, sir, I have made un-

classified statements which describe the entire program in concept to

the entire committee-the Armed Services Committees of both the

House and Senate-and if you would like, we will make that available

to all the members of this subcommittee.

Mr. SIKEs. We would like those.

Mr. LONG. I would like to ask questions and get answers which are

on the record so far as military construction is concerned.

Mr. SIKES. I think at some point today you should tell us briefly

just what this program is, so that members who do not feel familiar

with the program will have a little better understanding of it. Take a

few minutes later on to tell us exactly what this is all about.


Captain STACEY. We are shifting to the flight test facilities at Cape

Kennedy, a total of $35 million, consisting of these five facilities. The

wharf with related dredging is required because of the explosive

quantity safety distance criteria which precludes the use of the existing


This is the major facility in this group.

The missile checkout building, the guidance and telemetry building

and launch complex efforts are additions, or modifications to existing

facilities that are required to test the missile.

The lifting device proving facility is a facility to test slings and other

ordnance handling equipment up to a total of 250 tons. Mr. Chairman,

this is a very brief overview of the facilities in the 1974 program.

Mr. SIKES. Very well.

Mr. LONG. Are we going to be given a list of the construction items

we can take back to our offices and study with our staff, Mr. Chairman ?

Mr. SIKES. That will be available.

Mr. LONG. I find it hard to memorize all this.

Mr. SIKES. Admiral, will you proceed ?


Admiral LYON. Mr. Chairman, Admiral Kaufman is prepared to

give you the overview of the system, the purpose of the system, and

what its mission will be and what it will be capable of accomplishing.

Mr. SIXEs. That will be useful.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I came merely to

back up Admiral Lyon. I have no prepared statement. I have been

talking on this system 3 years and I think I can do it easily enough.

Mr. SIES. At any rate, you know more about it than we do.

Admiral KAUFMAN. I am not sure. It does change every once in a


I will try to give you a short overview of what the Trident program

is and then I will follow that up by providing for all the members of

this subcommittee the unclassified statement which I gave to both

the House and the Senate.

Mr. SIXES. That is fine.


Admiral KAUFMAN. First of all what is Trident ? I might add here

this is not a new concept. It developed from the old undersea long

range missile system, which developed from a study which was com-

pleted about 1967 by the Secretary of Defense to view all sorts of

options for a continued deterrent. He looked at Minuteman, bigger,

more survivable hardened Minuteman, and so forth; more bombers,

more sea-based deterrent. The sea-based deterrent with its survivabil-

ity came out ahead and they elected to go for something more in the

way of sea-based missiles.

Following on that at a very slow start, since the Polaris Poseidon

complex was a very, very survivable one and very credible and still

is and will be for some time to come yet, we think; we developed the

submarine that we see today. We have looked at over 200 different

designs. We have looked at all sizes of ships. We have had them as

big as . We finally came to where we are in response to urgings

by Dr. Foster to make sure we have more growth room for the missile-

we don't shoehorn them in-that we provide for whatever we need

in the lifetime of this ship in the same manner we did with the Polaris

Al, 2, and 3 and the Poseidon. The ship has gotten larger in response

to that need.

Mr. SIKES. Give us a comparison of the size of this ship and the


Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir, I will show that next.

Mr. SIKES. Will you tell us why you got the name Trident?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

ULMS was a very hard word to pronounce and I think Chairman

Stennis said in the Senate it sounded more like a burp than a word.

He asked for a different name. We told him we came up with a name

which happens to be Trident, suggested by a member of my staff.

It happens to be the three-prong spear that is used by the god of

seapower, Neptune and so forth. That is the name. It is also used

by the Naval Academy for a number of their publications. It is rec-

ognized throughout the world. It is not named for the chewing gum

that we see.


This shows you the comparative size vis-a-vis the Polaris/Posei-

don. The displacement of this ship is about - tons compared to

about 8,000 tons for Poseidon. This one has 24 missile tubes.

This has 16. This has a very sophisticated and very much improved

sonar in the bow. The sonar is capable to the same degree that our

most advanced sonars in the advanced attack submarines are capa-

ble and gives us the capability to detect the future submarines which

the Soviet may develop. This submarine (SSBN) will be able to

pick him up this one Trident will pick him up for


This means that this submarine won't know

Mr. LONG. Do you have to have a great big submarine to have the

better sonar ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. No, sir.

Mr. LONG. You could put the better sonar on a smaller submarine.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

For example, if you took the ones we have today, you have to

--- change the way of putting . It would be a major change

to the ship.

The other big thing we are doing to Trident is propulsion

plant. This ship literally is built with the technology of the 1950's.


You will recall that the first ship, the George Washington, was lit-

erally the U.S.S. Scorpion, an attack submarine when in 1948 and 1959

we chopped it in half and put a missile compartment in to get missiles

at sea as an expedient. We built all 41 of those ships in a short span of

7 years, with 13 coming out in 1 year, 1963 or 1964. They all have

compressed technology into that short-time frame so that when one is

vulnerable; we may predict all are vulnerable.

When one is old they are all within 7 years of the same age. If we

were to do it again on a planned basis I think we would be wise not to

put them all out in the same block. This creates block obsolescence; we

would do better to phase them and put improvements in them, 10 at a

time, in the same manner that we are looking to the first 10 Tridents

which can serve as replacements for the oldest ones of these. These

SSBN's will be 20 years old by the time the first Trident can be

available as fast as we can build it.

Mr. LONG. Admiral, that is not so much an argument for the Trident

as it is simply for a more modern submarine.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes.


Mr. LONG. I would hope that you could keep your arguments for

Trident, which is such a huge submarine and has many features be-

cause of its size, apart from those arguments simply of aging.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes.

We do have to recognize the ship is older, it will age, it will need


Mr. LONG. This is a bonus, but not inherent in the Trident system.

Admiral KAUFMAN. And we did not just discover that the ship is

going to be older.

That is not the reason for accelerating Trident per se. The one big

thing, Dr. Long, if you will look at her, is the -

Mr. LONG. Is that a feature of Trident or something you want in

any new submarine?

Admiral KAUFMAN. We would want it in any new submarine.

Mr. SIBEs. That is the quiet submarine concept.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes.

Mr. McKAY. Does that influence the size?

Admiral KAUFMAN. It absolutely does. We do it with - which

means to get the power out of the ship you have to have the ship

size so you get a -- which requires a certain amount of size.

Mr. LONG. That much size.

Admiral KAUFMAN. It does not necessarily require that much size.

When you go to missile tubes which will produce the range and carry

the payload we have been examining the missile drives the diameter

of the ship. So as long as you have that diameter you may as well

use it to get your -

To answer, which controls the problem, they both control it. You

have tradeoffs both ways.

Admiral LYON. Dr. Long, this submarine is driven in its total vol-

ume by the requirements of the size of the missile and the requirements

of the number of missile tubes, and to achieve a submarine that is

cost effective-that is able to put missiles at sea for less dollars. The

propulsion plant has been scaled up to provide the capabilities-scaled

up in power-that we want in this submarine to meet its mission


It in fact occupies about the same percentage of overall displace-

ment as the reactor plant and propulsion plant in the Polaris-Poseidon

submarine. The reactor compartment is approximately -- than

it is in the other submarine.

Mr. LONG. You understand the thing that makes this very con-

troversial as a submarine is the fact that really what you have

here is almost a submerged battleship. Isn't that right ? Does it com-

pare in size with some of the older battleships ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. NO, sir, not in any shape, size, or form.

Admiral LYON. A submerged cruiser.

Mr. LONG. It is very big.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes. sir.

Mr. LONG. And very expensive.

Admiral KAUFMAN. And very expensive.


Mr. LONG. It has many features that are desirable. But it also, I

think, is very vulnerable; too many eggs in one basket. There are

those who claim that the Trident is going to be very much of a target,

and once you have destroyed one you have destroyed something very,

very expensive. Yet what we want is something in the ocean that

will be hard to hit and, if hit, will not have been a loss of tremendous


Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. I am very partial to the idea. There is plenty of room

in the ocean, and what we ought to have is an awful lot of targets

instead of a small number of very big juicy ones.

~c~91111 Iriv

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir, this is a criticism and it is one we had

levied at us in the Navy itself when we first started this thing. We

have looked at the full spectrum of 8 missile tubes all the way up to 32

missile tubes per ship. We have looked at a full spectrum of threats

and studied these to exhaustion, for SSN's, the likes of which we do

not know how to design yet, the aircraft; very "hot" missiles that

can go down the path of our own missiles and destroy us, and

things like that. We have looked to all sorts of threats to try to find

wherein the larger submarine would be more vulnerable as a sys-

tem than is this one, the Polaris.


We cannot find it. The other thing that we do find is that from

the standpoint of cost effectiveness if we were to go to a full sub-

stitution of today's system (SSBN) here in time with age, with this

type of ship, Trident, the bigger one with more missile tubes, would

cost us several billion dollars less for the ship construction money alone

than the one with 16 tubes with more platforms, because you pay

so much for the inventory, the "real estate" of "getting into the strate-

gic ball game," of having the ship, the reactor driving and all these


It is cheap to add missile tubes at a cost per ship of $15 million per

two tubes. That has been the consideration. The other thing, people say

"what happens with SALT?" If that existing limitation stays with

you and a threat comes up to where you want more platforms, the fact

that we built the first 10 submarines with 24 in no way, shape, or form

keeps us from cutting down on the number of missile tubes in later

generations of submarines should we so desire to make more plat-

forms to get within the maximum permitted by SALT.

Mr. LONG. At that time you will look pretty foolish having a few

huge Trident submarines wandering around and with a very reduced

number of platforms.

Admiral KAUFMAN. No, sir. We have yet to find a threat that can

beat this one, Trident, down more than it can beat this one-SSBN-

down, even with more missile tubes.

Mr. LONG. Do you have circulating around in your files, or your

deliberations, some memoranda from people who have never been won

over to the argument for a Trident, and who feel this is definitely a

mistake, that it is too expensive for what you are getting, too vulner-

able, too many eggs in one basket.

Admiral KAUFMAN. No, sir.

Mr. LONG. You don't have any ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Are you saying do I have memoranda or claims

from people who say this ?

Mr. LONG. Yes; or are there any people who said-independent-

spirited people who think this is a mistake?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes. There is one testifying in the Senate, Ad-

miral La Rocque, retired. He does not believe we need the Trident,

CVN, or many other things and he is saying so.

Mr. SIKES. Does he want weapons of any kind ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. I do not know what he wants. All I can say is

that Admiral La Rocque has been a distinguished skipper of de-

stroyers and cruisers and he has had extensive experience on staffs

of schools and in schools and never served in a submarine.

To my knowledge I see no reason for him to understand what con-

stitutes a threat thereto. I do not know how he can have any expertise.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LONG. I think we are all trying to accomplish the same thing.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

I might say you are looking here at Admiral Lyon and myself, at a

true minority of the Navy in the submarines. We represent roughly

6 percent of the Navy. Yet, we represent a tremendous drain on the

Navy when we start talking to systems like this.

Bear in mind that Admiral Zumwalt, a surface ship officer and

Chief of Naval Operations, really needs other ships. If you do not

think we have been through the most searching type of investiga-


Mr. LONG. Surely. I am very sympathetic to the submarine concept.

To me it makes more sense than vulnerable aircraft carriers and all


I am wondering whether a new submarine has to be a Trident or

whether we should have an increased number of smaller ones.

Admiral KAUFMAN. We have really looked at it very hard.


Mr. SIKES. Why don't you give a short rationale on the reason you

want to go to the bigger ship and the more expensive ship, one which,

if lost, would mean you would lose the equivalent of a number of

smaller ships.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

First of all, let us examine the cost of the U.S.S. George Washington,

which was built in 1959-60. The cost was then for that representative-

type ship about $93 million.

Mr. LoNG. When was it built ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. 1959-60.

Mr. OBEY. What would the cost be in today's dollars ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. $168 million, escalated with nothing else in-

cluded. I may be off a couple of million. We just dug that out in

response to a query. That is doing nothing as far as making it a

Poseidon submarine.

Now, then, to put in the capability of Poseidon, to go to that sub-

marine and build a new submarine today-that is, the SSBN-640

class-for the lead ship, the Will Rogers, it would cost about $270

million through the program years that it would take to get it, which

would be 1978, if we started now.

Mr. LONG. And there would probably be a big cost overrun.

Admiral KAUFMAN. I am saying that is the first ship. The follow-on

ships would be about $230 million. We have computed these and

gotten the estimates on them and it takes that kind of money.

Mr. SIREs. So you are talking about one Trident or four Polaris/


Admiral LYON. No, sir.

IT'1 "lit firth" n


Admiral KAUFMAN. NO, sir, I am not.

Mr. SIRES. Costwise. You said $230 million.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Trident is not a billion-dollar submarine, Mr.

Chairman. That has been said by Admiral La Rocque and others and

I am glad to have the opportunity to refute that.

Mr. LONG. This is a very interesting point you are raising right now.

Let us talk more about that.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir. The cost of the program for 10 ships

and the base is about $12 billion. Last year it was presented at about

$13.5. So the critics say "10 into 13.5 gives you $1.3 billion per sub-

marine. That is more than the most expensive nuclear aircraft carrier,

CVN-70 at a billion dollars." They are not counting the F-14's, the

Phoenix missiles, the R. & D. for the ship, or the base cost or anything

like that. We are showing you the total systems costs in this thing, so

that when you divide the number of ships into that, you come up with

what appears to be an expensive ship.

You divide the same type of thing with any other ship, 'all the

support and weapons and everything else, you come up with a differ-

ent thing.

The ship's construction money (SCN) for the follow-on ships of

this of this 10-ship force, to further equate it to other shipbuilding, is

less than $500 million, including escalation through the building years

,all the way through to 1978.

Mr. SIRES. That is the follow-on ship.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIRES. The average taxpayer is still going to divide 10 into

whatever the cost is and get about $1 billion a ship. That is the most

important part of it. You are going to have an expensive ship which

will cost, give or take a few hundred millions, a billion dollars, includ-

ing the total system costs which we would not have if we were not

gomg to build the ship. We may as well face up to the fact that it is a

very expensive item. Tell us why it is better to have one of these than

four or even three of the Polaris/Poseidons.

Admiral KAUFMAN. I have not added missile costs into the Polaris/


Mr. SIKES. Have you added the missiles into the Trident ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, in that $1 billion cost, the missiles and

everything are in there.

Mr. SIREs. If you add them into the Polaris/Poseidon, what will it


Admiral KAUFMAN. Really what we are talking about here-

Mr. SIKES. In today's money.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Probably - per missile, that would be

- that.

Admiral LYON. - per missile.

Admiral KAUFMAN. $100 million then. It makes it some $300 mil-

lion. I have my tenders and all that. I would have to develop the full

system cost.

Mr. SIRES. Will you have to have tenders for Trident ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. No, sir, we will not have tenders for Trident.

That support is provided by the base.


Admiral LYON. Mr. Chairman, we have presented to you the total

program cost. What he is talking about here is the equivalent cost for

only the submarine portion of the total system.

To give an equivalent total program cost for Polaris/Poseidon

versus Trident you would have to include floating drydocks, train-

ing facilities, missile weapon facilities, personnel, deployed tenders,

piers and all the facilities that are in being to support that system and

new ones that would have to be provided.

We have looked at tradeoffs between all types of systems. We studied

this program in all of its complexities for 2 years.

Mr. SIKES. I understand your zeal for the program and I support the

program. I have to keep my feet on the ground.

Admiral LYON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIKES. I want to know whether you get two or three or four

Polaris/Poseidon for the cost of a Trident.

I want the record to show-this committee's record to show-why it

is better to have one Trident than two, three, or four other ships.

Mr. Nicholas has a question.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Tell me if this is a reasonable assumption. Under the

strategic arms limitations you are basically limited to replacement

submarines. So it would be a question of replacing, with the most mod-

ern Poseidon weapon system you have, 10 of the older Polaris subma-

rines, which cannot be updated, and which do not have Poseidon

missiles, or replacing them with the Trident system, actually a lesser

number of Trident boats. It is a question of trading either one of them


To some extent you would be able to use existing support facilities.

To some extent you have to beef up some of your older Polaris support

facilities in order to be able to handle the Poseidon missile. In addition

to that, you would have to buy new Poseidon missile equipment for

each of the 10 submarines. What other costs would there be aside from

those that I have mentioned ?

Would there be substantial additional R. & D. costs ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. To just make more Poseidon ships?


Admiral KAUFMAN. NO, not if you want Chinese copies of the ships

we built before. There would not. On the other hand what we are trying

to point out is that this ship has noise sources which we cannot correct

without building a new ship and a new propulsion plant.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Could you include in the record the comparative cost

of doing that on a replacement basis ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir. I will provide the information for the


[The information follows:]

Assuming that the current strategic arms limitations held indefinitely into the

future, the 10 oldest Polaris submarines could be replaced by 10 new Poseidon

submarines, each having 16 missile tubes. The cost to build these 10 new sub-

marines with either a Poseidon or Trident I missile capability would be about

$2.34 billion (without missiles).

If 24-tube Trident submarines replaced the first 10 Polaris submarines only

seven would need to be built to provide approximately the same number of

replacement launch tubes (168). The cost for these seven Trident submarines

would be about $3.78 billion.


Rough acquisition cost figures for these options to replace the 10 oldest Polaris

submarines are summarized in the following table:

(a) Ten new Poseidon submarines, each with 16 Poseidon missiles, supported

from a shore base at Charleston.

Submarine :

R. & D------------------------------------------- Insignificant.

Procurement (10)----- -------------------------- 2, 340, 000, 000


R. & D------------------------------------------ Insignificant.


Poseidon --------------------------------------

Base: MILCON-------------------------------------- $110, 000, 000

Total ----------------------------------------

(b) Ten new Poseidon submarines, each with 16 Poseidon missiles, supported

from a submarine tender.

Submarine :

R. & D---------------- --------------------------- Insignificant.

Procurement (10) --------------------------------- $2, 340, 000, 000

Missile :

R. & D_--------------------- ----------------- Insignificant.


Poseidon ----------------------------------------

MILCON ------------------------------------------ - 0

Tender: Procurement------------------------------------ 172, 000, 000

Total ----------------------------------------

(c) Ten new Poseidon submarines, each with 16 Trident I missiles, supported

from a shore base at Charleston, S.C.


R. & D------------------------------------------- Insignificant.

Procurement (10) ---------------------------------------$2, 340, 000, 000

Missile :

R. & D----- ...------------------------------------ 2, 690, 000, 000

Procurement (160 Trident I) -----------1, 410, 000, 000

Shore Facilities: MILCON-------------------------------- 156, 000, 000

Total ---------------------------------------- 6,596, 000,000

(d) Ten new Poseidon submarines, each with 16 Trident I missiles, supported

from a submarine tender.

Submarine :

R. & D------------------------------------------- Insignificant.

Procurement (10) --------------------------------------- $2, 340, 000, 000


R. & D---....------------------------------------------ 2, 690, 000, 000

Procurement (160 Trident I) ------------------------- 1, 410, 000. 000

Tender: Procurement------ --------------------------------- 172, 000, 000

Shore Facilities: MILCON--------------------------------- 46, 000, 000

Total ------------------------------------------------ 6, 658, 000, 000

(e) Seven Trident submarines, each with 24 Trident I missiles, supported from

a shore base.


R. & D ....------------------ -------------------------- $582, 000, 000

Procurement (7) --------- -------------------------- 3, 780, 000, 000


R. & D------------ --------------------------- 2, 690, 000, 000

Procurement (168) ----------------------------------- 1, 480, 000, 000

Base: MILCON---------------------------------------- 543, 000, 000

Total ------------------------------------------ 9, 075, 000, 000


Mr. SIKES. Supply for the record the cost of a submarine similar to

the Trident but with 16 instead of 24 missiles ?

[The information follows:]

A 16 tube Trident type submarine will cost about $423 million (without

missiles). A 24 tube Trident submarine will cost about $483 million (without



Mr. SIKES. Tell me why you want one of these instead of two, three,

or four of the others?

[The information follows:]

The construction of submarines comparable to our present SSBN's for the

purpose of replacing these SSBN's has been considered and rejected, mainly

because of the inability to incorporate into a hull of that size, needed techno-

logical improvements. We would be unable to incorporate the advanced sonars,

larger propulsion plant, and larger missiles in such a hull. As is the case with our

present SSBN's, there would be no available growth room for future techno-

logical advances, something which will be available in the Trident submarine.

In general, construction of another class of Poseidon submarines would not

be advancing the capability and survivability of our sea-based strategic force to

the limits of our technology and would result in a self-imposed obsolete system.

Today's SSBN's have technological deficiencies which cannot be corrected

by backfitting. Even with the programed improvements, the installed sonars

(AN/BQR-2 and the AN/BQR-7) do not have the capabilities which will be

incorporated in the Trident submarine sonar suit. Not only will - detec-

tion be greatly improved -- processors will be installed to provide Trident

with a sonar suit which will have, at a minimum, the detection and classifica-

tion capabilities of the passive portions of the AN/BQQ-5 system being installed

on the 688 class SSN. In conjunction with this sonar suit, quieting techniques

will be employed including -- and many others which are expected to

provide the Trident submarine with radiated noise levels approximately -

lower than those of our most modern SSBN's. The net effect of the sonar suit

and reduced radiated noise should provide an acoustic advantage over post-

ulated threat submarines and permit early detection of ASW threat vehicles,

both surface and submarine, allowing time for avoidance actions.

One of the more prominent technological improvements which will be in-

corporated in the Trident submarine is the -- plant which is expected to

provide a maximum speed - . The desirability of such a plant, which can-

not be backfitted into our present SSBN's, is based on many considerations.

A - knots would allow the Trident to "sidestep" the threat posed by a

rapidly advancing search force (for example, an ASW task forces). Successfully

avoiding threats is key to Trident survivability.

If contact is never made, it need not be broken. Increased maximum speed

drive an enemy to use of higher speeds . In turn, such higher speeds de-

grade sonar performance, and if sufficiently high, may make effective sonar use

impossible. Control of the ship during control surface casualties, high sea states,

flooding casualties, and weapon evasion are all dependent on the maximum power

capabilities of the propulsion system. The - SHP plant provide ample

acceleration/backing power. The long-range Trident missile provides vast ocean

areas from which missiles may be launched. In order to reach all of these areas

from Conus ports (in a normal patrol) the Trident must be able to transit

at higher speeds than would be available with the present SSBN plants. The

inability to use all the area made available 'by the missile places a self-imposed

limit on our survivability even with a C-4 backfit into Poseidn. Should an

improved speed capability be desired, it cannot be obtained by backfitting a new

propulsion system into our present SSBN's. Another important point to consider

is the -- feature of the propulsion plant.

Mr. SIKES. Tell us why, briefly.

Admiral KAUFMAN. I want one of these because it will stand up

against a future threat that can negate the SSBN.

Mr. OBEY. What kind of threat would that be ?


Mr. LONG. Are you comparing that with a Chinese copy of this one,

or a new type of smaller submarine that you could build using all

your best brains and ingenuity ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. We have compared it with both.

In other words, one like this but make it larger as necessary.

Mr. LONG. You have a somewhat smaller submarine.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir. We have looked at this. One other point

I have not mentioned is that this ship has greater speed, not a whole

lot more.

Mr. SIKEs. How much more ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. knots more. -

The idea that we drive the enemy up to -

Mr. LONG. Admiral, you mean you cannot build a smaller submarine

which would not be as fast or faster than the big submarine ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir; we can do that by doing various things.

One, making the missile smaller; in other words, using the missiles

we have.

Mr. LONG. Smaller or fewer ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Smaller and fewer.

Mr. LONG. You cannot make one which would have a smaller num-

ber but just as big a missile ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes.

I can cut this down to 16 or 12 tubes and make the ship smaller.

Mr. LONG. But faster even than a big one ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. It would get faster -- for every four mis-

sile tubes. It would be - faster if we took off eight.

Mr. LONG. You could conceivably have a smaller ship which would

have fewer missile tubes, but which would be even faster than either

the old SSBN or the new Trident you are projecting here.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, it would be larger than the old Polaris/


We have done this in our tradeoffs through at least 20 various, dif-

ferent type designs and have gone through barrages of studies. I have

been in it 3 years and there is no new question on it. This one comes

out ahead for the things we are trying to do to have the longer range

and equivalent payload of the Polaris/Poseidon.

Mr. LONG. It is not just us, but many others are going to hit you.

with this issue.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir; we are hit all the time.


Mr. LONG. For one thing, this base that you are building-is that

the only base that can handle this ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir, when we build it. You could build

another one in any of the four places on the Atlantic and here.

Mr. LONG. That puts your eggs in one basket just from the stand-

point of vulnerability of the base. Any time anybody wants to knock

out the base in Bremerton you are left with the whole Trident system

without a base, is that not right ?

Admiral LYON. No, sir.

Mr. LONG. Doesn't that cut off your lifeline; is it possible to cut off

your lifeline?

Admiral KAUFMAN. You are talking in terms of war, then ?

Mr. LONG. Of course.

Admiral KAUFMAN. No, this is a deterrent, designed to prevent war.

We have the same problem with the SSBN's now, what is the difference

between one base versus four in today's type of warfare?

Mr. LONG. You are thinking of a 15-minute war and no repeats or

no reloads.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Unless you do something like that, then Bangor

is about as survivable as any base you can have and one base versus

two does not make that much of a difference.

Mr. SIKES. I would like for you to get around to the answer to my

question. Why do you need one rather than three?

Admiral KAUFMAN. I am not sure that the numbers would come out

that way, sir.

Mr. SIKES. You have to start somewhere.

Admiral KAUFMAN. But more anyway. We are saying you would

have more of the Polaris as compared to the Trident.

Mr. SIKES. And you would have 16 tubes in one with a smaller

missile, and 24 in the larger one ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir. With the larger missile capability.

Mr. SIKES. You have 48 smaller tubes instead of 24 larger tubes.

Admiral KAUFMAN. It is three for two in the way of missile numbers.

Mr. SIKES. If you have 24 in 1 ship, 48 in 3, are the 24 of the larger

missiles equivalent of the 48 of the smaller missiles now in use on

Polaris/Poseidon ?


Admiral KAUFMAN. No, sir. The difference in the missile, next thing

coming, is one of the big factors. We are developing two missiles. The

first missile is identical in size, with exception of the weight, to the

Poseidon missile we have today. It is a 34-foot-long missile by 74 inches

in diameter, and it will have a nominal range, , of about 4,000

miles. . The present range of Poseidon, for example,


With the same type of payload or weight you can get with these

weapons, -- you get about 2,200 miles. So with the same payload

this C-4 missile-and I hasten to say it can fit into here [pointing to

SSBN]--can shoot twice the range, which means you have roughly

four times the ocean area to put this ship (Trident) into hiding. Or

putting the smaller missile, the first missile we develop (if we elect

to do it and have to do it), in these (SSBN's), you could get it in the

same area.

Mr. SIKES. You have much more flexibility about where that ship

can be in the ocean and can still be an effective weapon.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Exactly. Let me go on from there. Because of

the nature of the propulsion plant design in this (Trident) versus

this (SSBN), this ship [pointing] can't make a we are dealing

with now and can see around the corner. it can make on

patrol-really a finite period of time because we are going to have

men on the ships and men have to come back-in this one today, with

the same range missile in it, we cover about four times the area on

" ~~-~p

patrol than this one from the standpoint that this Trident can pa-

trol . This is a real big advantage. So you measure that surviva-

bility, if you will, in terms of the area that the ship can patrol, that

the enemy perceives he will be patrolling.

Mr. SINES. SO that makes it a much more effective deterrent?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir, exactly. It is credible.

Mr. SIKES. What about her range? What is the comparative range

in cruising capability between the two ships?

Admiral KAUFMAN. You mean in miles?

Mr. SIKEs. Miles, knots, whatever.

Admiral KAUFMAN. At a quiet speed.

Mr. SIKES. At normal cruising speed for a submarine on patrol.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Let's take, for example, a submarine leaving

Charleston, S.C., here. Unfortunately this map is for the Pacific, which

applies to later discussion.

This Polaris submarine, going at quiet patrol speed of about

the submarine in a 60- or 70-day patrol can reach down to about

here [pointing] by the time he has to go back. The Trident submarine

will be able to go all the way down to here. Does that give you a grasp

of it, sir ? At the -

Mr. SIKES. You are saying about half as much again ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. TALCOTT. Is there a quiet speed and a not so quiet speed ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir. -

Mr. TALCOTT. It is a decibel count that causes the noise ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir, the noise -


Mr. SIKES. What is the comparative size of the crew ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. The comparative size of the crew. Admiral

Lyon's estimate is roughly 10 percent more for this ship. I wouldn't

hang my hat on that, because from our experience, on particular size

of crews before we came out with detailed design, we don't have a

good track record. I think we will need more and he thinks we will

need less.

Mr. SIKES. Would you resupply at sea ?

Admiral KAUFMAN.No sir.

Mr. SIKES. It would not be necessary ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. NO, sir.


Mr. SIKES. What is the length of cruise before she would have to be


Admiral KAUFMAN. I would plan on it being -- days. As Ad-

miral Lyon stated earlier, - days out, -- days off patrol

days in port for refit period and 5 to 7 days for sea trials and


Mr. SIKES. How does that compare with the Polaris/Poseidon?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Here is the cycle right here, sir [pointing]. This

compares with Polaris/Poseidon, the total availability for Trident

we are planning is about -- of the life of the ship that it will be

at sea, survivable, -- as compared to about 50 percent that we

have enjoyed over the past with Polaris.

Mr. SIKES. Could she be resupplied at sea if necessry ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. No, sir. I say no, sir. It wouldn't be practical.

If necessary, you could tie it up to a tender that is anchored some-

where in the same manner that the Soviets tie up some of their ships

or that we do ourselves at advanced bases. But we are not designing

a tender to do that, so it would be a difficult thing. It would not be

able to handle the large missiles, for example.


Mr. LONG. I would feel happier about your comparisons if you

would also have a third column of estimates of what a new smaller

type submarine could achieve. Because I think it is really unfair to

compare Trident with an obsolete Polaris/Poseidon. Rather, you

ought to compare what performance you could develop if you went

in for a smaller submarine.

Admiral KAUFMAN. We have done that.

Mr. LONG. I think it ought to be presented to us here.

Admiral KAUFMAN. We have presented it to the armed services

and Appropriations Committees.

Mr. LONG. I am very unhappy about your giving us what seems

to be a loaded comparison.

Mr. SIKES. IS the Polaris/Poseidon an obsolete submarine?

Admiral KAUFMAN. It is not.

Mr. SIKEs. I haven't heard it called that.

Admiral KAUFMAN. It is not.

Mr. LONG. When was it built ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. The first was in 1959.

Mr. LONG. When was the last one built?

Admiral KAUFMAN. It was commissioned in 1967.

Mr. LONG. There is a long leadtime on this.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Very long leadtime.

Mr. LONG. You would not build new submarines, as you say, Chinese

copies, of this one. You would go in for the newest and best.

Admiral KAUFMAN. You and I wouldn't, but there are a lot of

people who would.

Mr. LONG. You are talking, I would hope, to a reasonably sophis-

ticated group. If you are going to make a comparison, it ought to

be the Trident versus the best you could do if you went out to build

a smaller submarine to achieve these missions.

Admiral KAUFMAN. We can provide you with the information we

went through on our studies. Bear in mind after we discarded that

type of idea we haven't progressed to the point we have in Trident

with a design or anything else; so you don't know as much about it.

Mr. SIKES. Isn't the more important thing the fact that the Navy

is supporting the Trident and the Department of Defense is support-

ing the Trident. The only choice that is before the Congress is whether

it approves the Trident.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. I don't think that is the only choice. I think you are going

to have a real question whether we shouldn't move ahead on an im-

proved Poseidon/Polaris system.

- r- -_. . .~_;_~.~

Admiral KAUFMAN. Let's make sure you understand that we have

steel that has been built for the reactor plant. We got long lead time

money, $311 million last year.

Mr. LONG. You mean you have done so much on Trident you are

committed to it ? Is that it ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. I wouldn't throw it away, sir.

Mr. LONG. In other words, you put Congress in something of a bind,

and I think you put yourself in something of a bind.

Mr. SIKEs. Congress approved this concept earlier.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Congress approved this, Dr. Long.

Mr. LONG. Congress may do things it ought not to.

Admiral KAUFMAN. In the normal manner of approval and hearings

we have gone through all of this, shown 'the matrices of our studies to

the Congress, and have gone through it I would say also "ad nauseum"

with various committees and staffs for years.

Mr. SIKES. You have gone through this in the Navy and with the

Department of Defense, and to some extent with staff and Members

of Congress. Now tell us in 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, order the disadvantages of

the smaller version of the Trident.

Admiral KAUFMAN. The disadvantages of the smaller version of the


Mr. SIKES. Or the souped up version of the Polaris/Poseidon.

Admiral KAUFMAN. The disadvantages of the smaller version really

vis-a-vis the larger Trident .are none. Let me make clear what I am


Mr. SIKES. I want you to be sure what you are saying.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir. I am saying one with less tubes, for

example, operationally has no disadvantage, and to people like Ad-

miral Lyon and myself as submariners .operating them, have some ad-

vantages in that they are slightly faster, they are slightly more maneu-

verable, more controllable as you get smaller. For example, the Scor-

pion I commanded was a far cry from the George Washington, which

was the same thing with the missile compartment in it, from the stand-

point that one was an attack submarine and the other literally a slow

speed submarine by comparison.

Mr. LONG. You haven't mentioned another advantage-the great

dispersion if we have this smaller one. To me that is a great advantage.

Mr. SINES. Would the smaller one cost half as much as the big one ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. It doesn't come to that at all. Ship construction

money of a Chinese copy, if you recall, comes to half of the Trident


Mr. SIKES. What is the cost of smaller ones ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. In the studies that we did-I am going to have

to go back, thinking about 3 years back now to the results of the studies

we did to compare smaller submarines wth a reactor, for example,

--- of the one we have here but

Mr. SIKES. And sonar ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. With sonar, yes, sir, good sonar. I am thinking

in terms of-it was over $300 million for the small one, and I would

say $310 to $320 million and probably about $340 million some for the

larger ones. Then what has happened, as we got the one with the larger

Power plant, then these things don't come neatly in the progression.

We came up with the ship the Navy sponsored and said, "We want this

ship with -- inch diameter missile tubes." That is smaller than we

have. We have now. Where did that come from? It comes

through the evolution. Once we came up with a ship, Dr. Foster and

his people said again, "don't shoehorn the missiles and the tubes. We

would like it to be bigger." Some people want as much as - - feet.

We compromised and showed them an -- inch tube and showed

them it is adequate to do anything that might be conceived desirable

by the President whoever he is in the future. We finally got that ac-

cepted, but the ship grew and the cost for obvious reasons grew. The

smaller ship would do the same thing. What I am saying, we are

talking about basically the difference in power plant which would give

us about - knots more speed.

Mr. SIKES. Would this new version require all of the new facilities

that the Trident will require or could you use existing facilities?

Admiral KAUFMAN. It would require new facilities because we are

going to a higher density propellant. The real big name of the game

here in R. & D. costs for Trident is the missile. The missile is being

developed to give us twice the capability in the same size we have


Mr. SIKES. In other words, all of that would be required to deploy the

same type of missile but in a smaller submarine. So, you are talking

about two-thirds to three-fourths the cost?

Admiral LYON. For an equal number, yes, sir. But you see 18 Trident

submarines are equivalent to 31 of the smaller ones in deployment and

time at sea.


Mr. SIKES. I want the record to show whether there is any economy

as far as cost is concerned.

Admiral KAUFMAN. I think it obvious. We go, and have gone with

one committee alone last year, something like four times, about 6 hours

a day, on just this sort of thing. I think Admiral Lyon can provide for

the record a comparison that will show what we would do with these

things and why this is cost effective.

Mr. SIRES. What we want to know is whether there is a significant

savings or cost for a smaller Trident type to achieve the same type of

capability the Trident achieves ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

The cost of a new smaller (16 missile launch tubes) ballistic missile submarine

would be about 80 percent of the planned cost of a Trident submarine (24 missile

launch tubes) assuming both submarines would carry the same size/weight mis-

sile. With projected availability for Trident, a 10-ship force will provide -- at

sea. To provide the same missiles at sea with a smaller submarine (16 missile

launch tubes) and same system availability, a force of additional sub-

marines and crews would be required. The acquisition cost for these additional

ships would equal the cost of - Tridents. This would be significantly more

costly than Trident. In addition, life cycle operating costs for this force of smaller

submarines would approach half again the life cycle operation costs of the 10-ship

Trident force.

The choice of the number of tubes that Trident should carry has also been the

subject of intensive examination from the viewpoint of threat to the submarine

and the missile itself. Recent studies indicate that for the probable projected

threats through the year 2000, the survivability of Trident missiles is fairly

insensitive to the number of tubes the submarine would carry for a total force of

more than 430 launch tubes. This is to say that, against both threats to the sub-


marine before launch and to the missile after launch, the probability of missiles

hitting the target would be about the same whether fired from more submarines

firing fewer missiles or fewer submarines firing more missiles.

Mr. SIKES. Not a modernized Polaris/Poseidon.

Admiral KAUFMAN. What I would like to do here is provide you

the information that we have already developed, at great length and

for many months, so the ship will be representative but not exactly

the same ship.

Mr. SIKEs. But you are not going to get a bargain rate if you go

to a smaller type.

Admiral KAUFMAN. You are not going to get a bargain rate if you

go to Polaris. The Polaris/Poseidon has cost a total of about $17

billion in the last 10 years.

[Discussion off the record.]


Admiral KAUFMAN. I would like to say for the record that I was

asked the question the other day in a Senate hearing-the statement

was made that "you are going for $1.7 billion this year and going to

$2.5 the next 2 years; there has never been any defense system that has

required this much."

Just a quick cursory look was made by one of my officers yesterday

at this sort of thing. I said: "Look at Minuteman and Polaris back in

1962, 1963, and what happened when we escalated the costs up ?" Po-

laris is comparable, and Minuteman is more than what we are spend-

ing. It was, in fact, in those "good dollar" years about $1.4 billion

the first year and $2.3 billion or $2.0 billion the next 2 years for Min-

uteman. So the other important thing was, with regard to something

you look at, like the gross national product, Trident over the next few

few years comes out something like 0.13 percent, and those systems came

out to about 0.3 percent in those years. So I think we all agree the cost

is fantastically high for any system. B-1, as a comparison system, is

programed for somewhere around the same that we are talking about

here for the total systems cost.


Mr. SIKEs. Let's talk a little about vulnerability. You are saying be-

cause she is a quiet submarine, she is a fast submarine-

Admiral KAUFMAN. This [pointing to Trident] is a faster subma-


Mr. SIKES. I understand. Once she gets out at sea she is much less

vulnerable than the current type of submarine that we have?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes.

Mr. SIKES. That is very much a plus. Then the area of greatest

vulnerability would be when she is at her dock; and what is your poten-

tial for getting her out to sea once there are danger signals ? I don't

mean once there is a missile launch. That is too late to get her very far.

But when the danger signals are such that we feel there is a serious

threat developing, how long is it going to take to get her out to sea,

away from the vulnerable position next to her port or where the chan-

nel could be bottled up so she can't even get out.

Admiral KAUFMAN. I think it will be more here in this particular

port than any port we could put it in.

Mr. SIKES. More what ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. The chances would be more optimal of getting

it out than it would be in others.

Mr. SIKES. Why ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Here is where we are right here [pointing to

Bangor]. I can dive this submarine right off the pier. Literally.

Mr. TALCOTT. To what depth?

Admiral KAUFMAN. One hundred or two hundred feet. There is about

300 feet of water right off this pier. I wouldn't do that necessarily.

There is a bridge up here. But I can dive under it. It is a floating

bridge. I could go under it. I can't say I would. I could if I had to. I can

put this submarine in, back away and go down where we are "lost."

Roughly it is around here [pointing], 80 miles from international

waters where we now have-not here but off Charleston and Guam,

Soviet AGI's patroling, a number of Soviet vessels patroling, --

in some of these places now; and this being almost 20 miles across here,

deep water, I can run out of here. And, for example, there is an aver-

age of -- like this. They need not know when you are coming out,

contrary to what you do in other places.


Mr. SIXES. You realize you are going to generate submarine patrols

off the west coast now don't you?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Require what ?

Mr. SIKES. Russian patrols.

Admiral KAUFMAN. And that is exactly the reason we picked it, to

give you two oceans they have to worry about instead of concentrating

in one where we have everything now.

Mr. TALorr. Wouldn't it be difficult if you had a sunken merchant

ship in the strait there ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. No, sir. The large surface ships run up here.

That is big and it is deep. The merchant ship doesn't exist that would

clutter this place.

Mr. OBEY. Wouldn't it be easier because of the geography of the

Soviet Union for them to operate in the Pacific much more easily

than they could in the Atlantic?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Again this is precisely the reason. Where are

your bases in the Pacific for the Soviets? Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk.

Where are they in the Atlantic ? One of the things we have been seeing

very much in the last few years is -

I have taken here a typical existing aircraft today, the Bear aircraft,

and it is capable today and does come down here [pointing to chart] on

ASW sweeps. I have given 3 hours on station to give time to prosecute

contacts. Right now it can blanket the - - but it can only look at

part of the . In most of the area we are going to be patroling

with Trident, they can't get forces up to it, they don't have

a base complex that can threaten the Pacific. We have even given

credit -- which I don't think they are capable of having. That is

not in the broad Pacific area.

There are other criticisms. I see you are reading one which I would

assume is Dr. Scoville's article.


Admiral KAUFMAN. He has said, for example, they can put SOSUS

here, have access to the Pacific with SOSUS.

Mr. OBEY. What is that ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. The long-range sonar detection monitoring sur-

veillance, sonar surveillance system. --

-- . For example, in a basin here the . Our own SSBN

today would be about -- of that. Compared to our SSBN which

could be detected about - of that radius, the Trident would be

detectable about - of that radius. So he is going to have to have

these things over on our coast. Yes, he can run cables quicker, easier.

He can run a 100-mile length of cable here [pointing]. If he has

SOSUS capability he would. Around here they are saying he would

have to run all the way around here [pointing]. My question to Mr.

Scoville is

Mr. OBEY. The article I am referring to is not Mr. Scoville's. I

haven't read the article you are talking about.

Admiral KAUFMAN. He has made this comment. If we were to base

it in the Atlantic, Mr. Obey, he would be making a criticism about it

being so shallow you have to run a long way under the surveillance of

the Soviet AGI's.


Mr. OBEY. What targets do you have in the Soviet Union more

reachable from the Pacific ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. YOU are making my brief for me, sir.

Bangor is here [pointing to slide]. I have shown here the arcs of

range for the missiles. Trident missiles will have maximum range,

. The ocean area you get here is fairly small because you are

constrained to the landlocked archipelagos here, . You can go

through it but for ease of showing we have shown about two-tenths for

this missile range all the way down to about 11 million square miles

of ocean area for this range [pointing]. This line, I hasten to point out,

is targeting alone, but in our study to determine what missile

range, consequently missile performance we needed, we looked for a

convenient reference. We didn't look at, say, just the first target here,

which some people look at. We said we have to go beyond - . To

me a useful system as an overall deterrent to the Soviets from the

Pacific ought to be able to reach over in there too.

So we have then targeting - which is also a very necessary thing

to consider, this type of radius or an area of 31 million square miles.

That is just to . Let's look at how many targets you can get

from the Pacific here. I have the same thing for the Atlantic, not with


Here I have done a study of all targets in the - system.

if you will, for an airfield. This would be the airstrip. This will be the

bunker of ammunition or fuel. This will be the installation. We try

to compute the aim point for the given point for yield and accuracy

to make sure we get all of these or else we have to develop other aim


points if it is a small-yield weapon. I have taken all of these that are

meaningful targets, and here is what we get.

Right out of Bangor I have -- targets if I want to just put

800, 1600 [pointing]. With the - missiles these

are Soviet targets. I have right here just about the whole base.

Most extreme targets in range from the Pacific are these most

extreme complexes, - . I can reach those all the way down to

these limiting lines with the mile missile. I can cover

Something I can't do from the Atlantic, Mr. Obey. And I would like

to point out all of this targeting information is very sensitive.

Here I am talking about why we don't want ---. So you have this

sort of flexibility which you do not have in the Atlantic.


Finally, one 'other point when we consider survivability. Mr. Chair-

man, a little while ago you asked what kind of range we can get with

ships patrolling. We have this capability here for going in the

which has advantages-as a lieutenant commander working on the

Polaris back in 1958 I tried to get people to . That was too

far out. I would do it again with Trident. Maybe I can do it this time.

Mr. SIKES. You would have a better chance.

Admiral KAUFMAN. A little better. Maybe not.

This represents only a - which is a deepwater port. You will

immediately ask why we can't base submarines there. We would have

to buy - as occupied by the Navy now. I have a chart that could

show you. It is a deepwater port. I can go in there as long as I don't

work on the missiles enough to make an explosive safety hazard. I

can put the ship in there, fly a crew out, change the crew, -- come

back out and change the crew and make three trips, three patrols, and

a longer upkeep period when I return after three if I want that

kind of flexibility.

The type of target coverage I get there gives me - 11 million

square miles there. In our studies on survivability this sort of option

increases survivability even more than the total Pacific which gives

us more than most people can ever imagine necessary.

In short then, to answer your question finally and completely, ---

Mr. SIXEs. I think this has been very useful. I am sure it has been

helpful to the committee.

Let's recapitulate. This, of course, has been a short briefing to

familiarize the committee with the Trident and with its strengths

and its vulnerabilities. What more do you have, Admiral, in your


Admiral LYON. That completes the briefing.

Mr. SIxEs. You are now ready for questions?

Admiral LYON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIKES. I am going to suggest that while'the briefing by Admiral

Kaufman is fresh in our mind, before I begin these other questions

I pass the witness around.

Mr. Davis, do you have some questions on the briefing itself?

Mr. DAVIS. No. I just wanted to comment I think the briefing has

been very good. But basically the decision on Trident is not one

we are going to make here.

Mr. SIKES. It is not for this committee to make.

Mr. DAVIs. It is a very good informational background and I do

appreciate it.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Patten.


Mr. PATTEN. I have a little comment only. I was a little surprised

to hear you say the core life on your Polaris is 41/2 to 6 years and the

Trident -- years. I thought it was much longer. On the Enterprise

I sort of got a different impression. It amazed me.

Admiral LYON. The lifetime of the core depends in part on how you

use the system. For instance, the core is designed to give so much effec-

tive full power hours. If you run the ship at 25 percent of that power,

it lasts longer than if you run at 100-percent power in comparison

to time.

With regard to the Trident submarine, our goal is to achieve a mini-

mum of -- no matter how the submarine is operated, and in fact

if it is operated in its normal patrol routine it will be able to run for

a longer period of time.

The reason for this is we did not want to have to bring all of the

submarines back into the shipyards at the same rate that we built

them. We would like to only overhaul probably one a year. That main-

tans the greatest number of them at sea and therefore the greatest

deterrent at sea.

Mr. PATTEN. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Long.

Mr. LONG. As I said before, from the standpoint of our strategic

defense, it seems to me a submarine makes more sense than anything

the Air Force, Army, or other parts of the Navy can offer. So I am

beginning with an enormous leaning in your direction.

My worries are the worries that an awful lot of people are going

to have on the Trident system. They concern the issue of a tremen-

dous supersubmarine as compared with some other type.


How many would be in dock at any one time ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Of the 10 ship force you would have about 3.

In dock-I am sorry, I thought you meant in port.

Mr. LONG. What is the difference between time in dock and in port ?

Admral LYON. In port, Dr. Long ?

Mr. LONG. Say Bremerton.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Out of 10 you would figure on an average of 3

in at any one time.

Admiral LYON. Let me put that in a little more perspective. You

would have one in the middle of refit. This means you might have

equipment torn down and be repairing it. You would have one that

would be in its shakedown period. It would be operating at sea but

in local areas. And you would have one that had just returned from

patrol. So in fact if an emergency arose at least two of those three

could immediately be sailed.

Mr. LONG. That is, if you had advance warning.

Admiral LYON. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. Of course, that is the great unknown factor in the case

of the next nuclear war, whether we do get any advance warning.

Admiral LYON. Yes.

Mr. LONG. We are going to have so many warnings we won't know

which one to take, and after a while we probably won't pay attention

to the warning which is the real one.

Admiral LYON. I might add, Dr. Long, that we have-

Mr. LONG. At Pearl Harbor you couldn't get them to believe this

was for real because there had been so many alerts.

Admiral LYON. We have actually run some of these tests in our de-

ployed sites on Poseidon, and we have had the SSBNS along side the

tender underway from that site in just a - and the tender itself

has been underway in about --

Mr. LONG. But this is a big if nevertheless. You are not going to get

hours, you are going to get a few minutes in the real thing.

Admiral KAUFMAN. I think one point needs to be brought out here,

sir. We, as strategic planners, don't plan on those ships in port surviv-

ing to make our deterrent work.

Mr. LONG. You are going to write off three probably.

Admiral KAUFMAN. In a surprise attack, I would write them off.

Mr. LONG. You have seven left.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Of the 10 ship force. We have the other force,

Polaris/Poesidon, which is still operating.

Mr. LONG. I understand. So you have a lot of eggs in one basket-

the wrong basket to begin with.

Admiral KAUFMAN. But all over the Pacific Ocean, sir.

Mr. LONG. The other seven. That is what bothers me. We are all

worried about the question of survivability.

Admiral LYON. Again, Dr. Long, if you had a larger number of

smaller submarines, then you would have a larger percentage in port.

Mr. LONG. Whatever the size of the submarine you would have about

the same percentage in port capable being knocked out?

Admiral LYON. Yes.

Mr. LONG. But they would be at more ports. This thing is one big

shiny target. It would seem to me if I were the Soviets, I would really

level on that thing.

Admiral KAUFMAN. I don't think they would have any more-

Mr. LONG. You know the more ports, the more places, the more


Admiral KAUFMAN. If they want to hit a ,port, they can hit five or

six just as easily as one.

Mr. LONG. That, I think, is the whole argument again as to why we

should have so many different types of defense. It makes targeting

more difficult so something is more apt to survive.

Admiral KAUFMAN. This is another one of our considerations in

going to the Pacific to avoid all of it being in the Atlantic.

Mr. LONG. I am not talking about that. I am troubled by the fact you

are building enormous ships that are going to be very vulnerable and

three of them are going to have to be written off. Are any others going

to have to be written off because they are -- or-

Admiral KAUFMAN. NO, sir.

Mr. TALCOTT. You have to write off the ones

Admiral KAUFMAN. These I am talking about are Tridents.

If we - . I say you have that option. You wouldn't be there if

you want to do that. And I am saying that is just another option you

can do to get more area if you need it.

Admiral LYON. If you - you wouldn't be at Bangor.

Admiral KAUFMAN. It is another place. He asked the question would

there be another one that might be written off.

Mr. LONG. You don't expect to have more than three in port.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes.

Mr. LONG. Is this average or maximum because they are going to

hit when they think you are weakest.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Average.

Mr. LONG. What would be maximum?

Admiral KAUFMAN. We have made over 1,000 patrols in Polaris to

date and our average is just about the maximum. Those ships stay

out. We have roughly --

Mr. LONG. They are going to do a lot of intelligence work and pick

out the time when your pants are down.

Admiral KAUFMAN. It goes like clockwork, really.


Mr. LONG. Our base advantage as you present it is simply enormous

compared to the Soviet Union. Isn't that especially in the Pacific ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. I was in the Near East recently and in the Straits of

Bosphorus, and looked down there and thought we could clock every

Russian submarine and ship coming through, and was told we were

doing that. I realized most of them had to pass through from the Black

Sea to get through there. Then up at Gibraltar we have them

similarly blocked in. You can forget about the SOSUS. It seemed to me

our advantage is tremendous.

I am wondering with all of this tremendous base advantage why

we need to move at such great expense to get this greater range?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Why we need more range, greater range, faster

in the missile ?

Mr. LONG. Yes. It looks to me as if the Soviets would have a very

difficult time really with their meager base setup.

Admiral KAUFMAN. You realize with the present range of our

ships, our submarines have to be well inside that shaded area to

attack the Soviet heartland I showed you on the chart.

Mr. LONG. I guess I was outside then.

Admiral MARSHALL. I think it goes back to Dr. Long's basic ques-

tion about vulnerability. The three ships in port represent three

vulnerable items, and the range factor which Admiral Kaufman has

shown in his demonstration gives you greater survivability and ex-

tremely less vulnerability to the ships at sea.

Mr. SIKES. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LONG. I am not quite sure I understand your answer.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Very simply, range gives you more area, more

survivability for the ships at a time when the Soviets are developing

ASW at a rapid rate. Two, we have a situation where right now we use

overseas bases. It may well be in the near future we are denied use of

overseas bases. Range such as we are talking about here permits us

to target the Soviet heartland from the United States on either the east

or west coast. So it would give you the option of pulling back if you

had to and keeping your submarines homeported here. Otherwise it

would mean a lot of time in transit to get to where you could even be

within range of the Soviet Union with our present ships.


Mr. LONG. Why won't the Soviet immediately start underwater

antisubmarine warfare research that aims toward this?

Admiral KAUFMAN. They have already. That is why we want this,

because of what this does for us.

Mr. LONG. Isn't this likely to be possibly obsolete by the time we

get it built in 1980 because it is such an important great shining

system and of such major concern to them.

Admiral KAUFMAN. I don't think it can become obsolete. From some

of the detectors they might develop which might enable them to pick

them up occasionally-we have to remember once they pick this thing

up at this patricular instant it is no more vulnerable than Minuteman

at anytime, but also it is not going to stay detected.

Mr. LONG. Right now submarine warfare in the foreseeable future is

very weak. We have a lot of time. Should we load ourselves onto one

system that is very costly, and that could be obsolete, the same thing we

did before-one generation and bloc obsolescence. Maybe we should

string it out more so we have greater protection.

Admiral LYON. We have modeled the Trident submarine against

every threat we can imagine out somewhere in the foreseeable future,

and in cases even beyond that. And this submarine is highly survivable

against all of the threats, including satellites, both low and high flying

aircraft, and submarines and surface ships. In fact, the reason that we

put the more missiles into it is because it is so survivable.

Mr. LONG. Can the Trident be justified on the basis that money

spent for deterrence of strategic nuclear attack will enable reductions

in the number of people necessary for conventional forces?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Mr. Long, it could be argued that another nation

would be more inclined to resort to conventional warfare for aggres-

sion if our strategic forces continue to successfully deter strategic

nuclear attacks. Thus, the continued effectiveness of our strategic forces

does not necessarily imply that our conventional forces can be reduced.

With reference to our Trident submarines, they are, as you are aware,

being designed for only a strategic mission. I suppose, on the other

hand, that one might conjecture that a sufficiently powerful strategic

force disinvites adventure on the part of another nation. From that

standpoint much money is saved by not having made larger "ready"

forces than we now see as necessary. Quite obviously, if we save our-

selves the expenses of even a "small" war, our deterrent money has been

well spent.


Mr. OBEY. Dr. Long mentioned the possibility of seven Tridents

being left in the event of attack. You said that, yes, but of course the

Polaris/Poseidon system is available. How useful do you think they

would be 10 years from now?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Mr. Obey, it is a very interesting thing that

when you run your threat studies, and I am not a real believer of all

the computer studies that come up and ignore the experience of peo-

ple, necessarily-but these studies do nevertheless show that with

Trident against the most credible projections of force levels the Soviets

can have, and even doubling that and looking at the whole gamut, so

we are not too far wrong, that the two systems taken in aggregate aid

and abet, if you will, to use the term that has become popular, "syner-

gistic." You require the Soviets to devote forces to the Atlantic deploy-

ment and to the Pacific deployment so that both come out with a diluted


The aggregate looks better. It would not look as good if you have a

full force of Tridents which would be more survivable.

Mr. OBEY. That is pretty obvious. Let me put it this way: Right

now I assume that you assume we are relatively secure with Poseidon/

Polaris; right?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes.

Mr. OBEY. How about 10 years from now ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Ten years from now I don't think the Polaris/

Poseidon by themselves-

Mr. OBEY. What is the specific new threat you see ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. It is not a new threat. It is just increased

development of the present ASW capability, sonars, lasers, and in-

frared capabilities.

Mr. OBEY. YOU testified we can take care of a lot of that at present

with the Poseidon program.

Admiral KAUFMAN. We cannot put into our present Poseidon pro-

gram sonars necessary to pick up new Soviet submarines at long range

as compared to the Trident submarines. You can do it better, but you

can't do the same thing unless you put the same sonar in it. You can't do

that unless you just about build a new submarine.

Mr. PATTEN. Are you speaking of diameter ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. I am talking now about having more room in

the submarine. We have used up all the room in Polaris.

Mr. OBEY. How long ago did we first test a MIRVed missile?

Admiral KAUFMAN. I am not sure of the date. We could provide

it for the record.

Mr. OBEY. Do you have a rough guess ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. I would guess about 1969, 1970, in that time


Mr. OBEY. How about the Soviets ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. TO my knowledge they haven't yet.

Mr. OBEY. That is right, they still have not. That is all, Mr. Chair-


Mr. SIKES. Mr. Talcott.


Mr. TALCOTT. May I ask why you selected Bangor, up in Washing-

ton, as compared with San Francisco, San Diego, or Panama City ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir. We looked at 89 sites in very great


Mr. TALCOTT. In the Pacific ?


Admiral KAUFMAN. No, sir; throughout. We looked at California,

Oregon, and Washington bases, Pearl Harbor and many others, Guam.

Mr. TALCOTT. Is this already in the record ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. I think it was covered last year. But never-

theless, real quickly and rapidly, the big thing that drives the problem

is with the larger Trident missiles, 24 on a ship, you get into an ex-

plosive safety radius . To put this into a metropolitan area

you would literally have to buy an awful lot of metropolitan real


Mr. PATTEN. There is no such real estate in Bangor.

Admiral KAUFMAN. In Bangor we have a very minimal, if any,

requirement for additional land over the 7,700 acres we have there


Mr. PATTEN. YOU are satisfied that being far inland there is no

detriment resulting from fallen bridges or sunken ships ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. On the contrary I think that particular situa-

tion there is an attribute.

Mr. PATTEN. You checked 89 locations. How many were in the

Pacific in numbers ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. I can provide it for the record. Admiral Lyon

says he believes it was 18.

[The information follows:]

Admiral KAUFMAN. Twenty-nine of the original 89 sites considered for the

Trident base are located in the Pacific area. Twenty-four of these are on the

west cost, three in Alaska, one in Hawaii and one in Guam.


Mr. PATTEN. Are there going to be three bases, one in the Pacific-

Admiral KAUFMAN. NO, sir. The present plan is for 10 Trident

submarines. The present plan is for one base.

Mr. PATTEN. So 4 years from now or 6 years from now you won't

be looking for another base?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Four or 6 years from now, so much depends

on the outcome of SALT, whatever the Soviets do. Obviously as the

submarines get older and you replace them, some people would say

you will replace them with Tridents in the out years. At that time

you will have to look and see if you want to put more of them in

Bangor, or if you want to put some of them in theAtlantic.

Mr. PATTEN. Present facilities are not adequate at all for this?

Admiral KAUFMAN. They are not.

Mr. SIKES. Did you not originally plan two bases, one on each


Admiral KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I don't think it is accurate to

say we have ever really planned it. In some concepts there have been

two bases, one on each coast, looking at a total replacement of the

entire existing Polaris force through the years.

Mr. SIKEs. Then the present planning for one base is not an econ-

omy measure ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. No, it is not.

Mr. TALcrr. I have no further questions.



Mr. SIKES. Admiral, does this program replace any existing pro-

gram in the fiscal 1973-1974 budget, and so forth? In other words,

is the Navy giving up another program in order to get this one or

is it an add-on to the Navy's budget over and above the other


Admiral KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I don't think I or anyone else

could .answer that at this time. It has been an evolutionary process of

developing the funding for this and all other systems. To my knowl-

edge there hasn't been a system which has been identified as being

given up to get this.

On the other hand, as you have gone through needing more money

each year and make reductions in the budget, various programs have

had to give up so much money, including Trident in the past year.

To answer the question whether there is any one or any two that have

been given up to get Trident, I think I would say, "No." On the other

hand, have any been affected? Very definitely, yes, sir. And maybe

a lot of them.

Mr. LONG. Quite aside from what is contemplated in the immediate

future in terms of trade-offs which you will have to give up, we are

moving into a very, very expensive system in the future. Isn't that


Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. Has the Navy considered they may have to give up air-

craft carriers and things like that? That would be perfectly all right

with me, I might add.

Mr. SIKEs. It would be all right with some of our witnesses, too.

Mr. LONG. I just do think, considering the way such affairs are

handled-the Navy is given so much money, the Army and Air

Force are given so much-aren't you going to have to give up some-

thing in order to get this ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. That is obvious.

Mr. LONG. What are you going to have to give up in the long run ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Admiral Zumwalt has stated before in his

testimony, Dr. Long, that his general purpose forces, the Navy gen-

erally, and here I mean aircraft carriers, destroyers and attack sub-

marines, are all impacted by the high cost of strategic systems.

Some could argue that, well, the Navy with Polaris got more than

its share of the pie of the defense budget.

Mr. LONG. I don't think you have answered my question though.

Admiral KAUFMAN. I am saying there will be things that have to

be given up.

Mr. LONG. Maybe you don't care to answer the question.

Admiral KAUFMAN. I think we all know we are not going to have

all of the things all the people would want and might have if you

didn't have Trident.

Admiral LYON. Dr. Long, I think Admiral Zumwalt has very

clearly indicated the Navy's concept now of going to a high value-low

value acquisition program, where we buy a small number of high-cost

systems including Trident and CVN's and nuclear powered frigates,


a larger number of small ships to tackle that specific problem that we

don't have enough assets to go out and buy all the ships with all the

capability we would like. And therefore we have structured our pro-

gram in terms of fiscal reality, including Trident and CVN.

Mr. LONG. I am not sure what kind of answer that is. I probably

couldn't hope for a real answer to that question.


Mr. SIKES. Let me ask two or three questions here.

Can you refresh our minds on the provisions of the interim SALT

agreement on the numbers of submarines and missiles which the

United States is allowed ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. According to the interim SALT agreement

the United States is limited to 44 modern ballistic missile submarines

and 710 SLBM launchers. In order to provide a complete picture of

the SLBM provisions. I would like to provide some extracts of the

interim agreement, for the record.

[The information follows:]





The Parties undertake to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)

launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational

and under construction on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement and

in addition to launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established

by the Parties as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of older

types deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers on older submarines.




The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed on certain limitations relating to submarine-launched ballistic

missile launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines, and to replacement

procedures, in the Interim Agreement,

Have agreed as follows :

The Parties understand that, under article III of the Interim Agreement,

for the period during which that Agreement remains in force: The United

States may have no more than 710 ballistic missile launchers on submarines

SLBM's) and no more than 44 modern ballistic missile submarines. The

Soviet Union may have no more than 950 ballistic missile launchers on sub-

marines and no more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines.

Additional ballistic missile launchers on submarines up to the above-

mentioned levels, in the United States-over 656 ballistic missile launchers

on nuclear-powered submarines, and in the U.S.S.R.-over 740 ballistic mis-

sile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, operational and under con-

struction may become operational as replacements for equal numbers of

ballistic missile launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or of ballistic

missile launchers on older submarines.

The deployment of modern SLBMs on any submarine, regardless of type,

will be counted against the total level of SLBM's permitted for the United

States and the U.S.S.R.

This protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Interim Agreement.


Mr. SIKEs. The interim agreement on SALT is in effect for 5 years,

and we must assume that some of these limitations would be continued

in future agreements.

If the interim limits are continued through the 1980's, will this mean

that the Trident submarines are intended to replace the older Polaris

boats in that time period ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, that is correct. We would replace

the older system. You will recall in the existing SALT limitation,

which is a 5-year limitation as I think you mentioned, the first Trident

submarine with the construction period involved will not appear, will

not be in the water before the expiration of that time. Should that

limitation then persist, obviously under the limits we would have to de-

commission and would plan to decommission, in order, the 10 older sub-

marines, and I would hope the old 54 Titan missiles which are permitted

to be replaced on a free exchange basis with sea based systems since

they came in the inventory in 1964.


Mr. SIKES. For the foreseeable future, according to your previous

testimony, the Tridents would be stationed at the same location?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir. You may recall that Admiral Lyon

showed he had growth potential there for up to 20 ships.

Mr. SixES. Where would the Polaris boats be stationed in that time


Admiral KAUFMAN. They would be stationed in the same places they

are right now-Guam in the Pacific where we have six submarines,

Rota, Spain, Holylock, Scotland, and Charleston, S.C.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Where will the 10 oldest Polaris submarines be based ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. The oldest 10 Polaris submarines will be at


Mr. NICHOLAS. They will be supported out of Bangor also?

Admiral LYON. Yes, sir.

Mr. NICHOLAS. And the rest of the SSBN's will be in the Atlantic.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, the rest of the SSBN's will be in the



Mr. SIKES. You told us about the factors which weighed in favor of

the west coast site. There were some which made the east coast appear

desirable. One was cost. Why don't you tell us what those were that

did favor an east coast site?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, you say cost, I will ask Admiral

Lyon in a minute to amplify that. I do not believe that the cost is an

advantage on the east coast.

Within the accuracy of the estimates his people made in looking

at the four candidate sites which ended up as finalists, the costs were

roughly within a few percent or a few million dollars of each other,

and quite possibly Bangor happens to be the cheapest.

Mr. SIKES. You can elaborate for the record.


[The information follows:]


Comparative (ROM) Milcon cost for 10 ship support facilities

Fiscal year 1972

Site dollars (millions)

Cape Kennedy--------------------- -------------------------- 663

St. Marys------------------------------------------------------- 616

Charleston ------------------------------------------------------ 615

Yorktown ------------------------------------------------------- 755

Bangor ----------------------------------- 632

The above figures are rough order of magnitude military construction costs

that were developed in a study completed on July 12, 1972. Since that time a

number of program decisions have been made that reduced military construction

costs to $543 million (estimated) at the Bangor site. An equivalent reduction

would have occurred at each site and therefore the comparatve ranking would

not change.

Mr. SIKES. What factors did favor the east coast ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. The factors that favored the Atlantic other

than cost were strictly . In the Pacific I would intend to operate

the missile . I would do that with the Trident submarine. If I

were operating the Trident submarine in the Atlantic, however,

[The information follows:]

The first phase of the Navy study into possible sites for Trident lasted from

September 1970 until October 1972 and it considered mainly the logistics and

limited operational considerations. Based on this study the Chief of Naval

Materiel identified four possible sites which best satisfied the technical criteria

for basing Trident. Although three of these final four sites were on the east

coast, there were no major logistic or limited operational considerations which

favored the east coast sites as a group over the west coast site, or vice versa.

Less significant advantages of the east coast arise from the fact that the two

shipyards capable of building Trident submarines are on the east coast as will

be the planned facility at Cape Canaveral for support of submarines conducting

missile firings. Thus siting the Trident base on the east coast would place it in

the proximity of the building yards and Cape Canaveral. The proximity to the

building yard might be viewed as an advantage in the event of structural damage

to the ship requiring services of the design yard. However, during extensive

submarine conversion and overhaul programs the west coast shipyards have

acquired adequate skills to perform this function. Siting the Trident base on

the east coast would also permit a slightly earlier deployment by eliminating

the time spent in transit from the east coast building yards to the Pacific Ocean.

Another advantage to east coast siting might be perceived in the more devel-

oped transportation system along the eastern seaboard.

In addition to the technical criteria for basing which are discussed above, a

subsequent detailed review in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations eval-

uated the strategic and operational considerations related to Trident basing.

The -- consideration mentioned above was the only significant advantage

that Atlantic operation of Trident afforded over the Pacific and it was out-

weighed by the other strategic and operational factors.

Mr. SIKES. During the course of the Navy's long review were three

changes in U.S. force planning which changed the relative merits of

deploying the Trident in the Atlantic or the Pacific.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, there were no real changes per

se that directed going one way or the other that we can point to.

There definitely has been, in the last couple of years, a tendency for

the Soviets to deploy their ASW ships farther and farther from port.

They have gone into Cuba and Africa. We can see their attempts to

develop a friendship if not actually a tendency toward base struc-

ture in other lands.

They have gone farther and farther from their own waters. They

are now a "a blue water" Navy.

Mr. SIKEs. What are they doing on the west coast of Africa ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. I do not know exactly what they are doing.

Mr. SIKEs. One of the charts indicated some Soviet activity.

Admiral KAUFMAN. Yes, sir. We see a lot of activity. We see their

ships there.

They are developing friendship and definite capability to put logis-

tics ships there and be able to resupply.

I would like to say for the record that the idea to go to the Pacific

is not a new idea. Upon reporting to my job in 1970, the first paper

was originated in my office to deploy in the Pacific for the same

reasons we are doing now. We had an uphill battle within the Navy to

convince people that this was important.

Mr. SIKES. I wish you had better luck earlier on the

Mr. PATTEN. Mr. Chairman, may I add this: When I was in Leo-

poldville last year and looked right across the river, I saw the new

Russian houses, and I saw the Russian tanks across the river in the


There is one regime there which is friendly to the Russians. I do

not know if anything has changed.

They were there, pretty substantially involved in the Congo, and that

is right in the Atlantic. That is not the only one. I saw their personnel


Mr. SIKES. The Navy spent considerable time and effort studying

potential east coast sites. If strategic considerations dictated the sit-

ing of the complex on the west coast, why was the Navy so long in de-

ciding where to build ? Why did you spend time and effort studying the

east coast ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. The initial studies for the site for what was then

ULMS were commenced prior to my reporting to my job late in 1970 in

the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. There was ongoing within

the Materiel Command, prior to Admiral Lyon getting into the pro-

gram, a study looking at candidate sites. The Materiel Command

should, I think, quite properly identify all the sites and bases that

could be used, with the pros and cons which apply and are pertinent

to the logistic considerations. It is not their business to determine stra-

tegic considerations. The Trident program received its impetus, you

will recall, on December 23, 1971.

Whereas it had been gauged to a first ship delivery time of some-

where in the early 1980's, it then got moved .ahead and we had to work

faster. We had to go through barrages of strategic studies which in-

dicated the type of targeting considerations I showed you today. Just

how many targets, what is the effectiveness of our deterrent? We had

to go all the way through those to convince People to get on their

schedule, that what we were doing is the right thing.

Mr. SIKES. Does the Navy anticipate that threats may develop in the

future which would make either ocean more desirable in the foresee-

able future ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Mr. Sikes, in the Navy's study to select the

ocean area for operating Trident submarines it became annarent that

the Soviets had more potential in the Atlantic Ocean for establishing

forward bases to support a large scale ASW effort than in the Pacific

Ocean. Soviet naval units intermittently use Cuban ports

right now-for operational support. Forward bases at these locations

. --1-1-1. - J.- . _1~

could provide their ASW forces with ready access to Trident subma-

rine operating areas in the Atlantic. Ports similar to these are not

available to the Soviets in the Pacific at this time. Furthermore, if thg

Soviets at some future time established a forward base on the west

coast of South America, it would not provide their forces with as

much access to Trident operating areas in the Pacific as they currently

have in the Atlantic.

Mr. SIXES. What prospective threats did you consider, and how

do they weigh in favor of one ocean or the other ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. I previously described the accessibility of Tri-

dent submarine operating areas in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to

traditional ASW threats such as those mounted by submarines, surface

ships, and aircraft. Navy threat assessments considered advances in

the capability of these existing and follow-on platforms, as well as

new approaches to ASW such as, for example, using moored acoustic

sensors to detect and localize SSBN's followed by an ICBM attack.

Our studies indicate that the threat represented by these type systems

did not vary significantly from ocean to ocean except as a function of

Soviet forward basing.


Mr. SIKES. Will you need duplicative facilities for Trident and the

older Polaris boats during the period of phasing in the Trident ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, we will need the duplicative

facilities to handle the Polaris at the bases there in the Atlantic and

Pacific while we are phasing in Trident. Does that answer your

question ?

Mr. SIXEs. How do you plan to conduct both Polaris and Trident

support at Bangor ?

Admiral KAUFMAN. Admiral Lyon, would you like to address that?

Admiral LYON. Yes, sir.

All of our master planning, Mr. Chairman, continues the capability

that we now have at Bangor to support the Polaris A-3 missile.

This is the only A-3 missile capability we have in the Navy. That

consists of an ability to break down, test, reassemble, and test again

the Polaris missiles that are returned from the deployed submarines

in Guam.

A transport carries those missiles from Bangor to the deployed

tender in Guam at which point they 'are reloaded into the operating

submarine. That facility would continue in operation until the Chief

of Naval Operations decides to retire the Polaris submarines, or to

move them elsewhere. The Polaris missile facility is inland just cen-

tered in the middle of the Trident weapon facility which will be built

around it.

Magazines will be provided for the storage of spare missiles.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Will there be any disruption as a result of the con-

struction activities or will there be problems in the safety zones because

of the existing Polaris facilities ?

Admiral LYON. All our planning is in line with that not being dis-

ruited since that is an operational system.

Mr. NICHOLAS. You expect no problems with the schedules, and so

forth ?

Admiral LYON. No, sir.

Mr. SIxEs. Admiral Lyon, this afternoon we will cover construction

and so we won't need the experts in their areas, as far as I know.

Admiral LYON. Yes, sir.



Mr. SIKEs. The committee will be in order. We will resume the

hearing on the Trident. How do the Navy's studies on the basing of

Trident take into account the base realinements and the possible utili-

zation of facilities such as shipyards ? Would you be able to use exist-

ing drydocks as a result of the phasing out of the old Polaris boats ?

Admiral LYON. Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Polaris boats and

the Poseidon submarines all have their own dedicated floating dry-

docks. These are currently deployed to the overseas sites as well as one

that is anchored in the Cooper River in Charleston. These floating

drydocks are too small for the Trident submarine and they cannot be

submerged down deep enough to receive the Trident submarine with-

out the drydock itself sinking. We did look at them and we have looked

at all other floating drydocks in the Navy inventory and none of them

are satisfactory.

Mr. NIcuoLAs. The recent realinements included closures of naval

shipyards at Hunters Point and Boston. These probably would not

be a suitable site for a Trident because of the explosive distance area.

However, there might be a possibility of a trade-off that would enable

you to use one of the other existing shipyards for Trident and to

shift its workload into one of the shipyards which you do plan to

close down?

Admiral LYON. Yes; we did look at the utilization of existing dry-

docks both during the preselection of the Trident site and after the

Trident site.

There are drydocks at Puget Sound that will take the Trident

submarine and we are planning to use those drydocks for the conver-

sion of the Trident submarine when that occurs for the Trident II

missile, which will require a new launch tube, and a'so to use them

during the periodic overhauls that will cccur about once every 10


However, explosive safety constraints prohibit the use of drydocks

in existing shipyards for the periodic, every - day refit of the

Trident submarine unless the missiles on board that submarine are


Offloading all of the missiles, in order to enter the shipyard, is

just not cost effective. It adds about 13 or 14 days to the time that

the submarine is off the line and for an equivalent number of missiles

at sea you would have to build additional submarines to counter that.

For a national deterrent it is just not cost effective.

Mr. SIKEs. To what extent did the studies on Trident take into

account the underutilization of naval bases and shipyard facilities on

both coasts which led to the shore establishment realinements?

Admiral LYON. Consideration, Mr. Chairman, was given to the use

of all of the existing shipyards and naval bases during our Trident

21-007 (Pt. 3) 0 - 73 -- 9

_ _n~l ___


study. We looked at all the naval facilities, primarily with regard

to availability of the land and availability of any facilities that could

be utilized for refit of the Trident submarines between patrols.

The results of the system cost effectiveness analysis and the required

explosive safety distances that are required to safely handle these

missiles in an industrial facility provided constraints that dictated

against the use of naval bases located in the vicinity of centers of

population and/or our existing shipyards which are almost invariably

located in centers of population.

Mr. SIKES. How do you explain that in view of the fact that we do

have nuclear ships and nuclear-powered submarines based in the

present establishments ?

Admiral LYON. If Trident were only a nuclear-powered submarine

that would offer no problems and we could operate out of a shipyard.

The problem, Mr. Chairman, is the propellant that's used in the


These are big missiles and the propellant that is used to project

them onto their ballistic path to the target is, in effect, a high explosive.

There is no nuclear hazard but the high-explosive hazard is very


There is no way we could guarantee safe handling of those, although

we have not had an accident in Polaris or Poseidon experience. We do

have to allow for that, sir.

Mr. SIKES. You mean the quantity and the quality of the material is

such that ordinary safeguards won't suffice ?

Admiral LYON. Yes, sir. I would say that on a 24-missile Trident

submarine, if we reach our ultimate growth we will have

pounds of high explosive aboard that submarine, and we will be han-

dling it as we load and unload those missiles.

I might point out that we have had several trains explode that have

been carrying high explosives, so accidents do happen. We certainly

do not project one and we are taking every precaution to prevent

such an accident from happening. However, it is always a possibility

and we must live with that possibility.

Mr. SIKES. Are none of the facilities which are being reduced or

abandoned by the Navy or other services as a result of SER suitable

for support of Trident? Why not? Since the Trident decision was

announced first, has this question been restudied since that time? Pro-

vide that for the record.

[The information follows:]

Consideration was given to the use of existing shipyards (SER and otherwise)

for refit of the Trident submarine between patrols. Results of system cost-effective

analyses and required explosive safety constraints dictated against use of exist-

ing shipyards for berthing and refit of these submarines. Existing shipyard

facilities will be used, however, for refurbishment of the rotatable pool com-

ponents of equipment and machinery and for routine overhauls and reactor

refueling of the submarines. Use of shipyards in this manner allows reducing

the maintenance capability at the refit site to approximate that on existing

missile submarine tenders. Full use will be made of suitable surplus material

which is available as a result of SER.


Mr. SIgES. There has been considerable delay in determining the

site for the Trident base. Can you describe for the record your process

of base selection ?

[The information follows:]

An indepth study of all aspects of the Trident base complex commenced in

September 1970. This study was originated by the then ULMS project manager

(Rear Admiral Levering Smith) and examined a spectrum of 89 possible sites

against a number of criteria, foremost of which were availability of Government

land, existing facilities, channel depth and characteristics, climatic conditions,

egress, transportation facilties, and labor base. In assessing potential of various

locations the requirement dictated by explosive safety distance, submarine draft

and the availability of existing facilities eliminated a number of candidates.

Elimination of sites occurred early in the site study under application of the

restrictive criteria, that is, land availability, labor base, and channel considera-

tions. An initial reduction to 17 sites occurred. A detailed study of each of these

led to narrowing the field to four; three on the east coast, one on the west coast

Onsite examinations were then conducted at each of the leading locations by

a team from the Naval Materiel Command. The Chief of Naval Materiel for-

warded the site study to the CNO on October 6, 1972. From a logistic standpoint,

two sites were identified as being leading candidates: Charleston, S.C., in the

Atlantic, and Bangor, Wash., in the Pacific. Existence of a skilled labor base,

existing facilities, and available Government-owned land were primary con-


Many attributes of Bangor led to its selection. Foremost among these is the

fact that it permits the Trident submarine to operate in the Pacific Ocean. Such

operations will at the earliest practicable time, pose to the Soviets or any

potential enemy, a two-ocean problem for any ASW improvements or break-

throughs which they might develop. Soviet basing potential in the Pacific does

not provide for staging of ASW efforts in areas close to those in which most

Trident operations will occur. The combination of area to be used by our sea-

based deterrent forces in both oceans, in combination with the more capable

Trident submarine, can be expected to perpetuate the relative invulnerability we

have enjoyed in the Polaris system. The Bangor location contains adequate land

and waterfront area to accommodate the various safety criteria. The harbor is

excellent and the channel is deep; neither will require more than minimal

dredging. The site, a former ammunition depot, is fully developed and will re-

quire relocation of only a limited number of facilities. The local labor base con-

tains a sizable nucleus of missile and ship related skills. E isting Department of

Defense installations, e.g., naval shipyard, military housing, and naval hospital,

are available to support the base.

Environmental assessments of Bangor were carefully considered in the de-

cision process. With the announcement of the decision, there will commence an

in-depth environmental study leading to filing of an environmental impact state-

ment. Public hearings will then be held prior to the commencement of any



Mr. SIKES. One of the major factors affecting the cost of Trident

facilities and the possible use of existing facilities is the Navy's main-

tenance program for Trident. Could you describe again the type of in-

port time schedule you are hoping to obtain for these ships and indicate

to what extent this would be extended if you were to rely on existing

industrial complexes to do more of your repairs between overhauls?

Also provide details for the record on exactly what effect the denial of

each of the facilities you are requesting would have on time in port.

Admiral LYON. The schedule for activities taking place during the

in-port period are shown on this chart. The days for each activity are

classified. Existing industrial complexes will be relied upon to accom-

plish the refurbishment and overhaul of components which are re-

moved from the Trident submarine and replaced from a rotable pool.

This reliance has in part resulted in the significant cut in this years

MCON program over that presented last year. Further reliance on

existing shipyards for piers, drydocks and direct support maintenance



shops would require the offloading of all missiles each refit and thereby

increase the in-port time by over 50 percent.

Denial of other facilities requested in the fiscal year 1974 program

would have the following effect:

Cape Canaveral Flight Test Facilities.-There is no alternative to

providing flight test facilites. Testing of the missile and system would

not be possible.

The Weapons/Navigation Training Building does not directly in-

fluence in-port time but the alternative of providing factory training

of crews would be much more expensive and would significantly extend

the time of separation between crew members and their families.

There is no alternative to the explosive handling pier required for

offloading and onloading missiles. Denial would prevent servicing of

the missiles and prevent deployment of the system.

Land acquisition, utilities and site improvements cannot be directly

related to time inport but are necessary for development of the site and

support of the submarine.

[The chart follows:]








o 4

W u
























Mr. SIKES. Can you apply any economic measure to the cost of this

time lost in terms of investment and operating costs of the system, etc.,

versus the cost of the additional facilities you are requesting?

Admiral LYON. Facilities such as the drydock and refit slip do not

duplicate facilities at shipyards because those at the Trident complex

have the capability of berthing submarines loaded with missiles. The

docks and piers at a shipyard cannot duplicate that capability. To

keep an equivalent amount of missiles at sea the time lost as a result

of additional missile handling and utilizing a shipyard to perform

the refits as indicated in the Alternative Refit Concepts Report would

require three additional submarines. This, in acquisition costs alone,

would require an investment of over 1.6 billion additional dollars.

This makes the drydock, at $40 million, an attractive investment.


Mr. SIKES. Admiral Lyon, you stated that the total cost of the Tri-

dent facilities is anticipated to be on the order of $550 million. Earlier

the committee had heard estimates as high as $1 billion. Supply for

the record what you have had to give up in order to achieve this


[The information follows:]

The cost estimate for the Trident MOON program was reduced from $1.083

billion to $543 million as a result of :

(a) Elimination of submarine depot level maintenance shops at the Support

Complex and accomplishing this refurbishment of components in existing ship-

yard shops.

(b) Exclusion of nonmission essential support facilities; i.e., family housing,

community and recreational facilities, etc.

(c) Scope reduction of operational support facilities; i.e., magazines, etc.

(4) Refinement of facility requirements and costs resulting from more detailed

definitions of system characteristics and selection of the site.

(e) Sizing facilities to support 10 vice 15 submarines. Capability is included

for facility expansion to support 20 ships.

A copy of the Alternative Refit Concepts Study has been provided to the com-

mittee staff. That study identified cost for all options addressed. Various alter-

natives were considered with MOON costs varying from approximately $375

million to $660 million (fiscal year 1973 dollars). The lower cost options are based

on greater use of shipyard drydocks, piers and shops for submarine maintenance

while the higher cost options provide for a dedicated refit complex with a wider

range of personnel support and production facilities to meet possible contingen-

cies as well as normal workload requirements. The alternative selected (approxi-

mately $488 million, fiscal year 1973 dollars, or $543 million, escalated) provides

for dedicated submarine maintenance facilities to perform the type of mainte-

nance now accomplished by tenders. This option, while austere, does provide capa-

bility to maintain the submarine in the minimum time and keep the off-patrol

period at no more than 25 days. Some further reduction in MCON costs can be

achieved in other options but only with a significant decrease in availability of

missiles at sea, decrease in reliability of the systems and resulting decrease in cost

effectiveness of the Trident System. The possible MCON cost reductions which

range up to approximately $120 million are more than offset by the required

acquisition of one to three more Trident Systems (at over $500 million per system)

in order to place the same number of missiles at sea.

Mr. SIKES. It has been stated that the total cost of the project

facilities is 'anticipated to be on the order of $550 million.

Is this a realistic figure, or is it an administrative limit?

Admiral LYON. I will let Captain Stacey answer that since he pre-

pared the estimate. I reviewed it and agreed with it.

U- ~C

Captain STACEY. We feel the $550 million estimate is a realistic

estimate for the essential requirements for the base, as well as in-

cluding the flight test facilities at Cape Kennedy.

The estimate we feel is good based on our best engineering in-

formation at this time.

Mr. SIxEs. Has an administrative limit been placed on this?

Admiral LYON. I will answer that, Mr. Chairman, if I may. There

was an administrative guideline given to us last year when we were

going through budget reviews. The target that we were given was

$550 million. We went to see what we could do for that amount of

money, and in fact cut it down to our current estimate of $543 mil-

lion in escalated dollars, and that did provide proper support for

the 10 submarine force that has been placed in the program.

Mr. SIKES. Does this take into account inflation during construc-

tion ?

Admiral LYON. Yes, sir.


Mr. NICHOLAS. You say this provides for the essential requirements

but does it provide for all of the personnel, support and other re-

quirements which in effect will be generated by locating a new base

at this location?

Are those being picked up in other budgets? Are they outside of

your figure of $550 million ?

Captain STACEY. It includes the barracks for the off-crew personnel,

the messing personnel and the personnel that are assigned to the base

and other support facilities.

It does not include the type of thing you are thinking about in the

way of recreation facilities and this sort of thing.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Family housing?

Captain STACEY. It does not include family housing.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Would it be fair to say this is limited to the items

specified under a narrow definition of the Trident complex as opposed

to a broader consideration of family housing and area support costs.

Admiral LYON. I think to put it in proper context, the program we

have laid out supports the Trident base in total, everything that is

necessary to operate that submarine, including that support for which

the Government is normally responsible, such as bachelor housing for

the enlisted people and the officers, dispensary and medical facilities

to tend the people working on the base, the transportation, the utilities,

and all of that.

The family housing as part of the total DOD housing program is

something that should be included in their annual housing survey

and placed into the program as the need might develop out there.

We would hope in this area, since we do have a gradual phase in

of the submarines, as well as the base, that housing would become

available in that area under other programs for our people to utilize.


Mr. DAVIs. Are there going to be any offsetting withdrawals of per-

sonnel from the Bremerton area that would permit you to make use of

some of the supporting facilities already there?

Admiral LYON. There are considerable facilities in the area at pres-

ent. There is a hospital at Bremerton that is underutilized right now

and will support the Trident buildup. It is an old hospital and will

eventually be modernized as we continue to operate in the Puget Sound

area. In fact, as a result of the base closures, it is anticipated one or

more additional ships will probably be homeported in the Puget

Sound-Bremerton area.

The housing that is available there at the present time although not

completely occupied I think can on the basis of that be expected to

be fully occupied.


Mr. SIKEs. The term "off-crew" has been used several times in this

discussion. I think for the sake of the record it would be well to ex-

plain how the off-crew in a nuclear submarine functions and what its

responsibilities and duties are when in port and not actually on the


Admiral LYON. Yes, sir.

Our strategic undersea based missile systems are operated by two

crews, designated a blue and a gold crew. When one crew is at sea op-

erating the submarine the other crew is in port for rest and recreation

and for training, and for receipt of replacements for people whose

enlistment may have run out or who have been transferred to other


In the Trident program we intend to utilize, because the submarine

will be based in the continental United States, both crews for the refit.

When the submarine comes in from a patrol, the crew that brings the

submarine in will be relieved by the on-coming crew. That on-coming

crew then will start the submarine into its upkeep, removal of surveil-

lance missiles and other necessary work. The off-going crew that has

just completed the patrol will depart on 4 days home leave, return to

the submarine and assist the net crew in putting the submarine through

its refit which takes - days.

At the end of that time the crew that is to take the submarine on

patrol will go to sea for a training and refresher period of -- days,

return to port for a short time to receive its new missiles and then

depart on its extended patrol.


Mr. SIKES. The $550 million does not take into account the total cost

of medical facilities, family housing, and other support costs ?

Captain STACEY. No, sir. The $550 million Trident military construc-

tion program includes essential bachelor housing and messing facilities

for personnel ashore, the off-crews, and an emergency care dispensary

for personnel assigned to or employed at the support complex as well

as the various types of management, base, and operational support


Mr. SIKES. What have you allowed for expansion of military hos-

pitals to handle this additional load ?

Captain STACEY. Currently naval hospital, Bremerton, has 295 beds,

which is sufficient to handle the additional load due to Trident.

--i i I

Mr. SIKES. Specifically what allowance have you made for family

housing construction and support ?

Captain STAGEY. The Trident program does not provide for con-

struction of family housing. As you know, we look to the community

for support first. Our analysis indicates that as many as 1,400 units

may be required and these will be provided through the DOD housing



Mr. SIKEs. Provide for the record a breakdown of the $550 million

by year and by category of facilities.

[The information follows:]


[Dollars in millions]

Facility category 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Total

100-Operatingand training................ ... $78.8 $16.1 $32.8 $17.2 $0.1 ....... $145.0

200-Maintenance and production------------~~.. ---------... 74.9 44.7 .5 ....... _ 120. 1

300-R.D.T. & E... ...------------------------------3. 8 . 3.8

400-Supply. ...------------......... .---------- .3 16.5 13.4 11.0 3.3 ..- 44.5

500- Hospital and medical -... ..- ---- ----_-- -_ --- --- --.4 .... ... .4

600-Administrative ......... .. . . . . . . . 9.3 5.9 3.2 ...-..... - - - 18.4

700-Housing and community.... 1.7 3.4 1.2 1.1 1.6 9.0

800-Utilities and ground improvements. 30.3 76.0 33.1 21.9 1.3 .8 163.4

900- Real estate - . 5.1 5.1

Design ................ ..... ........ $13.0 10. 8 3.0 4.5 2.1 .1 .1 33.6

Total.... ... 13.0 129.1 197.5 137.8 57.5 5.9 2.5 543.3


Mr. SIRES. The construction of a new Trident complex will be a

large construction effort concentrated in a relatively small area. As a

result of slippages in site selection, there may not be a great deal of

flexibility in your construction schedule. How is the Navy managing

this so as to keep costs at a minimum and yet meet operational sched-


Admiral LYON. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I will let Captain Stacey

answer that since he is directing his attention to that problem.

Captain STACEY. Essentially the basis for scheduling the construc-

tion is to complete each required facility at the established or required

date, and to preclude interference as much as possible, we have phased

the construction in each of the relative areas of the support complex.

Although this approach will result in requests for authorization and

funding of construction of some facilities earlier than dictated by

operational requirements, it permits us a more orderly construction

of the installation as a whole.

It will obviously reduce the environmental impact.

Mr. SIKES. What annual rate of obligations are you anticipating at

the Bangor complex for the next 5 years? Provide that for the record.

[The information follows:]

We anticipate that contracts will be awarded for all facilities in the fiscal year

1974 program prior to the receipt of fiscal year 1975 MCON funds. The goal


for fiscal years 1975 through 1978 is to obligate construction funds in the year

in which the funds 'are authorized and appropriated. These obligations would be:

(Dollars in

Fiscal year : millions)

1975 ----------------------------------- ------------ [deleted]

1976 -- ----------------------------- ------------ [deleted]

1977 ------------------------------------------------[deleted]

1978 ----[------------------------------------------------deleted]

Mr. DAvIS. In terms of work put in place each month during the

construction period, would you have a schedule as of this date that

would give us that information ?

Admiral LYoN. Yes, sir; we do have that, Mr. Davis. We would like

to provide that for the record.

[The information follows:]

The attached graph shows the work-in-place for each month during the con-

struction period for the total Trident construction program.



20 .






m 14 - I-

13 - I I -- I

- 12


z 10




Mr. DAVIS. If you would provide that for the record, a schedule

showing design, award, construction and acceptance, readiness date,

operational requirement dates and so on?

[The information follows:]

The design, award of the construction contract, construction and acceptance-

completion of the construction period-readiness and operationally required data

are shown on the following schedule.





Refit Pier & Slip 7-73 9-74 12-74 3-77 9-77 10-78


o Explosive Handling Pier 7-73 9-74 12-74 7-77 1-78 10-78

x Weapons/Navigational 7-73 9-74 12-74 4-76 1-77 1-77


Public Works Warehouse 12-73 4-74 7-74 12-74 12-74 12-74


to Land Acquisition NEGOTIATIONS 7-74 7-76 7-76 10-78

m Site Improvements 8-73 3-75 11-74 12-76 12-76 1st 1-77

Utilities incr

Utilities 8-73 3-75 11-74 12-76 12-76 only 1-77

Missile Checkout Buildings

Construction & Alterations 2-73 11-73 2-74 12-74 4-75 1-76

N Guidance & Telemetry 2-73 11-73 2-74 2-75 8-75 1-76

SBuilding Addition &

w Alterations

V Lifting Device Proofing 1-73 11-73 2-74 2-75 4-75 1-76


u Launch Complex 25 Alter- 1-73 11-73 2-74 3-75 7-75 1-76


U Wharf and Dredging 1-73 11-73 2-74 11-76 3-77 4-77

The Milestone dates as presented herein reflect current planning and programming, schedules and are

subject to change. *This is the construction start date. Anticipate contract award one month prior.

Admiral LYoN. For your information, we are planning a test and

evaluation period of this base just as we would provide a test and

evaluation period for the submarine. When the submarine reports

there in late calendar year 1978, we want it to find that base checked

out, fully operable and ready to support the submarine on her first

mission. It will be a very short turn around time.

Mr. DAVIS. Have you had any slippages that you can pinpoint that

would indicate that some of the funds that you requested for fiscal

1974 might not be needed until 1975?

Admiral LYON. No, sir.

Captain STACEY. I would like to elaborate a little on that. The refit

pier and explosive handling pier are included in the 1974 program

and we have projected contract award dates in November of 1974

prior to the fiscal year 1975 apportionment. Although this appears

to be in advance of when funds are needed, a 6-month period is

required to checkout both the explosive handling pier and refit pier;

this time is needed to conduct a dry run to insure we have perfected

the operation and we will not have accidents when the real operation


This takes 6 months after the facility is completed. If we slip these

piers into the next year's program we are going to peak construction

even more than if funded in fiscal year 1974, and further compress

the rate of construction that we project until the time of operation

of the support complex.

In other words, we have a work-in-place curve, which peaks and

then it phases out until completion of construction. We have the same

end date when the facilities are required. If you compress the con-

I _

struction time the curve is elongated with the resulting expansion of

work in place per month.

Mr. DAVIS. Just so that we will have a chance to look this over at a

little more leisure, would you provide for the record the scheduling

in this respect ?

Mr. NICHOLAS. Provide both alternatives, the schedule you are

planning and what would happen if it slipped.

Admiral MARSCHALL. Excuse me, if I may interrupt. Are we to

assume that everything would slip for a year and we would still have

a compressed schedule? You want the refit pier and explosive handling



Admiral MARSCHALL. We will provide that for the record.

[The information follows:]

The graph shows the work in place for the construction of explosive handling

piers, refit piers, the drydock, and small craft pier.

The waterfront area is considered to be the most critical construction area

due to the specialized type of work, the restricted work area, and the environ-

mental impact considerations. The Trident construction goal is to program

construction that will result in a gradual workload buildup, attainment of a

relative steady workload and a gradual tapering off of construction.

The graph illustrates that construction of one explosive handling pier and

one refit pier in the fiscal year 1974 program will accomplish these goals.

As shown on the graph, a delay of 5 months caused by funding the initial

refit and explosive handling piers with fiscal year 1975 funds results in the

following undesirable construction schedule:

1. A rapid work influx.

2. An extended peak of the construction work.

3. A rapid tapering off to completion.











i. I ' i 1


- - - -- - --- - - - - - -


.. . .l.

I I I I L I - I

1978I I I I






197- --




Mr. NICHOLAS. Presumably the same argument would apply to the

other things even more so, is that correct ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS. I gathered from what you said that you would not antici-

pate any better record than we have had lately as far as having an

appropriation available to you at the beginning of the 'fiscal year.

Admiral MARSCHALL. I would like to answer that. Traditionally

even when the Congress is very early in awarding its money, there is

an apportionment process which goes on within the DOD.


Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir. We feel it is comfortable to say we

won't get new moneys before the first of November of that year.

Admiral LYON. I would like to add, Mr. Davis, that looking at the

schedules of explosive-handling wharf and first refit pier, in light of

the testing of that base that I intend to do, and the usual cleanup

problems that result when a facility is turned over for use, that I do

not believe that those piers and that explosive-handling wharf will

be finished early. We actually plan on bringing in one of our attack

submarines into the pier and letting the base do an operational refit

on it, to both get our people accustomed to working on the submarines

and to see how our procedures will work.

This can take several months. Prior to that we would want to test

all of the shore power cables to make certain they are available to

provide the submarine the power that it will need.

We want to hook up the sanitary facilities. The submarine is being

designed, when it is in port, to not pollute the waters in that area or

the environment and to provide all of its discharges to the shore facil-

ities. Those will have to be thoroughly checked out. This is the first

time that we will have done that for a ship of this type.

It is very important that we test those thoroughly.


Mr. DAVIS. As far as the ships are concerned, has the Navy set up a

project manager-type of organization and then in your shop have you

set up a similar responsible group so that the two of you work together

on it ?

What kind of management team do you have on it ?

Admiral LYON. In assembling the base I have, in effect, as the project

manager, taken the responsibility to represent the operator that we

will eventually turn that base over to, the force commander, the fleet

commander. I have assisting me the officer in charge of construction

of that base. Supporting him I have a missile expert, a submarine ex-

pert, a communication expert, a logistics expert, and an ordnance ex-

pert, who are all doing individual studies to provide inputs to his

plans that will lead to an integrated support site that will be able to

meet all of the requirements of the submarine and the missile. In addi-

tion we are going to provide at this base a central training facility so

that that crew that brings the sub in and goes ashore will have the

facilities to, one, refresh their training in the systems of the subma-

marine; two, advance their training as we move people up to more

senior jobs and they must learn new talents.

21-007 (Pt. 3) 0 - 73 -- 10

PI* L L--- --

We will always have located there the training necessary to bring

some young man from the recruit training command into the subma-

rine program and initiate him into the Trident submarine so that when

he goes to sea on his submarine he will be able to do useful work. In

that regard I am working very closely with the chief of naval training

and the chief of naval personnel. They have representatives who sit in

on all our meetings and are providing inputs into the requirements

that must go into the central training facility.

Mr. DAvis. All of these inputs come to you, then.

Admiral LYON. Yes. I have developed a total integrated logistics

plan which has been distributed to all these people, received all of

their inputs, and provides the basic guidance throughout.


Mr. SIRES. It appears that some of the projects will be completed

in time for their use. Others, such as the refit pier and slip and the

explosive handling pier will be completed 15 months or more before

they are required. Is that correct ?

Captain STACEY. Yes, sir, it is.

Mr. SIXES. Why would you request funds for facilities now when

you could do it a year from now and still meet your operational date?

Captain STACEY. I would make two comments. One, there is a need

for a break-in period or training period that Admiral Lyon has men-

tioned-the 6 months of actual operation of the equipment, that is, con-

ducting a dry run of the missiles, and this sort of thing. And two, we

have the problem of maintaining a level amount of construction which

will minimize the impact on the environment and the local community

in that period.

So we are trying to level the construction effort and keep the impact

to a minimum.

Mr. SIKES. If you have to get past the environmentalists you may be

15 months late instead of 15 months early. You know that.

Captain STACEY. Yes, sir.

Admiral LYON. That is our first project, Mr. Chairman. We have

already started that.

Mr. NICIHOLAS. The testing out of the facility you referred to, I

assume you desire to do it, but in order to support the initial IOC of

the submarine is it necessary ? Given that, isn't there some possibility

of slippage of the submarine, while you are performing the testing on

the submarine, and making sure the missiles are operating and so on.

Admiral LYON. To show you how our planning goes, there is always

the possibility of slipping. My job is to prevent that from happening,

and I am doing everything I can to prevent that from happening.

Mr. SIKES. What is your batting average ?

Admiral LYON. It has been quite good in the ships I have had control

over, sir. In this regard the refit pier and the explosive handling pier

are the two most important facilities that we need on the waterfront.

Without the explosive handling pier we cannot, in fact, outload that

first submarine for deployment.

We have to have the cranes. We have to have the pier to be able to

take the missiles from the missile assembly plant, bring them down and

load them onto the submarine in a safe manner. There is no shortcut

that you can take there. If the equipment is not tested, if the equip-

ment will not meet specifications, if the grounding straps are not in

place, if the submarine cannot be grounded so there is no static elec-

tricity hazard, we just will not be able to do it.

Personally, I would rather be early in this regard than late, because

it will very definitely delay our ability to deploy that submarine on its

first mission.

I think it is very important that that submarine go to sea when we

said it is going to go to sea. The President has given us the highest

industrial priority in the country in an attempt to meet that goal, and

I certainly have got my people working full time to attempt to do

that, sir.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Now with regard to the construction schedule for

these two facilities-you said construction would begin in November

1974. Presumably, if funds were provided in the fiscal 1975 military

construction bill they would be available not much later than 2 or 3

months after that. This would not in itself create a bunching up of the

construction schedule which you could not live with, and neither would

it necessarily, of itself, eat up the flexibility of 9 months in one case,

and 6 months in the other case, which you have between the end of

the construction and the period in which you have to begin the testing.

Could you explain why the 3 months are critical ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I think probably that can best be shown by the

two curves which we will provide for the record to show the im-

pact of work in place at any one particular month. We will have cri-

tical months there. Even 3 months are going to be very important to

us as we slide across this curve.

We do not want to have the peninsula inundated with construction

workers nor do we want our site complicated with too many people. I

think the curves which Captain Stacey can provide for the record

will give a better indication of this than we could just trying to de-

scribe it. Three months will make a difference.

Admiral LYON. I imght add that you brought up a very important

consideration here in the morning session. We do have to keep thle

Polaris A-3 capability operational and minimize the interference with

that capability as we are building this site.

In that regard any significant increase in the number of people we

have over what is projected will offer problems in that area.

We can work around it but it makes it more difficult.

Admiral MARSCHALL. There is another factor here, too. When you

talk about money being available within 3 months of the time we dis-

cussed, that would mean that the money would be available around

the 1st of February. We do not like to advertise our construction

projects until we have the monev in hand.

You would crank automatically into what we are talking about now

another period of about 2 months for advertising. So you are really

not talking about a 3-month period as much as you are about a 5-month


This would be extremely critical.


Mr. SIKEs. Tell us about the manner in which the Navy is man-

aging Trident complex planning.

Captain STACEY. I think the best way to answer that would be

that Admiral Lyon is the project manager for the Trident system.

Admiral Marschall is responsible for the construction of the Trident

support complex and I am his representative for the project.

Admiral Lyon previously made some comments about the manage-

ment of the organization which might also help answer this question.

Mr. SIKES. Is this essentially an in-house operation ?

Captain STACEY. I am not sure what you mean.

Mr. NICHOLAS. The design and planning.

Captain STACEY. Architects and engineers are doing the design.

We have a staff to manage the design effort, but all of the work will be


Mr. NICHoLAs. Could you expand on this for the record ? The point

of the question was to get the relationship between the various elements

of planning, how you coordinate it within your shop, how the

master planning will be accomplished, how the master planning will

be integrated with the planning of the particular facilities that are

being developed, and how it ties in with the environmental impact


Admiral MARSCHALL. We will provide that for the record.

[The information follows:]



The master planning and the facility design are being coordinated within

OICC Trident by the Planning and Engineering Division. They are responsi-

ble for effecting liaison with the master plan/environmental impact statement

architect/engineer (A. & E.) and the various facility design A. & E.'s and

coordinating their (A./E.'s) efforts

Mr. SIKES. Tell us about the relationship between master planning

and the environmental impact study and the preparation of plans for

the various facilities being requested.

Captain STACEY. The master planning and the environmental impact

study statement will be undertaken simultaneously by the same archi-

tect engineer.

We consider this to be an ideal situation since the considerations

of planning are also influenced by the environmental impact. The

master planner will have approximately 2 months of leadtime to pre-

pare the land use and utility corridor plans.

The detail design contracts for the various facilities will then follow

this 2-month period. There will be a coordinated effort obviously be-

tween the master planner and the detailed design engineer as the plan


Mr. SixEs. What is the milestone schedule for master planning and

the environmental study ?

Admiral LYoN. We will provide that for the record.

[The information follows:]

_ I




Preliminary Site Development

Plan (In-House)

Contractor Selection

Negotiations, and

Award of contract

Irpt -o fY 7 Proj 4o,;t/./ de ., , A/Es

I -

Presentation to OICC, TRIDENT ---

Formal Presentation a

Termination - Prelim. Master Plan

Contract.... Distribution of


In-house review of prelim. master

plan Preparation of Scope/Award of

contract....Final M.P.

Printing final master plan I



Termination final Master Plan contract -

Distribution of Document

'Field Survey

Completion of Draft

Review by NAVFAC,



3 month waiting period

for public comment

/I Finalize EIS/Print

Randd Distribute

j Wait time

sAccept EIS




Mr. SIKES. What will be the phasing of the master planning and en-

vironmental impact study with planning of the other facilities?

Captain STACEY. The master planner is tasked with developing the

planning data for each of the facilities. The master planner will pro-

vide to the individual A. & E. design firms, selected for the fiscal 1974

projects, planning information. Planning information will include

flow diagrams, administration logistics, transportation patterns, et


A. & E. design firms will integrate the master planner's concept with

the final design of each respective facility.

Mr. NICHOLAS. According to the schedule provided to the committee,

the printing of the final master plan would not take place until July

1974, and the final master plan distribution would not take place until

November 1974.

As far as formal printed material and definitizing the master plans

are concerned, they presumably will not be accomplished until that

time. Precisely how do you plan to integrate the planning of the facil-

ities and the master planning and at what times ?

Captain STACEY. I would like to provide you with a schedule for the

record, but I can also say that the master plan initially will concentrate

on the 1974 projects in the development of a preliminary master plan.

It is facility planning information that he is developing that he passes

on to the various A. & E.'s for the 1974 facilities.

There is obviously a close coordination needed with the A. & E.'s

doing the individual projects and the master plan A. & E. We did

indicate that the master plan A. & E. has a 2-month start on the indi-

vidual A. & E.'s and we feel by that time he can develop pertinent

data that will be passed on to these A. & E.'s.

[The information follows:]


The initial integration will take place in July 1973. At that time the master

plan A/E will provide his initial input to the various A/E's who are designing

the fiscal year 1974 MCON facilities. As the master plan A/E continues, he will

provide additional information to the design A/E's. When the preliminary master

plan is complete in December 1973, it will be made available to the design A/E's

for use in coordinating their facilities. As effort on the final master plan pro-

gresses, the same pattern of providing information to design A/E's will be


Mr. SIKEs. What would be the time required to design the refit

pier and slip and the covered explosive handling pier? When do

you expect to start design of these facilities?

Captain STACEY. Design time for the initial refit and explosive

handling pier is estimated at 14 months each. Design should start

July 1973, for both facilities.


Mr. SIKES. The cost estimates for these piers are apparently based

on placing the piers into the bank of the Hood Canal; is that correct ?

Captain STACEY. The cost estimate is based on the conventional siting

of piers into the shoreline. Some contingency factors are included

in the budget estimates to cover unknown conditions at the site. If

in fact the piers are required to be built away from the shoreline,

additional costs would be incurred because of longer piling, connect-

ing trestles, longer utility lines.

Mr. SIKEs. Additional costs?

Captain STACEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIKEs. You do not know what they would be?

Captain STACEY. NO, sir. We feel we have a minimum contingency,

$1.826 million for the explosive handling pier and $1.268 million for

the refit pier built into the cost estimate, if the piers are sited somewhat

into the shoreline, to cover known site conditions.

Mr. SInES. What problems do you feel may arise on building it into

the bank of the canal?

Captain STACEY. We have a problem with salmon fingerlings that

migrate up and down the shoreline. Our master plan/EIS con-

tractor will be investigating this problem as an initial effort in his


Mr. SIKES. Is this the principal possible source of trouble?

Captain STACEY. I think there are several areas of impact on the

environment that we have to look at very carefully.

Mr. SIKES. YOU are talking about the environmental impact


Captain STACEY. Along the waterfront, yes, sir.

Mr. SIKES. Supply more detail for the record.

[The information follows:]

Examples of environmental impact considerations that will be investigated are:

(1) The temporary displacement of shellfish during actual waterfront con-


(2) Temporary turbidity in the water caused by construction at or near the

waterfront and its effect on fish in the canal.

(3) Temporary loss of flora on high banks in areas that have to be excavated

for facilities.

(4) Examination of the esthetic effects of new facilities along the waterfront

to insure that they blend into the environment.

Mr. SIKES. Isn't it important to be sure of the impact of local laws

or ordinances on the design of your piers before getting very far with

the actual design? When would you anticipate that these problems

will be resolved?

Captain STACEY. Yes; it is important. The EIS, A. & E. is being

directed to focus immediate attention on the fiscal year 1974 facilities

and it is planned that his input will be available to the waterfront

A. & E.'s in sufficient time to be a major influence in the siting and

design of the waterfront facilities.


Mr. SIKEs. Which of the facilities you are requesting this year will

not be affected to any great degree by master planning or the environ-

mental impact study ?

Captain STACEY. We feel all of the facilities in the 1974 program

will be affected by the master plan and environmental impact study.

Mr. SIKES. At that point in the overall planning will your utility

and site improvement layouts be sufficiently fixed so that you can begin

detailed design?

Captain STACEY. We anticipate the utility and site improvement

layouts will be sufficiently fixed to allow the detailed design to start in

August 1973.

Mr. SixEs. How long would it take to complete the detailed design ?

Captain STACEY. Completion of the detailed design of the utilities

and site improvements varies depending on the complexity of each


Mr. NICHOLAS. The present schedule indicates in August 1973, the

design won't even have been presented to the officer in charge of con-

struction of the Trident program. That is to take place in October.

Would it be proper to let the detailed design go ahead before the

Navy has had a chance to look at the master plan ?

Captain STACEY. You are speaking of the utility and site


Mr. NICHOLAS. The preliminary site development.

Captain STACEY. One of the first tasks that we are giving the archi-

tect engineer of the master plan is to develop total requirements for

utilities and site improvements. This we envision to be completed in

August 1973.


Mr. SIKES. According to information supplied the committee, certain

types of construction which would disturb the floor of the Hood Canal

are not allowed from early March through June.

Is it economical to start construction of the piers in December 1974

as now planned, since construction in the canal will be halted within 2

or 3 months?

Captain STACEY. Yes, sir, we feel it is economical to start the con-

struction in December. Certain phases such as the pile driving could

be commenced and a portion completed prior to the stoppage in March.

The current construction schedule would allow some phases of con-

struction such as placing pile caps, beams, and slabs, which do not

disturb the canal floor, during the stop period.

Mr. SIKES. Do you feel you have a good estimate of the costs of these

piers in view of the uncertainties as to design and construction sched-

ules which we have discussed ? If you started construction of these fa-

cilities after June 1975, couldn't the appropriation for them be delayed

for a year?

Captain STACEY. Yes, present estimates of cost are valid as they in-

corporate consideration for compensating for construction stoppage.

The appropriation could be delayed however; this would result in

heavy construction peaks later in the program with a resulting in-

crease in the environmental impact.


Mr. SIKES. Could you supply for the record a breakout of the esti-

mated cost of the facilities requested in fiscal year 1974. Also supply

for the committee's use the more detailed breakouts of these costs,

usually shown on 1391 justification sheets. (These are not printed in

the record to avoid prejudicing the Navy's position in contracting for




[The information follows:]


Support complex facilities, Bangor: Thousands

Covered explosive-handling pier--------------------------------- $21, 295

Refit pier and slip -------------------------------------------14, 793

Utilities (1st increment) 16, 827

Land acquisition ----------------------------------------------5, 100

Site improvement--- ------------------------------------------13, 469

Weapons/navigation training building---------------------------- 11, 392

Warehouse ---------------------294

Total ------------------------------------------------------ 83, 170



Wharf and dredging ---------------------------------------------31, 345

Missile checkout buildings (construction and alteration) ------------- 2, 158

Guidance/telemetry building additions and alterations-------------- -- 218

Lifting device proofing facility--------------------------------------- 467

Launch complex, 25 alterations -------------------------------------- 962

Total ------------------------------------------------------ 35, 150

Grand Total--------------------------------------- --------118, 320


Mr.. SIKES. Included in the estimated cost for the covered explosive

pier is a 120-ton bridge crane at an estimated cost of $2.3 million. Has

the explosion-proof requirement been deleted by the Navy ? How much

should this reduce costs ?

Captain STACEY. The initial estimate of cost for the bridge crane was

predicated on a requirement for an explosion-proof type of crane.

Subsequent to the original estimate, a scope change to 120 ton was

intiated and the explosion-proof requirement was eliminated. The

cost estimate for the crane was then reduced to $600,000. As the crane

is but a small part of the total facility, the cost estimate for the explo-

sive-handling pier has not been reduced, pending a more detailed

analysis by the A. & E.

Mr. SIKEs. The project for utilities includes $3.3 million for a sewage

treatment plant. The county is apparently building a new sewage

treatment plant which it has been reported could handle the Trident

installation. Have you considered the use of the county plant? How

much would this reduce your military construction cost ?

Captain STACEY. Consideration is being given to using the county

sewage plant. The architect and engineer for the master plan is being

tasked to conduct an economic and feasibility analysis of connecting

into the county plant or constructing a new plant on the Trident sup-

port site. After completion of the analysis, a decision will be made

as to which alternative will be pursued. At that time we will know

the impact upon the cost of the military construction program.


Mr. SIKES. In view of the fact that master planning for the complex

has just gotten underway, are you confident that all of the other utili-

ties requested in fiscal 1974 will be required this year ?

Captain STACEY. The utilities requested in the 1974 program are

based on a preliminary site-development plan and are phased to pro-

vide the minimum required utilities to be functional as other projects

in the program are completed. An initial effort of the master plan, to

be completed in August 1973, will be the confirmation of these utility

requirements. We will keep the committee informed of our latest


Mr. SIKES. Very good.


I see that the amount for land acquisition has diminished from the

budget request by $6.9 million.

What do you intend to do with this money ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. The $6.9 million will be used for military con-

struction projects not directly related to the Trident program.

Mr. SIRES. Will you show us on the map what you plan to acquire?

How much land are you going to buy and where is it ?

Captain STACEY. The land we are talking about is comprised in

three portions. Our best estimate of the land requirement is this.

[Pointing to chart.]

Admiral MARSCHALL. Outline the base first for the chairman.

Captain STACEY. The base is indicated by the dotted line with the

Hood Canal right here.

Mr. SIRES. What is the total acreage?

Captain STACEY. I will have to give the exact figure for the record,

about 8,000 acres.

[The information follows:]

The total acreage within the current Bangor annex property lines is 7,748


Captain STACEY. We are talking about 15 acres at Vinland, 36 acres

in this area, and 85 in the Bangor area : A total of 136 acres.

Mr. SIKES. That seems quite marginal in that it is on the perimeter

of the base. Why is it necessary to have that additional land ?

Captain STACEY. There are explosive buffer zones that are required.

Mr. SIKES. If yOU buy 15 acres at the extreme eastern corner of the

property, the tract on the southern border, apparently a narrow strip,

and 85 acres in the north-cental area, you still will be abutting other

privately owned land, I presume.

Is that true or not ?

Captain STACEY. Yes, sir, that is true.

Mr. SIKES. Why is it necessary to buy these small portions of land

when you will still have, I would assume, the problem of proximity

of private ownership ?

Captain STACEY. There are buffer zones that are required in which

there can be no habitability. If we put an explosive-handling pier in

this area, when you swing the arc, it cuts into Vinland by an amount

of 15 acres. When you swing it down in this direction, it cuts into the

boundary at this point requiring about 36 acres. Similarly, when you

get here for the refit piers, there is a certain explosive safety distance

required, and when you swing that arc it cuts into Bangor.

Mr. SIKEs. That explains it.

What is the anticipated cost to be?

Captain STACEY. Our best estimate is approximately 5 million.

Mr. SIKEs. It would appear that your present request may have

several duplications of costs. For instance, waterfront land shows up

three times in the compilation supplied to the committee: (1) as part

of the total land, (2) separately identified as waterfront land, and

(3) as a part of the estimated cost of the waterfront dwellings. Also

"other dwellings" includes a portion for land which is already in-

cluded in the estimate for land. Can you look at your estimates again

and tell us what you really require?

Captain STACEY. I would like to clarify this for the record.

The chart shows our current best estimate of land requirements.

Mr. SIKEs. We want to be sure we have a clear understanding and

you have not made a mistake.

Captain STACEY. Yes, sir, we will provide details for the record.

[The information follows:]

Our estimates have been reviewed and there is no duplication in land acquisi-

tion costs. The funds requested in the fiscal year 1974 MILCON program for

the land acquisition represents the best estimate for the anticipated maximum

amount of land to be acquired because of the explosive safety zone requirements

which were previously explained in the hearing. The exact amount of land will

be determined as the master plan A. & E. sites each of the Trident facilities,

considering all the Trident support operations, as well as existing NAD Bangor

functions that will be retained. Since uncertainties still exist concerning the

current operation that will remain at Bangor, and the final location of the

Trident facilities, particularly the waterfront area, a large contingency has

been included in the estimate for land acquisition. Phase I of the master plan

is scheduled for completion in December 1973, at which time the ultimate

real estate requirements will be defined. At that time a better cost estimate will

be developed and the committee will be advised of any changes from the $5.1

million estimate.

Admiral LYON. I might point out we did at one time have con-

siderably more money in the budget for land acquisition than we have

now. We have been able to reduce the amount of land required by

reexamining the explosive safety distances required and obtaining

permission from the Explosives Safety Board to reduce some of the

factors that decreased the amount of waterfront land we needed.

This is the most difficult portion to comply with, of course. On the

Hood Canal it is very valuable and we do not want to displace people


Mr. SIKES. Of course.

Captain STACEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIKES. Is it possible in view of the cost of the land and this

displacement to shift the site of your facilities sufficiently to avoid

this land acquisition ?

Admiral LYON. Mr. Chairman, we have been working on this for

about 12 months to obtain the most efficient arrangement on the water-

front. It is possible that we can reduce the land acquisition by some

degree by moving some of the collocated facilities that are there to

a facility that already exists at Indian Island.

Mr. SIKES. When will you know whether this can be done or not?

Admiral LYON. It is being discussed within the Chief of Naval

Operations right now.

Mr. SixES. You will keep us advised ?

Admiral LYON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIKEs. Does the acreage you propose to acquire include land

for the potential growth of the support complex ?

Captain STACEY. Yes, it does.

Mr. SINES. Does it appear that the currently projected location of

the missile processing facility will require the acquisition of land for

safety purposes ?

Captain STACEY. The current projected location of the missile proc-

essing facility will not require the acquisition of land.


Mr. SIKES. How are you going to deal with the mission of the exist-

ing ammunition pier at the site ?

Admiral LYON. The present level of operations of the existing am-

munition pier is not incompatible with the Trident development, but

it does affect the amount of land acquisition required, as I just men-

tioned, sir. The Navy is at the present time analyzing the long-term

requirement for conventional munitions fleet support in the Puget

Sound area as a result of the base relocation and readjustment, and

also as a result of the selection of Bangor for the Trident site.

As those studies are completed, I will keep you informed.


Mr. SIKES. Present plans call for a railroad and missile hauling road.

Where will these be located ?

Captain STACEY. YOU may recall in the briefing I gave this morning

an extension of the existing railroad spur will be required between the

marginal wharf and the explosive handling pier. It will be in that area

where we will also extend the missile haul road.

Mr. SINEs. What will the railroad be used for ?

Captain STACEY. It will be used for the transportation of concrete

ballast cans used in the submarine during the sea trials.

Mr. SIKES. Is it more economical to provide a railroad than it is to

move this material by ship ?

Captain STACEY. This has proved to be the most economical means

for the transportation of ballast cans in the current programs, Poseidon

and Polaris.

Mr. SINES. What about by barge ?

Captain STACEY. We would have to investigate this.

Mr. SINEs. I would think you would already have investigated it.

Certainly water transportation is cheaper than building a railroad.

Admiral LYON. We have looked at it, Mr. Chairman, and that cer-

tainly is an alternative. However, the Navy already owns a railroad

right-of-way that provides rail access into the base and down into the


Mr. SINES. But the railroad is not there?

Admiral LYON. Yes, sir; the railroad is there. It is in use at the pres-

ent time. All we are doing is extending it.

Mr. SIrEs. I misunderstood. I thought there would be some rail-

road construction.

Now you are talking about hauling by railroad versus hauling by

other means.

Admiral LYON. Yes, sir.

We will extend that by some short distance to where the pier will

be located.

Mr. SIHKs. I would still like to have a cost comparison with water


Captain STACEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIKES. And the feasibility of each.

[The information follows:]



The present method of handling ballast cans, which will also be used for

Trident, is by rail. They are received from the manufacturer by flatcar and are

offloaded by mobile crane and stored immediately adjacent to a rail spur. When

they are required at the pier, they will be loaded on a flatcar, transported to

the wharf, and directly loaded into the submarine by the bridge crane. These

ballast cans are the same diameter and weight as the missile. They are bulky

and awkward to handle and handling them by rail has proved to be the most

efficient, economical, and safe method. The cost estimate for extending the

railroad to the explosive-handling piers is $68,000. There would be no require-

ment to purchase additional equipment to handle the ballast cans.

Transporting the ballast cans to the piers by water poses several problems.

Either a new storage site for the ballast cans must be provided at the waterfront

or they would have to be transported by truck from the existing storage site

to a point where they could be loaded onto a barge. A mobile crane would be

required for loading onto the truck and a second mobile crane would be required

to offload from the truck onto a barge. An alternative to having a second mobile

crane would be moving the crane from the storage site to the barge loading

point every time you were transporting ballast cans, which would be a cumber-

some procedure.

Once the ballast cans have been transported by barge to the vicinity of the

explosive-handling piers (EHP), another mobile crane would be required to

offload from the barge to the EHP. The bridge crane at the EHP could not be

utilized because with a submarine berthed at the pier, the barge could not be

maneuvered into a position where the bridge crane could pick up the ballast

cans. Once the ballast cans are on the pier, they would then be loaded into the

missile tubes by the bridge crane.

Thus, transporting the ballast cans by barge would require handling them at

least three times, and possibly four times for each movement, vice twice when

rail transportation is used. It would require a new storage site at the waterfront

or the procurement of an additional mobile crane to accomplish the increased

handling. Finally it would require the operation and maintenance of a barge to

transport the ballast cans. The sum of these costs would easily exceed the

$68,000 required to extend the railroad. Further, the additional handling of these

bulky, awkward objects would provide increased opportunity for accident.

Handling the ballast cans by water is not feasible with all of these disadvantages.


Mr. SIKES. Can you explain the seeming discrepancy in the cost for

piers at Cape Kennedy and at Bangor ?

Captain STACEY. By deducting the dredging cost of $17 million

from the total Cape Kennedy wharf and dredging item, the cost of

the wharf approximates $14 million. The refit pier at Bangor is $15

million, and the explosive-handling pier $21 million. The slightly

higher cost for the refit pier at Bangor over the wharf at Cape Ken-

nedy is due to the greater tide at Bangor, which necessitates a greater

length of piling. The explosive-handling pier is unique in that it is a

covered structure, and consequently reflects a higher cost.

Mr. NICHOLAS. The detail provided for Bangor indicates that a pier

would cost $3.8, or $3.9 million for the explosive-handling pier, and

the refit pier and slip would cost some $6,168,000 and the quaywall

associated with that some $4,6000,000. That is still much lower. You are

not providing a covered pier at Cape Kennedy ?

Admiral LYON. No, sir; we are not.

Captain STACEY. A detailed analysis will be provided for the record.

[The information follows:]

The refit pier is approximately twice the square-foot size of the expolsive-

handling pier due to need for additional feet of berthing and laydown areas as-

sociated with refit operations. Also, part of the cost of the substructure of the

explosive-handling pier is incorporated into the cost estimate of the slip cover

because of its functional relationships to the cover. The total breakout of costs

for the pier structure of the explosive-handling pier should be $3.9 million for

pier and quay 'and $1.6 for foundations for a total of $5.5 million for the


The difference may be in how the cost is broken out on the sheet

you have as compared to the total cost of the pier. There are several

elements that go into making up the cost.


Mr. SIKES. What is the cost per square foot of the training building

you have?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. $81.56.

Mr. SIKES. That seems very high. Describe the building more fully

and tell us why the cost is so great.

Captain STACEY. The training building has in it all of the mockups

of the navigation and the weapons facilities that are on the submarine,

including the missile tubes. All of these require special treatment and

an extensive amount of foundation work required to support these

various types of equipment.


Mr. SIKES. I note that the cost of the pier and dredging at the cape

has increased markedly from earlier estimates, abot $8 million for the

pier. How do you explain this increase ?

Captain STACEY. The major change in cost has been in the dredging.

The original quantity of material to be dredged was increased due to

widening of the channel into the turning basin and also shifting the

center line of the existing entrance channel to prevent undermining of

the existing jetties.

Mr. SIKES. Will the Trident submarine be the initial test bed for

missile testing? Will the other test vehicle require all this dredging?

Captain STACEY. The Trident submarine will not be the initial ship-

board test bed for missile testing. The initial shipboard test bed will be

the Poseidon submarine backfitted for the C-4 missile. The Poseidon

submarine will require the dredging of the turning basin to provide a

sufficient explosive safety radius for the loading/offloading of the

C-4 missile. It would not require dredging of the turning basin to

the full project depth nor would it require the deepening of the en-

trance channel. However, construction sequencing, prudent costing,

and contract administration efficiency dictate dredging to the Trident

project depth.

Mr. SIKEs. Does the Eastern Test Range have the capability for

testing the full range of the follow-on missile ?

Admiral LYON. Yes, sir, it has the full capability to test both the

C-4 and growth Trident II missiles.

Mr. SIKES. How will the schedule for your construction at the cape

tie in with the construction of facilities for the Space Shuttle?

Have you examined this ?

Captain STACEY. Our investigations have shown that we do not have

any conflict. We will submit a comment for the record.

[The information follows:]

The Trident construction schedule for Cape Kennedy extends from early 1974

through mid-1976 with a total expenditure of $35 million construction funds.

The Space Shuttle construction schedule for Cape Kennedy extends from

early 1974 into 1978 with a total expenditure of approximately $150 million con-

struction funds.

The Trident facilities are located at the south end of the cape while the Space

Shuttle facilities are located at the north end. The largest percentage of Trident

construction involves trades peculiar to waterfront work while the Space

Shuttle is predominately related to work on launch complex 39 and a landing


No interference or conflicts are anticipated between these two construction


Mr. SIKEs. We would like to know if there is any possibility of diffi-

culty in connection with the volume of work which might be going on

at the same time.

Captain STACEY. Yes, sir.


Mr. SIKEs. Do you anticipate any difficulty with the labor contracts

either at the Cape or Bangor ?

Captain STACEY. No, we do not anticipate any difficulty.

Mr. SIKES. What is the status of labor agreements at each location ?

Captain STACEY. There are existing labor agreements at each loca-

tion and we can provide the detail for the record.

Mr. SIKES. Give us for the record the period for which those agree-

ments are to run.

[The information follows:]

The periods for which labor agreements run are:


Carpenters until May 31, 1974.

Cement masons until May 31, 1974.

Electricians until June 1, 1974.

Ironworkers until July 20, 1973.

Laborers until January 1, 1975.

Operating engineers-now negotiating.

Plumbers and pipefitters until May 31, 1974.

Sheetmetal workers-now negotiating.

Teamsters-now negotiating.

-aan~-RI---- I


Carpenters until September 30, 1973.

Cement masons until April 30, 1975.

Electricians until April 1, 1974.

Ironworkers until October 31, 1973.

Laborers until March 31, 1974.

Operating engineers-now negotiating.

Plumbers and pipefitters until August 31, 1973.

Sheetmetal workers until July 1, 1973.

Teamsters-now negotiating.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Are you planning any master long-term labor agree-

ment over the period of construction out there ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Let me answer that.

We have talked both with the labor unions and the associated gen-

eral contractors to try to figure out the best approach to this problem.

We have been assured to date, particularly in the Northwest that there

will be a good working arrangement between the two elements.

As you know, there has been at Cape Canaveral a master contract

which has been developed over the years during construction there.

As this comes up for renegotiation we will certainly keep our eyes and

ears open and make sure we are party to any other agreement as an

interested observer.


Mr. SIKEs. What community impact has there been as a result of

Trident construction at each site, pro and con ?

Admiral LYoN. Mr. Chairman, our environmental impact statement

for the Cape Canaveral work has been on file now for almost a month,

and there have been no adverse criticisms by the community, local

surrounding towns as far as I know. Some comnients are in and they

are acceptable.

The environmental impact statement is just commencing at the

Bangor site. We have established an environmental data base collection

system where we will for the next several months be collecting data

over a 1-year period to establish what the environment is there in the

detail that we deem necessary to see if we are affecting it.

There have been several meetings out there with local community

representatives and, while there have been some comment concern-

ing the location of the Trident site and the fact that Trident is moving

in there, there has been no great opposition to development, and in fact

the surrounding community seems to support it.

Mr. SIKES. What would be the impact population wise ? How many

people will be moved into each location ?

Captain STACEY. At Bangor we anticipate an addition of approxi-

mately 30,000 in the community. I don't feel it will have any impact

of any magnitude at Cape Kennedy.

Mr. SIKEs. Those at Bangor would be over what period of time?

Captain STACEY. This would be over a 5- to 7-year period as the

facility is completed and as the submarines are brought into the

support complex.

Mr. SIRES. What is the status of planning of projects at the Cape ?

Captain STACEY. All of the five projects at the cape are currently

under final design.

Mr. SIRES. Questions ?

Mr. DAVIs. No questions.

Mr. SIRES. Gentlemen, this has been a very helpful briefing and, I

think, a complete one. We appreciate your detailed answers and are

very glad to have had an opportunity to discuss this important sub-

ject with you.

Admiral LYON. It is always a pleasure, Mr. Chairman, to appear be-

fore your committee, sir.

TUESDAY, JUNE 12, 1973

Mr. McKAY. The committee will come to order.

We will proceed with the Navy. The 1st Naval District is next. Insert

page I-1 in the record.


[Page I-1 follows :]


[In thousands of dollars

Installation and project Authorization Appropriation

1st Navel District-State of Maine:

Navel Air Station, Brunswick (LANTFLT):

P-065 Operational trainer building(171.35-2,328SF) - .--. --. - --.. 135 135

Naval Security Group Activity, Winter Harbor (COMNAVSECGRU): P-026 Theater

(740.56-150 seats) ..._...... ... . . . . . . . 232 232

Total, 1st Naval District ... . ...-.........-.. . . 367 367


Mr. McKAY. Let us take up now Naval Air Station, Brunswick,

Maine. Mr. Reporter, insert page I-2 in the record, please.

[Page I-2 follo-ws:]

21-007 (Pt. 3) 0 - 73 -- 11



19 FE 1 NAVY











Maintain and operate facilities and provide services ,u (u ( ) () (.) () () (. . (7)

and material to support operations of aviation activ- .. o1 DEC 1972 99 607 1 1 0 37

ities and units of the operating forces of the Navy A A Ear 526 260 d 0 888

and other activities and units as designated by the

Chief of Naval Operations.


(1) () (3) (4)

Major Activities Supported: ( o(..0 3 12.32 5

Commander Fleet Air Wings Atlantic a LASS E E1 00* - # * - 7* 7 "3

Coander Fleet Air Bn vlek . INVENTORY TOTAL ( pI Iwl dR) AS OF .E J 1 IS 4

Commander Fleet Air Wing Five . AUTHORIZATIONN NOT YET IN INVRRY 2

Six Phitrol Squadrons .. AUTORIZATION REUESTE IN T.I P.O.R.

Survival, Escape, Resistance and Evasion School . ESTIMATED AUTHORIZATION - Y E EA* 2 I

d GRAND TOTAL (c d+ . O





IS 1d D) , ('TS)





u u,-;1,ow39u

Pae N L.2


- S 1 1 1 I I .

I 1 P

____ __ _ __ ____ _______ _ _____ _ ~~__~~~ _



This station provides support for six patrol squadrons engaged in antisub-

marine warfare.

The operational trainer project will provide a facility to house a directional

Jezebel sonobouy system training device to be relocated from the NAS Patuxent

River, Md.

Status of funds

Cumulative appropriations through fiscal year 1973--.----- ____ $33, 717, 000

Cumulative obligations, December 31, 1972 (actual) ----------_ 31, 452, 147

Cumulative obligations, June 30, 1973 (estimated)----_____- ____ 32, 701, 647

Percent complete,

Project Design cost Apr. 1, 1973

Operational trainer building----------................--------------------------------.................................. $7, 803 42

Mr. McKAY. What types of aircraft are based here ?

Mr. MURPHY. At NAS Brunswick, we base P-3 land-based ASW

patrol aircraft.

Mr. McKAY. That is all?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. It is the only type aircraft we base there.

Mr. McKAY. Will the operational trainer building complete the

requirements for the P-3 aircraft which you have here ?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir, it will complete the requirements for synthetic

training. However, in the out-years we have a balance of projects that

are required in the form of aircraft maintenance facilities, mainly.

Mr. DAVIS. How many P-3's do you have at Brunswick ?

Mr. MURPHY. We have 6 squadrons of 9 planes each, 54 total.

Mr. DAVIs. Do you have some superimposed administrative respon-

sibilities up there ?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. We have the Headquarters Command for all

of these squadrons in the Atlantic Fleet. That headquarters is there

and control squadrons at Jacksonville also.

Mr. DAVIs. Thank you.


Mr. LONG. Naval security group activity. Insert page 4 in the record.

[Page 4 follows :]


19 FEB 1973 NAVY











the Commander Naval Security Group and perform other r( ( 4) (d) r) rt) (T) (R) ()

functions as directed by the Chief of Naval operations . S...OF Der 1972 6 0 52 0 0 0 0 0 458

Major Function: b. PLANSo r(d rl 1977 17 346 52 0 0 1 0 421

Provide secure communications essential to the ' INVENTORY

defense of the UI LAND ACRES LAND COST (000) IMPROVEMENT (R0) TOTAL (R000)

(n) () () (4)

ONS 670 4 8, 8,479

a. LEAR*.. AS A KNWrN 13 - 1# * - 3# ) 10* - 1





. GRAND TOTAL (c + d4 + +





_ &O, PRIORITY 0"7" " '

740.56 THEATER .7 SE 150 232 150 232


u ,s~'390



P.R. z. .-4



The Naval security group activity is part of the high-frequency direction

finder network, and performs an antisubmarine warfare support mission vital

to the security of the Nation.

The theater project will provide a facility for movie, theatrical, and lecture

presentations. There are no other indoor or outdoor theaters available within

50 miles of the base and current use of the gymnasium for such purposes conflicts

with physical fitness programs and station athletic events.

Status of funds

Cumulative appropriations through fiscal year 1973 -------------. $5, 772, 000

Cumulative obligations, Dec. 31, 1972 (actual) ------------------5, 568, 056

Cumulative obligations, June 30, 1973 (estimated) ---------------5, 644, 000


Percent complete,

Project Design cost Apr. 1, 1973

Theater------........................................................------------------------------------------------....... $12, 473 26

Mr. LONG. What are you currently using for a theater here ?

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir, we are currently using a gymnasium for the dual

purpose of gymnasium and theater.

Mr. PATTEN. Why does this project rate such a low priority, No. 57?

Is this a weak installation ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Sir, it is not a weak installation at all. It is

going to be there for some time as far as any of us know. We just

have so many important porjects in our arsenal that we had to assign

it some priority. It is for people, it is important.

Mr. PATTEN. Are there any questions?

Mr. DAVIs. Have you ever had a theater there ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. No, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. You have over 400 people there ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIs. Is the gymnasium so bad ? Your justification refers to the

fact that sometimes its use for a theater conflicts with physical fitness


Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir, this is a very isolated station and the

need for physical training very real. The conflict in scheduling both

movies and physical training is the reason for this request. The people

are so isolated that we really think this project is warranted.


Mr. PATTEN. Let's turn to Portsmouth, N.H.

I do not see any appropriate justification sheet. Could you provide

one for the record ?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. Yes, sir.

[The justification sheet follows:]



S 2,817,000 P.L. _ 860.40 7 20 28 N PORTSMOUTITI NEW GHAMPSHIRE







PEA.rT X N..No o..... . SNO.OFROIEt PL-STR 4 dISo - TTRACKGE LF ' 4.010 ) -751 . 5


Install 135, crane rail and foundation for 20' gage .....R. . ":I.IE : :- '::::::' iiii:ii::

ooaow X crane travel using one rail of an existing 15' gage REPLACE IT IG COIO RATT, -L 2 9SO s.m


. covOACASoN Construct crossover between berths o A.. A TL..EATT OLA-ER 2A 2 p .00

" OTHER (AI=n) Construct turnout for passing

Replace existing common rail for 15' and 20' gage I

STPLUCEM ET tracks with 135# crane rail

TF. YPEOF DESIG Relocate subsurface utilities e.

sRTAoA oEoCK 00 Relocate, modify as necessary, and install two 56 ton "

. SPECIL AS, AN cranes from Boston Naval Shipyard

SoAmus No.




(U/mvNO P oRW ABLE) MISSION AND PROJECT: This Shipyard provides repair, overhaul, refueling and conversion of

. oTAL RSQU.IS ET - modern submarines, and Fleet logistic support. This project will provide a 20' gage crane rail

a ESTI. R Ws.S .EAR. ( ) system to permit the use of portal cranes being transferred from Boston Naval Shipyard.

_ Exrn DECAou.rE REQUIREENT: Additional and higher capacity cranes are required to effectively perform the

.o. C oC IYE.PTOv ry current end projected work load.

A Eo.cUATrrE A (c 1 CURREST SITUATION: The availability of portal crane service is 60% of that required. Excessive

AUTIHORIZED FUNDED waiting timas result,causing a productivity level significantly lower than that otherwise

1 UFURDEDP P.IOR UTHOAARI.A TIOR _.i . attainable. Lifts beyond the capacity of existing portal cranes can be made only in areas

A OcC.uAOED wO INPv A _ accessible to a floating crane.

NE. UCe --- -s- _ IMPACT IF NOT PROVIDED: Work will continue to be disrupted by the insufficient availability

2. EITAD ROJECTR of adequate crane service.

DL io 13QI......E.

1 t T Toy No| TA-EI C (]-71)

(OCsno e -

Page No.


Admiral MARSCHALL. Sir, in my statement on Friday I indicated

that this was one of the projects of the program change which we had

requested from the Department of Defense. It is currently at OMB

and will come to the committee as soon as it has cleared OMB. It is a

substantial project which we think is needed.



Mr. PATTEN. Let us discuss shipyard modernization. What amount

are you requesting in fiscal year 1974 for construction for the modern-

ization of your naval shipyards?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Captain Ginn will answer that.

Captain GINN. We are asking for $18,380,000 for modernization in

1974, Mr. Patten. There are also other dollars involved for personnel

support and pollution abatement.

Mr. PATTEN. HOW much for equipment procurement ?

Captain GINN. Our present budget plan requires $7.7 million for

fiscal year 1974.


Mr. PATTEN. What is the present estimate of the long-range require-

ments for this program and how much are you expecting to request in

fiscal years 1974 through 1978 ? I mean the whole modernization pro-


Captain GINN. The military construction requirements for fiscal

year 1975 is currently at a total of $52.1 million. That includes mod-

ernization, pollution abatement and personnel support.

Mr. PATTEN. You can provide details for the record on military con-

struction and equipment costs projected by shipyard for each of these


[The information follows:]


Military Construction and equipment dollars programmed for Fiscal Years

1974 through 1978 are shown below. The Military Construction Program for the

shipyards includes projects for the Shipyard Modernization, Personnel Support

and Pollution Abatement Programs.


(In M(illions)












*Not yet programmed

2.8 5.1 * * 7.9

2.4 3.3 4.4 .3 10.4

17.9 6.4 2.3 2.2 14.3 43.1

.6 4.0 1.1 7.7 2.8 16.2

14.2 11.7 4.0 8.1 7.2 45.2

.3 .3

11.9 10.3 9.1 .9 32.2

13.6 8.3 21.8 8.0 2.1 53.8

1.3 3.0 1.5 1.8 7.6

65.0 52.1 44.2 27.8 27.6 216.7



FY 74 FY 75 **FY 76

**FY 77 **FY 78

.1 .1

0 .3

2.3 4.5

**FYDP Figures are not broken down by individual shipyards beyond budget year

(FY 75)


(In Millions

SHIPYARD FY 74 FY 75 ***FY 76 ***FY 77 ***FY 78 TOTAL










.7 1.4

7.7 15.7 10.9 10.9 10.9 56.1

***FYDP figures are not broken down by individual shipyards beyond budget year

(ST 75).














Mr. PATTEN. What has been the effect of the shore establishment re-

alinement program upon the military Fnstruction requirements for

your naval shipyards

Captain GINN. Obviously, it removed the military construction re-

quirements for the two shipyards that we are inactivating and closing.

Other than that, there are a small number of projects that are involved,

four to be exact, associated with the transfer of active functions to

other shipyards from those yards that are closing.

Mr. PATTEN. What items in the fiscal year 1974 program are re-

quired as a result of these realinements ?

Captain GINN. We have an item for moving the computer support

office from Boston to Philadelphia, an item for moving the underwater

sound transducer and switch, electronics overhaul and repair work

out of Boston to either Philadelphia or Portsmouth. We do not have

a firm, fixed location on that at the moment. Though it is planned for

Philadelphia, it depends on a survey of currents and underwater

noises. We have a project at Mare Island which is an electronics project

for Crypto, moving out of Bunters Point. We have a project in Hunt-

ers Point to support drydock No. 4 as an emergency docking facility

for carriers.

Mr. PATTEN. What projects will be required after the fiscal year

1974 program?

Perhaps you can provide details for the record and give us a little

bit now.

Captain GINN. All right, sir. Relating to shipyard closures?

Mr. PATTEN. Right.

Captain GINN. There will be no other projects with the possible ex-

ception of a second increment that is involved with the movement of

the transducer and electronics work out of Boston. This requirement

depends on whether the project goes to Philadelphia or whether it ends

up in Portsmouth as a result of the survey. The survey is going on right

now. I simply cannot give you a firm answer.

Mr. PATTEN. Before we get this bill passed, you will probably

have it?

Captain GINN. Yes, sir.

We are supposed to have the answer by the end of this week.

[The information follows:]

Relocation of the electronics work related to underwater sound gear, previ-

ously accomplished at the Boston Naval Shipyard, will be transferred to the

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. The decision to relocate to the Portsmouth Naval

Shipyard in lieu of Philadelphia resulted from analysis of a site sound survey

just completed. Acoustic test sites surveyed at Philadelphia were unacceptable,

whereas Portsmouth',s sites were satisfactory. Therefore, the Philadelphia P-502,

electronics equipment facility in the fiscal year 1974 program is no longer

required. A project will be required at the Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth. This

project, relocation of electronics repair facility at $735,000 will convert 34,000

square feet of office space to a benchwork area, convert 15,000 square feet of

industrial area to a testing area, provide a wooden test tank 55 feet in diameter

by 40 feet high, and relocate and modify a 20-ton portal crane with foundation

from the Boston Naval Shipyard.



Mr. PATTEN. In recent years there have been various items built at

the naval shipyards which are to be closed. In addition, funds have

been provided for items, including pollution abatement items, for

which no construction has yet been awarded. For the last 5 fiscal

years, what amount of construction has been awarded at Boston?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. We have awarded one project at Boston

in the last 5 years, a sewage system for the drydocks initial cost


Mr. PATTEN. That may not be a total loss either?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. NO, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. How about Hunters Point?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. We have several projects that we have

awarded over the last 5 years: abrasive blast facility, electrical pre-

cision facility waterfront fire protection, compressed air dehydration

system, sheet metal shop, electrical distribution systems improve-

ments, paint bake oven afterburners, electrical distribution system

improvements, a second increment of the project I mentioned previ-

ously, waterfront utilities, service station, and a boiler fuel conversion.

Those projects were awarded in fiscal years 1969 through 1971


Mr. PATTEN. Provide for the record the cost of these projects.

[The information follows:]



Navy Shipyard, Hunters Point: (thousands)

Abrasive blast facility-----------------------------------------$684

Electrical weapons precision facility-----------------------------3, 885

Waterfront fire protection---------------------------------------- 987

Compressed air dehydration system------------------------------ 80

Sheet metal shop----------------------------------------------2, 983

Electrical distribution system improvements----------------------- 3, 906

Paint bake oven afterburners (2 each) --------------------------- 80

Electrical distribution system improvements (2d increment) ----- 2, 370

Waterfront utilities service station------------------------------ 2, 638

Boiler fuel conversion------------------------------------------- 50

Total ----------------------------------------------------- 17, 663

Mr. PATTEN. What other projects are pending?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. We have some projects that are pending

at Hunters Point which I can discuss in just a moment.

The principal projects pending at Hunters Point are pollution abate-

ment. Current plans are for the shipyard to be maintained in a care-

taker status. It is felt that these projects should be awarded.

I would like to say, though, we are currently reviewing these with

the thought that perhaps we migh be able to cut out one or two of


Currently we have three projects involved in Hunters Point that we

may have to go forward with.

Mr. PATTEN. Keep us informed and let us know before you award

these projects.

Commander KIRKPATRICK. Yes, sir; we will.

Mr. PATTEN. For how long has the Navy known that its shipyards

were and would continue to be underutilized ?

Captain GINN. This has been a situation, Mr. Patten, that has been

coming for a number of years as the size of the fleet decreased.

We have been continuously monitoring the rate of utilization of

the yards and it finally reached a place where we have, with the 10

shipyards in the complex, we have gotten below our lower efficient

operating level. The overhead of keeping the total complex going

became excessive.


Mr. PATTEN. What functions are to be transferred from Boston

Naval Shipyard and how will they be accommodated at the gaining


Captain GINN. The computer-aided systems group that supports the

entire Navy Ship Systems Command will be moved to Philadelphia

and will be accommodated in a building that will probably be available

over at the Naval Air Engineering Center.

The electronics work that we were talking about, the underwater

sound restoration work, if it goes to Philadelphia it will be moved

into a portion of the new electronics weapons precision facility. This

will require another increment of that to be built ultimately. That

is why I said there could be another increment there. If that function

goes to Portsmouth, the predominant amount of it will be housed with-

in the old shipbuilding ways building. Other minor functions will be

transferred out of Boston, such as the equipment for making the die-

lock aircraft carrier anchor chain, which will go into the forge shop

in Philadelphia.

Mr. PATTEN. What will be the total cost of this relocation and con-


Commander KIRKPATRICK. From Boston, sir?

Mr. PATTEN. Yes.

Commander KIRKPATRICK. From Boston, the total cost will be

$33,054 million, the one-time closure costs to effect the move, plus

$915,000 for military construction to house displaced functions.

Mr. PATTEN. What savings do you anticipate from the closure of


Commander KIRKPATRICK. The annual savings is $23.9 million.

Mr. PATTEN. Can you provide some further details on that for the

record ?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

The total cost of relocation, $33,054 million, is comprised of the cost to relocate

military personnel and their families, severance pay, relocation pay, lump sum

leave and associated civilian personnel costs, transfer of equipment and inven-

tories, and preparation of facilities for caretaker and or disposal.

The $915,000 for military construction is comprised of the two projects re-

quired at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard and the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard

to support the closures at Boston.

The $23.9 million annual savings is comprised of salary avoidance associated

with reduction of personnel and nonpersonnel operational costs.

Mr. PATTEN. DO you anticipate many transfers of personnel from

Boston to your other shipyards ?

Captain GINN. So far, there has not been a large number of trans-

fers. This is entirely something that is up to the individual. Of course

where we transfer a function, the opportunity to move with the func-

tion is offered to each of the employees concerned at the losing activity.

At Boston, a large number of the employees in the shipyard are eligible

for retirement and will do so.

Mr. PATTEN. Have you surveyed the employees to see who is will-

ing to transfer?

Captain GINN. Yes, sir. Every employee has had an opportunity to

indicate what geographic areas he was interested in for job offers.

Mr. PATTEN. Do you have a reaction ?

Captain GINN. We have had a very bad reaction.

Mr. PATTEN. Bad reaction depends on whose attitude you are talking


Captain GINN. In trying to recruit skilled people for vacancies we

have in other shipyards out of Boston, we have not gotten a good reac-

tion so far. Likewise, we did not get a particularly good reaction from

the local concerns that came into the shipyard to interview people. It

was a very poor response. We really do not have an answer for that

yet. I am not certain but maybe people were waiting to see exactly

what was going to happen.

Mr. PATTEN. There was an interesting article in one of the magazines

that the new type of employee, executive corporation fellow, was freer,

he will not take orders to pick the family up and move. There has been

a change of attitude.

These big companies are finding they cannot just say "You are

going out to Oshkosh." It is a different ball game.

Admiral MARSCHALL. May I go off the record, sir?

[Discussion off the record.]


Mr. PATTEN. What functions will you transfer from Hunters Point?

Captain GINN. The principal function that will come out of Hunters

Point is the crypto work which we are currently doing, plus the fact

that we will have to reassign the restoration work that is being done

on the S band radars and antennas 'at Hunters Point to another ship-

yard. At the moment, it appears that this will be done in Long Beach

in lieu of Hunters Point. The productive ship work will be a split

between Mare Island, Puget Sound, Long Beach, 'and Pearl Harbor.

There will be an immediate shift of work essentially to the Long

Beach-Mare Island-Pudget Sound shipyards, ultimately with the

transfer 'and the shifting of some homeports around, part of that work

will end up in Pearl Harbor.

Mr. PATTEN. Will you provide details for the record on the one-

time cost, including construction, and the savings you expect for the

record, and also show what personnel transfers you anticipate.

Captain GINN. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]


Navy Bhipyard Hunters Point

One-time cost including construction----- ....------------------- $22, 035, 000

Annual savings anticipated-------------------------------- 17, 883, 000

Personnnel transfers anticipated-------------------------------- 4, 061

Military :

Officer ------------------------------------- 58

Enlisted -------------------------- ---- ------ 106

Subtotal ------------------------------ --- 164

Civilian :

Relocated ------------------------------------- -- 1, 700

Rehire (Government or industry) ----------------------- 2, 197

Subtotal ------------------------------------ ----- 3, 897


Mr. PATTEN. Can you provide for the record the projected average

employment, and the projected utilization, based on maximum, one-

shift capacity of each of the Navy's shipyards for fiscal years 1973

through 1978 ?

[The information follows:]

The projected average employment and projected utilization of each of the

naval shipyards for fiscal years 1973 through 1978 is as follows:



fiscal year

1973 through Projected

fiscal year utilization

Shipyard 1978 (percent)

Portsmouth--...---....---..---....---------------------------------------------................................................. 5,750 71

Philadelphia. ---------------------------------------------------------6,700 60

Norfolk-------------------..----------------------------------------- 9,820..820 70

Charleston........................---------------------------------------------------------- 7,020 71

Long Beach-..--------------------.... .. ...------------------------------------ 7,200 68

Mare Island-----------------.......--.............................................------------------------------------ 7, 940 71

Puget Sound-------------...-------------.....------------------------------ 8,290 62

Pearl Harbor. ...........-------------------------------------------------------- 5, 090 66

Total..-------..--....-----------------------------------------------......................................................... 57,810

These utilization figures do not include capacity for new construction.

Mr. PATTEN. The figures provided the committee staff by the Navy

indicate that the man-years at naval shipyards are projected to de-

cline from 65,778 in fiscal year 1973 to 58,270 for fiscal years 1975

through 1978. Upon what assumptions are those man-year estimates


Captain GINN. The decreasing requirements for regular overhauls

as the fleet shrinks and, in the out-years, the low number will be

due to the fact that the new ships that will be joining the fleet will

not require immediate attention.

Mr. PATTEN. Are you anticipating any new construction of ships

in naval shipyards during this period ?

Captain GINN. No, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. Do your workload figures include the decommission-

ing or scrapping of major combatants such as carriers?

Captain GINN. No, sir. We do not do that type of work in naval


Mr. PATTEN. What do you do with the battleship New Jersey?

8wmrraaa~rmar~--~ e


Captain GINN. She is in mothballs in the reserve fleet in Puget


Mr. PATTEN. There is a little movement on in my State to bring it

back to New Jersey as a museum or a monument.

Captain GINN. Those are expensive museums; sir.

Mr. PArrEN. Provide for the record the annual level of ship altera-

tions upon which your workload projections are based?

[The information follows:]

Of the 58,270 average man-years projected for fiscal years 1975 through 1978,

the annual level of ship alteration work will vary between approximately 30,-

000 to 35,000 man-years per year at the naval shipyards.

Mr. PATTEN. Looking at your projected utilization of naval ship-

yards, I see that the projected rate of utilization in fiscal year 1974

ranges from a low of about 44 percent of maximum capacity at some

yards to a high of about 78 percent. This compares with an optimum

use which wnuldl be about 85 percent of your one shift, 5 days a week

capacity. Is this correct ?

Captain GINN. Well, Mr. Patten, it is correct, depending on what set

of figures you are using for the projection. The projections that have

been made have all been based on the one-shift operation, using the

maximum shift employment that was reached during World War II.

This, unfortunately, is not a good base today because at that time we

had new construction as well as conversion and overhaul and repair

going on in almost all the shipyards.

If you remove from those figures the number of people that would

normally be engaged in new construction and deal only with those

that are involved in conversions and overhaul and repair workload,

you will find the utilization will range somewhere in the 80- to 85-

percent range, which meets the DOD requirement for maintenance

type facilities operating on a single shift basis.

Mr. PATTEN. In other words, you are not going to buy that low of

about 44 percent of capacity at some of your yards?

Captain GINN. No, sir. My figures are different, but I am not going

to argue that because it is a matter of the base that we are using.

Mr. PATTEN. That is obvious.

Captain GTNN. Yes, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. Your workload does not include any new construction

of ships. We just passed the maritime bill the other day for $200 mil-

lion-some, one of the largest shipbuilding programs Congress has

authorized in my stay here. Last year and this year the will of the

Congress has been to build up our maritime.

I am correct on that ? You are knowledgeable on that ?

Captain GTNN. Yes, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. Then we come back to this: You are not going to con-

struct any new ships in your yards.

Captain GINN. I think I should clarify that point, Mr. Patten.

We are not going to construct any new ships in the naval shipyards.

We depend entirely and have for a number of years, on procuring our

new construction from private industry.

Mr. PATTEN. Then what is our fight all the time with our shipyards?

It is over what percentage of the maintenance they get, I guess.

Capain GINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. We hear a lot about their wanting more of this work.

Captain GINN. This is the overhaul and repair work you are speak-

ing of now, which is another matter.

Mr. PATTEN. What is your overall utilization projected for fiscal

year 1974 in terms of one-shift, 5-days-a-week capacity, according to

your computation and figures?

Captain GINN. It would come out to somewhere in the neighborhood

of 80 to 85 percent of the optimum utilization, by eliminating the new

construction from the basic figures.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Using the figures which the Navy supplied earlier,

based on these utilization figures, your rate comes out to something

like 54 percent utilization for all of your shipyards. Does that sound

reasonable? When you talk about 80 to 85 percent, are you talking

about 85 percent of the total capacity or 85 percent of the optimum

capacity? Supply an answer for the record.

[The information follows :]

The 80 to 75 percent used in the above discussion represents the percent utiliza-

tion of the optimum capacity of the total shipyard complex. Comparable figures

for percentage of maximum utilization of capacity would be 68 to 72 percent.

These figures have also been adjusted from the single shift World War II peak

manning by the removal of those personnel involved strictly in new construction.

Mr. PATTEN. IS it inefficient to run your shipyards at this low

level? You are saying it is close to 85, if you make a fair and reasonable


Captain GINN. At 54 percent utilization it is inefficient to operate a

shipyard, but at 80 to 85 percent it is very good.

Mr. PATTEN. Can you provide for the record your figures on over-

all shipyard utilization for the past 5 years and projected for the next

5 years on a comparable basis ?

[The information follows:]

To provide a comparable basis for measuring utilization, both facilities and

manpower associated with new construction have been disregarded. Shipyard

utilization for the past 5 years based on the optimum capacity for conversion,

alteration, and repair, varied from 81 percent in fiscal year 1969 to 73 percent

in fiscal year 1973, and averaged 78 percent for the 10 naval shipyard com-

plex. In the next 5 years, it is estimated that utilization will be approximately

80 percent of the optimum capacity for conversion, alteration, and repair work-

load for the eight naval shipyard complex.


Mr. PATEN. How do you expect that new ships being brought into

the fleet will affect the type of shipyard facilities that will be needed

through the 1980's ?

Captain GINN. We have projected those requirements into the proj-

ects that we bring before you on this committee. The new submarines,

the sea control ships, the PF's, the support of the gas turbine propul-

sion system, all of the support for these types have been taken into

consideration. Under the logistic support plan for each and every

new acquisition, part of that plan is the industrial support plan. I

have members of my staff that work with the acquisition managers to

critically review the support requirements so that at the time those

ships appear in the naval shipyards for support, we will have in place

the necessary facilities and equipment to do the jobs that will be



Mr. PATTEN. You know, you effervesced 3 or 4 years ago about this

modernization program and you have gotten some money since then.

Are you still enthused about it as you were when you first pro-

jected it?

Captain GINN. Well, I have to answer that one, Mr. Patten, by say-

ing the effervescence has subsided a degree because the amount of

money did not come in the same degree that the effervescence was at

that time. But I can truthfully say this: Without this money that this

committee has supported us with, we would be hard pressed today

to be able to properly dock and service the new modern deep-draft

ships. As you know, the requirements of these new ships for Cold Iron

support are much greater than they were for the World War II ships.

That, of course, is what the facilities in the yard were designed for-the

old ships of World War II. We have been constantly using the money

we received, though it did not come at the rate we would like to have

had it, to equip the shipyards to handle the modern ships.

Mr. PATTEN. Where do you plan to overhaul the ship turbine


Captain GINN. Are you speaking of the gas turbines?

Mr. PATTEN. Yes.

Captain GINN. As the population increases in gas turbines, we will

use one of the naval air rework facilities. The one that we are con-

sidering now is North Island. Up until we get enough turbines to give

them a reasonable workload, we expect to utilize the services of the

manufacturer for gas turbine overhaul.


Mr. PATTEN. Is liquefied gas something we have to take a look at, in

the United States and around the world as answering some of our fuel

problems ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I certainly think it is. It is part of the national

problem. Without the supply of natural gas coming in through trans-

mission lines, there has to be some other way of obtaining it. This is

the answer.

Mr. PATTEN. Navy uses so much power, I imagine you fellows have

to be up on that.

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir. We are very, very much involved in

it. As a matter of fact, in my organization I have established a fuel

task force, an energy task force if you will, just to look into items like

this, because we are feeling the crunch all through the Navy.

Mr. PATTEN. I will tell you, it is hot around our way, because they

have 'actually built for it-you know 14 fellows were killed 6 miles

from my house. They are big tanks and they are going to build bigger

ones, too.

Admiral MARSCHALL. That is right.

Mr. PATTEN. They are going to bring the boats up the bay.

Mr. LONG. Do you mean Staten Island Sound ?

Mr. PATTEN. Yes. They have to keep them at minus 2350. We do

not know what is going to happen. I have written all the depart-

ments and I cannot find anyone who has the experience to tell us, if a

thousand ships come in, what will be the rate of accidents or what will



Interior had very little to offer. The Bureau of Mines was of little

or no help. It seems to me, that if they have the knowledge of what

the experience will be, they are keeping it to themselves.

Of course the industry gives us little or no information.

I have asked a million questions about, if 100 ships come in, suppose

they hit something and they lose their temperature, will gas be floating

all around the town? And all kinds of questions. I have not been able

to document anything from anyone reliable and with experience.

Mr. LONG. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]


Mr. PATTEN. What will be the effect of replacement of the

Polaris submarines with Trident submarines on the utilization of

drydocks and other types of facilities at naval shipyards?

Mr. NICHOLAs. Can we go off the record ?

[Discussion off the record.]

Admiral MARSCHALL. We are going to be replacing them eventually.

What you are talking about now is a larger boat than the one you

previously had; therefore, it is going to require a larger drydock than

presently required for Poseidon/Polaris submarines during the refit


We have discussed in the Trident portion of the hearing the neces-

sity for a dedicated drydock for Trident during refit periods. But when

these ships go into their regular overhauls, they will go into naval

shipyards and they will require the larger facilities which are avail-

able in these shipyards.

As you may remember from the Friday discussions which were clas-

sified, the SALT discussion will have a bearing on what we will have

in the way of submarines at the time that the Trident comes on the

line. Whether we will have to replace one for one or two for one is

something we do not know yet.

Mr. NICHOLAs. Assuming that you do replace on the basis of the

current SALT Interim Agreement, the question was: What would be

the effect on utilization of the shipyards ?

Captain GINr. Well, as far as we can see, when the Trident comes

into a naval shipyard for overhaul in the late 1980's it will represent

substantially the same total shipyard utilization. I would like to en-

large upon this question for the record.

[The information follows:]

First a review of the planned Trident maintenance cycle. The Trident sub-

marine increased availability requirements are to be met through shortened

upkeep periods - for Polaris/Poseidon, coupled with an extended operating

period between major shipyard overhaul availabilities (9 years versus 6 years

compared to that of present Polaris submarines). The use of a dedicated dock-

ing facility at the Trident support base and the establishment of a rotatable

submarine system component pool are essential elements in meeting these

availability requirements. Components from the rotatable pool are planned to

effect submarine repairs with the removed components to be refurbished by

shipyards as necessary. The workload imposed on the shipyards by pool com-

ponent refurbishment plus regular submarine overhaul routines during the 10th

year represent substantially the same utilization of naval shipyard repair

facilities. Shipyard drydock utilization by Trident is expected to decrease from

that of.Polaris as a result of the extended period between overhauls. However,

overall shipyard drydock utilization for the Navy's deep draft ships is expected

21-007 (Pt. 31) - 73 -- 19

II1FrmI ['1 IIII

to increase at yards such as Puget Sound, as a result of the recently announced

closure of two naval shipyards and the increase in the number of deep draft

ships in the U.S. Navy.

Mr. NICHOLAS. It will be overhauled less frequently.

Captain GINN. It will be overhauled less frequently, that is correct,

9 years between overhauls.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Would that reduce the overall workload?

Captain GINN. It should not, because if you remember from the

Trident discussion they talk about replacement of rotatables, equip-

ment that will be overhauled in a naval shipyard and brought to the

dedicated sites for replacement.


Mr. NICHOLAS. Will it reduce the drydock utilization ?

Captain GINN. As far as we can determine now, the Trident boat

will probably not be in dock any longer at a time than a Polaris is

now and will be drydocked less frequently in the naval shipyard

because of the expanded overhaul cycle. However, drydock utilization

will be affected by the two shipyard closures.

Mr. PATTEN. An analysis of your planned utilization of nuclear

capable drydocks provided the committee staff, indicates that utiliza-

tion of these facilities will average about 60 percent on the east coast,

and about 50 percent on the west coast. Can you verify this for the


[The information follows:]

The two charts provided the committee in late May 1973 on utilization of dry-

docks normally used for nuclear ships have been updated and revised and are

correct insofar as we can predict utilization 10 years into the future. The revised

charts dated June 20, 1973, have been provided. These charts show total expected

utilization of these docks as well as that portion for nuclear ships alone. An

85-percent utilization line is shown on these charts since this percentage utiliza-

tion factor is considered the maximum practical over a period of years because

of requirements for maintenance work on the docks themselves and the time

for preparation of the docks for each ship docking. Preparations include such

work as removing the drydock blocks for the previous ship, sand cleanup, and

setting the blocks for the next ship. The charts include an allowance for un-

scheduled and emergency dockings based on past experience.

Another factor affecting available capacity of drydocks is that the utilization

varies from yard to yard. Some yards close to home port/operating areas of large

concentrations of ships experience heavier utilization. By the same token, other

yards somewhat removed from large concentrations of operating ships are operat-

ing further below the 85-percent capacity line.

[The charts follow:]

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5Io NU.22 ,M . .2 -2SBN 4 /2s 2 0o JUN 1973


Mr. PATTEN. What percentage of your nuclear work, other than new

construction, do you plan to do in-house and out of house over the next

5 years?

Captain GINN. I will provide that for the record.

[The information follows:]

It is anticipated that approximately 65 percent of the shipyard nuclear work

will be performed in the naval shipyards, and approximately 35 percent in the

private shipyards over the next 5 years.

Mr. PATrEN. What about the long-range projection ?

Captain GINN. We will provide that, too.

[The information follows:]

The ratio of approximately 65 percent of shipyard nuclear work performed in

naval shipyards and approximately 35 percent performed in private yards is ex-

pected to continue in the long-range projection.

Mr. PATTEN. If you follow the plan shown here, will you be utilizing

the nuclear repair capabilities of naval shipyards and private indus-

try in the most efficient manner ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. We believe it will be.

Mr. PATTEN. If you were to close one nuclear-capable shipyard,

would your utilization of trained personnel become more efficient at the

remaining naval and private yards?

Captain GINN. Not necessarily. There is a limit to what you can do

in the way of having nuclear starts in a given year with the configura-

tion of your plant. We very carefully looked at this question at the

time of the base realinement, the requirement for all nuclear capability

that we had.

We must constantly keep in mind one of the primary concerns in

any nuclear yard other than the fact that we have a license there is the

fact that we have a tremendous investment in the trained personnel

that we have. This is one of the big costs. It is not just a facility situa-

tion. It is a matter of training. It is a matter of keeping people and

keeping them trained. You cannot take a nuclear shipyard and have it

do nuclear work some time and for long periods of time not to do any

nuclear work.

Mr. PATTEN. Can you put a price tag on a nuclear repairman ? Is he

worth $20,000 to you ? You don't put that in your computer ?

Captain GINN. No, sir. I am sure that we don't put that human fac-

tor in our computers.

Mr. PATTEN. We have industries which tell us the ordinary laborers

they train in a 6-month period are a $20,000 asset. In other words, if

they see him walk off the job or transfer they lose $20,000. We put a

price on a doctor at $400,000 in our State department of labor. They

said an M.D. in our State is a $400,000 asset.

If you can equate these in terms of dollars, you can support the need

for an item. This is a factor to be considered when you are talking about

efficiency, whether you are utilizing 60 percent or whatever. I have seen

organizations dip into all their surplus, over a year's period, to keep

their organization together. That is how much they regard their top

people and their construction leaders, they pay them for a whole year

and don't make a dime on them.

Admiral MARSCHALL. I have heard it expressed that it would take

about 4 years to build up a nuclear capability in a shipyard.

Is that correct ?

Captain GINN. Yes, sir; a minimum of 4 years.

Admiral MARSCHALL. Four years investment in time plus the amount

of money necessary to train these people in their work is a very healthy

dollar figure which I would hate to estimate at the moment.

Mr. PATTEN. We hear a fighter pilot is a $500,000 asset. I heard that

from the military people. It costs us about $500,000 to train them ? I

don't remember the exact figure.


What factors led the Navy to decide against the closure of Ports-

mouth Naval Shipyard at this time ?

Captain GINN. As far as this time is concerned, we have to go back

and look at the Portsmouth situation. It was on the closure list for 7

years. No major capital investment has been made in that shipyard

during that period. When the President, in 1971, removed Portsmouth

from the 1964 closure list, he had to take into consideration the proj-

ected buildup that was going to occur in the maritime fleet and the

requirements for new construction capacity that would be required.

The decision that he made in 1971 was that the Navy could ill afford

to give up a nuclear capable shipyard along with its trained people.

When we looked at this from a standpoint of the long-range proj-

ected workload and the fact that we now get all of our new construc-

tion from shipyards that are going to be or are already deeply involved

in the maritime program. The problem is further complicated since

three of the principal producers of maritime ships also do overhaul

and repair work on submarines.

The fact is that we were not looking at it purely from a standpoint

of in place facilities and equipment but rather from the reservoir

of trained mechanics to do this type of work and that reservoir is run-

ning rather low. You probably will have noticed in many of the news-

papers lately the ads for the private shipyards.


Mr. PATTEN. What is the proposed division of shipwork, other than

new construction and conversion, between naval and private yards

for nonnuclear work ?

Captain GINN. I will have to supply that for the record. I came with

a different figure. I have the breakout of fiscal year 1973's overhaul

and repair work with nuclear. It turned out about 33 percent of the

total overall and repair work went to the private sector. It appears

next year it will be the same. You asked for a different percentage and

I will furnish it.

[The information follows:]

The proposed division of shipwork other than new construction and and con-

version between naval and private yards for nonnuclear work will average

approximately 25-percent private and 75-percent naval over the next 5 years.

Mr. PATTEN. What do you mean by nonnuclear?

Captain GINN. Yes, sir. When you asked about non-

Mr. PATTEN. Do you have a choice on the nuclear ?

Captain GINN. Yes, sir. We go both ways. We do in-house in the

three yards that do new construction, three private shipyards do over-

haul and repair. General Dynamics, Groton, Newport News, and Lit-

ton on the East Bank.

Mr. PATTEN. Can you provide both the overall percentages and the

percentages of this nonnuclear work done in house and out of house

for the past 5 years and projected for the next 5 years ?

Captain GINN. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

The division of the total overhaul and repair workload between the naval and

private shipyards was 70-percent naval and 30-percent private for the past 5

years. The estimated split projected for the next 5 years is 68-percent naval and

32-percent private.

The division of the nonnuclear overhaul and repair workload was 78-percent

naval and 22-percent private for the past 5 years. The estimated split projected

for the next 5 years is 75-percent naval and 25-percent private.

Mr. McKAY. Would you yield ?

Isn't there an agreement on the percentage of work that shall be

provided to private and naval yards ?

Mr. PATTEN. As a matter of law ?

Mr. McKAY. Or regulation.

Captain GINN. It is an agreement, Mr. McKay, that we will get in

the 30-percent bracket for private shipyards. It is a 30-70 percent split.

Mr. McKAY. That is regulated by agreement rather than by law ?

Captain GINN. It is not by law, sir. I think it is the consensus of

Congress. It is a DOD regulation that we end up following.

Mr. McKAY. You work out the percentage?

Captain GINN. That is right. It has historically been in the last few

years approximately over 30 percent.

Mr. McKAY. You have had some problems. In fact you feel you need

a certain percentage of capability, so in times of emergency you still

have a capability to move ?

Captain GINN. Yes, sir. The fact that we have now spent the ma-

jority of our resources in the naval shipyards on overhaul and repair

is indicative of what we consider this capability to mean to the Navy.

If an emergency comes, this service must not be denied the fleet. It

must have overhaul and repair capability and it must be available in

a form where the Government's control is absolute. That is why we uti-

lize the limited personnel we have in the shipyards and our limited

dollars for capital improvements for overhaul and repair and pro-

duce all new construction from private shipyards.

Mr. PATTEN. The next question takes in the whole workload, in-

cluding nuclear ships and the new construction. Take all three into

account: Non-nuclear repairs, nuclear and new construction.

How does the percentage done in house compare to that done by pri.

vate yards?

Captain GixN. That one I can answer right now. New construction,

100 percent in the private yards. Overhaul and repair, 34 percent.

Sixty-six percent naval shipyards.

Mr. PATTEN. Well put it all together for the record.

[The information follows:]

The total naval ship workload, including nuclear ships and new construction,

is anticipated to be assigned for the next 5 years as follows :

[In percent]

Naval Private

New construction. ....-------------------------------------------------------- 0 100

Conversion, overhaul, and repair...--------------------------------------------- 68 32

Total...................----------------------------------------------------------- 38 62

Mr. McKAY. On new construction, do they turn it over to you after

a shakedown or do you shake it down and take it back to them for


Captain GINN. We accept the ship after builder sea trials. It goes

into an operational period and then goes into a post-shakedown avail-

ability at some naval shipyard.

Mr. McKAY. After that first seaworthiness test by the builder it is

on your hands?

Captain GINN. Yes, sir. We do have a warranty, though.

Mr. McKAY. How long is that warranty ?

Captain GINN. For some reason I think it is 1 year. I would have

to verify that.

[The information follows:]

New construction ships procured under cost-type contracts carry no warranty.

Those procured under fixed-price contracts carry a 6-month warranty.

Mr. PATTEN. Are there any questions on this modernization pro-

gram ?

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


It seemed to me that in the briefing we had that the time at sea was

considerably more favorable for the Trident than for the Posiedon.

Admiral MARSCHALL. That is correct.

Mr. DAVIs. Was a statement made here this morning, in response

to the Chairman's question about the shipyard facilities that would be

utilized by Trident, that the utilization would be at least as great for

Trident as for Posiedon ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir, I think what we are talking about is

the length of time in the drydock. It would probably be about the same

or less for each docking. The frequency of docking in naval shipyards

would be less, 9 years for Trident versus about 6 for Polaris.


Mr. DAVIs. Haven't there been some studies recently carried out in-

house by the Navy that indicate we get more per dollar for overhaul

and repair, conversion of our nonnuclear ships in private yards than

we do in the Navy yards ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I would defer to Captain Ginn on this.

Captain GINN. Yes, sir. Your recollection is correct. We had such

a study made and we made it for the reason that we were interested in

knowing what the cost situation was. When you sit down and try to

compare one completed job with another, it gets very difficult when

making the comparison between a private shipyard and a naval ship-

yard. The best comparability we could get was at the job level and

not a complete overhaul. This comparable nonnuclear surface ship

work represented only 9.5 percent of the total work of this type com-

pleted during fiscal year 1966 through fiscal year 1971. The comparable

work appeared to be cheaper in private industry than it was in the

naval shipyards.

Of course, there are many reasons for the cost difference and I will

only mention a few: the civil service regulations that we operate under;

the system by which salaries are fixed; and the volume of business.

On the positive side, we have to take into consideration the advantages

that accrue to the ship and to the fleet by having the things that are

available to them in the naval shipyard that are not available to them

in private industry, such as barracks, messes, recreational facilities, et

cetera. When you price this whole business out, it is still to the Navy's

advantage to have assured in-house capability to provide this overhaul

work which is so necessary to the fleet in time of emergency. I must

add on the basis of this study the Naval Ship Systems Command has

made an all-out frontal attack on the cost of work. We have instituted

quite a program to improve the productivity of the individual em-

ployee as well as the overall organizational efficiency of the activity it-

self. This is one of the reasons we have pushed our naval shipyard

modernization program so vigorously.

Mr. DAvis. I think there is another side to the coin when you speak

of getting into an emergency. If we don't have these private shipyard

facilities available to us in a time of emergency, we will be in pretty

bad shape, won't we ?

Captain GINN. Yes, sir. They are part of our national industrial

asset. There is no question about that. That is one of the reasons we

have consistently shared what we have in the way of new construction

and overhaul and repair with the private yards. We went to 100-per-

cent procurement of new ships in the private shipyards because we

thought it was in the best interests of the Navy to do so. We do not find

any difficulty whatsoever with the 30-percent agreement that we

reached because we have that many ships 'that we can adequately put

into private industry.

Mr. DAvIS. Apparently this is something that occurred during the

past year ? Is there a statement of policy on this ?

Captain GINN. Yes, sir. It dates back 'to, as I remember, 1965, when

the 35-65 rule, which was the voice of Congress on a law, was wiped

out. Then I think OSD discussed this with Congress and drew up a

regulation on a 30-70 split. We have abided by that since.

Mr. PATTEN. We were in the middle of that fight in 1963 and 1964.

There was great pressure on us by the unions out of Brooklyn and out

of the shipyards around the Metropolitan New York area and in


I have not felt it so much the last few years but some of those years

that you mentioned industries used to come down here and say, "You

take a rowboat out of our area and send it down 'to Norfolk to be

repaired." They are still complaining somewhat.

Captain GINN. Another factor we have to consider in this is the

Navy's home port consideration. This to a marked degree goes to

determine where a ship will be overhauled.

Mr. DAVIS. That is all.

Mr. LoNG. Mr. Chairman.

I am a little puzzled about this business of private shipyards. Why

shouldn't as much work as possible be done in private yards? It is a

little cheaper ?

Captain GINN. As far as we are concerned, Dr. Long, the work

basically and fundamentally, according to the study we had done by

Booz, Allen Research showed that on the type of work compared there

was a differential between the Navy and private shipyards.

Mr. LONG. How much? In which direction? Private shipyards are

cheaper and how much ?

Captain GINN. Yes, sir. I would be perfectly frank to say I would

have to furnish that for the record. I don't have it with me.

[The information follows:]

The recent study of the relative costs of ship construction, conversion, alteration

and repair in naval and private shipyards, completed in June 1972, indicates that

the cost of repairs and alterations for surface ships, during the period of fiscal

years 1966 through 1971, was approximately 16 percent higher in the naval

shipyards. Comparisons were also made for nuclear submarine overhauls for

which detailed data were lacking and comparability was only approximate.

However, the overall result indicated that the approximate cost to the Depart-

ment of Defense was 14 percent higher in the naval shipyards.

Mr. LONG. That would be interesting to know.

When I was in the Navy in World War II, I spent a lot of time

in shipyards, and was appalled by the double hierarchy. Every naval

officer had a civilian counterpart, everything was duplicated. It seemed

to me to be appallingly inefficient.

I have to admit I saw things in private yards that were also a waste

of time.

Captain GINN. There is a whole new situation. The naval shipyards

were completely and totally reorganized after World War II.

Mr. LONG. I hope so.

Captain GINN. I don't find that situation existing today. The aver-

age naval shipyard will probably have no more than 70 to 80 officers

in the whole yard and some 5,000 to 8,0P0 civilian personnel.

Mr. LONG. Run mostly by civilians ?

Captain GINN. Yes, sir; except for certain key jobs.


Mr. LONG. On this matter of security, why is security any better

in the Navy yard than a private yard ?

Why can't you have juvt as good security in a private yard ?

Captain GINN. We have more stable employment and get clearance

for the individual.

Mr. LONG. You cannot do that with the private yard ?

Captain GINN. As far as I know. they hire as they have workload

requirements and reduce as the workload'falls off.

Mr. PATTEN. Except in time of war you can make it enual? I think

during the 'war you stepped in when private shipyards had to be

cleared. I know a lot of men around our way came running around

for us to straighten them out, especially for a Hungarian or German

or enemy aliens. We had a lot of trouble with that. The Coast Guard

people came in and I know they had strict clearance even if for dry-

docks. They were cleared. You had control under the war powers ?

Captain GINN. I am sure such arrangements could be made again.

Mr. LONG. Defense concerns which are manufacturing defense sys-

tems are handled under security ?

Captain GINN. The yards that are doing nuclear submarine work

have security problems, obviously.

Mr. LONG. It seems to me that you run into security problems either


Admiral MARSCHALL. It is of a hit-and-miss nature, that precludes

counting on the security clearances in private yards as opposed to

Navy yards. You have a constant work force which is cleared in

the Navy yards. If you bid the work in private yards you then have

to get people in for the surges. I think as a practical matter it is not

something that I personally would want to hang my hat on.

Captain GINN. We also have to consider the fact that many of

the pieces of equipment that come off the ship go into a classified

portion of the shop which we have because we continually do this

kind of work. One of the things that we do have is we have perimeter

security. Unless you have a reason to be in there you don't get in.

In all the shipyards where we carry on classified work we have a

production security zone also. There are two security checks that you

have to go through. The most important situation is that we don't

have a foreign flag berthed right next to one of our ships. When we

are in a test situation with classified gear a foreign flag, with a

proper set of monitoring instruments, can learn a heck of a lot about

what is going on. We have that situation under control in the naval

shipyard. It is the environment that we operate in that we are talking

about basically.

Mr. LONG. The environment, I recall, was one of vast confusion.


Mr. PATTEN. If there are no further questions, we will turn to the

"Additional crane rail system, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard."

You are requesting an additional crane rail system at Portsmouth

in the amount of $2,817,000. What is the need for this item at this

time ?

Captain GINN. The Portsmouth Naval Shipyard was built to be a

new construction submarine shipyard and historically has been this

until we stopped building ships in-house and it became an overhaul

and repair activity like the other naval shipyards. Submarines are

pretty well complete when they are launched. The heavyweight

handling that is required is done either in the building basin or the

building ways where the boats are constructed. In Portsmouth for

instance, the cranes in the building ways lift sections and components

up to 100 tons.

Consequently, when new construction is alongside the piers, rela-

tively light lifts are all that is necessary and that is why they have

25-ton cranes. Since we were dealing with submarines, the crane is

extremely low to the ground since they don't have to reach over a lot

of top hammer. When we put Portsmouth into the overhaul and repair

business, the heavy cranes that were available in the building area

are no longer usable for overhaul and repair. The lifts that are neces-

sary to be made on submarines undergoing overhaul exceed the 25-ton

capacity of the waterfront cranes. We have had to handle these heavy

lifts by moving a floating crane around. Making lifts on a submarine

that is in the water with a floating crane that is also in the water gives

you 2 of motion that you have to overcome on all lifts. The ship-

yard is going to remain in the overhaul and repair business and needs

heavy waterfront lift capability, since we have, at Boston, cranes that

will be excess to our needs. By utilizing these cranes in Portsmouth we

can get the weight handling that we need very easily, very quickly,

and very cheaply. The modernization study that we had made of Ports-

mouth required us ultimately to buy cranes. The fact that they are

available to us now allows us to move quickly, and this is a No. 1

priority item as far as the shipyard commander is concerned.

Mr. PATTEN. Will you barge them up to Portsmouth out of Boston?

Captain GINN. They will be, I am sure.

Mr. PATTEN. That will be quite a trick. What do you mean by float.

ing cranes?

Captain GINN. The floating cranes we use are barge mounted.

Mr. PATTEN. Provide for the record an economic analysis of this proj-

ect. Show who prepared it.

Captain GINN. There is no economic analysis for this project, Mr.

Patten. This is a mandatory item that is required to meet the work-

load commitments, and we do not have an economic analysis.

Mr. NICHOLAS. You are doing this workload now at Portsmouth,

you are not increasing the number of submarines done there?

Captain GINN. That is right.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Presumably the impetus behind this is to be more


Captain GINN. We only produce economic analyses for those proj-

ects that are justified on economy only. There are savings, yes, but

there is no formal economic analysis for the project. There is a cost

avoidance also that you can consider.

Mr. PATTEN. You are saying it is mandatory, and so you didn't need

an economic justification?

Captain GINN. Right. We don't produce economic analyses for every


Mr. NICHOLAs. If it is urgent, why wasn't it done 10 years ago?

Captain GINN. Ten years ago we could not spend any money on

Portsmouth since it was on the closure list. It came off the closure list

in 1971 and CNO directed we make a study of Portsmouth, which

we did. This is one of the items.

Mr. NICHOLAS. This item is to be included as a late starter in fiscal

year 1974 ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. It is not officially recommended to the com-

mittee yet.

Mr. NICHOLAS. It has not reached the committee yet. It can't be too

urgent. They must be able to do the job using the system they have

now, otherwise you could have programed it years ago?

Captain GINN. The weight-handling problem in Portsmouth is a

matter of having to make work wait until a lift is available. Right now

out of every 10 lifts needed to be made, a crane is available only six

times. There are three cranes, three 25-ton cranes servicing the en-

tire drydock 1, drydock 3 and berths 12 and 13 areas. As a result of

this, we need the increased capacity and capability.

Mr. PATTEN. Let us continue on that. We don't have answers. May-

be we can work that up for the record. What is the benefit-cost ratio

for this project?

Captain GINN. We don't have one. We did not make an economic

analysis of this project.

Mr. PATTEN. What is the status of the design for this project ?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. We plan to authorize design on June 15.

That is provided the project clears OMB this week as expected. We

would be prepared to start the design the 1st of July.

Mr. NICHOLAS. When will design be complete ?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. In January 1974. We would advertise at

that same time.

Mr. PATTEN. When was the need for this project identified ?

Captain GINN. We identified this as a hard-core requirement in the

report that we made to CNO in April of last year.

Mr. PATTEN. What is the priority in comparison with other items

in the fiscal year 1974 request ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. It will be in the priority 1 category, inasmuch

as this is an operational requirement.

Mr. NICHOLAS. It was not included in the fiscal year 1974 program

originally, yet you are saying it rates higher than projects which

were included ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Mr. Nicholas, the base realinement program,

coming when it did, gave a greater impetus to this thing because

we can now use the cranes in the Boston shipyard which won't be


Mr. NICHOLAS. You have known for some time which shipyards you

would close and that these assets would be available ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. As a matter of fact, we didn't know for some

time. I couldn't have told you the day before the announcement was

made what activities were going to remain open and which were

going to be closed. It was a very close-held type thing and very

much down the wire which way we would go. There were so many

considerations to be taken into account.

Mr. PATTEN. Is the requirement a result of the base realinement


Admiral MARSCHALL. No, sir, it is not a result of it. The timeliness

of it probably is generated 90 percent by the fact that these cranes now

are available from Boston.

Mr. PATTEN. When are the portal cranes scheduled to be transferred

from Boston?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Again, I think we have our design and con-

struction work to be done in the meantime. It would be compatible

with the timing of the availability of the tracks.

Mr. PATTEN. What is the estimated construction time for this


Admiral MARSCHALL. We anticipate it would be completed by

March of 1975.

Mr. PATTEN. Can we pin that down? When do you think that the

portal cranes will be transferred out of Boston? You are not going


to have your design finished until January. Could you wait until

the 1975 budget ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Moving the cranes themselves is not a critical

item in this thing. We would hope to get them as soon as we could use


Mr. PATTEN. Would you move them in a Northeast storm?

Admiral MARSCHALL. No, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. Wouldn't this be quite a task to move these cranes ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Not insurmountable.

Captain GINN. We moved 12 of them out of New York when we

closed that shipyard. We sent them all over the world. We have them

operating in Guam now.

Mr. PATTEN. You have to have 900 people this year in Boston. When

will the cranes be available to be moved out of Boston?

Captain GINN. December 31 this year. In fact, the odds are that we

can get them ahead of that date. That is the end of productive work.

Admiral MARSCHALL. That does not really figure into the critical

timing of this thing at all. The timing would be to fix the facilities up

in order to receive the cranes.

Mr. PATTEN. What is your estimated construction time for this

project ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. About 12 months, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. With all of this, can't we get an economic analysis?

You use the word mandatory. You didn't make an economic study.

Admiral MARSCHALL. We can certainly make an attempt to look into

this and give you the figures. We shall provide for the record some


Captain GINN. We will give you one.

Mr. PATTEN. How much would it cost to make this economic


Admiral MAR5CHALL. Mr. Patten, we can do it in house. It won't

require additional funds, and we will try to provide for the record

some economic justification for this project.

[The information follows:]

_ I


The Economic Analysis of Investment is detailed in the following For-

mat A-1. It can be seen that a Savings/Investment Ratio of 1.38 will result

in a payback period of 11 years.




1. Submitting Department of the Navy Component: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard

Portsmouth, New Hampshire

2. Date of Submission: 14 June 1973

3. Project Title: Additional Crane Rail System, MCON Project P-156

4. Description of Project Objectives: This project will alleviate the current

deficiencies in portal crane service to

Drydocks 1 and 3 and Berths 11 and 13

by increasing the number of portal

cranes serving the area from three (3)

to five (5) and thereby permit the

shipyard to reduce the cost and length

of time required to accomplish the

overhaul of modern submarines.

5a. Present Alternative: Continue to operate 6a. Economic Life: 25 years.

existing system.

b. Proposed Alternative: P-156 b. Economic Life: 25 years.

7. 8. Recurring 9. 10. 1.

(Operations) Costs

a. b.


Project Present Proposed Differential Discount Differential

Year Alternative Alternative Cost Factor Cost

1. (310,000) 0

2. (322,400) 0

3. 335,296 0.788 264,213

4. 348,708 0.717 250,024

5. 362,656 0.652 236,452

6. 377,162 0.592 223,280


7/ 8. Recurring 9. 10. 11.

(Operations) Costs

a. b.


Project Present Proposed Differential Discount Differential

Year Alternative Alternativ4 Cost Factor Cost

7. 392,249 0.538 211,030

8. 407,939 0.489 199,482

9. 424,256 0.445 188,794

10. 441,227 0.405 178,697

11. 458,876 0.368 168,866

12. 477,231 0.334 159,395

13. 496,320 0.304 150.881

14. 516,173 0.276 142,464

15. 536,820 0.251 134,742

16. 558,293 0.228 127,291

17. 580,624 0.208 120,770

18. 603,849 0.189 114,127

19. 628,003 0.172 108,017

20. 653,123 0.156 101,887

21. 679,248 0.142 96,453

22. 706,418 0.129 91,128

23 734,675 0.117 85,757

24. 764,062 0.107 81,755

25. 794,624 0.097 77,074

26. 826,409 0.088 72,724

27. 859,466 0.079 67,898

12. Totals 13,963,707 3,653,406

13. Present Value of New Investment: $2,540,000

14. Total Present Value of New Investment $2,540,000

15. Less: Present value of existing assets replaced 0

16. Plus: Value (salvage value of cranes on open market)

of existing assets to be employed on the project $ 100,000

17. Net Investment $2,640,000

[13 III l





18. Present Value of Cost Savings from Operations $3,653,400

19. Plus: Present Value of the Cost of Refurbishment

or Modification Eliminated 0

20. Total Present Value of Cost Savings $3,653,400

21. Savings/Investment Ratio 1.38

22. Source/Derivation of Cost Estimates:

a. Investment Costs:

(1) Trackage $1,505,000

(2) Crossover 210,000

(3) Relocate Utilities 100,000

(4) Relocate and Install 2 Cranes 650,000

(5) Turnout (Item 20c) 75,000


The following project line item is a necessary

maintenance and repair item under both alternatives

and, therefore, excluded.

(6) Replace existing common rail (Item 21c) 277,000

Total $2,817,000

b. The industrial area of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard that would

be served by this project includes Dry Docks #1 and #3 and four

(4) repair berths (#11A, 11B, 11C and 13C). The workload in this

industrial area normally contains one SSBN and at least one SSN

under regular overhaul plus one or two submarines who are in the

yard for an unscheduled restricted availability or interim dry-

docking. On the average, about 1,200 men from the production

shops (06-99) are working on these ships daily at a composite

manday cost of $126 per day, including overhead and support costs.

The Portsmouth Naval Shipyard has been engaged in a major

program to improve the shipyard's productivity and over the past

two years has reduced the length of time required and the cost of

21-007 (Pt. 3) 0 - 73 -- 13





overhauling an SSN from $17,000,000 and 14 months (USS JACK) to

$14,500,000 and 11 months (USS HAMMERHEAD) and of overhauling an

SSBN (including refueling and conversion) from $42,500,000 and

20 months (USS SAM RAYBURN) to $37,000,000 and 15 months (USS

GEORGE BANCROFT). The cost per day of overhaul varies between

$44,ooo and $80,ooo.

A limiting factor in achieving further reductions in the

time and cost of submarine overhauls at Portsmouth is the shortage

of portal cranes serving the Drydock 1/3 and Berths 11/13 area.

It is taking longer than it should to offload stores from the

Boat when it arrives, and to reload the Boat after the overhaul

work has been completed. The time consumed in staging and un-

staging a Boat in its Drydock could be halved if adequate portal

crane service was available. It is taking longer than it should

to accomplish the removal (RIPOUT) of the equipment that needs

to be sent to the shops for overhaul, and the reinstallation of

that equipment is being similarly delayed. With only three portal

cranes to serve all the ships in the Drydock 1/3 and Berth 11/13

area, all three of the portal cranes must be scheduled to work

every day, and every breakdown, no matter how minor, disrupts

the overhaul schedule and causes lost time.

If the two portal cranes being requested by this project are

provided, the shipyard estimates it will be able to further reduce

the time required to overhaul an SSN or SSBN by at least 5 working

days and to further reduce the cost of such overhauls by $150,000

per overhaul. Since the long-range minimum scheduled workload for

Portsmouth is two SSN overhauls each year and one SSBN overhaul

every 15 months, the potential annual savings in direct overhaul

costs are in excess of $400,000.

~ar P-~P~Ei~i~





The current annual cost to operate and maintain the two

additional cranes is $90,000 per year. The differential cost

(anticipated financial gain) is thus $400,000 $90,000 =

$310,000 per year. The differential cost (anticipated financial

gain) of $310,000 was escalated at the rate of 4 percent compounded





Public Works Officer Date: 14 June 1973

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard

Portsmouth, New Hampshire

The above savings do not include any monetary value for returning sub-

marines to the fleet 5 days earlier after completing an overhaul.

Mr. PATTEN. Are there any questions on Portsmouth?

[No response.]


Mr. PATTEN. Turn to the 3d Naval District. Insert

the record.

[The information follows:]

page I-6 in




Installation and Project

Naval Submarine Base, New London (IANTFLT)

P-155 Bachelor Enlisted Quarters Modernization

(722.10-1,202 Mn) (250,524 SF)

P-111 Electrical Tie and Distribution Line


Naval Underwater Systems Center. New London

Laboratory, New London (CNM

P-003 Engineering Building (310.34-74,000 SF)

Military Ocean Terminal Bayonne (CNO)

P-020 Military Sealift Command/Atlantic Relocation

(610.10-98,200 SF)

Naval Support Activity, Brooklyn ( CNO )

P-998 Relocate Telephone Switchboard (135.50-LS)

P-008 Bachelor Enlisted Quarters Modernization

(722.11-225 MN)(37,500 SF) a



Project Installation

Amount Total


State of Connecticut






State of New Jersey



State of New York






Project Installation

Amount Total














Mr. PATTEN. Turn to Naval Submarine Base at New London, Conn.

Put in page I-7 in the record.

[The information follows:]









Maintain and operte facilities to support training PERSONNEL STRENOT O .IIIC LISTED CII.LIAN OICR c LI.TE OFFICER ENIS.. T CIVILIAN TOTAL

and experimental operations of the Submarine Force; ( e ( ( (') ( m () )

provide logistic support to submarines including A "o" DEC 1972 1.146 60 1 0

their overhaul and repair; provide logistic support a PLaNmE( ryr1977) 1 129 1 072 170 0 1

to other #atgvities of the Navy and other Government "' INVENTORY

Activities in the area. LAND ACRES LANDCOST(00) IMPROVEMENT) TOTAL (1

SS r(C) () (O

Maor Activitles Supported: 0N.

Fleet Un nelud ng Submrine Squadrons LEA ,.eMN aN - )

Submarine Flotilla 2 4 INVENTORY TOTAL (aEuSP Im~ m) A o a JUNE '1.,2 84


Submarine Medical Center . AUNOI.ATIOU REQUESTED IN"rIERR OR0N (ElLSIVE OF avrTv TTiTT r.

Marine Barracks I. MTI-ATs AUTHORIZATION - NE A (EC VE OF -TY 7TrT .-

___d_ GRAND TOTAL ( e d . .





722.10 F OR ENLISTED QUARTERS MODERNIZATION 54 SF 250,524 3,372 250,524 3,372


TOTAL 6,158 6,158


FOR - -

D D, ;,0 -:

P[pE _ I.-7



Naval Submarine Base, New London, CT,, $6,158,000

The base maintains and operates shore facilities to support

2 attack submarine squadrons, a submarine development group

and 2 deployed Polaris/Poseidon Submarine squadrons.

The bachelor enlisted quarters project will modernize, to

current standards of habitability, living spaces for 1,202 men.

The electrical tie and distribution line project will provide

facilities to meet increasing demand resulting from facilities

expansion and a need to provide shore power to modern nuclear


Status of funds:

Cumulative appropriations through FY 1973 $45,560,000

Cumulative obligations, Dec 31, 1972 (actual) 34,645,477

Cumulative obligations, June 30, 1973 (estimated) 40,268,695



Project Design Cost Complete

Bachelor enlisted quarters modernization $173,346 16

Electrical tie and distribution line $127,620 24

Current Bachelor Enlisted Status at NSB, New London, CT

1. Effective BEQ requirement 4,904

2. Adequate Assets 543

Installation 172

Community 371

3. Deficit 4,361

4. Fiscal Year 1974 project 1,202

5. Remaining deficit after fiscal year 1974 3,159

___ ~ _I __;~I__



Mr. PATTEN. Last year funds were provided for the first increment

of a dredging project to provide for access of the SSN-688 class sub-

marine to the State pier and the laboratory here. What is the status of

this project ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Right now the engineering and environmental

statement submission is pending a public hearing. The hearing was

postponed while the Corps of Engineers of the Army, which is respon-

sible for such things, is investigating a new spoil site for the dredge


Mr. PATTEN. When do you anticipate that the dredging must be com-

pleted in order to allow the first 688 class submarine access to the sound

laboratory ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I think Mr. Murphy has that information.

Mr. MURPHY. The first 688 class submarine will complete perform-

ance trials and enter the Atlantic Fleet in early 1975. We require 36

feet of depth by that time up to the State pier, or the sound lab, pre-

dominantly to the Navy sound lab facility.

Mr. PATTEN. IS it still your plan to bring it here for testing?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. The 688 class ships that come in the fleet

initially will periodically come to the sound lab for testing and devel-

opment work for that weapons system.


Mr. PATTEN. Can you provide for the record the schedule for the

procurement and delivery of the SSN-688 class. Show where each of

these ships will be homeported. Also indicate what testing period will

be required at New London.

[The information follows:]


Fiscal year

in Homepurt

Fiscal year Hull No. Name Builder commission (tentative)

1970........... 688 Los Angeles-------....-----.... ---...... -------........... NN 1975

1970.......... 689 Baton Rouge......................--------------------- NN 1975

1970.......... 690 Philadelphia..............---------------------- EB 1975

1971......... 691 -------------------------------------- NN 1976

1971 694 ....... .......-------------------------------EB 1976

1971------ 693 ---------------------------------- NN 1976

1971------ 694----------------------------------- EB 1976

1972---.-----. 695 ...............------------------------------- NN 1977

1972...... 696 ........................------------------------------- EB 1977

1972....... 697 ..................------------------------------- EB 1977

1972........ 698 . .......------------------------------- EB 1977

1972 ....... 699 ..................EB 1977 Classified.

1973......... 701 ..................--------------------------------------------- 1978

1973....... 702 ..................--------------------------------------------- 1978

1973....... 70 ................. ......---------------------------------------------1978

1973- 703------------------------------------------------ 1978

1973........ 704 ............................--------------------------------------------- 1978

1973 ......... 705 ......................--------------------------------------------- 1978

1974........ 706 .........................--------------------------------------------- 1979

1974.... 707 ........................--------------------------------------------- 1979

1974..... 708 .................................---------------------------------------------1979

1974.--- 709 ------------------------------ .---------- 1979

1974.......... 710 ........................--------------------------------------------- 1979

Note: NN= Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., Newport News, Va. EB= Electric Boat Division, General Dynam-

ics, Groton, Conn.


The testing period at New London will extend from early 1975, when the

first ship is operational, through several years into the future. Since this is an

entirely new class of submarine, equipped with new sonar and weapons systems,

the testing will progress from sonar evaluation, with the Naval Underwater

Systems Center New London Laboratory ("sound lab") playing an important

role, to a later class evaluation program by the New London based Submarine

Development Group 2. Since the sound lab is at the forefront of development

work on the new BQQ-5 sonar in these submarines, periodic visits to the sound

lab waterfront facilities are essential.


Mr. PATTEN. Provide for the record the out-year construction pro-

gram at Naval Submarine Base, New London.

[The information follows:]


The out-year construction program is as follows: (29 May 1973)


131.50 Communication Facility

151.20 SSN Berthing Pier

151.50 Drydock Fac Pier 15

151.10 Weapons Pier

151.40 Replace Pier 1

151.20 State Pier-Addn Utilities

151.20 Pier 33

165.10 Dredge River Channel 2nd

213.49 Sub Rep Supp Fac 3rd Incr

214.20 Auto Maint Facility

219.10 Conversion Bldg 411

216.40 Torpedo Assembly Shop

441.10 Transit Shed

722.11 Marine Barracks

722.11 BEQ

724.11 Rehab BOQ Bldgs D/M

722.11 BEQ

740.36 Hobby Shop

740.40 Bowling Alleys

740.43 Rehab Gym/Pool

740.56 Rehab Theatre/Library

740.73 Sub Museum/Library

740.01 Navy Echange/Branch

740.60 Replace Com/Open

740.66 NCO Club

740.55 Teenage Club/Dependents

740.50 Field House

812.30 Utilities Improvements

822.12 Pier 8-Addnl Utilities

822.12 Pier 9-Addnl Utilities

851.10 Access Road/on base

880.10 Fire Sprinklers Misc Bldg

851.10 Arterial Rds Upper Base

890.20 HP Air Cap Nucl Sub Sup

890.90 Power Plant P/A

911.10 Land Acq for BEQ


P-NO. SCOPE ($000) YR YR

1,835 SF

840 FB

460 FB

1,160 FB

350 FB


720 FB

1,286,578 CY

35,658 SF

33,300 SF

12,644 SF

1,188 SF

30,000 SF

54 MN

66,400 SF

131 MN

780 MN

24,900 SF

14 LA

48,242 SF


10,000 SF

65,000 SF

26,300 SF

25,000 SF

14,400 SF

62,000 SF




11,000 SY


10,000 SY



11 AC





































58, 384



Mr. PATTEN. You are requesting bachelor enlisted quarters modern-

ization at a cost of $3,372,000. What is the requirement here?

Captain WATSON. Mr. Chairman, the requirement is to modernize

six barracks buildings for the personnel that are stationed at New

London. These are primarily permanent party personnel at the naval

station, offduty crews from the nuclear submarines, and transient per-

sonnel. The barracks were built during the period 1944 through 1969.

Mr. PATTEN. You have nothing at Newport, R.I., or the like, that is

portable that could help you with this?

Admiral MARSCHALL. NO, sir. Nothing of that nature. These are

existing buildings to be modernized. We do have a real estate problem

there. It is a very tight situation. We have chosen this modernization

approach as opposed to new construction for that very reason.

Mr. PATTEN. Will you provide for the record, at this station, and at

all other locations where you are requesting bachelor housing in the

fiscal year 1974 program, a summary of the bachelor housing situation.

Admiral MARSCHALL. We will, Mr. Chairman.


Mr. PATTEN. What is the average cost per man, per square foot, and

per room of the bachelor enlisted quarters in your fiscal year 1974


Admiral MARSCHALL. May we provide this for the record ?

[The information follows:]

Average cost per square foot--....----------------------------------- $30.90

Average cost per man------------------------------------------ 5, 006. 00

Average cost per room----------------------------------------- 14, 596. 00

Mr. PATTEN. Why do you give this project such a low priority, 54?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Here again, Mr. Chairman, we have so many

really vital projects that this took its place after certain operational

requirements. It is a very desirable project.


Mr. PATTEN. For what time period do you anticipate the electrical

distribution project will meet your requirements?

Captain WATSON. This should satisfy our requirements through


Mr. PATTEN. That ends New London.

Are there any questions?

Mr. LONG. No questions.

Mr. PATTEN. Is it agreeable to everyone that we adjourn now ?

We cannot meet this afternoon. So we will reschedule this.

Thank you, I think we have had a good morning.

THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 1973.



Mr. LONG. The committee will come to order.

The first item today is the Naval Underwater Systems Center, New

London Laboratory, Conn. Insert in the record page I-11.

[The page follows:]









The principal Navy RDT&E Center for underwater weapon (I m m (0 S .m m (a). oT

systems. .Asor31 DEC 1922 11 30 1,364 0 0 0 0 0 105

." PLAUODS E r 1975) 11 9 1,391 0 0 0 0 0 1,411



( I) (2) () (

AoN.No 25.5 160 10,502 10,750


C. v[INVTOR TOTAL ( UISI.O ldm.) As Or s JUNE 18.. 10,750



I. ItMATrn AurTomInION - NexT . yEARS 0

. GRAND TOTAl (+ d .. 1 ,350






310.34 ENGINEERING BUILDING 8 SF 74,000 3,600 74,000 3,600

DD, ,, 390 --,I-..._-_



CONN., $3,600,000

This laboratory is the principal Navy research, development test and evalua-

tion center for underwater weapons systems.

The engineering building project will provide space for engineering and scien-

tific personnel engaged in the research and development of Sonar systems and

improved underwater acoustic sensors for antisubmarine warfare ships. This

developmental and test support is currently being conducted in World War II

type, deficient, dispersed and functionally inadequate buildings.

Status of funds


Cumulative appropriations through fiscal year 1973------------------- $0

Cumulative obligations, Dec. 31, 1972 (actual) -----------------------0---

Cumulative obligations, June 20, 1973 (estimated) ----------------------


Design Percent complete

Project cost Apr. 1, 1973

Engineering building. - -. - - --..-..-.-$... ............ $172, 600 4


Mr. LONG. Tell us about the consolidation of this laboratory with

the one at Newport.

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir. I think Captain Watson has chapter

and verse on that, Mr. Chairman.

Captain WATSON. Mr. Chairman, the laboratory was consolidated a

year or so ago under one head up at Newport. The two laboratories

operate independently with Newport laboratory primarily concerned

with underwater weapons research, development, testing and fleet

introduction of the weapons, whereas the New London laboratory is

essentially involved in underwater acoustics, detection, communica-

tions, and related technology. Each laboratory has its own separate

functions although they do operate under one head at Newport.


Mr. LONG. How does the mission of the Naval Underwater Systems

Center, on the east coast, differ from that of the Naval Undersea

Center, on the west coast ?

Mr. MURPHY. The Undersea Center in San Diego, Mr. Chairman,

deals in all phases of underwater research whereas New London is

limited to acoustics and underwater communications applied to weap-

ons systems directly.

Mr. LoNG. Are the east and west coast laboratories set up to compete

with each other ?

Mr. MURPHY. No, sir. They have independent areas of interest, and

they pursue them independently. They are not competing.

Mr. LONG. How is the work assigned to one or the other ?

Mr. MURPHY. The Director of Naval Laboratories at the Secretary

of the Navy level, within his research and development resources

designates which lab will take the lead in developing specific weapons

systems, such as the MK-48 torpedo. Specific work assignments are

made primarily by the various systems commands under the Chief

of Naval Material. Other assignments are made by major Navy com-

mands such as BuMED, BuPERS and by other Government agencies.

Labs also make assignments from one lab to another for specialized



Mr. LONG. According to a report by the committee's surveys and

investigations staff, the Naval Undersea Center in San Diego loaned

out 22 man-years of effort during fiscal years 1970 through 1972. Is

this laboratory underutilized ?

Mr. MURPHY. I am not immediately familiar with the loan of those

man-years, but I can state that the laboratory is not underutilized.

As a matter of fact, under the recent shore establishment realinement,

they will receive additional people through a relocation.

Mr. LONG. You have an anomaly there to explain nevertheless;

don't you ?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. The facilities base is adequate to take addi-

tional people.

Mr. LONG. Why are you loaning people out ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Mr. Chairman, I will investigate that for the


Mr. LONG. You are not aware of it ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. No, I am not aware of it. My immediate feel-

ing is that these people may have been expert in some particular

field which called for their services at another place. I will provide

this information for the record.

[See page -.]


During the period of fiscal years 1970 through 1972 the following exchanges of

personnel took place at the Naval Undersea Center in San Diego.

MH loaned MH borrowed'

Fiscal year:

1970--------------.....--------------............------------------------------........................ 12,653 1,50

1971.---------..-----....................................--------------------------------------------... 15,406 7, 285

1972-------...... --...... ------------.................................. 20,351 4,180

Total -------------------------------------------.....-------------............. 48, 510 13, 025

' Scientific exchange program.

The policy of the laboratories is to loan out personnel when a recognized expert

in a specific field who is employed at one laboratory is required to fill a short

term critical need at another laboratory. In the above data, 48,519 man-hours

quates to 23.3 man-years at' O hours per man-year; however, the man-hours

f41 individuals make up thi -tota

'To reiterate testimony $ive, the Naval, Undersea Center, at

Sa DiePgo '. fully utilized aV e plesest time. Loaning of personnel does not

necessarily Indicate an excess hor does borrowing indicate shortage although

the latter is more nearly the case. This shifting of personnel can result from

the scientific exchange program, an interchange of scientists to broaden ex-

pertise and further the cause of R.D.T. & E., and the short term shift of

recognized experts in specific fields to meet critical needs in other laboratories.

It is also a useful technique to balance workloads over Staff resources in periods

of relatively slack or full activity. The number of man-years loaned in this in-

stance is not considered to be a significant index of utilization. A more pertinent

indicator is the ability of staff in-house resources to do the work assigned. For

fiscal year 1973 (first 6 months actual, second 6 months estimated) the total

R.D.T. & E. funds expanded at NUC broken down as in-house and contract are

as follows:


In-house R.D.T. & E--$---------------------------------------33. 62

Contract R.D.T. & E--------------- ------------------------ 18. 88

Total R.D.T. & E-------------------------------- ------- 52. 50

A small portion of the $18.88 million was contracted out because of highly

specialized short time requirements; however, a major portion of these funds

would have been expended in-house had sufficient resources been available at


Mr. LONG. I thought every naval admiral was aware of absolutely

anything that went on anywhere in the Navy. Mr. Nicholas.


Mr. NICHOLAS. The committee has an investigative staff report

which is classified "Secret" and so we can't discuss it too much at

this point, but the technical director of the Naval Undersea Cen-

ter advised the investigative staff that the two laboratories, the Un-

dersea Center and the Underwater Laboratory were intentionally

created as competing laboratories. He said this was in compliance

with the principals stated by the Director of D.D.R. & E., that within

each mission there should be at least two laboratories in the Depart-

ment of Defense. Do you have any comments on this? Do they do the

same type of research?

Mr. LONG. That certainly conflicts with the testimony.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Is there differentiation between their missions which

you indicated here? Would you like to research it further?

Mr. MURPHY. We would like to research it. I would like to reiterate,

however, that the Underwater Sound Laboratory of the Naval Un-

derwater Systems Center at New London devotes itself to weapons

systems development for underseas weapons systems almost exclu-

sively. We can provide a more distinct differentiation.

Mr. LONG. It says, "Intentionally created as competing laboratories,"

and we asked if they were set up to compete with each other ? That

is exactly, it seems to me, what this statement indicated. You have

said no, so there is something to be explained.

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir. We will provide that for the record.

[The information follows:]

The chief of naval material assumed command of the major Navy research

and development activities on April 1, 1966. The Navy laboratories had been

operated under broad mission statements and often overlapping functional

assignments which generated competition for resources.

The intervening years has seen the realinement of major Navy laboratories

into centers along warfare or functional lines. In doing so six centers have been

established. The shift to this arrangement was dictated by the increasing need

to have technical organizations capable within themselves of handling the tech-

nical features of significant portions of complicated systems rather than merely

components of such systems.

It has been the intent of the chief of naval material to strike a balance be-

tween, on the one hand, a rigid definition of functions that would create monop-

olies, deprive sponsors of flexibility, and lead to a decrease in technical option;

and on the other hand, a dispersion of capabilities that would foster duplication,

", 7 r I I jl

decrease effective application of resources, and promote competition for programs

and resources.

Assignment of primary responsibility to Navy research centers and labora-

tories carries with it the responsibility for fostering communications to keep

abreast of related efforts in other laboratories and to insure compatibility of

interrelated development programs.

Because of the diversity of technical equipment used by the Navy and the broad

applicability of technologies certain laboratories and centers are sometimes re-

quired to maintain secondary, supporting capabilities.

The assignment of primary functional responsibilities for systems, subsystems,

and supporting technologies to the appropriate laboratory or center is the re-

sponsibility of the chief of naval material through his director of laboratory


The officially assigned mission and functions of the laboratories are mutually

exclusive, however, the Navy policy encourages exploitation of the technology

base so that alternative technical approaches to particular problems are avail-

able to provide options for systems development.

Editor's note: For further discussion on subject of competition between lab-

oratories, see later testimony, given in these hearings on July 11, 1973, under over-

all subject of "Navy Research Projects."

Mr. LONG. Would it be beneficial to put the east and west coast

laboratories under one head, in order to minimize duplication ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I think, Mr. Chairman, that they do have a

common head, the Director of Naval Laboratories. If you mean in im-

mediate superior running both, that is an organizational question,

which we can research for you. I would say we effectively have that

now at the top. It is just a matter of degree as I see it.

Mr. LONG. That is a little confusing.

Admiral MARSCHALL. All Navy laboratories now work under one

head, who is the Director of Naval Laboratories.

Mr. LONG. I think it makes a difference whether this is a nominal

or real consolidation.

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. Is this nominal or real ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. It is real as far as the head Director of Naval

Laboratories, is concerned. He is the boss, and he is the one who desig-

nates lead labs and assigns missions to the laboratories. If you are

talking about a common commanding officer or a common technical

director of the laboratory, we would have to go into that and research

it for you and find out if this were feasible.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Again this report, which we have not yet put in the

record, indicates that the Navy has attempted to distinguish between

the missions of the Naval Underseas Center at San Diego and the

Naval Underwater Systems Center at Newport, but the investigative

staff says the principal difference seems to be that the underwater

center has cognizance over the development of incoming systems and

the underseas for more advanced systems. They also point out that

much of the work of the latter center has to do with improvements in

operational systems. In a way they feel the distinction hasn't been

made, and that really perhaps these two are competing, duplicating a

good deal. Could you answer that in greater detail?

Admiral MARSCHALL. We will for the record.

[The information follows:]

The missions of Navy laboratories under the command of the Chief of Naval

Material are defined in terms of technologies, platforms, and warfare areas.

The Chief of Naval Material monitors work assignments after the fact to insure

reasonable balance between competition and consolidation; approves all assign-

21-007 (Pt. 3) 0 - 73 -- 14

~- ------ ZOMMM-W


ments of lead laboratory and programwide responsibilities and provides resources

and sponsors military construction projects to obtain facilities required by the

respective laboratories or centers to carry out their assigned mission.

The naval undersea center's mission is oriented along technology lines of

undersea surveillance, ocean technology, and advanced undersea weapons sys-

tems. As such, it has broad programwide management responsibilities which in-

volves management and coordination of supporting activity in other laboratories

and in industry. Two such assignments to the naval undersea center are: Under-

sea surveillance and marine biosciences.

The naval underwater systems center is focused on undersea and antisub-

marine warfare. One such program for which it has broad programwide responsi-

bilities is Sanguine.

A further distinction of the mission of NUSC and NUO is evident in their

working arrangements with their principal customers. NUSC is heavily involved

with fleet users of the electronic submarine and surface ship sonar systems and

the related control systems that combine into an underwater ordnance system.

The philosophy of relating the weapon and fire control systems to the electronic

search, target acquisitions and identification expertise has been the background

for the formation of the naval underwater systems center.

The naval undersea center was formed and functionally alined to address the

longer range missions, objectives, and developmental requirements of the Navy.

Their mission encompasses a broad range of advanced R.D.T. & E. programs

versus the operational systems fleet support of NUSO.

There is no duplication. Because both laboratories work in the underwater

environment there is some similarity in the types of work they do. For example,

both laboratories develop torpedoes. The torpedoes developed at Newport are

those launched from ships or submarines; while at San Diego they develop

lighter weight torpedoes for use from aircraft. In the sonar area the large hull

mounted sonar are developed at underwater systems center, while the naval

undersea center specializes in sonar for small high-speed vehicles and fixed sonar

systems. The naval undersea center is the Navy's principal center for ocean

technology, ocean engineering, and marine biosciences while the naval under-

water system center specializes in areas important to the evaluation of under-

water systems such as underwater range technology, underwater target systems.

Editor's note: For further discussion on subject of competition between labora-

tories, see later testimony, given in these hearings on July 11, 1973, under

overall subject of "Navy Research Projects."

Mr. NICHOLAS. I guess a follow-on question, as a result of this, is

whether there are duplicating facilities which are being requested or

programed in the outyears?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Certainly there is a feeling here today that we

are not duplicating facilities.

Mr. LONG. There may be some question of semantics here. I don't

suppose anybody ever plans to duplicate intentionally.

Admiral MARSCHALL. No, sir.

Mr. LONG. Duplication might be a result, but very few people inten-

tionally set out to accomplish that.

[Discussion off the record.]


Mr. LoNG. May we have a list of the Naval laboratories and the

pr ai mission of each ?

Amral MARSHALL. Yes4 .

[the info'nation follow s "



1. Naval Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory, Pensacola, FL:

Conduct research, development, test and evaluation in aerospace medicine

and related scientific areas applicable to aerospace systems.

2. Naval Air Development Center, Warminster, PA:

The principal Navy RDT&E Center for naval aircraft systems.

3. Naval Air Propulsion Test Center, Trenton, NJ:

To test and evaluate aircraft propulsion systems-their components and

accessories and fuels and lubricants and to perform applied research and develop-

ment leading to correction of design deficiencies and service problems.

4. Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, MD:

Coordinate and perform test and evaluation of aircraft weapons systems,

their components and related equipment, conduct test pilot training, provide

technical advice and assistance to BIS NASC contractors, etc.

5. Naval Electronics Laboratory Center, San Diego, CA:

The principal Navy RDT&E Center for electronics technology and command

control and communications concepts and systems.

6. Naval Medical Research Tnatitute, ethedar M:

Conduct basic and applied research and development concerned with the

health safety and efficiency of naval personnel.

7. Naval Missile Center, Point Mugu, CA:

To perform test, evaluation, development support and exercise engineer-

ing cognizance as assigned of naval weapons systems and related devices.

8. Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak, Silver Spring, MD:

The principal Navy RDT&E Center for ordnance technology, concepts and


9. Naval Ordnance Missile Test Facility, White Sands M.R., NM:

Support the Navy guided missile and rocket program including ground and

flight testing and participate in the operation of the Department of Defense

Integrated Missile Test Range at White Sands.

10. Naval Personnel R&D Laboratory, Washington, DC:

Conduct research development test evaluation behavior and social

sciences and related fields directed toward new and improved personnel and man-

power systems techniques and operations.

11. Naval Personnel Research Activity, San Diego, CA:

Plans and conducts research and development in personnel operations and

behavioral sciences to develop new concepts and improved methods for acquiring,

classifying, training, distributing, and retaining personnel and for maximizing

the utilization of Navy manpower resources.


12. Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC:

To conduct scientific research and development in the physical

sciences and related fields directed toward new and improved materials,

equipment, techniques, and systems for the Navy.

13. Naval Coastal Systems Laboratory, Panama City, FL:

The principal Navy RDT&E center for the application of science and

technology associated with military operations carried out primarily in the

coastal region, and to perform investigations in related fields of science and


14. Naval Ship Research and Development Center, Bethesda, MD:

The principal Navy RDT&E Center for naval vehicles and to provide

RDT&E support to the U.S. Maritime Administration and the maritime industry.

15. Naval Submarine Medical Research Laboratory, New London, CT:

To conduct basic and applied research in submarine and diving

medicine, closed environments in areas of physiology, medical psychology,

vision audition, human facility engineering, dentistry, military applications,

to meet' Navy requirements, and furnish research and medical assistance to

sub and diving shore and fleet activities.

16. Naval Undersea Center, San Diego, CA:

The principal Navy RDT&E Center for undersea surveillance, ocean

technology, and advanced undersea weapons systems.

17. Naval Underwater Systems Center, Newport, RI:

The principal Navy RDT&E Center for underwater weapon systems.

18. Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, CA:

The principal Navy RDT&E Center for air warfare and missile weapon


19. Naval Weapons Laboratory, Dahlgren, VA:

The principal Navy RDT&E Center for surface warfare weapon systems.

20. Navy Medical Neuropsychiatric Research Unit, San Diego, CA:

Conduct neurdpsychiatry research as applies to naval service.

Develop study plan on repatriated prisoners of war.

21. Pacific Missile Range, Point Mugu, CA:

To provide support for the Department of Defense and other desig-

nated government agencies for launching, tracking, and collecting data in

guided missile, satellite, and space vehicle research, development, evaluation

and training programs and actual operations.

22. Naval Ai? Test Facility, Lakehurst, NJ:

To conduct tests and evaluation of launching, recovery and visual

landing aids systems and related equipment. Provide test site facilities for de-

velopment and test of ship installations equipment. Conduct R&D of equipment

and instruments used in test and evaluation of ship installation equipment.



Mr. LONG. I note that the engineering building here has a relatively

low priority. What are you using at the present time ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. We have some pictures here which may be of

interest to you, sir. This is a picture of the establishment itself.

Captain WATSON. The buildings on the waterfront near the piers

are the buildings that we are requesting replacement of. They are old,

deteriorated, wooden buildings.

Mr. LONG. You mean down here?

Captain WATSON. No, sir, the upper left. There are several small

buildings that were there when the station was first established, and

they have become machine shops and woodworking shops. This is where

they fabricate the prototypes of the installations for the submarines

or whatever ship is to have the installation put aboard.

Mr. LONG. They seem awfully small.

Captain WATSON. Yes, sir. These are some photographs of the work-

ing conditions, and further photographs of the buildings themselves,

showing how old they are, subject to flooding in case of extremely

high water, and they have very crowded working conditions. With the

larger sonars, like the SQS-26 and various other large projects,

fabrication is done outside, in the open. There is not room in the build-

ings. This new facility would consolidate these buildings into one with

decent working conditions. The new building will be large enough to

fabricate the sonars or whatever device is inside the building. Addi-

tionally the new building will have air-conditioning for a large amount

of electronic equipment that requires the proper temperatures to keep

it within calibration limits.

Mr. LONG. What portion of this will be administrative space and

what part will be shops and laboratory space ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. May we supply that for the record.

[The information follows:]

Engineering building space breakdown

Square feet

Shops 3----------------------------------------------------------- 7, 000

Administrative ---------------------------------------------------- 4, 500

Laboratories ----------------------------------------------------- 32, 500

Total 7------------------------------------------------------4, 000

The above space breakdown is taken from plans being developed in preliminary

engineering studies. These studies are currently under review for possible re-

vision to improve site adaptation and may result in changes to functional areas


Mr. LONG. Is this space required to build and test working models

of components and sensor systems?

Captain WATSON. Yes, sir, it is.


Mr. LONG. What type of R. & D. money is this funded under?

Captain WATSON. I will furnish that for the record.

Mr. LONG. We are told there is a shortage of R. & D. funding in this



[The information follows:]

The major effort of work to be accomplished in the proposed facility would be

funded from research and development funds in category 6.4, engineering develop-

ment. This includes development programs being engineered for service use, but

which have not yet been approved for procurement or operation.

The remaining source of funding would be proportioned approximately equally

between category 6.3, advanced development, and 6.2, exploratory development.

Advanced development includes projects which have moved into the development

of hardware for experimental or operational test. Category 6.2 funds encompass

efforts directed toward solution of specific military problems. This is the research

in technology phase.

The programs which will be supported by this project are fully funded by major

underwater combat systems using 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 R.D.T. & E. funds. There are

shortages in other.R.D.T. & E. funding areas at New London but they will not

affect the work to be accomplished in the building proposed in this project.


Mr. LoNG. Military Ocean Terminal, Bayonne, N.J. Put page 13 in

the record.

[The page follows:]

S -i -- II " "IllTTN









Provides effective and economical sea transportation rw (B ( ()u m I () I )

in the Atlantic Area for personnel cargoes of the .. o 31 DEC 1972 21 39 354 0 0 O 0 o 414

Department of Defense and other governmental agencies PL.aNpoEd.rr1977) 22 166 354 0 0 0 2

Provides and administers support ships for scientific ,,. INVENTORY


Administers established supporting facilities for N AES I N rr ( o

accomplishment of the Military Sealift Conmand L ow N 4,736 82 6 8708

Atlantic Mission. . LEA.[ A..ND EAS.o NN 0 0 ) Q 0

c. IvroY rOL lindrm AS sor o N O S JUNE 1.




. sGRAND TTAL (. + d + s 88 888





O000E (NO.


610.I kITARY SEALIFT COMMAND/ATLANTIC RELOCATION // SF 98,200 1,806 98,200 1,806

DD, 0|J390

Pa JR. T-13



This activity provides effective and economical sea transportation in the At-

lantic area for personnel and cargoes of the Department of Defense and other

Government agencies. The headquarters of the Military Sealift Command is

presently located at the Brooklyn Army Terminal, which is scheduled for closure.

The Military Sealift Command/Atlantic relocation project will convert exist-

ing space to accommodate the facilities to be relocated from the Military Ocean

Terminal, Brooklyn.

Status of funds

Cumulative appropriations through fiscal year 1973 --------------------- $0

Cumulative obligations, Dec. 31, 1972 (actual) ----------------------0-- 0

Cumulative obligations, June 30, 1973 (estimated) ---------------------- 0


Design Percent complete,

Project cost Apr. 1, 1973

Military Sealift Command/Atlantic relocation...-............................... $80, 000 1

Mr. LONG. Can you explain the relationship of your Military Sea-

lift Command, Atlantic, and the Army's Eastern Area Military Traf-

fic Management and Terminal Service ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Mr. Taylor will answer, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir, the Army's Military Traffic Management and Ter-

minal Service is responsible for getting the cargo from its origin to

the piers and loading it onto the ships. The Military Sealift Command

is responsible for arranging for the ships and the transporting of the

cargo to the terminal port.

Mr. LONG. What is the status of the proposed merger of MSC and


Admiral MARSCHALL. That is I think at the moment in limbo, Mr.

Chairman. I do not believe there are any longer plans afoot to merge

the two organizations.

Mr. LONG. Would such a merger, if it were ever put into effect, save

money, or do you feel that is an academic question at this time ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I have been told that it would not save money.

Mr. LONG. How is the proposed move of the Military Sealift Com-

mand to Bayonne related to the consolidation of other naval activi-

ties in the New York area at the Brooklyn Annex ?

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir, the Navy has been trying to relocate the Military

Sealift Command to Bayonne, in conjunction with the Army's move,

for quite a while. As a result of the recent shore establishment realine-

ment space has become available which we are studying to see if

it would be more economical to locate MSC into the space becoming

available than it would be to consolidate at Bayonne. The study

should be complete within the next couple of weeks, and we will keep

the committee advised. However, there is the other side of the coin,

that it may be operationally effective to colocate it with the Army

at Bayonne.

Mr. LONG. Would the Navy rather move the MSC to Bayonne? If

so, why ?

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir, from an operational standpoint it makes good

sense to locate with the Army. However, as I mentioned we have to

study the economics of the situation to see which in the long run is

the most satisfactory to the Navy.

Mr. LONG. But the economics would justify it, then you would prefer

to be there.

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. Is there sufficient space to accommodate MSC at the

Brooklyn Annex ?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir, there is a possibility there will be space avail-


Mr. NICHOLAs. That is the space you are looking at ?

Mr. TAYLOR. That is the space we are looking at, the space that is

being vacated by the Naval Strategic Navigational facility.

[The information follows:]

The reevaluation of the New York Complex realinements indicate that the

project to relocate the Military Sealift Command, Atlantic from MOT Brooklyn,

N.Y., to MOT Bayonne, N.J., is still a valid requirement. The project at the NSA

Brooklyn, N.Y., to relocate the telephone switchboard is no longer required and

the project for the bachelor enlisted quarters modernization can be reduced in

scope from 225 men to 150 men with a comparable cost reduction to $612,000.


Mr. LONGo. Naval Support Activity, Brooklyn, N.Y. Insert page I-15

in the record.

[The page follows:]









perating forces of the Navy, Administrative Staff o r () ) ( )

services for dependent activities and other commands aL or 31 Decemb er 7 2. 6 161 7 0

s asiged, a r L*N raNE r 7*5 > 360 1703 95 24 8 O 0 612



(1 ( (3) (0

b LEASES AND E*AsNTS 0 0 0 0

INVENTORY TOTL (ocepl IwdmiO AU or ,o. JUNE 7S 20,501



4. GRAND TOTAL (f +*0 2 67






722.11 P :~E R ENLISTED QUARTERS MODERNIZATION I SF 37,500 1,056 37,500

TOTAL 1,131 1,131

D D ... 1390 s I-15.

-_ r "



This activity maintains and operates facilities to provide services and material

in support of operating forces in the New York area including port services, com-

munications, medical care, receiving and shipping, and personnel support services.

The telephone switchboard project will relocate the telephone switchboard

equipment from the naval station to the naval annex as the existing facilities used

to house this equipment will be excessed.

The bachelor enlisted quarters project will modernize existing spaces to provide

modern living quarters for 225 men. Existing spaces are overcrowded, poorly

lighted and ventilated, and have no recreational or storage spaces.

Status of funds


Cumulative appropriations through fiscal year 1973_________________ $113, 000

Cumulative obligations, Dec. 31, 1972 (actual) ---------------------- 62, 496

Cumulative obligations, June 30, 1973 (estimated)-------------------- 64, 496


Project Design cost Percent complete

Apr. 1, 1973

Relocate telephone switchboard .......-....... .. ......... ........ . $3,600 0

Bachelor enlisted quarters modernization- -.-...... ..-..._ ..... ..____ 50,6880


Mr. LONG. Could you discuss further, and provide details for the

record on the activities being consolidated into the Naval support

activity, Brooklyn ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. We shall, sir.

[The information follows:]

The Naval Support Activity; Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier; Commandant,

3d Naval District; Navy Exchange; Military Sealift Command, Atlantic; 'Naval

Investigative Service Office; Plant Representative, Bethpage (Grumman) ; Navy

Finance Office; and Navy District Recruiting Office are being reduced in their

scope of operation.

The Public Affairs Office, East Coast; Armed Forces Police Detachment; As-

sistant Supervisor of Salvage, Inactive Ships Maintenance Activity; Naval Audit

Office, New York; Navy Oceanographic Office representative; and area rep-

resentative. Boston Branch, Office of Naval Research are being disestablished.

The planned actions rre a rart of an overall effort to realize the shore establish-

ment commensurate with programed reductions of the operating units of the fleet.

The reduction and disestablishment of the 15 activities will result in an annual

savings of $2.5 million and a reduction of 161 military and 149 civilian personnel.

One-time cost to implement this action totals $2.56 million.

Mr. LONG. What savings and costs are associated with this

realinement ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Estimated annual savings are $2.494 million,

the one-time closure cost is $2.56 million, and the military construction

required is $1.131 million.

Mr. LONG. And what is the savings ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Savings annually-estimated at $2.494 mil-

lion, sir.

Mr. LONG. Is this a real savings? Have you taken into effect all of

the costs, including the costs of return on the money? I am always

puzzled by military estimates of savings, and wonder whether they

take into account the implicit cost to the Government of the interest on

the money they are putting into it, and appreciation of that ?


Admiral MARSCHALL. We didn't do a present value study on this.

Mr. LONG. I think all your savings data ought to have that. If

not, it is fallacious.

Admiral MARSCHALL. Again, sir, we normally would do this, but

this one happens to be part of the shore establishment realinement

program, the total of which has been shown to amortize itself in

approximately 21/2 years.

Mr. LONG. I would hope you would keep that in mind for the future.

Admiral MARSCHALL. We certainly try to do that in any of our

capital investments.

Mr. LONG. Will the two projects here complete the requirements?

Admiral MARSCHALL. These two projects are being studied at the

present time. We are looking for a better solution than the one we

have right now. I should think these studies would be completed

within the next few weeks.

Mr. LONG. What is the additional $2,046,000 you are requesting

in the out years?

Admiral MARSCHALL. That should be zero, Mr. Chairman. That

figure is in error, and we didn't get a chance to correct it previously.

Mr. LONG. You mean you are not asking for anything in the out


Admiral MARSCHALL. It depends on the studies. We really have no

figure to give you now. This particular figure we can't stand behind.

We should have taken it out of your book.

Mr. LONG. At this point, you -do not plan to request anything for

the out years ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Nothing at this time.


Mr. LONG. Why is it necessary to move the telephone switchboard ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Again this is part of the same study. We feel

this study we are conducting may very well prove that we should

leave the telephone switchboard where it is.


Mr. LONG. You are asking for bachelor enlisted quarters moderni-

zation at a cost of some $24.61 a square foot. Is this economical?

Admiral MARSCHALL Mr. Chairman, this is part of the same ongoing

study. We should be finished with it in about 3 weeks.

Mr. LONG. Provide for the record a breakdown of the enlisted per-

sonnel to be stationed here by activity.

Admiral MARSCHALL. We shall, sir.

[The information follows:]

The following is the enlisted strength projections for ships and activities in

the New York area supported by Naval Support Activity, Brooklyn.

Naval Support Activity, Brooklyn_____________________________ --- 109

DD-842 (Reserve) --------------------------------------------------____________________________ 176

DD-863 (Reserve) --------------------------------------------------________ 176

DD-829 (Reserve) -------------------------------------------------- 176

Naval Reserve Center, 3d Naval District______________________________ 178

MSO-430 (Reserve) -- ------------------------------------------------36

MSO-441 (Reserve) .....________ -------------------------------------------------- 36

AE-23 -------------------------------------------------------------.......296

Reserve centers (New York, New Jersey area) ------------------------- 136

Commander, Military 'Sea Lift Command, Atlantic---------------------- 35

Navy Band ---------------------------------------------------------- 30

Commander, Eastern Sea Front--------------------------------------- 13

Marine Inspection and Instruction Office, New York, New Jersey area--- 48

Navy/Marine Recruiting Office, New York------------------------ 51

Navy Special Services Administration, New York----------------------- 44

Fleet Post Office, New York------------------------------------------- 9

Headquarters, 3d Naval District-------------------------------------- 30

Director, 1st Marine Corp District --------------------------104

Commissary and exchange personnel ---------------------------------- 12

Officer selection teams-------------------------------------------- 8

Total ------------------------------------------------------- 1, 703


Mr. PATTEN. Next is the Fourth Naval District. Insert page I-18 in

the record.

[The page follows:]


[In thousands of dollars]

Installation and project

Authorization Appropriation

4th Naval District-State of Pennsylvania:

Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, Philadelphia (CNM):

P-502 Electronics equipment facility (217.10-62,000 SF)--------.. ----------- 735 735

P-501 Computer support facility (610.20-5,500 SF)-----------------------.. 180 180

Total.......-----------..................................------------------------------------------................ 915 915

Naval. Air Development Center, Warminster (CNM): P-120 primary substation

expansion (812.10-7,500 KV)-------------------------------------------. 215 215

Total, 4th Naval District.....------------.....--..-----................---------------------- 1, 130 1,130


Mr. PATTEN. Can you discuss the realinement of naval research

activities affecting the 4th Naval District?

Mr. MURPHY. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, would you repeat the

question please, sir?

Mr. PATTEN. This is the 4th Naval District. Can you discuss the

realinement of naval research activities affecting the 4th Naval


Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, we propose to relocate into the 4th

Naval District the Strategic Systems Navigation Office that was

previously discussed, which is now in Brooklyn. We propose to move

that into the Naval Air Development Center at Warminster. We

have plans also to move into the Naval Air Test Facility at Lakehurst

elements from the Naval Air Engineering Center in Philadelphia.

We propose to accomplish that over the next 2 years.

Mr. PATTEN. What construction will be required as a result of

these relocations?

Mr. MURPHY. At Warminster to receive the Navigations Systems

Office, Mr. Chairman, we don't anticipate a considerable amount of

construction. We feel we can .accommodate most of that move in

some existing facilities. A potential requirement for 20,000 square

feet of lab space is being studied. However, for the Naval Air Engi-


neering Center move, we will require extensive modernization and

alterations to the existing facilities there, including the large blimp

hangars that exist at Lakehurst. We plan to use those for industrial

facilities. A new engineering building will also be required. The fiscal

year 1975 Lakehurst Milcon program in this regard will approximate

-$6.2 million.

Mr. PATTEN. A lot of people like that area, such as Rockefeller

and others, so the Navy should like it.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.


Mr. PATrEN. What net savings do you project as the result of the

closure of the Naval Air Engineering Center?

Mr. MURPHY. We project annual savings, sir, of $14.944 million

for that closure.

Mr. PATTEN. What use do you expect to make of the existing facili-

ties at this location ?

Mr. MURPHY. Are you speaking of the facilities at Lakehurst? We

plan to modify the blimp hangars and other facilities to accommodate

some of this relocation.

Mr. PATTEN. Provide for the record the construction which will be


[The information follows:]

NAEC projects required at Lakehurst, fiscal year 1975


Engineering complex------------------------------------------------$8....... .3

Administration building----------------------------------------------0.8

GSE development center....... --------------------- --- --- _----__ 1. 6

Utilities -------------------------------------- 0.5

Total ---------------------------------------- ----- 6. 2


Mr. PATrEN. Naval Shipyard, Philadelphia, Pa. Put page 1-19 in

the record.

[The page follows:]

~3 11119111bi ~ i-----~-








Provide logisti support for assigned ships including PERSONAL STRENGTH CILIA OICER EN T OFICR ENLI CIILIA TOTAL

overhaul, conversion, repairs, alteration, and dry- (u (51 () ( (3) (() ( () (n5(u m

docking of surface ships (up to and including attack A2 2)

carriers) and diesel submrl.nes, surface new oonstru- . PLANEO(I dll 77 1 8 68 24 20 277".5-590

tion; support for weapons systems, air and anti-air , INVENTORY

wfarre; nly East Coast capability, public or ACRES LAND T TOTAL (

cial for production of large special war ship propel- LA.o 0A L " 0OT3 O I M EPROVEwT_(_0 TOTL__0__

lors. 828

Ma or Functions LEAs ,.o H EASiiEN7S 0 0 4*- .1

SConvers overhaul of surface ships and over- ..V..NTORY TOTAL s...PI , m U or.o SJUNO 1 5

haul of diesel submarines d. AUHORIZATION NOT YET IN I WC Y 17R



Inative Ship Maintenance Facility - GRAND TOTAL(. d.. O





217.10 ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT FACILITY SF 62,000 735 62,000 735

610.20 COMPUTER SUPPORT FACILITY I SF 5,500 180 5,500 180

TOTAL 915 915


-P -A


D D, -,, 390


This shipyard repairs and overhauls surface ships and diesel submarines.

The electronics equipment facility project will provide additional facilities

required to perform the restoration and refit of selected electronics components

for all east coast naval shipyards.

The computer support facility project will provide the facilities necessary to

relocate the NAVSHIPS Computer Applications Support Development Office to

this yard from the Boston Naval Shipyard.

Status of funds

Cumulative appropriations through fiscal year 1973 ------------- $36, 815, 000

Cumulative obligations, Dec. 31, 1972 (actual) ------------------- 26, 976, 652

Cumulative obligations, June 30, 1973 (estimated) -------------- 28, 258, 983


Project Design cost Percent complete

Apr. 1, 1973

Electronics equipment facility -----------------------------------..... $20,000 0

Computer support facility-----....................---------------------------------------- 8, 640 0


Mr. PATEN. According to figures provided the committee earlier,

your projected man-years for Philadelphia in the fiscal years 1975

through 1978 is 6.500. Is this your latest and best estimate?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Captain Ginn will answer that, sir.

Captain GINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. What number of man-years would be employed at

Philadelphia if this shipyard were fully utilized on a one-shift basis?

Probably 15,600 ?

Captain GINN. No, sir. The one-shift basis figure for Philadelphia

is around 9,000, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. That is for full utilization ?

Captain GINN. Yes, sir. That is optimum utilization.

Mr. PATTEN. We didn't 'ask optimum. We 'asked, if it was fully

utilized on a one-shift basis, what number of man-years would be em-


Captain GTNN. That is what we call optimum utilization.

[Discussion off the record.]

Captain GINN. The figure is close to 14,000, but I would have to re-

confirm that for the record.

[The information follows:]

The maximum shipyard size as used by the Navy is the manpower level to

which a navy shipyard can be workloaded on a one-shift 40-hour-a-week basis.

In the case of the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard the maximum shipyard size for

a new construction, conversion, overhaul, and repair workload mix is 15,800 men

per day on a single-shift, 5-day-week basis.

Mr. PATTEN. That is the presently projected workload. What would

be the optimum man-year level at Philadelphia for repair work only?

Captain GINN. About 9,500, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. At the presently projected workload, what percentage

of your man-years represents direct labor, and what percentage is

overhead ?

Captain GINN. I will have to furnish that for the record.

[The information follows:]

Based on the current workload projection of 7,250 employees per day for fiscal

year 1974, the production ratio for the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard is 50 percent

direct labor, 35 percent overhead, and 15 percent absences.

Mr. PATTEN. What would be the corresponding figures for direct

work force and overhead if the shipyard were working at optimum

utilization levels for new construction and repair?

Captain GINN. For both new construction and repair ? I would have

to supply that for the record.

[The information follows :1

Corresponding figures for the optimum Philadelphia Naval Shipyard size of

13,500 employees per day and a workload mix of new construction, conversion,

overhaul and repair would be 59 percent direct labor, 26 percent overhead and

i5 percent absences.

Mr. PATTEN. And then for repair only ?

Captain GINN. Yes, sir, I will supply that also.

[The information follows:]

Corresponding figures for the optimum Philadelphia Naval Shipyard size of

9,500 employees per day for an overhaul and repair workload mix only would

be 54 percent direct labor, 31 percent overhead and 15 percent absences.

Mr. PATTEN. What types of ships are you planning to overhaul

at Philadelphia ?

Captain GINN. Philadelphia performs work on aircraft carriers, on

DLG's and other ships of this type and size. They also work on diesel

submarines, as long as they are in the fleet.

Mr. PATTEN. I was in Philadelphia when you didn't have a rowboat.

Mr. McKAY. Are you phasing out the diesel subs ?

Captain GINN. The diesel subs are being phased out of the fleet,

yes, sir.

Mr. McKAY. When will the phaseout be complete ?

Mr. MURPHn: I can answer that. By 1978 all but a few that will be

used in special operations will have been phased out.

Mr. McKAY. What is a few ?

Mr. MURPHY. About four.

Mr. DAVIs. Does that mean you have never had or do not now have

capacity for handling nuclear vessels at Philadelphia ?

Captain GINN. That is correct, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. I think you have answered that. Provide a detailed

breakdown of your projected workload for the record.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Broken down between ships, components, et cetera.

Captain GINN. When you speak of components I assume you are

talking about major categories of commodities.

[The information follows:]

The projected workload for the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard for fiscal year

1974 is made up of the following work:

1. Completion of the conversion of two guided missile frigates.

2. The overhaul of seven surface ships: one guided missile cruiser (CG),

one guided missile destroyer (DLG), two guided missile frigates (DLG),

one escort ship (DE), one destroyer (DD), one storage ship (AF).

3. Several post construction ship availabilities (PSA).

4. Inactivation of one guided missile cruiser (CLG).

5. Overhaul of one conventional submarine for transfer to a foreign


6. Various refit and restoration programs in support of the fleet, manu-

facture of naval propellers and primary east coast foundry (approximately

400 men per day).

~ e~slrr~ l--T--


7. Unscheduled restricted availabilities in support of the fleet (approxi-

mately 80 men per day).


Mr. PATTEN. According to your criteria, how does Philadephia rate

in comparison to other east coat shipyards?

Captain GINN. As compared to what sir?

Mr. PATTEN. We are doing a lot of talking on the floor. Yesterday,

we heard a lot about Boston, Portsmouth, Norfolk.

Captain GINN. Philadelphia is one of the two east coast aircraft

carrier overhaul sites.

Mr. PATTEN. Can you make other comparisons ?

Captain GINN. You can compare at the various missions of the

yards, but as far as Philadelphia is concerned, it is unique and has

its own set of capabilities. It was created to satisfy certain strategic

and operational requirements of CNO such as being one of the two

east coast sites for carrier overhaul and, one of the three east coast

sites for complex electronics and weapon systems overhaul. It is the

principal propeller manufacturing activity for the Navy as well as

the principal east coast foundry.


Mr. PATTEN. Is there a possibility that space at the Naval Air

Engineering Center which is being vacated could be utilized for

the computer applications support development office which is trans-

ferring from Boston ?

Captain GINN. Yes, sir; and that is where we proposed to put it.

Mr. PATTEN. Would that eliminate the need for the $180,000 you are

requesting here ?

Captain GINN. No, sir. That money is to make the NAEC space

suitable for this application.

Mr. PATTEN. What are buildings 17, 713, and 19 at the shipyard

presently used for ?

Mr. NICHOLAS. The justifications sheet indicates that this is to

convert warehouse space to computer administration space. Was it

originally planned to locate this computer support facility at the

naval shipyard or at NAEC ?

Captain GINN. The naval shipyard, sir. At the time the project

was originally planned we knew nothing about property at NAEC

being available.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Will there be a reduction in cost ?

Captain GINN. No. We have already revised the project. It is a

standoff in cost.

Mr. PATTEN. What are buildings Nos. 17, 713, and 19 at the shipyard

presently used for?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. Electric shop functions, which are sched-

uled to move into the new electronics weapons precision facility. The

first increment will be completed about October 1973.

Mr. PATTEN. What had you planned to do with them ?

Captain GINN. They will be demolished, sir.


Mr. PATTE. The electronics equipment facility you are requesting

at a cost of $735,000 is one of the items which has been identified as

being due to base realinements. Is it required as the result of base

realinements ?

Captain GINN. Mr. Patten, during the hearings here on the 12th

we discussed that item. At that time I said there was a possibility of

it going to Portsmouth as a result of the sound survey. You asked me

to prepare an insert for the record if we knew where it would go before

these hearings ended. I have done so for the record of the 12th. The

sound survey has been completed and the site in Philadelphia was com-

pletely unsatisfactory. We cannot put the facility there. It has now

been determined that it will definitely go to Portsmouth. This will

mean that the project P-502 in Philadelphia is no longer required, and

a project for Portsmouth will have to be requested.


Mr. PATTEN. Next is Warminster, Pa., Naval Air Development Cen-

ter. Insert page I-22 in the record.

[The page follows:]









test, and evaluation of aeronautical systems and cam- (o m s (0 w n t) () (8)

ponents; and performs research and development in , .. DM 1972. 8 0 2 286 0 0

2vsfic - m ,ine, , rL -r 1979 93 316 2.278 0 0 6 0 14 2,7o7

Wior Activities Supported: I,. INVENTORY

1aval Air Facility LAND AREs LAND COST (0o) IMPROVEMENT (804) TOTAL (8000)

to < <(_ r0

O. 73 706 22 361

a .EA A ASN.nsT 16* - 1* _ 'N E 7N1.1,

C. INVENTORY TOTAL (S.0p IRId mrI) Au or sO o Jua 2,




II. GRAND TOTAL (* " d .+ + 0






N S I I I 5

812.10 PRIMAR SUBmTATION PA ON 78 KV 7,500 215 7,500 215

-D -1 - 2-5

fl V uen4h

- *Do ps90 *1- -

Page jg -22

n ,SID 7A3


This center conducts research, design, development, test, and evaluation of

aeronautical systems and components and performs research and development

in aviation medicine.

The primary substation expansion project will expand the existing primary

system to meet normal power usage growth and planned facilities construction

and improvements.

Status of funds

Cumulative appropriations through fiscal year 1973_____-________ $9, 226, 000

Cumulative obligations, Dec. 31, 1972 (actual) --------------------- 8, 866, 550

Cumulative obligations, June 30, 1973 (estimated) ----------------- 9, 018, 550


Percent complete

Project Design cost Apr. 1, 1973

Primary substation expansion-- -...-.............. .......................... $10,796 41


Mr. PATTEN. Can you describe the mission of this installation and

tell us if similar work is done at other Navy R. & D. facilities ?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, the work of this activity is predomi-

nantly on aeronautical systems. It differs from the station at Lakehurst

in that work here centers on aeronautical systems, the physiology of

the flight crews, aviation medicine the ability of the aircraft to stand

stress in flight. LAMPS program effort is centered at Warminster

Lakehurst concentrates on marrying an aircraft carrier to the air-

craft, involving test and development of arresting gear and the cata-

pult launching equipment. Warminster does not deal with that type

but deals solely with the aircraft, with the crew and the onboard



Mr. PATTEN. The project for expansion of the primary substation

has a low priority of 78. How urgent is this project ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Sir, we think all of these are urgent. These

projects have been distilled from many, many projects and it is a

judgment factor. Additionally we have an overload problem.

Mr. PATTEN. You think it is a co-favorite ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I think all of them are co-favorites, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. Provide for the record information on the increases in

load here. Show in what fiscal year you expect to exceed present ca-


[The information follows:]

The single electrical load of significant impact most recently added was the

Structural Environmental Simulation Facility in 1972. This facility consists of

banks of 240-volt quartz heat lamps which may be arranged in different arrays

and at varying distance from the test subject to produce desired temperatures on

the subject. This facility has varying power requirements related to tests being

run. High short period requirements are 8,000 kilovoltampere for a 12-second

period and 6,000 kilovoltampere for 5 minutes. The load requirement under con-

tinuous operation is 4,000 kilovoltampere.

Additional loads of recent origin which make the transformer capacity mar-

ginal occur from the need to provide enclosed areas in the main building to house

efforts related to specific new projects. One such requirement in 1972 is for the


LAMPS program. The power requirements for this space began at 40 kilovolt-

ampere and is now being increased by an additional 70 kilovoltampere for a

computer system to simulate aircraft. Load increases of this nature have added

10 percent per year to power requirements over the past 5 years with exception

of 1 year.

The present 10,000 kilovoltampere capacity transformer substation is inade-

quate now for peak transient loads imposed during equipment startups. The

present substation's capacity to meet daily continuous loads will be exceeded

by fiscal year 1975. This is predicated on a load of 6,600 kilovoltamperes experi-

enced in June 1973, which was reduced at that point in compliance with an

urgent request of the Philadelphia Electric Co. Based on past experience of a

6,800 kilovoltampere peak and knowledge of existing requirements the activity

estimates the June load would have peaked at a minimum of 7,000 kilovoltampere.

Increases in power requirements by the summer of 1974 will be 2,370 kilo-

voltamperes from the following sources :

Apron power units for P---------------------------------------- - 350

Additional hangar power-------------------------------------------- 200

New P-3C software development facility--------------------------- 50

Technical support center--------------------------------------------- 150

Tactical support center instruction facility-- --------------------------- 50

Dedicated aircraft programs (new generator development) ------------- 500

Naval strategic systems laboratory----------------------------------, 000

LAMPS facility------------------------------ ------ 70

Total ------------------------------------------------------- 2, 370

Additional increases anticipated for fiscal year 1975 total 700 kilovoltampere

from the following sources :

Requirements of new laboratories to be converted from shop space----..-- 500

Proposed dispensary------------------------------------------------- 200

Total --------------------------------------------------------700,

The above tabulated loads total through fiscal year 1975 as follows:

Current peak load------------------------------------------------ 7,000

Anticiptaed 12-month increase-------------------------------------- 2, 370

Fiscal year 1975 increase---- ----------------------------------------700

Fiscal year 1975 total --------------------------------------- 10, 070


Mr. PATTEN. Let's turn to our home base, Naval District, Washing-

ton, D.C. Insert in the record pages I-24 and 1-25.

[The pages follow:]



[In thousands of dollars]

Authori- Appropri-

Installation and project zation ation

Naval District, Washington, D.C.:

District of Columbia:

Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C. (ONR):

P-091 Acoustic research facility (310.26-46,200 SF)............ __ 740 740

P-180 Integrated electromagnetic test and analysis laboratory (310.34-

56,250 SF)...----------------------------------------------- 4, 655 4, 655

Total...--- ----------------------------------------------- 5,395 5, 395

State of Maryland:

Naval Academy, Annapolis (CNT): P-071 Maury Hall rehabilitation (171.10-

73,506 SF)....................--------------------------------------------..... 4, 334 4, 334

Naval Station, Annapolis (CNT): P-184 Bulkhead replacement (154.10 LS)_.- 1,080 1,080

National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda (BUMED):

P-033 Navy exchange retail store (740.01-36,370 SF).................. 1,764 1,764

P-046 Roads (851.10-15,000 SY).-----............................. 1,546 1, 546

Total.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,310 3, 310

Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda (BUMED): P-020A Environmen-

tal health effects laboratory (phase II) (310.88 LS)--....------------.---- 6, 372 6, 372

Naval Communication Station, Cheltenham (COMNAVCOMM) NRS Annapolis:

P-105 VLF antenna modifications (132.10 LS).............. . .. 1,300 1, 300

Naval Ordnance Station, Indian Head (CNM): P-236 Fire protection system

modifications (843.10 LS). .-.................................. . 1, 528 1, 528

Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River (CNM):

P-100 Electromagnetic propagation facility (310.24-8,370 SF) -....... 680 680

P-158 Electrical distribution system (812.10-7,500 kVA) .............. 560 560

Total ..-....................------------------ 1,240 1,240

Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak (CNM): P-003 Hypervelocity wind

tunnel (amendment Public Law 89-568, fiscal year 1967-authorized (3,847,-

000) (310.68 LS)..~.... 0 448

Naval Hospital Quantico (BUMED): P-006 Hospital alterations (510.10-2,424

SF)--------..... --...... ..---------------------- - --... 484 484

Total, Naval District, Washington, D.C --... _-. _--. -. . ..........- 25, 043 25, 491

Mr. PATTEN. Is it correct that none of the facilities requested here

are the result of the shore establishment realinement ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. That is correct.

Mr. PATTEN. Are any projects going to be required in this Naval

District as a result of these realinements?

Admiral MARSCHALL. NO, sir.


Mr. PATTEN. Provide for the record the progress made in the past

year in locating Navy activities out of Washington.

[The information follows:]


Activity and relocation site Military Civilian Total date

Naval Training Support Command: Pensacoa, Fla ............ 4 58 62 1973

Overseas Dependent School, Atlantic Office: Plmscola, Fla...... 0 15 15 1973

Inactive Ship Division: Portsmouth, Va.____-_________-- --_ 6 0 6 1973

Naval Personnel Research and Development Laboratory: I San

Diego, Calif -----...... . ..--------------------- 11 94 105 1973

Education Programs Division and NROTC/NJROTC Programs

Division: Pensacola, Fla ..--------------------------------- 11 -- 39 50 1973

Navy Manpower Support Unit: Norfolk, Va................----- 2- 5 7 1973

Naval Training Publications Detachment: Pensacola, Fla ......... 52 99 151 1974

Naval Experimental Diving Unit: Panama City, Fla............. 72 7 79 1974

Naval Reserve Personnel: New Orleans, La.......--------............. 30 99 129 1975

Total-.............................................--------------------------------------... 188 416 604 ............

L To be disestablished effective July 1, 1973; personnel to ba assigns to the Parsnnal R:sosr i alJ 33vlbp yslt Can-

ter, San Diego.

230 b

Continuing efforts are being made to reduce Navy space by consolidations and

further relocations. However, major emphasis during the past year has been

placed on the large Navy-wide realinement of forces and weapons systems as op-

posed to administrative-type facilities which predominate in the Washington

area. Additionally, and as stated by Mr. Sheridan before the committee, the

new top management of the Department of Defense has not yet had the op-

portunity to focus on this problem.

Mr. PATTEN. Can you tell us how many square feet of space will

be given up as the result of Navy activities being consolidated and re-

organized in the Washington region, but not relocated ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir. We will provide that for the record.

It is roughly 900,000.

[The information follows:]

A total of 950,000 square feet of space will be vacated as a result of consolida-

tion and reductions.

Mr. PATrEN. But not relocated ?

Admiral MARSOHALL. Not relocated. This is consolidation.

Mr. NIoHOLAs. Have these consolidations been announced ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. No, they have not been announced, Mr.

Nicholas. The plan is to do it within the next 2' or 3 years. As you know,

it is going to take time to move the various organizations. However,

there is a specific plan under way which will achieve Mr. Laird's

target for the Navy of approximately 900,000 square feet.

Mr. PATTrEN. What are the Navy's objectives in terms of reorganiza-

tion of administrative functions in Washington to reduce personnel

and office space ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. We have under way, at the present time, a

staff reduction of both military and civilian personnel of about 25

percent, Mr. Patten.

Mr. PATTEN. When do you expect to have more definite information

on this subject ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I think that by the end of fiscal year 1975 we

will have achieved this.

Mr. McKAY. We had some figures, I think a year ago, Mr. Chair-

man, which indicated the number of your people who were employed

in the Washington area. It was something around 85,000. Can some-

body enlighten me as to what those figures were ?

Mr. PATTEN. Are you talking just Navy ?

Mr. McKAY. Maybe this was total Defense Department.

Mr. PATTEN. I remember the figure. If you are talking about Vir-

ginia and the cost of Navy research-

Mr. NICHOLAS. This newspaper article says 82.000 military p -

sonnel and 91,000 civilian employees, a total of 174,000.

Mr. McKAY. How many employees does the Navy have in this area.?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Sir, I will have to provide that for the record.

I do not know offhand what the number is.

[The information follows:]

The Navy and Marine Corps have a combined total of 56,200 civilian and

military employee positions in the Washington area. As of March 31, 1973, there

were 38,400 civilian and contract employee positions and 17,800 military positions.

The number of positions is provided since this is fairly stable while the actual

number of employees on board would var.v daily.

Mr. McKAY. My question relates to the fact that you come in and

say "we are cutting 25 percent," and so on, by date X, but it seems

to me that, when we get through, we wind up with the same number

of employees year after year. We have shuffled missions or some other

ploy, and the Defense Department is still petitioning for a second

Pentagon. If we are reducing all this many personnel and shifting

these activities out into the regions and elsewhere, why do we still have

to keep pushing for more buildings ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I think probably that question came up on the

Defense Office Building and it was an attempt on the part of the

Department of Defense to consolidate activities to get out of leased

structures. In answer to your question about the real numbers, the real

numbers have been going down rather steadily and will continue to

go down through fiscal year 1975 for the Navy. I don't have figures

right at my fingertips, but, in my own organization, for example, in

the headquarters, I am losing or I have lost about 100 people this


Mr. MCKAY. Are these military or civilians?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Military and civilians, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. This is logistics ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. McKAY. Have they moved to other stations or is that a total


Admiral MARSCHALL. It is a total cut in the numbers. Navy-wide, for

example, I think I have lost something like 2,500 to 3,000 total, in a

small organization. We handle the construction and maintenance of

shore activities through various engineering field divisions and

public work centers. We have had a rather remarkable drop in just

the last year, and expect more, because the Navy is shrinking through

realinement and reducing bases. My total number will go down.

Mr. MCKAY. Your total number is nationwide ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Worldwide, really.

Mr. MCKAY. Or is that Washington ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. No, in the Washington Headquarters I have

685 people going down to 635. We have really made significant reduc-

tions, not paper reductions.

Mr. McKAY. I have this concern, because in this discussion we had

last year it came out that even after they consolidated in a proposed

new building, they would still have 25 leases, so even that wouldn't

meet their needs. Then you turn around and begin to see coming in

the back door more leasing space. That is Defense overall. I think

there is too much impaction in the Washington, D.C., area. This is out

of date. With our ability to communicate and our new facilities for

sending messages and all the rest, we ought to be able to diffuse to sev-

eral locations but it seems like everybody has to sit near the throne.


Mr. PATTEN. We will turn to the Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md.

Insert in the record page I-29.

[Page I-29 follows:]










Prepare young men morally, amntanlU ,and physically r) (s) I (s) r () ) () t ) r( ()

to be professional officers in the Naval Service. 'ASo 31December-7 377 41 2 12C 4, 00 0 0 0 6 7

&F LANo(Sd rY1977) 377 45 2 12C 4, 00 0 0 0 1og 6. 51



I ) (2) ( (n

a oWNo 1,194 5,89 115,302


. INVyNTORy TOTAL (BOICprI Indrl) AS OF 10 JUNE I1S 1..a'. l




d. GRAND TOTAL ( + d + a +






171.10 MAURY HALL REHABILITATION 6 SF 73,506 4,334 73,506 4,334

-" -" -

P[a,,". 1-29

DD, ,#390



The Academy prepares young men to be professional officers in the Naval


The Maury Hall rehabilitation project will correct existing deficiencies in

classrooms, laboratories, and training facilities needed for the expanded program

of the Weapons and Systems Engineering Department.

Status of funds

Cumulative appropriations through fiscal year 1973--------------$131, 036, 000

Cumulative obligations, Dec. 31, 1972 (actual) ------------------120, 060, 475

Cumulative obligations, June 30, 1973 (estimated) ----------- 126, 278, 323


Percent corn lete,

Project Design cost Apr. 1, 1973

Maury Hall rehabilitation---------------.............----.............------------..............------------ $255, 000 8

Mr. PATTEN. You are proposing to rehabilitate Maury Hall at a cost

of some $51.76 a square foot. What type of space are you providing

at this cost?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. We are providing academic space. The

large cost is due to the fact the interior of the building is quite anti-

quated. We are removing virtually all of the insides of the building

and modernizing it.

Mr. PATTEN. Can you give us some examples of the types of cur-

ricula which require this type of space?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. We are providing weapons and systems

engineering courses there.

Mr. PATTEN. Provide further details for the record.

Commander KIRKPATRICK. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]



1. Basic shipboard weapons and engineering courses for all first-year mid-


2. Electrical engineering systems.

3. Systems approach to design as applied to naval weapons systems.

4. Simulation and control of weapons systems using analog, digital, and

hybrid computer systems.

5. Laboratories for study of actual, modern hydraulic, and electrical control


6. Research programs in conjunction with the naval weapons laboratories.

Mr. PATTEN. Provide for the record the breakout of the space being

rehabilitated by function. Show what the costs are to rehabilitate the

current facilities for each type of space being provided.

Commander KIRKPATRICK. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

Type space Quantity (SF Cost

Classrooms.. ------------------ 17, 000 $850, 000

Laboratories -- --------------------------------------------------------- 12, 000 720, 000

Offices..---- -------------------------------------------------------- 17,000 935,000

Corridors ----------------------------------------------------------13, 000 615, OO

Mechanical room/heads..-------------.......---..........................................------------------------------------ 3,000 140, 00

All other-------.. --... --........----------------------------------------------- 11, 506 545, 00

Total.....-------------------------------------------------------- 73,506 3,805,000

Mr. PATTEN. What is the most expensive type of space you are pro-


Commander KIRKPATRICK. The laboratory type space would be the

most expensive.

Mr. PATTEN. What is the cost per square foot of this type of space?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. Mr. Chairman, we have not had our

architect-engineer breakout the cost by functional space. We can pro-

vide that for the record when we get it.

[The information follows:]

The cost of the laboratory space is approximately $60 per square foot.

Mr. PATTEN. What alternatives have you considered in the way of

providing this high-cost space in new construction or in other existing

facilities in lieu of rehabilitating Maury Hall at such a high cost?

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir, we have looked at the option of new construction

versus rehabilitation. One of the problems is that land is at a premium

at the Naval Academy. A second thing that makes rehabilitation of

Maury Hall the best alternative is its relationship to the new engineer-

ing building that is under construction and the other existing engineer-

ing spaces at the Academy.

Mr. PATTEN. Provide more details on that for the record.

[The information follows:]

At the Naval Academy provision of sites for the needed facilities becomes

a critical issue on a campus where land is in short supply and expansion is

limited by the Severn River and densely developed areas of Annapolis. To

provide the needed sites, the Navy is faced with three alternatives:

(1) Landfill of additional water areas.

(2) Acquisition of privately owned city land.

(3) Relocation of some existing facility.

In the resolution of the site problem, there are three restraints that limit the

range of possible alternatives.

(1) The midshipman's tight schedule allows only 7 minutes walking time

between regularly scheduled activities. Occasional activities (such as the Field

House, chapel or auditorium) can be only a few minutes further or about 12

minutes away.

(2) The availability of adequate sites is restricted by the absence of vacant

land, the historical significance or financial investment in existing facilities and

the time required to make sites available for a new use.

(3) The ability to relocate activities is limited by the cost of constructing new

facilities for them.

The optimum sites, therefore, are those with the following characteristics:

Within the "7-minute walking circle"-except for the auditorium, which

may be within the 12-minute circle.

Most efficient use of land: minimum landfill or acquisition, minimum

encroachment on athletic fields; minimum utilities extensions.

Availability when needed and with the least disruption and relocation

costs, including temporary relocations.

Opportunities to improve the functioning of the academic facilities, to

obtain multiple use of facilities, or to improve appearance of the Academy.

Opportunities for facilities to grow and change and adapt to the unfore-

seen future.

Under the Naval Academy modernization program the rehabilitation and use

of the existing Maury Hall offered the best overall solution for providing the

required facilities. No other existing facilities could be made available to provide

satisfactory space at a lower cost. New construction was not feasible due to the

land availability constraint and the high cost of new construction. Rehabilitation

at a unit cost of $51.76 per square foot represents a considerable savings over

the cost of new construction. For comparison, the fiscal year 1964-66 Science

Building was constructed at a unit cost of $39.70 per square foot. When adjusted

for building size and cost escalation this represents a comparable fiscal year 1974

unit cost of $84.50 per square foot. Similarly the engineering studies complex

authorized in fiscal year 1971-73 at an average unit cost of $66.33 per square foot

would represent a fiscal year 1974 unit cost of $87.10 per square foot when

adjusted for size and cost escalation.

Captain WATSON. I have a map here. This is Maury Hall. The en-

gineering laboratory is over here. The complex is here. There is very

little land to build a new building.

Mr. NICHOLAS. You are not providing any complex laboratory space

or ripping out floors in order to put in two-story lecture halls or this

type of thing. This is just a normal rehabilitation of the inside of the

building ?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. We do have a lecture hall in there.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Is it going to be extraordinarily expensive? Are you

going to be gutting the building ?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. The building is largely to be gutted.

Admiral MARSCHALL. Mr. Nicholas, I think you will remember over

the years we have had money appropriated by the Congress to increase

the landholdings of the Naval Academy. The land is at a complete

premium. With the athletic program and the drill program at the

Naval Academy we need quite a number of fields for both athletic

and drill purposes. Anything that requires any more land is really out

of the question.

We had a recent project, I guess within the last 3 years, to fill that

part of Dorsey Creek just to get more land available for the mid-


I'think in answer to your basic question we don't have a great deal

of choice here. It is a necessity.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Is this the type of space where there is no question

of being able to save money by providing some of this type of space in

a new building ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. NO, sir, I don't know of an alternative. I feel

we are in a corner here as far as what we do. We need certain types

of space to provide certain types of training, and with no more real

estate the alternative of a new building as opposed to rehab of an

old one just doesn't exist.

Mr. PATTEN. Are there esthetic or historical or sentimental rea-

sons for doing it this way ?

Admiral MARsCHALL. I think from the purely esthetic standpoint

you will find we keep the compatibility which has existed over the

years. As you know, when we presented our master plan some years

back, compatibility was the key to the master plan-to try to provide

an architectural theme and make it the showplace which it is.

Mr. PATrEN. Are there further questions on the Academy?

Mr. LONG. Last year the Navy estimated in fiscal year 1974 that

$3.137 million would be requested to modernize Maury Hall. Why is

$4.334 million now requested ?


Admiral MARSCHALL. Was this figure in our preliminary planning

Dr. Long? I am not familiar with the figure you refer to.

Mr. Loa. This was in the fiscal 1973 hearing record.

Admiral MARSCHALL. That was in the 5-year projection before we

did a preliminary cost estimate which revealed the true value of the

project. It has been engineered to some extent now, Dr. Long.

Mr. LONG. So this is merely a price change?

Admiral MARSCHALL. The same work, but we have estimated it

more carefully.

Mr. PATTEN. They upped it to $53 a square foot. ,

Mr. LONG. Last year the Navy estimated $4.9 million would be re-

quested in fiscal year 1974 for Luce Hall modernization.

Admiral MARSCHALL. We have deferred that item for this year.

Mr. LONG. What are your estimates for fiscal 1975?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. We hope to have the Luce Hall re-

habilitation in the program.


Mr. PATEN. We will turn to Naval Station, Annapolis, Md. Please

put page I-31 in the record.

[Page I-31 follows:]









a"Lo, 0 (EC 1972 22 907 48 0 0 7 194 28 1.206

.... ,orY 1979 22 ?07 48 0 0 7 194 28 126



(I) (I) () (

oRN..C o 257 1 6694 6,852

b. LEASES AND EAS.I E. 0 0 ) 0 0

C. INVyrNORT TrOTL (acp, IadI r ) AN ONJU. I7 6,852




. GRAND TOTAL (. + d + 1





154.1 A EAMEPRIORITY '--"1 ' 080 1,08

154.10 BULKHEAD REPLACEMENT 84 LS - 1,080 - 1,080

r% I%~ Fo i a/


Pge p_ I-31



This station supports the U.S. Naval Academy.

The bulkhead replacement project will replace a damaged bulkhead and

associated facilities used to protect and maintain 150 various types of small craft

used for training at the Academy.

Status of funds

Cumulative appropriations through fiscal year 1973----------------- $307, 000

Cumulative obligations, Dec. 31, 1972 (actual) ----------------------303, 576

Cumulative obligations, June 30, 1973 (estimated) ------------------ 303, 576


Design Percent complete,

Project cost Apr. 1, 1973

Bulkhead replacement- __-..... -................ - - - -- $51, 840 100

Mr. PATTEN. What is the requirement for bulkhead replacement


Captain WATSON. Mr. Chairman, the bulkhead has been collapsing

over the years, and with the storm Agnes a year ago it accelerated

the destruction of the bulkhead. The area was originally a seaplane

ramp and these pictures show how it is deteriorating. A pier extends

out from this bulkhead where the YP's the Naval Academy use are

moored. The docks are used for small boats. With the continued de-

terioration of the bulkhead the building on this seaplane ramp will

soon be undermined unless we keep backfilling, which is an interim

measure until the complete repair job is accomplished.

Mr. PATTEN. The Army Engineers could do that job for you.

You have given this a high priority of 84.

Admiral MARSCHALL. We have been making do by trying to fill in

behind this bulkhead.

Mr. PATTEN. What is the anticipated design and construction


Admiral MARSCHALL. The design was completed on February 2 of

1973, and we estimate that we will complete the job in 9 months.

Mr. PATTEN. IS this small craft function a long-term need at the

Academy ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir, it is.

Mr. PATTEN. Have you studied other less expensive ways to conduct

this training?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Mr. Chairman, this is sort of the guts of

going down to the sea in ships business. Without training in these

small craft we wouldn't have the naval instruction that we have

today. I think it is vital to the mission of the Naval Academy.

Mr. PATTEN. We will skip the medical facilities and come back

to them when we consider the medical facilities together.


Mr. PATTEN. We will turn to Naval Communications Station Wash-

ington, Cheltenham, Md., and insert page I-39 in the record.

[Page I-39 follows:]

\- ~ ~iV









Provide Fleet broadcasts, tactical ship-to-shore Nu ()o y ()A () I c, (n (m ra T

and point-to-point communications in support of the .. ao. 31DeOmbe r l J 51 48 0 0 0 57 0 0 59

Defense Communication System for surface ships and a PLANN.rm dr1977y 7 67 0 0 0 60 0 0 80

submarines operating in the Atlantic Ocean Area. I.. INVENTORY


(() (() (J

*o t. 1090 180 14,857


e. INv*NTORY TOTAL (RCAIPI INd.U .0 o so u. ,1 72i 107




_d GRAND TOTAL . + d + 0 ,





. ot NG P IO0RI T Y " . " "d (d i


132.10 VLF ANTENNA MODIFICATIONS I IS - 1,300 - 1,300


P.s.s I-39

DD, ,,C71390


This station provides very low-frequency broadcasts to submerged

submarines operating in the Atlantic area.

The VLF antenna modifications project will correct existing defi-

ciencies in the system which cause the current to arc over to ground,

thus drawing excessive current which could damage the transmitters.

A reduction in operating power, to prevent the arcing to ground lowers

the signal strength to an unacceptable level.

Status of fund

Cumulative appropriations through fiscal year 1973------------ --$5, 952, 000

Cumulative obligations, Dec. 31, 1972 (actual) -------------------- 5, 728, 149

Cumulative obligations, June 30, 1973 (estimated) ___-----__---- 5, 810, 149


Design Percent complete,

Project cost Apr. 1, 1973

VLF antenna modifications - ...... ........._....... .. $62, 400 100

Mr. PATTEN. Are the VLF antenna modifications proposed here to

correct a design defect in the original construction?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. In a sense it is to correct design defects.

We designed in accordance with current practice at the time. As you

know, this is a VLF tower, very low frequency. It is one of the first

of a kind. During the testing we found that the insulators cracked,

due to unexpected eclectronic properties. So they are having to be re-

designed and retested.

Admiral MARSCHALL. This was in the way of pushing the state of

the art, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PATTEN. Are you sure this project will correct the problems?

Admiral MARSCHALL. We feel right now that it will. We have had

some subsequent experience which we think will stand us in good



Mr. PATTEN. Insert page I-41 in the record.

[Page I-41 follows:]



19 M 1973







weapons systems, weapons or components. ( ) ( r I ( (( t) ( ) I ) 0r)

Ma!or Functions: ASP 31DEC197 75 23 2,545 24 134 0 0 0 3,017

Maintain and operate facilities for mixing, blending .PLANED ornd197 86 262 2289 24 134 0 0 0 275

casting and extruding chemicals, propellants and ' INVENTORY

explosives and for the assembly and test of rocket LAND ACRES LAND COST ( 000 IMPROVENENT (10) TOTAL (SN)

and missile motors (o I r( (0

Conduct research in propellants, explosives and re- osNEO 3 37 5 311 l5,748

lated fields, including producing pilot plant L.An AND.. S..UET 0 0 ) 0 0

quantities of new chemicals c NNTCORY TOTAL (SCPr A rI I.nES) Ae OF a JUNE _7

Repair, rework and modify Fleet returned guided d. AUTHoRIZATION NOT vYTI IN IvTORY

missile propulsion units *. AUTHORIZaTION nROUST Eo IRE T ,s PROARA 1,528

Provide laistic suovort for the Naval Exolosive . E T ATED AUTHORIZATION - NET A YEAR 10970

an e os alF ilt anf the Navelg School, d.GRAND TOTAL (S. I 102780





CODE . I (--)


- -


This station conducts research and development in the field of pro-

pellants, chemicals and explosives. Rework and modification of fleet

returned guided missile propulsion units is also performed at this


The fire protection system modifications project will increase the

capacity of the system and will provide treatment plants to reduce the

corrosiveness and turbidity of the water.

The corrosive water causes a chemical buildup in the piping system

which restricts water flow to and plugs deluge sprinkler nozzles in

propellant production facilities.

Status of funds

Cumulative appropriations through fiscal year 1973--------------- $20, 792, 000

Cumulative obligations, Dec. 31, 1972 (actual) ---- __------------ 10, 073, 015

Cumulative obligations, June 30, 1973 (estimated) -----_-------- 11, 389, 551


Design Percent complete,

Project cost Apr. 1, 1973

Fire protection system modifications ..-.. __....-........ . .............. $37, 000 17

Mr. PATTEN. Has the problem with the fire protection system been

known since early 1970? What are you doing to correct it at the

present time ?

Mr. MuRPHY. Mr. Chairman, we realized in 1970 some of the fire

protection devices were inoperative. This project will provide a

solution to the problem of the deteriorating system. In the interim

we have inaugurated some temporary measures of periodic inspection

and disassembly and cleanout of the sprinkler system. We would

anticipate being able to terminate that temporary measure when

this project provides in effect the clear water we are looking for for

the system.

Mr. PATTEN. Are there questions ?


Mr. PATTEN. We will turn to the Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent

River, Md., and insert page I-43 in the record.

[Page I-43 follows:]








Test and evaluate aircraft and weapon systems, com- PERSONNEL STRENGTH O PICER NSED CTLIA R EXISTS TOTAL

ponents, and related equipment for Fleet use. ( ro a ) o4 () () n)

Aor 97 3,3 2 -

Provide logistic and training support for assigned A PL6 36E2 1"p r 1977) '

Fleet squadrons. ,A. IN VE0 T i O R o 0


.Vor Activities Supported: LAND ACRS LAND cosr (o) IMPROVEMENT (300) TOTAL (*ON)

Test Pilot School re

Research Squadrons 66 1,01 12029 121 460

3Research Squadrons CD AED IE Sa T 23 * 0 4 - -

Integrated Logistics Support Center INvTORY TOTAL (sO ..,d-) o SC JNIN ) 0# 57

Naval Hospital ,. ,Nv,. olr ToI, rS'l Id m) 1 o, ,o , ,, 2121.507

Reserve HoTraspining Unit 68 . AUoNIATION NOT T IN I.NTORY 959


Naval Air Reserve Training Detachment . ESTIATEO AUU ORIZATION -N A .EAR,240

4 GRAND TOTAL (.c , + *







812.10 ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 66 KV 7,500 560 7,500 560

TOTAL 1,240 1,240

lt rFoES I j ----

t , SC-

as paS "I.



This center tests and evaluates aircraft and weapons systems, components,

and related equipment for fleet use and supports two research squadrons, the

test pilot school, and a naval hospital.

The electromagnetic propagation facility project will provide a facility free

from electronic interference adjacent to an extensive water surface for electro-

magnetic propagation studies on avionics systems. It will replace existing sub-

standard dispersed buildings currently used for these studies which do not

provide a suitable environment for the sensitive and expensive electronic gear

used in the studies.

The electrical distribution system project will correct current deficiencies

which resulted in 79 power outages over the last couple of years, and provide

additional transformer capacity to meet the power demand of new testing equip-

ment and facilities.

Status of funds

Cumulative appropriations through fiscal year 1973-------------- $20, 998,000

Cumulative obligations, Dec. 31, 1972 (actual) __________________ 14, 597, 285

Cumulative obligations, June 30, 1973 (estimated) ---------------- 18, 114, 421


Design Percent complete

Project cost Apr. 1, 1973

Electromagnetic propagation facility-...- --....-....-.. .............. $34, 499 52

Electrical distribution system . ..---------------------------... 10, 000 31


Mr. PATTEN. What functions are being relocated in and out of

NATC, Patuxent River ?

Mr. MURPHY. The patrol squadrons have been migrating out of

Patuxent River to Jacksonville and Brunswick for about 3 years now,

Mr. Chairman. The last squadron will transfer to Jacksonville this

year. That is one action. Under the SER announcement, we are moving

into Patuxent River a research and development squadron from Key

West, Fla. Essentially those are the main moves going on as the on-

going mission of development continues.

Mr. PATTEN. Can you provide the costs and savings associated with

these moves for the record ?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

Naval Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 1 (VX-1) with 348 military per-

sonnel and 14 aircraft, will relocate to NATC Patuxent River, Md., from NAS

Key West, Fla. This move complements other moves into NAS Key West which

result in significant savings. VX-1 is more closely alined with the basic test and

evaluation mission of the Patuxent River facility, where existing excess facility

capacity is available. Facilities freed up at NAS Key West by the move out of

VX-1 will be available for support of A-5 reconnaissance squadrons displaced by

the closure of NAS Albany, Ga.

Savings associated with the VX-1 move to Patuxent River are in reality

the savings generated by closure of NAS Albany, since the Albany units will be

accommodated (in part) in the former VX-1 facilities at NAS Key West. The

annual savings from closure of NAS Albany are $3.986 million. One time

relocation costs from Albany are $4,023 million. MILOON required at NAS Key

West is as follows, all in the urgent minor construction category :


P-261-Alterations to building A-994--Elect reconnaissance photo----- $221, 000

P-263--AIMD shops expansion-------------------------------- 300, 000

P-266--Training space alterations .----------------------------- 204, 000

P-265 (tentative)--Carrier deck lighting simulation------------- 80, 000

Total MILCON ---------------------------------------805, 000

MILOON required at NATC Patuxent River for VX-1 is as follows, all in the

urgent minor construction category :

P-252-Alterations to buildings 305/301------------------------- $229, 000

P-255--Sonics computer laboratory----------------------------- 284, 000

P-254-Training building------------------------------------ 237, 000

Total MILCON----- ----------------------------------750, 000

P-8 squadron relocations from Patuwent River

The relocation of four P-3 squadrons from Patuxent River to Jacksonville, and

two P-3 squadrons from Patuxent River to Brunswick, Maine, was approved by

SECDEF in June 1970. All squadron moves are complete, except for the training

squadron, VP-30, which remains at Patuxent River pending completion of the

new training facility at Jacksonville, approved in the fiscal year 1973 military

construction legislation. Costs associated with the P-3 squadron relocations are:

A. One-time moving costs for personal household goods, equip-

ment ----------- -----------------------------------$1, 544, 000


Fiscal year:

1970-Patuxent River, parking apron (cancel)--------- (-1, 219, 000)

1972-Jacksonville aircraft maintenance hangar/apron 3, 262, 000

1972-Jacksonville BEQ (partial) -------------------- 2, 346, 000

1972-Jacksonville BOQ (partial) -------------------- 1, 322, 000

1973-Jacksonville training building------------------ 3, 676, 000

1974-Brunswick DIFAR trainer--------------------- 135, 000

Costs (P-3 squadrons) ---------------------------11, 066, 000

Savings associated are as follows :

1-time Annual

A. Single-site, all P-3C aircraft ..----------...... ---................--.. $8, 000,000 .........

B. Colocate RAG w/Jax squadrons for transition.......................... 378,000 .........

C. Per diem and travel for RAG students.... ..........___ ... ....__........- ........... $500, 000

Savings (P-3 squadrons) __ .... ...... . ..... ...... ...... 8, 378, 000 500, 000


Mr. PATTEN. How do the test functions carried out at the Naval Air

Test Center, Patuxent River, differ from those carried out at Lake-

hurst or at China Lake, Calif.? Is there any duplication of function or

of facilities between these activities ?

Mr. MunPHY. First, Mr. Chairman, with regard to Lakehurst and

Patuxent River, we think a most concise statement would be at Lake-

hurst we marry the ship to the airplane and at Patuxent River we

marry the airplane to the ship. Patuxent River is concerned principally

with the aircraft itself, its ability to perform in flight, be arrested

and make a carrier landing. The test and inspection and survey process

on all new aircraft is conducted at Patuxent River. Lakehurst is fully

equipped with catapults and arresting gear systems to test that air-

craft's ability to land on a ship's deck. Patuxent River also serves as

host to the Navy's test pilot school.

Mr. OBEY. Could I ask you to run that by me once more.

Mr. MURPHY. At Lakehurst we have an extensive installation of car-

rier deck catapult systems with which we can launch an aircraft as

though it were launched from a carrier at sea. At Lakehurst we also

have extensive arresting gear installations where we can propel sleds

of lead or steel at high speed and arrest them, simulating the equip-

ments' ability to arrest the aircraft.

Patuxent River concerns itself with the airborne element entirely,

and its ability to perform in flight and operate from a carrier. Evalu-

ation of the ability of the aircraft to communicate, as supported by

one of these projects at Patuxent River in this year's MILCON


Mr. OBEY. If you are relating them to each other, why don't you do

them at the same place ?

Mr. MURPHY. I think the principal reason is that over the years at

Lakehurst we have developed an extensive facility base. These launch-

ers and arresting gear installations are tremendous in length and are

in effect runways unto themselves. Relocation of that to another loca-

tion would be very complex and costly.

Mr. McKAY. You still have me confused. One is the plane to the

ship and the other is the ship to the plane. One is launching and one

is landing.

Mr. MURPHY. The ship has to have its hardware to 'launch aircraft

and accomplish the landing as the aircraft approaches the deck and

engages the arresting gear. The testing of that arresting gear, using

predominantly sled dummies, the testing of the vvire, the testing of the

entire pay-out system is performed at Lakehurst. Entire catapult sys-

tems are in place at Lakehurst. Patuxent River is entirely a flying

operation, the capability of the aircraft when it is airborne to perform

its mission, not only to land on a carrier but to communicate with the

ground and perform to the specifications for the aircraft.

Mr. McKAY. Are they both test facilities ?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

Mr. McKAY. And not training facilities?

Mr. MURPHY. It is completely in the area of test, development and

evaluation, of new systems.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. McKAY. In the total testing somewhere they have to be joined

together. You are going to have both of those systems on the same ship

when you go to sea. Is that right?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I think what he explained, as I see it, is that

you are testing aircraft at Patuxent; testing their performance, com-

munications and weapons systems, all functions that take place in the

air. At Lakehurst we have a huge complex consisting of a runway,

which I think is about 10,000 feet. and all of the arresting gear and

catapult facilities. I think we tested for ourselves the first catapult.

Lakehurst is more oriented towards ship hardware as opposed to the

aircraft itself.

Mr. McKAY. At some point those two have to come together. You

don't operate the carrier in isolation from the airplane. They are the

two things you are trying to put together. Is that right ?

Mr. MURPHY. We have the ability at Lakehurst when we feel we are

ready to arrest the aircraft that Patuxent River has pronounced fit for

a landing so that we can go to Lakehurst and perform an arrested

landing, but the operations are distinct and separated and have been.

%-- --I-- 1 I I1"ll

Admiral MARSCHALL. Until that point in time.

Mr. MURPHY. At China Lake you have none of this type of evalua-

tion, neither the arresting capability or the capability of the ship.

China Lake is an air weapons development and test facility where the

aircraft, with the availability of a huge range some 60 miles in dimen-

sion, can come in and fire its weapons system and we can evaluate and

score the performance of the aircraft to confirm it is really doing the

purpose created for, which is essentially to fight.

Mr. McKAY. You have said you have two segments of testing, both

of which finally have to end up on a ship. But you have separated them

competely in testing and analysis. Is that right ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir. I think that if we were able to go to a

single place and perform all of these functions in the same locale it

would be wonderful. Over the years we didn't have the luxury of doing

this, and these separate areas grew up. Not at China Lake so much

because that is a different kind of research, but primarily Lakehurst

and Patuxent.

I think from any operator's standpoint it would be great to have

them together. At the time the test function grew up at Lakehurst we

still had blimps operating out of Lakehurst and we had real estate and

a place to put the test function. If we were able to go back and put them

all together, I think we would.

Mr. PATrEN. Embellish this for the record.

[The information follows:]

The Naval Air Test Facility (NATF) Lakehurst and the Naval Air Test Cen-

ter (NATC), Patuxent River have distinct, not overlapping missions. They are:

NATF-Conduct tests and evaluation of launching, recovery, and visual land-

ing aids systems and related equipment; and to provide test sites, facilities, and

support services for developmental tests of ship installations equipment.

NATC-To conduct tests and evaluation of aircraft and aircraft weapon sys-

tems, their components and related equipment to determine technical suitability

and suitability for service use. To maintain the excellence of the Navy's total

aviation test program by managing the Test Pilot School.

In essence NATF tests and evaluates the launch and recovery equipments which

make the operation of aircraft from ships feasible, while NATC tests and evalu-

ates aircraft and everything that goes with them, i.e., ground support equipment,

communications systems, gun fire control systems, weapon delivery systems,

navigation systems, etc.

To carry out these missions, each base has installed specific equipment and

has requirements which are unique. NATF has a C-13 catapult system; non-

aviation ship (as differentiated from carrier) simulation facilities; and re-

covery systems test tracks. NATC has extensively instrumented test ranges over

land and over water which require a very large airspace reservation unavailable

at NATF. NATC's mission could not be performed at NATF because of restricted

airspace and inadequate available land for installation of required instrumenta-

tion to permit data collection from operations over land or water.

To move NATF to NATC would necessitate duplication of large, fixed installa-

tions which cannot be economically moved, plus construction of laboratory and

office buildings which are not currently available at NATC. Such a move would

likewise involve a second relocation of the Naval Air Engineering Center. which

is currently being consolidated into NATF from Philadelphia, an action imple-

mented by the Navy in the continuing efforts to consolidate activities to improve

management, effect cost reduction, and facilitate operations.

For all of the foregoing reasons, and based on an in-dept study of consolidation

feasibility conducted by the Naval Air Systems Command in January and Feb-

ruary of this year, consolidation of NATC/NATF is not economically justifiable

and would seriously impair the performance of the unique functions involved



Mr. PATTEN. You .are requesting an electromagnetic propagation

facility in the amount of $680,000. You give this a priority of 70 in the

bottom 20 percent of the program. What type of construction are the

present facilities ?

Mr. MURPHY. We now use four separate buildings for this function

and they total 7,300 square feet. Three of them were built in the 1941-

55 period. The two constructed in 1944 are wood frame and are lacking

in the necessary environmental controls that we need for this type of


Mr. PATTEN. Did you say where they are located ?

Mr. MURPHY. There are four separate buildings separated by 2 miles


Mr. PATTEN. What use will you make of these buildings if you get

the new facilities ?

Mr. MURPHY. The two buildings that are not wood frame that are

more or less permanent are not suitable for antenna work due to loca-

tion, however we can retain them for other administrative and some

other test functions. The two wood frame buildings we will have to

demolish because they are so substandard.

Mr. NICHOLAs. How hard have you really looked at the necessity of

building this electromagnetic propagation facility ? Our investigative

staff report indicates there are four laboratory antenna facilities that

do antenna research. At one laboratory there is an antenna model

range, microwave antenna pattern range complex, and antenna test

area. At another laboratory there is a 320 foot antenna range, and

there is an outdoor modeling antenna facility at another location.

Have you really looked at whether you need all of these facilities before

proposing to build another antenna facility ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Are we talking about the same function here,

Mr. Nicholas ?

Mr. NICHOLAS. I don't know.

Mr. MURPHY. This facility is complementary to facilities at Pa-

tuxent River overall. Let's consider the F-14 when it goes into survey

trials. There are many operations that Patuxent River would perform.

Indeed last year's program provided a data analysis facility for this

installation to obtain in-flight data on the ground. At the same time

that that aircraft is put up for an evaluation of some of the specifica-

tions, this facility compliments that by testing its ability to receive

the communication signals, the antenna system mounted on various

parts of the aircraft. Antenna test work here is complementary to the

overall mission. We feel Patuxent River is the place to do it, to accom-

plish both evaluations simultaneously.

Mr. PATTEN. I think it is clear it has no relationship to the job

at Lakehurst.

Mr. MURPHY. That is correct.

Mr. PATTEN. Will the functions transferring here from NAEC,

Philadelphia have any effect on the requirement for this project or

its scope?

Mr. MURPHY. No, sir. In fact, the Navy is now proposing that most

of the NAEC relocation will go into Lakehurst. The principal incom-

ing element here is a research and development squadron from Key




Mr. PATTEN. Is the same true of the electrical distribution system?

Mr. MURPHY. The electrical distribution system is related in part

to the arrival of this new squadron but relates mainly to a buildup

over the years. We have had considerable military construction at

Patuxent River since 1972 which is greatly taxing our present dis-

tribution system. This project opens up, if you will, an entire new

area of the base to a proper electrical distribution capability.

Mr. PATrrN. Provide for the record data on the growth of elec-

trical power requirements in the southeast area of the station.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]


Commercial power is now fed to the Naval Air Test Center through a single

high voltage line which terminates in the northern area of the base. To reach

the growing Weapons System Test (WST) Area in the southeast area of the base,

power must flow from this primary terminal point over long secondary lines.

This results in severe voltage drop, up to 8%, as the load in the southeast

area grows. This is critical as each 1% voltage drop causes a 3% decrease in

efficiency of lamrs, electron tubes, and motors. Motor burn-out are a severe

problem due to this voltage drop. An engineering study by electrical consul-

tants recommends the solution proposed in this project, that is to construct

a new, high voltage primary feeder from a commercial line near the southeast

area of the base directly in to the center of WST area, thereby providing a

second, more effective power source. This will eliminate the long secondary

power runs. The initial transformer capacity of 7,500 KVA will be expandable

for future growth. The high voltage transmission line will be constructed

with ample built-in capacity for this future growth.

Recent new construction at Patuxent River, plus currently proposed pro-

gramming, is listed below to indicate the growth situation causing power problems.


FY 72 Heating Plant Expansion 170

FY 72 Replace Theatre 635

FY 72 (UMC) Jet Engine Test Cell 296

FY 72 (EMERG) SES Facility 1,870

FY 72 Family Housing 856

FY 73 Acft Data Analysis 2,529 WST Area

FY 73 BEQ 2,100

FY 73 Galley 285

FY 73 Training Bldg. 1,680

FY 74 Electromagnetic Prop. Fac 680 WST Area

FY 75 Test Pilot School 1,548

Other load growth is associated with steady expansion of new weapons systems

testing programs in existing facilities in the WST area.

-- T 1 [



Mr. PATTEN. We will turn to Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White

Oak, Md. Insert page 1-46 in the record.

[Page I-46 follows:]










Technology, concepts and systems. (u (. . (I (4) () (.) () (a) ()

SPLANEDO ( 975 ) 16 2 260 0 i



AOWNED 7 7 41.227 41.55

. LEAse ANo EAsUENs * - o */R - 8* - 89

C. INVENTORY TOTAL (B AcUp eI I rlnt) AS Or JUNE I _2 41.6




. GRAND TOTAL (c + d + .*





j S




D DI ' 390

PCE w I -46


.... U,


This laboratory develops new and improved explosives for underwater- and

surface-launched weapon systems.

The hypervelocity wind tunnel project was originally authorized and funded

in fiscal year 1967. The prime contractor defaulted on four procurement con-

tracts. Additional authorization and appropriations are required for award of

a procurement contract for the mqdel test section, which is needed to provide

a complete and usable facility.

Status of funds

Cumulative appropriations through fiscal year 1973________-_____ $72, 783, 000

Cumulative obligations, Dec. 31, 1972 (actual) ------______-___--72, 191, 494

Cumulative obligations, June 30, 1972 (estimated) -----_____---- _ 72, 410, 494


Percent complete,

Project Design cost Apr. 1, 1973

Hy ervelocity wind tunnel......... . . ... . . ................ ....... (1) (1)

I Nat available.

Mr. PATTEN. Can you explain the legal situation here ? Is this project

still required ?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. We have just recently advised the staff,

sir, that the legal situation has clarified considerably. At one time

we could not obtain a court order to clear the necessary equipment from

the contractor's plant and it appeared there would be no way to obtain

that equipment from the contractor's plant. In just recent weeks we

have been able to obtain the equipment from the defaulted contractor.

The equipment is in good condition, much better condition than we

expected, and we feel we can proceed without this amount.

Mr. PATTEN. Is this project still required ?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. No, sir, it is not.

Mr. PATTEN. We will omit the naval hospital at Quantico for the



Mr. PATTEN. Let's turn to the Fifth Naval District. Mr. Reporter,

put pages I-50 to I-52 in the record.

[The pages follow:]



[In thousands of dollars]

Installation and Project Authorization Appropriation

5th Naval District-State of Virginia:

Fleet Combat Direction Systems Training Center, Atlantic, Dam Neck (CNT):

P-829 Academic training building (171.10-9,100 SF) ---------------------- 572 572

P-999 Applied instruction building (171.20-112,409 SF) 5,959 5,959

Total-----------..-------......................--------------------------------- 6, 531 6, 531

Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek (LANTFLT):

P-213 Electronics building (217.10-3,281 SF) ......-----------------------------..139 139

P-194 Dispensary and dental clinic (550.10--44,132 SF) .-------------------- 3,211 3,211

Total.............. . . ..-.. -------------------. . ............... 3,350 3,350

Naval Air Station, Norfolk (LANTFLT): P-517 Helicopter maintenance hanger

(211.05-73,642 SF) ---....-------------.. ------------------------------- 2, 525 2, 525

Naval Station, Norfolk (LANTFLT):

P-373 Berthing pier (151.20-2,800 Feet Berthing) ------------------------ 9,624 9,624

P-697 Relocate fleet landing (159.40 LS)._-------------------------------- 803 803

P-889 Pier 2 dredging (165.10-151,000 CY) ...._.....-.-.-.. . 314 314

P-725 Enlisted men's dining facility modernization (723.10-30,300 SF) ..... 1,435 1,435

P-372 Pier utilities (812.90 LS).......------------------------------------- 2,057 2,057

P-025 Vehicle parking area (852.10-52,500 SY)....--------------------------- 310 310

P-999 Applied instruction building (171.20-74,500 SF)....-------------------- 3,950 3,950

Total...... ... .. ---------. .. .. ..... .... ....... . . . . . 18, 493 18, 493

Navy Public Works Center, Norfolk (CNM): P-901 Electrical distribution system

(5th increment) (812.30 LS) _........... 567 567

Nuclear Weapons Training Group, Atlantic, Norfolk (LANTFLT): P-413 Nuclear

training building (171.20-47,500 SF) ......----------------------------------- 2, 470 2, 470

Naval Air Station, Oceana (LANTFLT):

P-243 Aircraft systems training buildings (171.20-68,409 SF) --------------- 3,386 3,386

P-623 Utilities (822.22 LS) --..-. --... --..-.-..._...-- 576 576

Total ........-----------------------------------------------...------.... 3,962 3,962

Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth (CNM):

P-212 Machine shop (213.49 LS).....------------------------------------ 4,066 4,066

P-134 Bachelor enlisted quarters (722.10-516 MN, 81,012 SF). ------------- 2,624 2,624

P-002 Enlisted men's dining facility (723.10-13,696 SF) -------------------- 1,111 1,111

P-221 Utilities improvements (5th increment) (812.30 LS) ------------------ 3,332 3,332

Total __ _......-................... . ... ..................... 11,133 11,133

Nbval Weapons Station, Yorktown (CNM): P-329 Torpedo overhaul shop (216.40-

13,400 SF)1 ----------------- 1,327 1,327

Total, 5th Naval District.....----------------...----------... ----------------- 50, 358 50, 358

I See classified book for requirement statement.


Mr. PATTEN. Which of the projects requested in the program for the

Fifth Naval District this year are requested as a result of the shore

establishment realinements ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. In 1974 we have an applied instruction build-

ing at the Fleet Combat Direction Systems Training Center, Dam

Neck, Va. We have a helicopter maintenance hangar at the Naval Air

Station, Norfolk, Va. We have a relocation of the fleet landing, dredg-

ing of the south side of Pier 2, a vehicle parking area, and an applied

instruction building all at the Naval Station, Norfolk, Va.

Mr. PATTEN. What amount of construction will be required in the

Fifth Naval District in future years as a result of these actions?

Admiral MARSCHALL. At Dam Neck in 1975 we plan to have proj-

ects for bachelor enlisted and bachelor officer quarters.

At the Naval Air Station, Norfolk, we plan to have a runway and

i -

parking apron project and at the Naval Station, Norfolk, a fleet op-

erations staff facility and BEQ modernization.

Mr. NICHOLAs. And nothing at the naval shipyard ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. No. At the moment we don't think so.

Mr. PATTEN. Provide more details for the record.

[The information follows:]

The following shore establishment realinement (SER) related projects are

currently planned for the fiscal year 1975 Milcon program for the Fifth Naval

District :


Activity and project thousandsa)

FCDSTC Dam Neck-Bachelor officers quarters---------------------- $1, 685

FCDSTC Dam Neck-Bachelor enlisted quarters---------------------- 1, 095

NAS Norfolk-Runway--------------- ------------------------------1, 530

NAS Norfolk-Parking apron 1--------------------------------------, 364

NS Norfolk-Fleet staff operations facility 1----------------------------, 214

NS Norfolk-BEQ modernization---------------------- ..--------------. 2, 680

NSY Norfolk-None ........ ....---------------------

No SER related projects are presently planned beyond fiscal year 1975.


Mr. PATTEN. With regard to military personnel, which installations

in this naval district will have the largest increases?

Admiral MARSCHALL. The naval station will have the largest

increase, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. Where will they come from?

Captain WATSON. They will mainly come from Newport. The people

gained will be at the fleet sonar school from Key West. The ships at the

naval station will bring in another large group of 8,000 enlisted

Commander KIRKPATRICK. 8,006 enlisted, 496 officers which are

connected with the Newport and Key West moves.

Mr. NICHOLAS. How about the naval air station ?

Mr. MURPHY. At Norfolk Naval Air Station, we are relocating heli-

copter squardrons from Lakehurst. This would bring one helicopter

squadron of approximately 80 officers and 300 enlisted men. At the

same time, however, we will commision a new squadron similar to that

from scratch, if you will, at Norfolk, further increasing the load.


Mr. PATTEN. How are you planning to provide the necessary bachelor

and family housing for the personnel being relocated to this region ?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. The bachelors not living aboard ship

will be housed in the previously mentioned facilities at Norfolk and

Dam Neck.

Mr. PATTEN. What will be the net increase in bachelor and family

housing units required ?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. Our family housing unit increase would

be in the neighborhood of 4,000. That does not necessarily mean it

would 'all come out of the family housing construction program. We

will be looking to the community for a portion of that. It would mean

an additional 4,000 requirement for enlisted, and for officers it would

be about 441-a total of about 4,500 families additional in the area to

be housed by the community or the family housing construction


21-007 (Pt. 3)1 - 79 -- 17

Mr. PATTEN. Provide more detail for the record.

Commander KIRKPATRICK. Yes.

[The information follows:]

Bachelor personnel reassigned to the Norfolk area who live aboard ships will

continue to do so. The increase in bachelor personnel not living aboard ships is

1,249 and will be absorbed by the planned facilities at Norfolk and Dam Neck.

The net increase of Navy family housing units required by the realinement is


Captain REED. Our housing deficit will be 2,793 families after they

all shake down. We do have an increase of about 4,000, as the com-

mander says, but they will not cause an increase in our program with

a deficit of that magnitude.

Mr. PATTEN. How much will it cost to provide the necessary hous-

ing and community support facilities to support these additional

personnel ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. We would like to supply that for the record.

[The information follows:]

The cost for bachelor housing is estimated at $3,775,000. If the community is

unable to absorb the additional requirement for family housing, and it is deter-

mined necessary to construct units to meet the total deficit, the cost would be

approximately $57 million. It is envisioned, however, that the majority of this

deficit will be accommodated by increased community support. The Navy will

continue to review the availability of family housing support from the com-

munity in an effort to minimize new construction under the military construc-

tion family housing program. We do not anticipate the need for any other type of

community support facilities to support the additional personnel.

Mr. PATTEN. How about rule of thumb ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. As Captain Reed pointed out, the addition of

4,500 families doesn't mean we have to build for 4,500 families because

we use community assets where possible.

Mr. PATTEN. Have all of these costs been taken into account in your

estimates of costs and savings resulting from these realinements?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir.

Commander KIRKPATRICK. We don't anticipate any significant in-

crease in personnel support facilities connected with the move into the

Norfolk area other than the family housing, which we expect to be

largely accommodated by the community over the long haul.


Mr. PATTEN. IS there a danger from overconcentration of Navy ac-

tivities in the Norfolk area ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. I am sure there is a danger of concentration

anywhere. The matter of concentration was considered in the shore

realinement and was given a weight and the other factors outweighed


Mr. PATTEN. After the realinements have been completed, would

the Atlantic Fleet be unable to operate for a sustained period if some

man-made or natural disaster were to eliminate Norfolk as a support


Admiral MARSCHALL. I think probably if the ships were out they

could operate from other ports. If the ships were in and a disaster oc-

curred and we lost the ships, we would be in a bad fix.

Mr. PATTEN. You have 80 ships right now. Would you say how many

are in and how many are out ?

_r EsPI

Admiral MARSCHALL. Captain Watson has the figures.

Captain WATSON. Out of the 80 ships home ported, the maximum

we have in port would be 50 ships or 49.2 ships at one time on a week-

end. That is what our planning factors show.

Mr. PATTEN. Are you pulling them all in as an economy measure to

save oil in this crisis ?

Captain WATSON. We have more ships in port at certain times than

others. If, for example, the Navy operating funds run low we may

tie up the ships. For planning purposes these are the figures we used,

figuring deployments ships in normal operation and ships in over-

haul. Statistics show that over the years for 80 ships home ported at

Norfolk, 50 ships would be in port on a weekend.


Mr. PATTEN. We have two cars in our family. We sold my wife's car

and don't use it anymore after listening to the pleas on the power

crisis. I didn't get in my car Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, nor

today. Normally I would be in and out of it everyday coming to work

and the like.

You know there are millions of people who will follow if the leaders

will tell them what they want done. I don't think we have asked the

American people in this power crisis to cooperate strongly enough as

a patriotic duty.

You are too young to know but we had two gallons of gas a week in

World War II and we were happy to cooperate. They say if you drive

15 miles less we will solve gasoline shortages in the District. I know a

lot of people who haven't used their car this week in trying to help.

I have faith our people will cooperate if we tell them what we want,

if the leaders of the government will tell them.

I don't want to ask you a direct question because you fellows are

logistics, but I bet overall in the service there are many people like

minded and I bet there have been a few less test flights and a few less

maneuverings lately in order to help.

Admiral MARSCHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. Without making a big song and dance about it. That

would be my natural reaction if I were in charge of Lakehurst or any

other place. I would try to cut down a little bit. The American people

are expected to go to smaller cars and get more mileage. If the statistics

they are. giving public are true, it will take very little if we all coop-

erate and cutting down 15 percent is nothing. That is no problem for


I put 50,000 miles a year on my Cadillac running back and forth to

New Jersey once or twice a week, 400 an some miles each time, and

running around all weekend. Several times in April and May I have

cut my gasoline bill in half. I know others who are doing it too.

Most everybody has two cars. So this is a little sacrifice and a simple

adjustment. I think in the services there must be many who are co-

operating to this extent.

In answer to the last question, when you think of Pearl Harbor and

you think of other situations in the past history, it makes you think

about Norfolk.


There will be a lot of questions and objections on the floor. In that

light the best job you can do for the record will help us on the floor

because you are going to have many questions. We have had a sample

of it.

Are there questions on Norfolk ?



Mr. PATTEN. We will turn to Fleet Combat Direction Systems

Training Center, Atlantic, Dam Neck, Va., and insert page I-53 in

the record.

[Page I-53 follows:]

~C~F~S9511ICC r~-r~ ~L~-------










specified tactical combat direction and control (r ) ( r4 () r ( (5> I

systems in Naval Warfare, and support operational AsOF 3Decemboer 213 1 327 222 177 1 055 0 129 0 1

cumanders in evaluation, development and analysis a LAN.Eor~(r 77) 277 1,776 269 292 1.805 0 75 0 4Q4

of Naval Warfare doctrines and tactics. IS. INVENTORY


.. o.. 1 1 7 .654 1- 72


C. INVENTORY TOTAL (Ese Nt Im.d m) A OF s JUN 3372




. GRAND TOTAL (C* d t * + 0





(5500) (8055)

a *PRIORITY " ____

171.10 ACADEMIC TRAINING BUILDING 7g SF 9,100 572 9,100 572

171.20 APPLIED INSTRUCTION BUILDING / SF 112,09 5,959 112,409 5,959

TOTAL 6,531 6,531


DD, ;Oo1390

PEW N. 1-53


VA., $6,531,000

This center provides naval warfare training for fleet personnel to develop

and perfect their skills by the actual operation of tactical command direction

systems in a realistic warfare environment.

The applied instruction building project will provide facilities to support

Combat Information Center and carrier air traffic control training to be relocated

from the Naval Air Station, Glynco, Ga.

The academic training building project will provide academic instruction

space to support courses whose applied training is being conducted in a nearby

multipurpose building. Several new areas of training coupled with projected

increases in student loading requires the provision of additional academic

training space.

Status of funds

Cumulative appropriations through fiscal year 1973-------------- $34, 486,000

Cumulative obligations, Dec. 31, 1972 (actual) ------------------34, 485, 757

Cumulative obligations, June 30, 1973 (estimated) ----------------34, 485, 757


Percent complete

Project Design cost Apr. 1, 1973

Applied instruction building-------------------------------.... 528 6,030 1

Academic training building ....................................... ..... . 9,600 19


Mr. PATTEN. What are the costs and savings of relocating functions

here from Naval Air Station, Glynco ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. The estimated annual savings, sir, are $9,260,-

000. The one time closure cost will be $21.111 million.

Mr. PATTEN. Provide us details for the record

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

The costs and savings associated with the closure of NAS Glynco, Ga., are as

follows :


Estimated annual savings $---------------------------------------- 9. 260

One-time closure costs-------------------------------------------- 21. 111

Military construction avoided -------------------------------------- 11. 609

Military construction required :

Fiscal year 1974 --------------------------------------------- 10.437

Fiscal year 1975------- ....--------------------------------------- 9. 500

Of the total military construction required in fiscal years 1974 and 1975,

$8,739,000 is for construction of facilities at FCDSTC Dam Neck, Va.

Mr. PATTEN. What functions are being moved here, and how will

they affect the training facilities required?

Mr. TAYLOR. The combat information center training from Glynco

is being relocated to this activity. It involves some 442 military posi-

tions and an onboard student loading of approximately 118 personnel.


Mr. PArrEN. Will the 112,409 square foot applied instruction build-

ing, which you are requesting in the amount of $5,959,000, complete

the requirements for training spaces for these functions?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir, it will.


Mr. PATTEN. How much training space did these activities occupy

at Glynco ?

Mr. TAYLOR. 126,281 square feet.

Mr. PATTEN. Provide for the record the training load, past, present,

and future, for the courses which will be located at Dam Neck.

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]


1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

Students (average onboard)---............ 361 272 475 506 531 520 600


Mr. PATTEN. You are also requesting an academic training build-

ing for $572,000 which has a priority of 7373. How are you currently

conducting this academic training ?

Mr. TAYLOR. This academic training is currently conducted in an

applied training building. An applied training building is designed

primarily for mockups of weapons systems. We are receiving a new

surface ship antisubmarine warfare attack trainer which requires the

space we are presently using in the applied training facility. There-

fore, when we install this new training device, we will have no place

to conduct the academic training.

Mr. PATTEN. Should not the provision of some 112,409 square feet

of applied instruction space in the other project reduce the pressure

to move academic training out of the existing applied training spaces

which it now occupies?

Mr. TAYLOR. No, sir. As a matter of fact, even before the relocation of

the combat information center training, Dam Neck had a serious

deficit in both academic and applied training space.

Mr. PATTEN. Could you give us more detail for the record ?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]


Academic Applied

(square feet) (square feet)

Before CIC training:

Requirement .................-----------------------------------------------------28, 300 209, 550

Existing adequate .................-------------------------------------------------- 1,744 95, 880

Deficit .. .. .....---------------------------------------------------------26, 556 113, 670

After CIC training:

Requirement (additional)..------------------------------------------------ 0 112,409

Deficit....--------------------------------------------------------- 26, 556 226, 079

Mr. PATTEN. It wouldn't hurt to put this off for a year, of course.

Mr. TAYLOR. It sure would.


Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I notice on page I-54 you mentioned,

in connection with the academic training building, your use of vinyl

|'1_ [111

asbestos floor tile. I am curious as to whether or not you have run

into any flak about the use of asbestos tile from a health standpoint ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. No, sir. I think, and I am sure Captain Ginn

can elaborate more on this, the problem we have had with the asbestos

is the working of the asbestos on large jobs. One of the shipyards

had a great problem with respect to asbestos dust.

Mr. OBEY. I understand that, but the reason I ask this is because

we had some testimony from NIH on my other subcommittee which

indicated that there may exist hazards from use of the asbestos tile

which becomes scuffed and releases particles into the air. I expressed

my surprise at the time.

Admiral MARSCHALL. I express my surprise, too, because I have

never heard of this before.

Mr. OBEY. I hadn't either and wondered if you had.

Admiral MARSCHALL. NO, sir. We have had an industrial asbestos

dust problem that we have been trying to combat in these locations,

but nothing else.

Mr. PATTEN. You know the head of our union died due to asbestos

inhalation. I introduced the first asbestos bill in the Congress for

him at the request of a doctor in New York. This past year it has

blossomed out and now NIH and all are making a big effort of the

question of air vents and ducts and things like that. That is well

established. But they are going further.

Admiral MARSCHALL. We will certainly look into this, Mr. Obey.

It is a complete surprise to me.

Mr. OBEY. I was curious if anyone had raised it in your shop. As

I say, I used to work with asbestos tile myself and I was surprised

to hear that even the stuff sitting on the floor was considered by

some to be a potential hazard if it wasn't kept freshly waxed.

Admiral MARSCHALL. We will try to find out some more information

just for our own use.

[The information follows:]

The question of vinyl asbestos floor tile being a potential health hazard has

been researched and the following information is provided :

(a) No Navy or DOD design criteria indicates vinyl asbestos floor tile (VAT)

as being a health hazard.

(b) Clean room criteria does not ban VAT; however, vinyl sheet flooring

is preferred.

(c) VAT is used in most naval hospital administrative patient care and

general-purpose areas but not in operating-type rooms.

(d) No mention is made of VAT as a potential health hazard in the Occupa-

tional Safety and Health Act, Public Law 91-596.

(e) Navy and commercial construction material specialists consulted have

not heard of a problem and could not foresee this type of floor creating a health

hazard if properly applied.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. PATTEN. Are there other questions?


Mr. PATTEN. We will take up Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek,

Va., and insert page I-56 in the record.

[Page I-56 follows:]









ve logistic support, facilities ad other support PERSONAL STREET OFIC ELTED CIVILIAN oR NLI.TE OPICE ST c A TOTAL

as required to local comns, organizations, units, ( (S) () (S (U) (1) U) ()

amphibious ships and coeands of the Operating Forces . 31 December1 1166 1 0 1

in order to met the amphibious training requirements .. ra l ) 1 8;1 1632 228 1 416 120

of the rNvy, Marine Corpe, Ary and Air Force and per- II. NVENTORY

foam such other functions as my be directed by

ca uetent authority. AES A COST (u00) IMPROVEMENT (o) TOTAL (O )

or Activities Soupported . oWN 7 09

Comader, Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet b. LEAE AND EAsSNEY - O* -

aval Inshore Warftre Comand . INVNyOR TOTAL ( sSE la.dI) AS or so JUNE IS

Amphibious Operational Training Unit, Atlantic e. AUTHORIZATION NOTYET S INVI.TOR.

Naval Amphibious School . AUTHORIZ.AIOU REOUSTEuDIS ISo.......

Amphibious Construction Battalion Two, Eastern S.u.TIMAT. AurToizA.. - SrR VAT.I 2 9179

Area Amphibious Training . GRAND TOTAL s.. o108055





17.10 ELECTRONICS BUILDIIG 85 SF 3,281 139 3,281 139

50.10 DISPEWART AND DERAL CLIIC I S 44,132 3.21 44,132 3.2

TOTAL 3,350 3,350

/ IIC EuS 433,000 FOR POaLwrPTON Annu

D, I ,1390

PEW -56


This base supports the headquarters, Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force, Am-

phibious School, Inshore Warfare Command, and is the homeport of 35 Atlantic

Fleet ships.

The electronics building project will provide an electronics maintenance shop

to furnish communications support to harbor control, security, training, and

administrative functions.

The dispensary and dental clinic project will provide a new clinic to replace

the existing inadequately sized, dilapidated, and poorly located facility.

Status of funds

Cumulative appropriations through fiscal year 1973_ $-------------57, 996, 000

Cumulative obligations, Dec. 31, 1972 (actual) ------------------- 52, 968, 525

Cumulative obligations, June 30, 1973 (estimated) ----------------53, 701, 591


Percent complete,

Project Design cost Apr. 1, 1973

Electronics building.....-------- .....-........... ...............-- $5,000 10

Dispensary and dental clinic........-........._- ...................... 45, 000 4


Mr. PATTEN. What is the status of prior year projects at this instal-


Admiral MARSCHALL. To date there are two uncompleted projects

at the naval amphibious base. The bachelor enlisted quarters in the

1971 program is now 60-percent complete, ,and the land acquisition in

the 1972 program is not consummated.

We have three projects in the 1973 program which have not yet

started. Two of them are to be .awarded in July with completion in

December 1974, and one of the requirements has been canceled.

Mr. NICHOLAS. The 1973 project ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir, the messhall.


Mr. PATTEN. It would 'appear from your briefing on the shore estab-

lishment realinement that the number of 'amphibious ships is declining

rather markedly. Provide for the record the number and types of

amphibious ships which are expected to be based at this installation

through fiscal year 1978. Also show what ships have been located

here in fiscal years 1964, 1968, and 1973.

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

_ _C _I



































64 68 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78

2 2 2 2 2

4 4 4 4 4

7 7 7 5 4

1 1 1

3 3

12 11 7 6 6

18 18 14 11 10

4 4

4 4

1 1

3 3


55 54 35 32 30

3 3 3 3 3

TAGM 1 1 1 1 1

TAGS 1 1 1 1 1

60 59 39 37 35

Projected home-port data is classified. Data has been furnished separately to the

Committee staff.

Mr. PATTEN. In view of these reductions, do you still need the

electrical improvements and land acquisition which were provided in

previous years?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Yes, sir, we do.

Mr. PATTEN. Will you still need the BOQ ?

Commander KIRKPATRICK. That was in the 1971 program and is

still required.

Mr. PATTEN. As you shift to lesser numbers of larger amphibious

ships in later years, will Little Creek remain a viable base for these


Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. The amphibious force is

declining. However, we have come down in the case of landing ship

tanks, LST's, to 10 large new high speed ships that will be assigned

to Little Creek as part of the Atlantic Fleet. They are a very sophis-

ticated ship and will be there over the long term. Also landing ship

docks, LSD's, all new construction, will be located at Little Creek. So

we have a hardcore amphibious loading here.

Mr. PATTEN. And the larger LPH's ?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. Are they located there too ?

Mr. MURPHY. No, sir. Traditionally they have to go to the Norfolk

Base piers. There is only 20 feet draft in Little Creek.

Mr. PATTEN. As you go to larger and larger ships is there going to

be less of a requirement?

Mr. MURPHY. No, sir. In the case of LST's, we are already using the

larger ship and it has been constructed for a shallow draft by nature

of its function. So the LSD's and LST's have Little Creek as a home

port for the long term.

Mr. PATTEN. Do you need more than 20 foot draft ?

Mr. MURPHY. For the LPH, which is practically an aircraft carrier

in size we draw 32 feet. They have to berth at the Norfolk waterfront.

Admiral MARSCHALL. They provide for the vertical deployment of

helicopters and are not truly amphibious.


Mr. PATTEN. You rate the electronics building at a rather low prior-

ity of 85. What are you currently using?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, we are now using a building of ap-

proximately this size. However, in addition to being substandard for

the function, it is being displaced by the construction of a new build-

ing. This building is going up now well within 3 feet of the walls of

the present building, and for fire protection reasons and other reasons

we have to demolish it and in effect leave them without a facility.

Mr. PATTEN. What are you currently using?

Mr. MURPHY. We are using this building that is jeopardized by

the construction of a new building adjacent to it.

Mr. PATTEN. What type of equipment are you maintaining here?

Mr. MURPHY. It is essentially radio equipment, the mobile radio

equipment that the amphibious force needs for controlling ships in the

Little Creek Harbor and in amphibious operations which we practice

here, landings, coordinating landing craft with beach operations. Es-

sentially it is mobile communications equipment.



Mr. PATTEN. Provide for the record the outyear projects at this


[The information follows:]



PY Cat. code Project description (thousands)

75 151.20 Extension to Piers 12-15 ... ----------------------------------------------- $1,120

75 165. 10 Dredging Little Creek Channel-------------------------..-------------------- 896

75 610. 10 Command control and administration building..................................---------------------------------- 2,034

75 821.50 Steam plant boiler addition.....................................................-----------------------------------------------.. 904

75 832.10 Ship wastewater collection ashore..........................................--------------------------------------..... 1,171

Total----.....................................-------------------------------------........................----------------. 6, 125

UP 141.55 Ordnance disposal group facility-----......--------....--....---.............................-------------------------. 2, 193

UP 171.20 LFTC vehicle training facility----------.....----.......---..---------------------------------.................................... 306

UP 179.55 Combat swimmer operations trainer.-------...---------------------------------..................................... 1,070

UP 213.54 AMSU maintenance facility------....-----................................----------------------------------- 3, 873

UP 213.75 NAVSPECWARGRU facility 1st increment-----...----........................----------------------------. 2,715

UP 213.75 NAVSPECWARGRU facility 2d increment-----...............---------------....--------............---------.... 1,030

UP 213.75 NAVSPECWARGRU facility 3d increment-------......-----......-------------------------.............................. 2,478

UP 431.10 Dry/cold provision storage.----------------------------------------------- 1,204

UP 141.83 SERVRON 8 facility --------...---...--.....................................------------------------------------ 2,209

UP 722.11 Modn of IUWG II barracks/AC...........................................-----------------------------------------..... 110

UP 740.76 Library ------------------------------------------------------------- 289

UP 740.60 Officers club 2d increment.......................................................-----------------------------------------------. 730

Total----------------.....................------------........................----------------------------.... 18, 207

Mr. PATTEN. We stand adjourned until Tuesday at 10 a.m.

TUESDAY, JUNE 26, 1973.


Mr. SIKES. The committee will come to order.

Admiral Etter, we are happy to have you here this morning to

present the Navy's fiscal year 1974 request for the medical facilities

modernization and to discuss with us the Navy's overall program for

modernization of its medical facilities.

We are particularly interested in the modernization program and

in the new developments which are in progress. We are appreciative

of the good work that you are doing and have done through the years.

We are grateful for your help to this committee. We expect you to

take full advantage of your supporting witnesses when, questions are

asked which require their assistance.


Tell us how much the Navy is requesting to modernize and replace

its medical facilities.

Admiral MARSCHALL. In this area for the next 5 years the figures are

as follows: Fiscal year 1975, $161.7 million. Fiscal year 1976, $177.1

million. Fiscal year 1,977, $144.3 million. Fiscal year 1978, $111.2

million. Fiscal year 1979, $38.3 million, for a total of $632.6 million.

Mr. SIKES. How much is requested for fiscal year 1974?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Fiscal year 1974, sir, is about $65 million in

pure medical facilities with a total of $77.4 million in the entire

medical improvement program.

Mr. SixEs. What did you have in fiscal year 1973 ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. That was $36,230,000.

Mr. SIKES. Is this a realistic picture that you have given us for

the future in view of the fact that the prior programs have been much

smaller than that which you project ?

Admiral ETTER. Mr. Chairman, I think it is a realistic program

when it is looked at in the context of the present plan for the All-

Volunteer Force and the things that we must do to give our physicians

modern facilities in which to practice medicine.


Mr. SIKES. What is your current deficit in medical facilities, and

what do you expect it to be at the end of the 5-year period ?

[The information follows:]

The current deficit in medical facilities is $597.6 million. The Navy expects to

eliminate this total deficit at the end of the 5-year period if funds are provided

in accordance with the annual requests described above.

Mr. SIKES. What type of facilities represent the larger portion of

this deficit, major hospital centers, base hospitals, dispensaries, dental

facilities ? Where are you going? Where is your principal problem?

Admiral ETTER. If we look at it from the standpoint of the dollars

attached to the programs, it naturally falls in the major hospital

centers and base hospitals. On the other hand, if you look at the

numbers of different areas to be considered, it would also be the

dispensaries and dental facilities because there are obviously many

more of those than base hospitals. The big dollar value is attached to

our centers and base hospitals.


Mr. SIRES. Does this indicate there has been a gradual obsolescence

in Navy medical facilities over the years which you feel must now be

overcome by modernization ?

Admiral ETTER. There definitely has been obsolescence over the

past years. Many of these were built in the mid-1940's and even

earlier so that it is just time. They are tired, worn out, they are not

equipped with modern equipment, and we have to get on with the

program of replacing them or modernizing them.


Mr. SIKES. Tell us something about the manner in which Navy

health care delivery is organized and discuss any significant changes

that have occurred recently or that are scheduled.

Admiral E r ER. The biggest change that has taken place in deliv-

ery of Navy medicine has happened over the past 2 years with the

development of the concept of regionalization. Under this concept all

major hospitals in any area are the supporting structure for the sur-

rounding dispensaries so that you have support from the director of

the regional center reaching down to the .dispensary level. You can

have a much better distribution of patient load, of staff, and also of


Up to the development of this concept, as you know, Mr. Chairman,

the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery was only the major claimant,

or responsible for or commanded only the naval hospitals and medical

centers and three area dispensaries. These were in the neighborhood

of 38. With this new plan we have now brought from the other major

claimants, dispensaries, under the command and supervision of the

Surgeon General. With this plan we have now established 27 regions,

including 151 medical facilities attached thereto. We have about 61

dispensaries in relatively isolated places that have not been regional-

ized to date but the plans are to regionalize them. When this happens,

then all medical care and treatment facilities will be under the cog-

nizance of the Surgeon General.

We hope by this method to have achieved economy of operations

and more uniform distribution of health care.

Mr. SIKES. At the base or naval complex level, do you prefer to have

one centralized medical facility or a series of dispensaries and dental

clinics which deliver health care to each locality in the complex?

Admiral ETTER. We prefer to have the centralized facility, sir. To

give you an example of what will happen in the-

Mr. SIKES. Is that realistic in view of the gas shortage, et cetera ?

Would it make it difficult for people to get to a centralized facility ?

Admiral ETTrR. I am thinking of centralization here only from the

management standpoint, not from the standpoint of the abolition

or closing of smaller ones. We definitely would like to close some

marginal ones, but this is not in our present plans. I would like, if I

could, to give you an illustration of how this regionalization would


Take the Bethesda complex for a moment. As of the 1st of August

the Bethesda Regional Medical Center will include not only what is

presently at the compound at Bethesda and all the component com-

mands, but also under its umbrella, if you will, will include the hos-

pitals of Annapolis, Quantico, and Patuxent River and the scattered

dispensaries in the area, including the naval regional medical clinic

in Washington, and those at White Oak and around the metropolitan

area. Under this concept the commanding officer of Bethesda then

will be responsible for the day-to-day operation of all of these satel-

lite activities.

Mr. SIKES. In which areas has the Navy set up regional health care

delivery as it has in the Norfolk area ?

Admiral ETTER. A total to date of 27, sir.

Mr. SIKES. Is this a significant change?

Admiral ErrER. It is extremely significant, as I attempted to out-

line in my previous answer. It is, primarily a management concept. I

feel it is a significant change. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIKES. Are you satisfied with the way it is working?

Admiral ETrER. Yes, but certainly changes can and should be made.

As with any new system, it has to work a while to get the bugs ironed

out. I am not saying everything is completely satisfactory as yet, but

approaching that.


Mr. SIKES. You stress management, but what about the patients?

Admiral ErIER. I am stressing management from the standpoint

of the patients' welfare first and foremost. With a centralized man-

agement and ability to distribute resources equitably where the pa-

tient load is, you automatically improve the lot for the patients.

Mr. SIKES. Except for availability. I come back to the problem of

availability. Some of these bases are quite large and scattered in sev-

eral different localities. Does that not cause some problems with

accessibility ?

Admiral ETTER. In the areas that are currently regionalized, Mr.

Chairman, the care is just as accessible as it ever was. We hope it is

more accessible.


Mr. SIKES. Are there certain medical facility requirements which

tend to be identified with certain types of populations or base missions?

Do you need a different mix of facilities to support a training complex

than to support a fleet base ?

Admiral ETrER. There are major differences, Mr. Chairman. In each

one of our training centers we have established a recruit dispensary,

which takes care of the short-term illnesses of the recruits, getting them

back to duty in the most expeditious manner. These particular recruit

facilities can be analogous to the infirmaries attached to some of our,

or the majority of our major universities where students can be

treated for up to 4 or 5 or 6 days and then returned. For any major ill-

nesses., however, or any complications they must be transferred to the

base hospital where the equipment is better, the staff is more in depth.

At the recruit dispensaries we primarily are manned by general medi-

cal officers for short-term upper respiratory illnesses and these kinds of


Mr. SIKES. I note that you are requesting facilities at several of your

training bases. Can you provide for the record data on the size and type

of populations you are supporting at these training bases and the type

of medical workload which is generated at training installations as

compared to some of your other naval complexes.

[The information follows:]


Fiscal year

Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Ill.: 1978

Average recruit population_____------------------------ ---------- 6, 914

Average Navy/Marine Corps population, other_______------------ _ 7, 735

Naval Training Center, Orlando, Fla.:

Average recruit population __________ ------------------- 4,361

Average Navy/Marine Corps population, other________________ -----1, 609

Naval Training Center, San Diego, Calif.:

Average recruit population-_-_____ 6, 552

Average Navy/Marine Corps population, other____________ooo_ 6, 461

Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, Calif.:

Average recruit population ....____ 6, 200

Average Navy/Marine Corps population, other____________________ 9, 500

Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, S.C.:

Average recruit population_____ 6, 400

Average Navy/Marine Corps population, other_____________________ 8,300




1. Recruit screening examinations-conducted on all recruits reporting to naval

training centers and Marine Corps recruit depots. This examination is accom-

plished at a separate medical/dental processing facility and is required to detect

physical and mental defects or active communicable and infectious disease proc-

esses which may not have been detected at time of enlistment or occurred prior

to reporting to recruit camp. It also insures that required laboratory tests, chest

X-rays, or other indicated tests are accomplished for cases where facilities were

not available at the original examining activity.

2. Recruit populations, in contradistinction to the populations at other naval

complexes, have historically experienced epidemics of short-term illnesses (such

as upper respiratory infections). Such short-term illnesses can be adequately

treated at a recruit dispensary, thereby eliminating the need to admit these

patients to a hospital with its sophisticated equipment, facilities, and personnel.

By admitting these patients to a recruit dispensary for short periods, there is less

disruption to the recruit training cycle.

Admission rates of recruits are generally much higher than for nonrecruits,

despite the fact that recruits are a relatively small group, rarely accounting for

more than 5 percent of the total naval strength. The following table represents

incidence rates per 1,000 average strength for recruits and nonrecruits:


Diagnostic class Recruits nonrecruits

All diseases and conditions . . ..... .. . ...... . ........ ... . .. 638.8 245.0

Diseases - - - 542.9 156.7

Injuries ..... ..... .......-----------------------... --........... -... .. 95. 9 88. 3

The high morbidity rate among recruits results from a variety of factors.

Exposure of recruits for the first time to new strains of respiratory disease

bacteria that form a "military pool" contributes to a higher incidence of upper

respiratory infections and other communicable diseases. However, following

development of immunity seasoning, the active duty man or woman experiences

relatively few incidences of hospitalization due to respiratory or communicable

diseases for the remainder of their careers. Other contributing factors leading

to a high morbidity rate among recruits include skin infections from the break-

ing in of new clothing, particularly boots; and increased accidents and diseases of

the bones and muscles due to the strenuous physical conditioning that is a part

of the recruits training. Another significant factor that tends to increase recruit

morbidity is the encouragement given to recruits to report even small com-

plaints to physicians and hospital corpsmen. This increases the probability that

some significant morbidity will be diagnosed that otherwise might be overlooked.

The opportunities for recruits to disclose this information are far more numerous

than those for nonrecruits, due to the extensive and repetitive screening re-

cruits undergo in order to insure that those individuals with preexisting physical

defects and disabilities are culled out of the service before serious problems


Variations in rates among the training centers are basically similar to regional

and city variations in disease rates, especially those of respiratory diseases, in

the population at large. There are also variations due to administrative differ-

ences, such as recruits excused from duty (sick in quarters), proximity of

quarters to nearest medical facility, and the methods used to report the incidence

rates of hospital admissions.


Mr. SIKES. Tell us about the Navy's success in the recruitment and

retention of medical personnel.

Admiral ETTER. I can tell you about some of our efforts. Our success

at the moment is a little difficult to forecast. In the All-Volunteer

21-007 (Pt. 3) 0 - 73 -- 18


Force we do have problems. Up to now we have relied on the Berry

plan, which has been stimulated by the draft environment, of course.

With the lack of the draft, the incentives for the Berry plan and other

plans for young doctors to come in the service will be gone. In an

attempt to remedy the situation the hospital modernization and re-

placement program is one of the methods that we hope to use to in-

crease the attractiveness of a service career.

Mr. SIgES. Are you about to build more medical facilities than you

can staff under the 5-year program you outlined ?

Admiral ETTER. NO, sir. I would hope not. It is difficult to forecast

what is going to be downstream here for the next few years. For

example, we still have an adequate number of Berry plan physicians

who have 2 years obligated service to get us over this year and help

in the following year. It is following the loss of these that we are

going to have problems. At this particular time we hope to have our

scholarship programs turning out physicians in increasing numbers,

and hopefully this will add a considerable number to the system.


Mr. SINES. Tell us about the new family practice training program

you are setting up.

Admiral ETTER. Mr. Chairman, the family practice training pro-

grams are designed to produce a more sophisticated type of general

medical officer than we have had in the past. In the new scholastic

schedule which has been recommended for postgraduate training after

medical school, the old internship, as we used to know it, is disappear-

ing. That first year of internship instead of being a rotating intern-

ship where they were exposed to all specialties is now being replaced by

going into a residency directly and having that first year out of medi-

cal school count on the residency program in medicine, surgery, OB,

et cetera. For the family practice program, they start their first year

and it, in effect, is like the old internship and been; then the next 2

years for the residency are related to producing a rounded medical

officer with some specialty training in obstetrics, surgery, in the garden

variety type of things, so he does become a well trained family prac-

titioner like we used to familiarly call the old family doctor.

He has 3 years of specialized training to improve his skills in these

areas. This is what we hope will replace the general medical officers, as

we think of them today.

Mr. SIKES. Where are these family practice training programs

located ?

Admiral ETTER. We have them located at naval hospitals in Pensa-

cola, Jacksonville, and Camp Pendleton and one will start in July

at the Naval Hospital, Charleston.

Mr. SIKES. Are you going to expand the program ?

Admiral ETTER. The program will be expanded, Mr. Chairman, yes.


Mr. SnK S. What is the situation with regard to specialists ? Are you

experiencing new and unusual difficulty in attracting specialists to

the Navy ?

Admiral ETrER. Yes, sir, we are. Again it is hard to gage what the

long-term difficulty will be because we this year still have access to our

Berry planners. They are specialists. They have been deferred from

military duty specifically to pursue the residency of their choice.

Therefore, this year we will have sufficient specialty coverage in most

fields with the exception of some shortages in neuropsychiatry, neu-

rology, pathology, anasthesiology, and radiology. The following year

will not be as good. It is beyond that that we expect to have trouble, at

which time we hope to realize the benefits of modernization and other

incentives such as special bonuses which we hope will be enacted.

Mr. SrKES. Are there significant changes planned or anticipated in

the way you use or train Navy specialists ?

Admiral ETTER. Yes, sir; there certainly are from the standpoint of

utilization. For example, I said before that the general medical officers

are going to be in short supply from now on. Until such time as we

have enough family practitioners to replace them, we have a program

now of training physician assistants where we take selected corpsmen

and have them attend a 1-year didactic course and 1-year practical

course in a naval hospital following which they will function directly

under the physician. This physician assistant then will do the screen-

ing in the outpatient department and if it is a surgical problem he

will take him to the surgeon. If it is a medical problem he will take

him to the internist. Many minor illnesses he will manage himself.

Hopefully better utilizing our corpsmen and get more mileage out

of our specialist.

Mr. SIKES. Where are the major training centers for specialists at

the present time? Can you provide for the record data on where your

specialty training is conducted and what the anticipated training

workload is for 1975 through 1980?

[The information follows:]

The following tables list the major training centers for specialists at the pres-

ent, the type of specialty training available, and the anticipated training work-

load for 1975 through 1980.

It should be emphasized that the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda,

is the central major training facility, recognized for its excellence both nationally

and internationally, which exists within the Navy.

Specialty Training Program







ermacoiogy 3 6 0

Hand Surgery 1

Internal Medicine 3 18 17

and Subspecialties

Cardiovascular Diseases 2 4 4

Endocrinology & Metabolism 2 1

gastroenterology 2 2 2

Hematology/ ncol ogy 2 1

Nuclear Medicine


Obstetrics and Gynecology

Dccupati- 1 Medicine


CV Surgery

81 6










7 12 3

14 18 14











q IF I





Grand Total 791



Organized Medicine in 1970 implemented a five year plan designed to eliminate the

traditional internship training year. The rationale behind this decision was to

eliminate mandatory non-specialty related training in the developmental gradient

for physicians. In February, 1969 a new specialty was established to reassert

emphasis on primary health care: Family Practice. This will then offset the

dwindling numbers of primary care practitioners which has resulted from continued

emphasis on clinical specialization. Therefore, as conscriptive physician procurement

will no longer provide general medical officers, trained Family Practitioners will

assist in providing primary health care.

Fully approved three-year Family Practice residency training programs are presently

conducted at:





Actual on

Board (1 July 1973)

Camp Pendleton, California

Charleston, South Carolina

Jacksonville, Florida

Pensacola, Florida


FY75 FY76 FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80-

Naval Hospitals (Load output (Load) utput (Load) Output (Load) output (Load) Output oad -tpt

Camp Leeune North Carolina 8 0 12 0 12 4 12 4 12 4 12 4

Camp Pendleton, California 18 4 18 6 18 6 18 6 18 '6 18 6

Charleston, South Carolina 12 2 12 4 12 4 12 4 12 4 12 4

Jacksonville, Florida 18 6 18 6 18 6 18 6 18 6 18 6

*Lon9 Beach, California 8 0 12 4 12 4 12 4 12 4 12 4

Memphis, Tennessee 0 0 8 0 12 4 12 4 12 4 12 4

New Orleans, Louisiana 0 0 0 0 8 0 12 4 12 4 12 4

Orlando, Florida 0 0 8 0 12 4 12 4 12 4 12 4

Pensacola Florida 12 4 12 4 12 4 12 4 12 4 12 4

TOTALS 76 16 100 24 116 36 120 40 120 40 120 40

*Contingent upon resolution of current SER plans.


Mr. SIKEs. Do you expect or have you experienced any major shifts

in your training programs or in your workloads as a result of the

DOD effort to achieve a higher degree of integration of military

health care?

Admiral ETTER. Up to this time, Mr. Chairman, we have not had

any significant changes. As you know, the triservice regionalization

program of the DOD has been on a trial basis for the past year in the

bay area, in the Tidewater area, in the Texas area, and in the Florida-

Georgia area. This program, quite frankly, up to now has resulted in

a better rapport between the three services, improving lines of com-

munication and cooperation between the Army, Navy, and Air Force,

which should always have been present. But quite frankly I cannot

say at the moment it has resulted in a significant shift of workload.

This will happen as the program becomes more operational, as we

get more experience with it. Up to now I don't think so.


Mr. SIKES. We are aware of the marked shift from inpatient to out-

patient care at military hospitals. Can you identify some of the causes

of this trend and tell us whether it will continue to increase or diminish

in future years?

Admiral ETTER. This, Mr. Chairman, is really a reflection of what is

going on in the civilian community also. It is due to an increasing

awareness by patients and physicians of the value of preventive medi-

cine, attempting to get at the problem before it becomes serious enough

to admit them as inpatients. I am sure that it is also a result of increas-

ing effectiveness of some of the newer drugs available today which can

be used to treat successfully the patients on an outpatient basis so you

don't have to admit them.

There have also been trends recently to do an increasing number of

very minor surgical procedures on an outpatient basis where you can

keep them for only 1, 2, or 3 hours postoperative and send them home

rather than have them take up a hospital bed. This is a trend in the

civilian community and it is reflected here in the military. It appears

to us at the moment that it is leveling off. We do not know whether

we have reached a plateau, but we feel that it is about in a balance that

we can expect over the next few years between outpatient and


Mr. SIKES. Can you provide for the record the Navy's total workload

for inpatients and outpatients at the present time anda what you expect

5 years from now. Also show, for purposes of comparison, your work-

load for 1 or 2 years of the last 5 years.

[The information follows:]


Average monthly

Fiscal year ADPL1 outpatient visits

1971 (Historical) .------ 10, 537 1,276,000

1972 (Historical- ) - ........... ...... ..... _".8,467 1,237,417

1973 (Current).------------ ---------------------------------------- 8,073 1,237,080

1978 (Projected) --------------------------------------------------- 8,200 1,309,000

1 ADPL-Average daily patient load.



Mr. SIRES. What is the Navy's policy on providing medical support

for retired personnel ?

Admiral ETrER. The Navy's policy is the same as that of DOD, in

that we provide care for retired personnel to the limit of our facilities

and personnel resources.

Mr. SIREs. Are you building additional facilities to accommodate

the retired personnel workload ?

Admiral ErTER. Mr. Chairman, we at this time follow the DOD

policy of allowing 5-percent additional beds in a nonteaching hos-

pital and 10 percent more beds in a teaching hospital for the retirees

and their dependents.

Mr. SIREs. That is not going to be realistic in the future as more

and more retirees settle in the areas around major military hospitals.

Do you anticipate any change in policy? What is the Navy's recom-

mendation on this?

Admiral ErrER. As long as the commitment has been made to the

active-duty man when he comes into the service he will be taken care

of during his service and retired years, we certainly have to provide

resources and facilities for them. We also must remember our first

obligation is to the active-duty man and active-duty dependents. If

the capabilities for our care, both facilities and particularly personnel

resources, cannot expand to take care of retirees, they obviously would

have to get their care elsewhere.

Mr. SIREs. Mr. Patten ?

Mr. PATTEN. We talked about phasing out Camp Dix and the local

people told us they had 55,000 retirees in the Army who would be

affected if we closed Camp Dix-55,000. We looked into it and we have

everything there. You can buy land for $100 a lot and as long as they

had the backup on the health care, this was the ideal place for them.

No schools, no taxes, down in the pines.

Admiral, don't belittle the importance of this on the outside. It is

all right to say we have first to take care of our own, but we have

to face up to this retiree proposition.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral ETTER. Mr. Patten, I agree with you wholeheartedly we

must take care of them under the current environment. Unless we do

get more personnel downstream and more facilities, we are going to

be in a position that we just are not going to be able to do it. It is for

this reason that Congress in their wisdom provided the Champus pro-

gram, where a certain percentage of their hospital bill can be picked

up by the Government and they pick up a very small amount of it.

Mr. SIES. What I am trying to get at is, is it realistic to set a limit

of 5 percent across the board as specified in the current OSD policy

for spaces, or 10 percent in the case of teaching hospitals for the retired

personnel ?

Admiral ETTER. It is not realistic if you look at it from the total

numbers that you have to take care of. I think it may be realistic,

though, when we are looking at it from the standpoint of resources

to take care of it.

Mr. SIRES. You outlined a very large and costly program for the

next 5 years by which you hope to be able to accomplish this modern-

ization of medical facilities. Does that program adhere to the 5-percent

or 10-percent limit ?

Admiral ETrER. Yes, it does, and it is not realistic if all eligible re-

tirees are considered. A recent check showed roughly 19 percent of our

present hospital patient load is made up of retirees and their depend-

dents across the United States. Nineteen percent in general.

Mr. SIKEs. What do you think it will be in the future, in 10 or 20


Admiral ETTER. I think it will be much higher if the services still

have the responsibility of giving this care. I repeat that I think every-

one has to realize we have to have the resources to do this.

Mr. PATTEN. Mr. Chairman, I don't know of any Congressman who

has any pending legislation to reduce the amount of care given to the

retirees. I am not familiar with any such pending legislation.

Admiral ETTER. No, there is none. We find ourselves in a position,

Mr. Patten, both dollars and people, of having a hard time trying to

keep up with our commitments. It is my position that right now

morally and legally we have to do this. At the same time we don't

want to forget that we have to take care of active-duty personnel and

their dependents first.

Mr. PATTEN. Between you and me, my closest friends are World

War I veterans. You young fellows around here don't realize this.

Admiral ETTER. I feel it very acutely, Mr. Patten. Again, I want to

make sure that we do not make promises that we cannot keep. That is

what has been happening in Navy medicine for a long time now.

Mr. SIKEs. By and large, are the hospital facilities which you are

closing adequate or inadequate facilities?

Admiral ETTER. They are inadequate.


Mr. SIKES. Which of the remaining hospitals are substandard ? Those

remaining in the inventory? Identify that for the record.

[The information follows:]

All of our existing hospitals are substandard in one respect or another.

Changes to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes which have

been recently made, modify certain requirements for emergency electrical power

and electrical systems. However, those structures of World War II vintage or

older, are inadequate not only from the standpoint of the NFPA codes, and the

Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals criteria, but are structurally

inadequate and functionally obsolete.

The codes referred to involve the National Electrical Code and NFPA 101 (Life

Safety Code). They are quite voluminous and complicated; but briefly, article

517 of the National Electrical Code incorporated new criteria on essential elec-

trical systems for health care facilities. These systems are comprised of alternate

sources of power, transfer switches, overcurrent protective device, distribution

cabinets, feeders, branch circuits, motor controls, and all connected electrical

equipment designed to provide designated areas with continuity of electrical

service during disruption of normal power sources, and also designed to minimize

the interruptive effects of disruption within the internal wiring system.

The two resulting systems are designated the equipment system and the emer-

gency system. The emergency system is divided into three branches, (1) the life

support branch, (2) the life safety branch, and (3) the critical branch. The re-

quirement for emergency electrical power has been required for many years, but

the code was not as comprehensive as this new one adopted within the last year.

The Life Safety Code, NFPA 101, requires more complete fire detection and fire

isolation requirements through use of smoke detectors, automatic door closers,

and isolated ventilation systems.

\~Pr~FIBc-~na; I~FI;- ~i-----~


The first naval hospital to be constructed incorporating these latest codes is

Pensacola, Fla. These new codes are being incorporated into the new facilities

during their design. Changes are being made insofar as economically practical

to the facilities that were under construction when the code was changed.

Other major deficiencies involve seismic protection. For example, San Diego

Naval Hospital, the largest naval hospital, does not meet seismic requirements.

In fact, a large part of it which was constructed in 1920-1921 is of identical con-

struction to the VA hospital which collapsed 2 years ago.

The following is a listing of all of the naval hospitals with construction dates.

Dates Meet

constructed codes


Portsmouth, N.H .............. 1913-45 No.

Boston, Mass .... 1900-58 No.

Newport, R.I....----.. ....- . -1913-45 No.

Quonset Point, R.1 ........ .. 1941 No.

New London, Conn t--....... 1941 No.

St. Albans, N.Y...------------ - 1951 No.

Philadelphia, Pa-------------- 1935-46 No.

Annapolis, Md ...... -------------- 1939-42 No.

Patuxant River, Md............ 1967 No.

2uantico, Va.-.-.-.......... . 1939-42 No.

ethesda, Md...------------ 1941-63 No.

Portsmouth, Va....-.....-.. 1927-60 No.

Cherry Point, N.C-...---...--~. . 1942 No.

Camp Lejuene, N.C.........--- 1943 No.

Memphis, Tenn-............... -1972 No.

Charleston, S.C.-....-..-- . ~. .. -1973 No.

Beaufort, S.C-.. . ...------- - 1949 No.

Jacksonville, Fla-.-........... . 1967 No.

Key West, Fla------...... -- 1943 No.

Orlando, Fla._-...... .... 1943 No.

Port Hueneme, Calif............ 1942 No.


Pensacola, Fla__

Great Lakes, IllI .... . .....

Corpus Christi, Tex. 2...... ....

Bremerton, Wash ........ ....

Whidbey Island, Wash ..........

Lemoore, Calift.................

Oakland, Calif.................

San Diego, Calif...........

Camp Pendleton, Calif 5.......

Long Beach, Calif 4

Overseas hospitals:

Guam, Micronesia Islands....

Yokosuka, Japan .- ....-

Subic Bay, Republic of the


Taipei, Taiwan .......-

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba ...

Roosevelt Roads, P.R. 8 .-..

Naples, Italy - _

Rota, Spain....._ .. ...

Dates Meet

constructed codes

1942 No.

1928-60 No.

1943 (2)

1911-43 No.

1969 No.

1961 No.

1942-68 No.

1922-56 No.

1944 (3)

1967 (4)

1954 No.

5 1928 No.

1956 No.

1961 No.

1956 No.

1962 (s)

7 1960 No.

1958 No.

I New London, Conn.-Naval hospital will be completed in November. Certain modifications have been made to the

grounding system, but since this hospital was designed in 1967, the new code changes were not included. Neither time

nor funds permitted necessary changes.

a Corpus Christi, Tex.-Naval hospital will be completed in November. This hospital was designed in 1969. Certain

modifications have been made to the grounding system but neither time nor funds permitted inclusion of all new codes.

a Camp Pendleton, Calif.-Naval hospital was designed prior to the new codes. However, every effort is being made to

incorporate all code changes that can be done. Completion scheduled for May 1974.

* Long Beach, Calif.-Naval Hospital addition scheduled for completion in June 1974. This was designed prior to recent

code changes, but modifications are being made to include as many as possible.

5 Former Japanese hospital.

9 Roosevelt Roads, P.R.-Naval hospital was designed in 1967 and did not include code changes. Facility is scheduled

for completion in September 1973. Certain modifications have been made to the grounding system but neither time n or

funds permitted inclusion of all new codes.

7 Leased building.

BTemporary construction. All other hospitals are primairly permanent construction.


Mr. SIKEs. Can you discuss the impact of the recently announced

hospital closures on your workloads at existing hospitals and on the

Navy's overall health care program.

[The information follows:]

The Navy will experience an increase in the workload of certain naval hospitals

as a result of the shore establishment realinement. It is planned to increase the

authorized staffing of the following naval medical facilities by the number of

billets indicated :

Billet increase

Facility Officer Enlisted Civilian

Naval Hospital, Beaufort, S.C... .. ------------------------10 25 0

Naval Regional Medical Center, Bremerton, Wash.....------------------.... 15 40 0

Naval Hospital, Charleston, S.C...--------------------------------------. . 11 14 23

Naval Regional Medical Center, Charleston, S.C -----------------------...... 20 0

Naval Regional Medical Center, Jacksonville, Fla ----- - 0.1...-. -M..A.. . . 20 0

Branch Dispensary, Naval Air Station, Brunswick, Maine....-----------.... - 1 6 0

NavalSubmarine Medical Center, New London, Conn....._._ - __ -_ - 12 20 0

Naval Hospital, Orlando, Fla.....-- .------------------------------ -- - 10 20 20

Naval Aerospace and Regional Medical Center, Pensacola, Fla-----.-. - -.. . - 0 20 29

Naval Hospital, Philadelphia, Pa- ..................................- - 17 36 35

Naval Regional Medical Center, Philadelphia, Pa........---------------------- 17 43 21

Naval Hospital, Portsmouth, Va . .---------------------------------------. 29 61 59

Naval Regional Medical Center, Portsmouth, Va..---------------------------- 18 15 80

While it is quite possible that it will be necessary to increase the size of some

of these facilities to accommodate the growth in workload, the exact amount of

increase and alternate courses of action are still being studied. Other than the

reduction in the Navy health care program in the Northeast Conus areas of

Portsmouth, N.H.; Boston, Mass.; Newport, R.I.; and St. Albans, N.Y., the Navy

does not anticipate any major impact on the program overall.

Mr. SIKES. Do you need all the remaining hospitals in the inventory ?

Admiral ETTER. Mr. Chairman, we are taking a hard look at some

of the hospitals which have a low-occupancy rate. At the moment I

would have to say that we need them all. I am thinking of hospitals

that are only running around 40 or 50 percent occupied. These mostly

happen to be in areas with inadequate civilian facilities available to

support the population if the others would be closed. At the moment I

would have to say we need them all, but we are taking a good hard

look. Again, because of resources, both dollars and people.

Mr. SIKES. According to figures supplied the committee in earlier

testimony, your workload at your 10 major hospitals will decline from

an inpatient load of 7,654 in 1971 to 5,962 in 1975. Does this take into

account the shifts in workload as a result of the closures ?

Admiral ETTER. I think we would have to say it does, Mr. Chair-

man, although it should provide' a better training mix of patients for

these training facilities. For example some workload will shift down

into the Norfolk, and Charleston areas, away from the hospitals closed.

I think it is pretty well taken into account.

Mr. SIKEs. How many hospital beds will be given up as a result of

the realinements ?

Admiral ETTER. Boston has a normal capacity of 380 beds, has been

running a census around 246. St. Albans, 607 beds, a census of 155.

Quonset, 104 beds, census of 33. Portsmouth, N.H., 151 beds, for a

census of 58. The point is that when you close a hospital you are clos-

ing a lot more beds than being used in today's environment. Many of

these beds are not being used.

In the St. Albans, N.Y. area, only 150 patients in that hospital, for

a 600-bed facility. You have to be careful. We are giving up a lot more

beds than medical care provided.

Mr. PATTEN. When we talk of St. Albans, you are talking of Navy


Admiral ETTER. I am talking-

Mr. PATTEN. Those beds are not empty ?

Admiral ETTER. No, sir, there are 450 empty beds. Today's census is

155 of all categories of patients.

Mr. PATTEN. You are closing facilities in New Hampshire, Mass.,

and New York as well as reducing the scope of operations at the hos-

pital at Newport, R.I. Will this create a deficit of adequate hospital

facilities to support Navy populations in the Northeast ? Is the reduc-

tion in eligible personnel in the Northeast proportionately greater or

lesser than the reduction in hospital facilities?

Admiral ETTER. The answer to the first part of the question, Mr.

Patten: We do not think that there will be a deficit of adequate hos-

pital facilities in the area. There will be a deficit of military facilities

to take care of the dependents and retirees in those areas. I cannot

argue that point. They are eligible under the CHAMPUS program in

very fine civilian facilities. They can be taken care of. The few active-

duty remaining in the Boston-New York area can either be hospitalized

in civilian facilities or more likely will be hospitalized at naval facili-

ties in Philadelphia, Newport, or at New London. Adequate facilities

are available. The reduction in eligible personnel is proportionate to

the lack of hospital facilities, neither greater nor less, proportionate

to the remaining population.

Mr. PATrEN. How will you take care of the population which does

require care in this region ?

Admiral ETTER. Following closure of the naval hospitals in the

Northeast, medical care for eligible beneficiaries will be available from

a variety of sources-both military and civilian. Navy outpatient facil-

ities will be available in the New England area in Brunswick, Maine;

Portsmouth, N.H.; South Weymouth, Mass.; Davisville, R.I.; and

Newport, R.I., to provide routine and emergency care and to act as

referral points to either the civilian medical community or to the

Naval Hospital, Newport, R.I. As authorized by Congress, the bene-

fits of the civilian health and medical program, uniform services

(CHAMPUS), or medicare will apply when civilian sources are elected

for use. In addition, the Air Force is completing construction of a new

hospital at Pease Air Force Base, N.H., and the Cutler U.S. Army

Hospital, Fort Devens, Mass., will continue to provide inpatient serv-

ices for a portion of the eligible community. Continued availability

of an aeromedical evacuation service will provide the option of trans-

porting selected patients to appropriate military installations should

the need arise.

In addition to this I would like to point out, outpatient facilities

will remain available at the naval support activity at Brooklyn and

the naval ammunition depot at Earle, N.J.

Mr. PATTEN. If yOU will, look at the picture in Newport, R.I., at how

many sailors marry Japanese, how many married Koreans or Viet-

namese. Fellows tell me that you have people who just can't be left

adrift in the local economy; they are foreign to it. Have you ever

thought of that? I had a big red-headed Irishman who married a

Japanese girl and they have four children. These people do not feel

part of the local economy. I have talked to a couple of them and they

feel they should not be cut adrift.

Admiral ETTER. I think there certainly are counselors that can be

made available to them to help them bridge this gap and if their hus-

bands are still on active duty, most likely they will move when their

husbands move back to the military communities.

Mr. PAT EN. Admiral, the truth is when you came here this was not

on your mind; right?

Admiral ETTER. Not this particular point, no, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. Maybe there is nothing to it. It may have been over-

stated. But some people have told me-not Congressmen-people from

the base I just happened to be with over the weekend-told me there

are many Navy personnel with wives from all over the world. You

have sailors who married Filipinos and married Japanese.

Can you provide for the record the personnel shifts and the costs

and anticipated savings associated with each of the recent Navy hos-

pital realinement actions. Also show how you plan to take care of the

residual health needs in each of these areas.

[The information follows:]


Naval Hospitals, Portsmouth, N.H.; Chelsea, Mass.; Quonset Point, R.I.; and

St. Albans, N.Y., are being closed in fiscal year 1974. The staff of the Naval

Regional Medical Center, Newport, R.I., is being reduced and the naval hospital

annex in the REPOSE is being disestablished. The personnel shifts, costs, and

anticipated savings from these hospital realinement actions are as follows:

IDollar amounts in thousands]


Anticipated Estimated

Transfers Eliminated savings 2 costs a

Off. Enl. Civ. Off. Enl. Civ. MPN O.& M.N. MPN 0. & M.N.

Naval Hospital, St. Albans, N.Y....... 57 111 117 101 248 269 $2,738 $89 $513 $1,611

Naval Hospital, Quonset Point, R.I..... 26 54 22 10 27 9 (4) ( 116 97

Naval Hospital, Newport, R.I.... - 0 0 0 54 121 71 () () 173 126

Naval Hospital, Boston, Chelsea, Mass_ 102 144 129 83 143 195 ) () 482 1,965

Naval Hospital Annex in Repose...... 0 0 0 45 133 0 ) () 172 0

Naval Hospital, Portsmouth, N.H_..... 18 35 31 24 61 55 (') (') 136 454

I Based upon June 30, 1972, end strength.

2 Savings are estimated for 1st full year of savings being in fiscal year 1975.

a Estimated costs are 1-time only. MPN costs are estimated costs for civil service severance pay or relocation costs and

for 1-time costs attributable to closure.

4 The savings associated with the relocations are included in the overall calculations of such data resulting from the

closing of the entire complexes, of which these activities were a part.

When the Naval Hospital, St. Albans, N.Y., is disestablished, medical care

for the active duty population will be provided in outpatient facilities in the

Naval Support Activity, Brooklyn. Emergency medical care can be obtained in

Veterans' Administration hospitals and any one of the 150 general hospitals in

the Greater New York City area. Routine and elective medical care can be

provided in the naval hospitals in New London, Conn.; Newport, R.I.; or

Philadelphia, Pa. Other eligible beneficiaries may receive care under the pro-

visions of CHAMPUS, the cost-sharing program legislated by the Congress to

insure adequate care when service facilities are not available.

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIKEs. Proceed.


Mr. DAVIS. I would like for you to discuss for us the relationship

of the CHAMPUS program to the medical facility development

program. What does CHAMPUS provide? What does it cost the

serviceman ? Who is eligible ?

Admiral ErrER. The program primarily was provided to supple-

ment that in military facilities or to provide care when military

facilities were not available. For the active duty dependent their cost

is $1.75 per day or $25 for the total hospitalization. For retirees,

however, and their dependents, the Government, as I remember it,

picks up about 75 percent of the bill and the patient is responsible for

the additional 25 percent. This admittedly in an extended illness or

long-term hospitalization can be a hardship to the retired community.

There is no doubt about that. For your usual type of care this will

suffice. In addition to that, I would like to point out that for the

retirees and their dependents, all of the Reserve officer associations,

and those associations also which are responsible for the enlisted

retirees, all have optional insurance programs that the retiree can

pick up, can pay the premiums, and with CHAMPUS this covers

the entire cost of his hospitalization in civilian facilities.

__ I

The capability mechanism is there for the retirees to be taken care

of at a very reasonable cost. If they have the insurance this would

be the cost of the insurance premiums.

Mr. DAvIs. The man in uniform does not rely upon CHAMPUS ?

Admiral ETTER. He does not rely upon CHAMPUS but there is

a program-it is called nonnaval medical and dental care program,

his entire hospital bill can be picked up for outpatient care and hos-

pitalization of emergency medical/surgical conditions, in a civilian

facility if a Federal facility is not available. The entire bill is paid

under this program.

Mr. DAvIs. CHAMPUS supplies this then to the dependent of the

man in uniform, to the retiree, and his dependents ?

Admiral ErrER. That is correct.

Mr. DAVIs. He has made no direct financial contribution for that

coverage; is that correct ?

Admiral ETTER. That is correct, except for the retirees' optional in-

surance premiums.

Mr. DAvIS. With that kind of service available to this individual,

should we be concerning ourselves about expanding the physical plant

of the Navy's medical facilities for other than those who are actually

in uniform? In other words, there is another side of the coin to what

has been previously discussed here.

Admiral ETTER. Mr. Davis, I appreciate your concern here, but if

we are looking at it from a cost-effective standpoint and to providing

a full mix of patients to provide a more professionally rewarding

career for a physician, there is no doubt the service facilities have

to take care of a certain number of dependents and their retirees. In

all of your residency training programs they require care across the

board, in all age groups from the time you are born until the time you

die, some people at 95 or 100. You have to have this span for your

training requirements. In addition, you could get very few doctors

worth the name doctor to come into the service if all they had to do

was take care of healthy, getting sick occasionally young males. It

just doesn't work. This was the background for the 5 and 10 percent

mix DOD has allowed in your service hospitals. It was specifically for

training and to provide this more complete patient mix in the practice

of medicine. You can supplement with CHAMPUS but it cannot

take the place of military medicine. It can also get to be a very costly

thing. Admittedly when you try to break down CHAMPUS costs,

you can get yourself into some difficulty, but we estimate that from

strictly O. & M. operating costs, it costs us between two and three

times as much in the civilian community as it costs to take care of the

patient in our own hospitals.

Mr. DAvIs. How long have these 5 and 10 percent DOD directives

been in effect?.

Admiral ETTER. I think since about 1966.

Mr. DAVIS. Has CHAMPUS been in effect that long?

Admiral ETTER. Yes, sir. It has been in effect since I think 1966,

with the expanded CHAMPUS program. The original bill since

about 1956. They came in about the same time.


Mr. DAVIs. Roughly speaking, the limitation on the development of

physical facilities for the nonserviceman and CHAMPUS have

grown together?

Admiral ETTER. They have.

Mr. DAvis. Thank you. That is all.


Mr. SIKES. We will take up the National Naval Medical Center,


Insert in the record page 1-33.

[The information follows:]



19 FEB 1973 NAVY

" Ifl AhLLA A h A '






To administer the various activities and components .PERONNL STRENGTH CIVILIAN O [ NLRT OPPICE LIT CILA TOTAL

by direction, coordination and professional super- u .. (8 ( ( .. c m m(.( ( c J(n L

vision with respect to research, training and clinic- AoP. 31 DEC. 1.922 758 873 1,241 11 4 11

al and hospitalization services. LPLA.1, KO(Er 75 611 950 1,241 22 11


The mission of the Naval Hospital component is to pro LAND

vide general clinical and hospitalization services fo (J) (L mn (

active duty Navy and Marine Corps personnel, other a opsO 243 350 6 .56.u11

services, dependents of active duty personnel and to L LEAS.A*NO AANTr* 0 0

cooperate with military and civilian personnel in I INVENTORY TOTAL. (as. e ImR.. As or s.OJU.E 2

matters pertaining to health, sanitation, local dis- . AurNIORISon* NOT YETr N INuTOrno-

asters and other emergencies. . AUThOImZATION REIIEII[DIN TNI. PEONA


d. GRAND TOTAl. (.e + d . 0





" * y . .. 0:0

740.01 NAVY EXCHANGE RETAIL STORE 5 SF 36,370 1,764 36,370 1,764

851.10 ROADS SY 15,000 1546 15,000 1,546

TOTAL 3,310 3,310

....--.-.- -

... P I 7

DD, .. 390

National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Md., $3,310,000

The center administers the various component commands and activities and

provides personnel support and community facilities for assigned personnel. The

Naval Hospital component of the center provides general clinical and hospitaliza-

tion services for active duty Navy and Marine Corps personnel.

The Navy exchange retail store project will replace, with a convenient, one-

stop shopping center, the existing inadequately sized and located store. The

vacated site of the retail store is required for the construction of new clinical


The roads project will provide the new roadways required to streamline in-

gress and egress to the center from Jones Bridge Road.

Status of funds:

Cumulative appropriations through fiscal year 1973--------- $14, 774, 500

Cumulative obligations, Dec. 31, 1972 (actual) -------------- 13, 470, 150

Cumulative obligations, June 30, 1973 (estimated) ---------- 13, 470, 150


Percent complete

Project Design cost April 1, 1973

Navy exchange retail store........... --------------$84,672 4

Roads........... .._. . _._......... ....... . ... ............ ...... _-- - - 73,000 1


Mr. SIKES. I understand that there is a briefing on your core devel-

opment plan for the hospital complex at this installation. We will be

glad to hear you.

Admiral ETTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Commander Jim Smith is going to give this presentation.

Mr. SIREs. Proceed.

Commander SMITH. Mr. Chairman, the National Naval Medical

Center at Bethesda was opened in 1942. The basic mission of this 31-

year-old center is to provide for the delivery of health care, conduct

education and training, and undertake medical research. Bethesda is

more than a hospital; it is made up of the following components:

Hospital, Center command which administers the complex, Medical

Training Institute, Medical Research Institute and Graduate Dental

School, and the School of Health Care Administration. It is a highly

integrated medical center.


The center covers some 245 acres and has a total staff and student

population of approximately 3,500. The center is currently affected by

four major operational deficiencies. These are (1) fragmentation of

functions; (2) obsolescence; (3), vehicle circulation and parking;

(4), increased workload without a corresponding increase in facilities.


The most evident of these deficiencies is No. 1, fragmentation of


As an example, I portray here the Laboratory Service of Bethesda.

As you can see, the various parts of the laboratory are spread through-

out the institution. Management of such a fragmented service is diffi-

cult and inefficient at best. Another problem, (2) obsolescence. The

original design of this facility is obsolete for today's level of care.

This diagram is a cross section of a typical ward in the tower of

the hospital at Bethesda. The green indicates the patient area and the

orange corridors, and purple nursing stations. This configuration was

examined by a consulting firm, and they found that the tower wards

take care of 19 percent of the total patient load, while costing 36 per-

cent of the total operating cost at Bethesda. It is a very inefficient



Another of Bethesda's major deficiencies is indicated by red, which

you see here on the chart. This is the only fire exit from the tower.

The Joint Commission on the Accreditation for Hospitals has indi-

cated if we do not find an alternative to housing patients in the tower

at Bethesda, that we will lose our accreditation as a hospital.

The impact of the loss of accreditation is severe. This would mean

it would completely destroy our entire residency training program.

Let me give you some idea of the magnitude of the residency training

program. Of the 298 physicians at Bethesda, 32 are interns, 113 are

residents, and nine are fellows. This means 51 percent of the total staff

are in accredited training programs. These would be lost should we lose

our accreditation because of the potential fire problem.


The third major problem is the parking deficiency. An independent

consulting firm examined our parking problem and found the de-

ficiency is now 100 percent. We presently need twice as many spaces.

Mr. SIRES. Don't you have any parking? One hundred percent? I

have seen some parking out there. How do you get 100 percent


Commander SMITH. We need to increase it 100 percent. We need to

double the parking availability.


The most serious of all deficiencies is the overwhelming workload.

In 1963 we built a new outpatient clinic at Bethesda. At that time

the outpatient visitation rate was 10,000 visits per month. In March

of this year, the same facilities, the visitation rate was 2,000 patients

per day in the same facility.

Mr. PATTEN. How many a month? You said 10,000 a month? Com-

pared with what today ?


Commander SMITH. 60,000. The point is that it is just completely

overwhelmed to the point that the waiting time for various clinics

has been as long as 8 weeks. Should a dependent or serviceman need

a specialty appointment, they must wait 8 weeks in many clinics. This

is poor medical practice. As a result of these deficiencies that I have

mentioned, a consulting firm was hired in 1971 to prepare a study for

the redevelopment of Bethesda. Their recommendations were as

follows :

1. Development of a new naval hospital at the same site.

2. A retrofit of the other components in space vacated when the new

hospital is completed.

3. Provision for structured parking.

4. Reutilization of the tower at Bethesda for other than patient care.

The redevelopment of Bethesda was programed on a functional

zoning basis. That is with like activities grouped. The plan was for

command and administration to occupy the tower and the central

building, with education and research to the north, with room for

expansion, health care delivery to the south on the site of the new

hospital and parking to the east connecting with both of these.

The consultants recommended that Bethesda be redeveloped by phas-

ing and by so doing this would allow us to continue to perform our

mission with little or no decrease in services and also would allow us

to continue our residency training programs.


The implementation of the proposed plan requires a 5-phase con-

struction program. I will first present a brief overview and then I will

explain the hows and whys of phasing in detail.

To maintain the operation of this Center during the redevelopment

cycle phasing is necessary; that is, certain things must happen before

other things can be done. Thus, before the new hospital can be built

here, the functions that are in these buildings which must be demol-

ished must be moved. This parking lot, which is-

Mr. SIRES. When the job is complete will you have torn down the

present facility and built a new one ?

Commander SMITH. No, sir. The portions that are shown in red on

the chart are the portions which will be demolished. These are for the

most part World War II temporary structures, and these are perma-

nent construction [indicating]; the only permanent construction

which will be destroyed. The remaining part of the institution will re-

main, but it will be-

Mr. SIRES. Orient me. Where is the tower?

Commander SMITH. Here is the tower [indicating]. This is the west

facing Wisconsin Avenue.

Mr. SIKES. You will keep most of the existing structure?

Commander SMITH. Yes, sir. It will be retained for command ad-

ministration and training functions for the component commands now

located on the periphery, in 17 World War II buildings, which will

be moved in to occupy this space. Those World War II buildings that

are now on the periphery will be destroyed.

As I indicated, the parking must be moved. These buildings must go.

The parking is proposed to be on the east and the parking structure

here. We have two buildings in the way, one of which is the Navy Ex-

change. It seems ludicrous to begin redevelopment of the Navy Medi-

cal Center by building a Navy Exchange, but the truth of the matter


Mr. SIKES. First things first.

Commander SMITH. The truth of the matter is that it is in the way.

We have a parking facility to go there. The Navy Exchange has merit

on its own. It is an old World War II structure but the exchange serv-

ice is fragmented. It is in the way. Therefore, the functions in these

buildings need to be relocated. In 1974 we plan to build a new Navy

Exchange which will be located [indicating] in this area of the base.

The present site will be moved here.


Now, by so doing we are also in keeping with our master plan which

shows all personnel support services in this area of the base, removing

them from the areas of the clinical aspects of the base.

Mr. SIKEs. That thing looks a little too much like a modernistic


Commander SMITr. I am not responsible for this.

Mr. PATTEN. You have a couple of buildings out there that fasci-

nated me, the radiological facility and a few other of those exotic

subjects. Are they going to be retained and be part of the whole


Commander SMITH. Yes, sir; the Armed Forces Radiological Re-

search Institute will be retained just as it is. It won't be touched

at all.

Mr. PATTEN. In other words, that nuclear-

Commander SMITH. The nuclear reactor is at the site.

Mr. PATTEN. You have a facility out there related to research on

any trouble or accidents or as a result of radioactivity. Those facilities

will still stay ?

Commander SMITH. Yes, sir. They are modern and complete. They

are going to stay.

To briefly run through the phasing, as I said, the exchange will

go and also the other temporary buildings and this will make room

for the parking facility which is to go here.


This parking facility will take the place of this during the con-

struction and the functions located in these buildings we hope to move

into a temporary-

Mr. SIKES. How many cars will the new parking facility accom-


Commander SMITH. Six hundred thirty.

Mr. SIRES. How many do the present facilities accommodate ?

Commander SMITH. This lot here takes care of 243.

Mr. SIKES. Well, according to your diagram the new parking area

looks smaller than the old one.

Commander SMITH. You are correct, sir, in area. This [indicating]

is a multidecked parking structure. This [indicating] is simply a

flat lot.

Mr. SIKES. Is it necessary to have a parking structure with the addi-

tional cost that is associated with a vertical structure?

Commander SMITH. Yes, sir. We examined that very carefully along

with the consultant that did the study. We found, No. 1, that the Na-

tional Capital Planning Commission frowns very much on our taking

up any more of the grass space. We also have severe problems with

the environmentalists.

Also the patient care functions are located here. If we spread our

lots farther away the sick people must walk farther and farther to

get to their treatment center.

Mr. SIKEs. What is the difference between walking further on the

ground or up and down stairs?

Commander SMITH. Well, this facility and the new proposed park-

ing lot that would go here [indicating] bring you in on the ramps

according to the clinic you are going to.

Mr. OBEY. How many levels of parking ?

Commander SnITH. Four. An interesting thing, the structure is very

much in keeping with the rest of the design of the facility.

Mr. PATTEN. Will that take care of your nurses, your interns, and

your permanent residents as well as the patients and visitors?

Commander SMITH. No, sir. This will take care of the staff pri-

marily when the project is completed. Another parking garage is re-

quired accommodating some 830 cars which will go here, the south

parking garage, and it will serve primarily the outpatient depart-

ment and the hospital itself. The two are required.


The functions located in these buildings we hope to put in a relocat-

able building which is in phase 2, 1975. The construction would be a

temporary facility merely to give us some space during the construc-

tion phase.

Next in 1975 we also have public works shops and warehouse which

would be constructed off the perimeter of the map and would provide

relief for the functions located in these buildings.

With these buildings and the parking then we can begin construc-

tion of the naval hospital which will go at this site.


Mr. SIKES. You will have an entirely new hospital at a cost of $82.5

million ?

Commander S rITH. Yes, sir; with 135,000 square feet of the exist-

ing plant still utilized, the messhall and some of the adjacent areas.

135,000 square feet of existing space will be utilized as part of the new


I have divided the items in fiscal year 1975 into two groups. One I

call the primary group, the relocatable structure, parking structure,

public works shops, and the warehouse. I did so because these items

are instrumental to the operational phasing of the project. These must

occur for the phasing to develop without an impact on our services.

Support facilities in 1975 are ongoing projects not directly related

to the phasing although having merit of their own.


Mr. SIKES. When was it determined that you will need a new hos-

pital at this location ?

Commander SMITH. It was determined on the basis of the study

conducted in 1971. The study was completed in late 1972 early 1973.

Mr. SIKES. IS your problem overcrowding or obsolescence or both ?

Commander SMITH. The problem is both, sir, but primarily obso-

lescence, mainly functional obsolescence, the existing facility is not

suitable for today's level of care.

Mr. SIKES. You have 750 beds now; is that correct ?

Commander SMITH. That is correct, 750 authorized beds.

Mr. SIXES. How many will you have in the new hospital ?

Commander SMITH. The new hospital will have 600 new acute care

beds, retaining in that 135,000 square feet that I mentioned and 250

light care beds.

Mr. SIXEs. And the total is what ?

Commander SMITH. The total will be 850.

Mr. SIKEs. We have been attempting to get some military activities

moved out of Washington, not very successfully, but we have been

trying to get it done. We have felt that that is one good way to effect

revenue sharing, to let some of the States have some of the military

activities that have been concentrated around Washington and to

make this a little less attractive as a target in case of war.

Apparently you are expecting the military population to build up


Commander SMITH. Well, sir, two points on that.

One, Bethesda is a large teaching hospital and a research facility

and its present location is close to the National Institutes of Health.

It is close to the National Library of Medicine and it is close to sev-

eral universities that we are affiliated with, George Washington, How-

ard, and Georgetown, with whom we have programs.

Therefore our population base is quite a bit larger than just this

area. It acts as a center receiving patients from outside of the area.

Some 10 percent of the patients are referred from other hospitals,

because the level of treatment they require is available here but not

available elsewhere.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, would you yield at that point?

Mr. SIKES. Yes.


Mr. OBEY. Could you explain to me just in a shorthand way the kind

of relationship which you have with NIH?

Commander SMITr. Yes, sir.

Mr. OBEY. How integrated it is.

Commander SrITH. Yes, sir. We have mutual training programs

with NIH and also cooperate in various research projects which I am

not prepared to discuss.

We have ongoing research projects, both psychological and phy-

siological, with NIH.

Mr. SIXEs. Do you have anyone here who knows more about the

relationship between the two? Do you have anyone here who has

the details on this?

Admiral ETTER. What is the particular question ?

Mr. OBEY. My point is that in response to the chairman's question

one of the reasons given for the necessity to locate here was that you

had some cooperative efforts going on with NIH and I was curious

as to really how important those were and what they really in fact


Admiral ETTER. From the overall residency programs I think that

they are quite important. They provide, for example, the expertise

which is not available anywhere else to the best of my knowledge

in the United States in neuroradiology ,and in certain types of neuro.

physiology. They share certain of the laboratory facilities and it just

makes a very happy relationship.

Now, Dr. Friess would like to add to that.

Dr. FRIEss. I have at least one example to give you of a way in

which medical research laboratories and the National Naval Medi-

cal Center interact with those at National Institutes of Health. Take

the homey example that struck the heart because it is in my


We have developed some techniques for the use of carbon monoxide

as a means of looking at the dynamic half life of the red cells. That

technique once evolved was most useful in looking at the course of

some diseases which are progressive in nature to make the maximum

use of the technique.

My technologists and research people intercollaborate with several

laboratories at NIH to study the disease of interest to them and then

the use of the technique in our particular case for our problems. It

is cross-fertilization.

The development in a given area has worked to the advantage of

both programs of NIH and to the Navy Medical Research Institute

and the personnel cross-fertilizing get much more mileage out of

some development.

Mr. OBEY. Of your total personnel, how many in a given year work

with NIH on some kind of problem ?

Dr. FRIEss. It looks like about 10-percent collaboration at any given



Mr. SIKES. That would hardly seem a justification for an increase

of 100 beds in the hospital, and again I refer to the efforts of this

committee to have some military activities moved out of Washington.

Your plans would indicate that you anticipate a continuing increase

of activities in the Washington area. Is that what you are basing

this on ?

Commander SMITH. I can address part of that. Sir, 25 percent of

our present workload is retired, factually 25 percent of our workload

is retired and dependents of retired.

Mr. SIKES. But you only build for 10 percent ?

Commander SMITH. Yes, sir; and that is the planning base that

has been used.

Mr. SIKES. Are you going to build for more than 10 percent at the

new hospital?

Commander SMITH. No, sir; 10 percent is what has been calculated.

Mr. SIKES. But you expect to accommodate 25 percent?

Commander SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIKES. There seems to be an inconsistency there. That would

indicate that you are building more than you need for the military

requirements plus 10 percent.

I_ _

Commander SMITH. The workload projections were based on 1977

and the consultant made a computer-based program to determine

what our forecast would be.

Mr. SIKEs. Do we have anything in our justifications that indicate

the Navy population in the Washington area is going to increase?

Commander SMITH. No, sir; it is going to decrease and the con-

sultant estimated by 33 percent.

Mr. SIKEs. I don't want to spend too much time pursuing this, but

if you have a decreasing population I don't understand the need for

an increase in the size of the facility.

Commander SMrrITH. Sir, a decrease in the population here along

with closures elsewhere, and the more centralized we are becoming,

the more people come into the larger facility.

Mr. SIKES. You see, Commander, and Admiral Etter, this is only

the beginning. You are asking for $3,300,000 for roads and an exchange

in fiscal 1974 which doesn't look particularly big but that is the first

bite out of a $136 million package which includes an 850-bed hospital.

Let us be sure that we are on sound ground and that we can justify

each step of this program. Otherwise we are going to run into

difficulty all along the line, not only in authorization but in funding.

Admiral ETTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. Chairman, there is one thing that has not been emphasized here

and that is that Bethesda is a referral center for many types of pa-

tients from without the Greater Washington area. For example, it is

our only organ transplant center. All of the patients on the east coast,

Navy patients, who are in need of kidney transplants are transferred

to Bethesda. It is the center of excellence for open heart surgery on

the east coast and these are regardless of the local populations.

However, I will assure you that the 850 beds that are being asked

for can be well documented. This was the recommendation of the con-

sulting firm that did the study for us.

Mr. SIKEs. Will you document it for this record ?

Admiral ETTER. We will document it for the record, sir.

[The information follows:]

The projected bed requirements for the Naval Hospital, Bethesda, were deter-

mined as a result of an extensive study by RTKL, Inc., a civiilan architec-

tural/engineering firm assisted by the following special consultants :

1. Westinghouse Electric Corp. health systems department.

2. Metcalf & Associates, architects and engineers.

3. John Hopkins Medical Institutions Medical Planning and Development Com-


4. Jack W. Love, M.D., Ph. D., Santa Barbara Medical Clinic.

Four levels of care were identified: intensive, heavy, moderate, and light. The

criteria for placing patients within one of these levels are described below.


If a patient is admitted or transferred to either the intensive care unit (ICU)

or coronary care unit (CCU) as noted in either the nurse's notes or doctor's


Isolettes and croupettes are noted in the same manner.


Any of the following conditions indicate heavy care:

The patient is bedridden.

The patient requires respiratory assistance or IV's.


All newborns were considered in heavy care unless nursing notes indicate



Moderate care is dictated by the patient's ability to walk. The patient is con-

sidered to be in the moderate care category if he is ambulatory and/or has

bathroom privileges but does not yet satisfy the condition of light care.


A patient enters light care if he is transferred to a light care unit or assigned

a task within the hospital. It may be noted that most patients in this category

for any length of time are active duty military.

The importance of this relates to the beds required by level of care. The risks

the hospital should be willing to assume for best occupancy differ by level of care.

For the purpose of this analysis, the following occupancy rates were assumed as

planning criteria :

Percent occupancy

Intensive ----------------------------------------------------------- 50

Heavy-------------------------------------- 75

Moderate -----------------------------------------80

Light -----------------------------------------90

By planning with this method, rather than using the usual planning criteria

of 80-percent occupancy for all levels of care, there is less chance of not being

able to accommodate a patient requiring more intensive care. The total beds re-

quired is shown for each method of planning in the table.


Percentage of occupied beds by level of care:

Intensive.... ..........--------------------------------------------- ......--------------------- 1.91

Heavy. --------------------------------------------------------------------- 16.74

Moderate....... ---------------------------------------------------------------------37. 99

Light..............................................................---------------------------------------------------------------------... 29. 75

Total percentage of occupied beds............ ------------------------------------------------- 85.68


Appropriate Beds required

Average daily occupancy rate (as recommended

patient load (percent) by RTKL Inc.)

ICU..------------------------------------------------- 10.6 50 21

Heavy..---------------- ---------------------------- 173.4 75 231

Moderate--------------------------------------------- 316.7 80 396

Light ---.----------------------------------------- - 231. 8 90 258

Total--.....---------- ------------------------------- 732.5 ---------------- 906


1. The total inpatient beds required exceed slightly the current authorized

level of 906.

2. The current authorized level of 906 falls approximately at midpoint within

the range predicted by the total patient demand and the extension of historical


3. It is concluded that with an improved configuration related to levels of care,

the authorized level of 906 beds is capable of meeting all the predicted patient


After thorough review of the consultants' findings by the Navy Medical Depart-

ment, it was felt that the nnoropriate or ideal occupancy rate could be slightly

increased without compromising patient care and therefore the total bed re-

quirement was reduced from 906 to 850.

[Note: Additional information will be found in the appendix to

this volume on page 1054.]

Mr. SIKES. How many beds are there in the tower ?

Commander SMrrH. There are 241 beds in the tower.

Mr. SIKES. Will they be discontinued ?

Commander SMITH. Yes, sir; those beds will be discontinued and

will be in the new hospital facility.

Mr. SIKEs. Please continue with your briefing if you have not



Commander SMITH. Yes, sir. The other point I wanted to address

was the roads which appear in fiscal year 1974 in phase 1. The black

indicates the present roads, the red the new roads.

Mr. SIKXE. That is what you would get for $1,546,000 ?

Commander SMITH. Yes, sir.

The purpose of the new roads is threefold.

One, it will allow access to the construction site without disrupting

services of the hospital during construction, but, more important, on

a long-range basis it will allow access of administrative traffic to the

base and segregated from the patient traffic.

Right now we have a mix and it is a rather tremendous problem.

Mr. SIKEs. Will you need to restructure those roads after you com-

plete the building program ?

Commander SMITH. NO, sir. It meets short-term and long-term

needs, both.

Mr. SIKEs. What is the sketch behind you ? I think it would tell me

more than some of the other maps which you have been showing me. Is

that the new facility or the---

Commander SMITH. This is how we hope it will look at completion.

Mr. SIKEs. This is the new facility ?

Commander SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIKES. Go through that. I can understand that one better than

I could that modernistic diagram, so would you tell us now what you

have been telling us previously ?

Commander SMITH. Yes, sir.

The new parking structures are indicated in this area. This, [indi-

cating] of course, is the existing facility. This [indicating] is the

new hospital. The new road system will come in here [indicating]

and also here. Of course this [indicating] serves the administrative

portion of the base.

The other reason for the change in the road here was to cooperate

with Montgomery County highways. We have a dangerous problem.

This road [indicating] is too close to Wisconsin Avenue causing quite'

a bottleneck. They have requested that we adjust that to be consistent

with future county plans. That was the third point on the roads.

Mr. SIKES. Where is the new exchange ?

Commander SMITH. The new exchange, sir, was left off by the artist

but it goes right here in this location.

Mr. SIRES. Where is the one that you propose to build for

$1,764,000 in fiscal 1974?

Commander SMrrH. That is the new exchange. It doesn't appear

on here.

Mr. SIKES. I see. You weren't very sure of getting it. You didn't even

put it on the map.

Commander SMITH. My artist wasn't sure.

Mr. SIKES. Anything else ?

Commander SMITH. No, sir.


Mr. SIKES. You have done a good job for us.

What are the areas in the existing facility in which you could, if

necessary, locate the beds you require

Admiral ETTER. No areas exist in the present facility which could

adequately accommodate the 241 beds which must be removed

from the tower to maintain the hospital's accreditation. The master

planning study completed by Ballinger Planning Consultants in 1967

recommended new construction for the 241 bed requirement, as did the

1972 RTKG study. There has been no proposal to relocate the beds

into existing buildings.

Mr. SIRES. What is the replacement value of the existing hospital

core facilities at Bethesda? Can you show us each of these buildings

and tell us what its replacement value and current and projected uses

might be ? Provide details for the record.

Admiral MARSCHALL. The replacement value of the existing Core

facilities is $48,230,000. The replacement cost of the buildings to re-

main for reuse under the Core area study is estimated to be $37,800,000.

The projected use for each building is: Building 1-command and

administration; building 2-administration and training; building 3-

administration and training; building 4-to be demolished; building

5-training; building 6-to be demolished; building 7-light care

ward; building 8-light care ward; building 24--to be demolished;

building 31-to be demolished; building 110-to be demolished; build-

ing 136- to be demolished; building 144--to be demolished and build-

ing 211-oxygen dispensing unit (tank farm surrounded by a fence).

We will provide for the record the current use and replacement

value for each building.

[The information follows:]

~_ __



Building Current Use Value

1 Inpatient Ward, Administration, Graduate Dental $17, 300, 000

School, portions of Medical Training Institute,

Diagnostic Support Activities (Radiology and Lab),

Obstetrics Suite, Nursery and Physical Therapy

2 Hospital Area, including Food Services Division, 6, 200, 000

number of Administrative Spaces and Clinics,

Diagnostic Area and portions of Lab

3 Wards 2,300,000

4 Wards and Outpatient Clinics 2, 800, 000

5 Wards (clinic area to be established) 2, 300, 000

6 Wards and Clinics 2, 700, 000

7 Wards (basement level Physicians' Offices, 3, 700, 000

Administrative Space and Clinics for


8 Inpatient Wards (Basement - major section of 6, 000, 000

Outpatient Department (Clinics))

24 Radiation Therapy 700, 000

31 Radiation Exposure and Evaluation Lab 1, 000, 000

Endocrinology Lab

104 Radiation Therapy and Lab 300, 000

105 Radiation Therapy and Lab 600, 000

109 Blood Donor Center and Red Cross 400, 000

110 Teaching and Administration 400, 000

136 Experimental Immunology and Radiological Safety - 500, 000

Public Works space & Warehouse Storage in the


137 First Floor Physical Evaluation Ward and Day 400,000

Care Nursery Basement Public Works

Administration and Design

144 Navy Exchange and Television Division 600, 000

211 Oxygen Dispensing Unit (Tank Farm surrounded by 30, 000

a fence)

Mr. SIKES. The justification material lists the total cost of your im-

provements at Bethesda as $36,415,000. What is the corresponding

replacement value ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. The cost of improvements consists of two

parts, $350,000 for land and $36,065,000 for structures. The replace-

ment cost for the structural improvements is $111,507,000. It is difficult

to estimate the replacement cost of the land without current appraisals

but we consider it to be approximately $10 million.


Mr. SIES. How much land is there in this center, total land, acreage.

Commander SMITH. 245 acres.

Mr. SixES. Do you expect to retain all of that land ?

Commander SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. SixES. None of it will be available for other purposes?

Admiral ETTER. No, sir.

Mr. SIRES. It would seem that you would certainly not have any

excess land. Do you anticipate the possibility of needing additional


Admiral ETTER. No, sir.

Mr. SIRES. Is this the soundest way to provide the facilities which

the Navy needs for a national medical center ? Would another site and

a completely new facility be preferable to this ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Mr. Chairman, I don't think there is another

site available within the commuting distance. We had certainly looked

into this and with the availability of this land and the fine location we

feel that this is probably the ideal site.

Mr. SIREs. Is it the site that is governing, or the fact that you have

some facilities which you would continue to use ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. Well, it is a combination of both, Mr. Chair-

man. I think the bill would come even higher were we to begin from


Mr. SIRES. What other areas did you look at ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. To be perfectly honest, sir, we don't have any

other areas in which to look without acquiring land and land is be-

coming a much more precious commodity in this area than it was


Mr. SIREs. So there are really no other alternatives which were be-

fore you, in your opinion ?

Admiral MARSCHALL. NO, sir.


Mr. SIRES. Have you considered moving the medical center out of

Washington and away from the high priced and scarce land ?

Admiral ETTER. We have thought about it, sir, but have decided that

it certainly would be much more desirable to keep it here than to move

it anywhere else.

Mr. SIKES. Why ? Snell that out for the record, will you?

Admiral ETTER. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

~----~ - -


The graduate training being accomplished at the National Naval Medical

Center, Bethesda, accounts for 25 percent of all Navy medical officer residents.

These training programs rely heavily on the faculties of George Washington Uni-

versity, Georgetown University, Howard University, and the National Institutes

of Health for professors in the teaching programs. Ninety professors from the

above institutions are utilized in the medical residency programs, and 62 Navy

medical officers hold faculty appointments at these civilian institutions. In addi-

tion to the faculty at the National Institutes of Health, the medical case material

available at the National Institutes of Health and the library material available

at the National Library of Medicine play a vital role in the residency program.

Collectively, this constitutes a unique educational center which spans the entire

spectrum of medical education.

If the training programs were removed from the Washington area all of the

professional services outlined above as well as the clinical and research material

would be extremely difficult to duplicate. In addition to the above it must be

recognized that we currently possess a facility which has a replacement value in

excess of $110 million which must be constructed elsewhere.

[Note: Additional information appears in the appendix to this

volume on page 1053.]


Mr. SIKES. Have there been any major problems with regard to

community relations, security, et cetera, at the present site ?

Admiral ETrER. NO, sir.


Mr. SIKEs. What is the center of the naval population which this

hospital is called upon to support ?

Admiral ETTrr. It is practically areawide, of course, extending from

Anacostia, the Navy Yard area, out to White Oaks. A large percentage

of the population, Navy population at least, live in the Rockville-

Gaithersburg corridor area so if I can provide this for the record,

this is an origin of outpatient visits to Bethesda from the area.

Mr. SIKES. Provide it for the record.

[The information follows:]

The Medical Center serves as a focus for a perimeter of population centers

which comprise the outpatient beneficiary group. The Metropolitan Virginia

suburbs account for 34 percent of the total visitation, the Maryland suburbs

38.9 percent, the District 12 percent, and other areas 15.1 percent, with 3.9 per-

cent originating from Annapolis or Quantico. The enclosed map and chart give

specific geographical breakdowns.



National Naval Medical Center

Bethesda, Md.


o" .OtI

/ 11.2

. !/"

i-Z @


". 3.57













Falls Church




Silver Spring



Oxon Hill






College Park




Other Areas


2.00 .91 .08

.08 .08 .08

.25 .91 .17 .58

.25 .91 .25 .33

25 .25 .17 .08

.58 .17 .17

58 2.16 .58 .75

3__99 4,07 1.25 2.16

16.29 36.82 7.48 12.64

I . j ,99 .


1.75 .17


.2 _o .uo . . -0 1

.08 .08 .17 2.16

.17 .08 .08 2.00

I Ii I-----1


4.07 .08 .33 .08 .50 .33 .33

.08 .17

H .- .~ .'. n~T i, ]- A R I R I 43


.25 33



5 y,2

7 23 .5 3.9 .75 1.1 6.6 .33 2.99 .7 1.41 5.8 .650 O 51v16

78 1

I ___


._ ._ ~




III II IlnVO I _11 _ I _ ( __ _ I ~I 17



.08 .42 .50 AR 7 0 COAT.17 ,91

,8 a 0 az a

-2 . .2 .25 .08 .08 .17 .08 3

58 2.49 .42 .9 4.41 .08 .67 .33 1.08 .08 .42 .17 .42 1.08 .33 1.83 2.16 .58 9

58 1.50 .25 .67 2.99.08 .08 . 17 1 7 .08 .25 7 .17 .33 .00 5.74

25 1.16 .67 .42 2.49 .08 .08 .08 2 5 25 08 .33 . 1.49

08 .42 .50 .17 .48 )25 '0 .91

16 4.41 .42 .42 6.40 .17 OS .25 .17 .17 .25 .25 04 0.40

5.74 .08 .17 .25 .08 .08 .08 .33 .17 .42 . 08 .1767 .

17 0.83 .50 2.74 .08 .67 .75 .08 .08 .

2.49 .42 91 4.41 .08 .67 .33 1.08 .08 .42 .17 .42 .08 .33 1.83 2.16 .58 9.

.33 1.91 .25 .67 3.16 .17 .42 .58 .08 .25 .33 .67 .08 .8 .17 .25 4.84

.2 .08 .25 .25 .08 .08 .08 8 .17 .25 .08 .33 1.3

83 1.33 .25 .25 2.66 .08 .08 .08 .33 0 .17 3.

.25 .83 .17 .58 1.83 .8 .08 .1 08 .25 .08 .17 . 7 .42 .08 .67 .58 3.49

1 . 50 .0 8 . .75 .75

.08 .83 .25 .33 2.4 .2 .25 .25.25 .08 .08.17 .08 3.24-




& '

08 I u





Mr. SIKES. What are the specifics on the amounts of clinic space,

doctors offices, et cetera, which are available in the present facility

versus what you are planning in the new facility?

Admiral ETTER. Mr. Chairman, I will provide 'that for the record.

[The information follows:]

Proposed new Proposed

Existing construction alterations Total

Outpatient diagnostic/treatment and ancillary support - 398, 092 732, 942 66, 779 799, 721

Inpatient nursing units----------------------------- 314, 909 244, 909 84, 822 329, 731

Total gross areas.....-------------------------- 713, 001 977, 851 151, 601 1, 129, 452

Note: These areas reflect preliminary programing prior to submission to OASD (H & E).


Mr. SIKES. Can you provide some statistics on the need for a 680

car parking structure at a cost of $3,927,000. You have 243 acres here.

Why do you need a structure ?

Admiral ETTER. Mr. Chairman, an independent consulting firm made

a study of the parking deficiency at Bethesda which I will summarize

for the record:

[The information follows:]

Parking deficiency

Parking spaces

Core parking requirements---------------------------- -------------2, 500

Current inventory 1------------------------------------------------- , 100

Parking deficiency 1------------------------------, 400

Surface parking to remain -------------------------------------------740

New structured parking -------------------------------------1, '510

Parking Area "G' ---------------------------------------------------- 250

Total available within Core-----------------------------------2, 500

The parking is allocated as follows:

Patients/visitors (2,400 visits per day, approximately three turnovers

a day) ------------------------------------------------------- 850

Staff (P-80 criteria) -------------------------------------------1, 650

Total assigned within the Core--------------------------------- 2, 500

Structures are needed because sufficient area does not exist in close proximity

to the new facilities to allow adequate drop-off areas for patients convenient to

their destination. The new parking structures are designed to bring the patient