

CHAPTER 5

FUNCTIONAL MAJOR ARMY COMMANDS

5-1. GENERAL: Major Army Commands (MACOM)) are commands directly subordinate to, established by authority of, and specifically designated by Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQ DA). The functional MACOM's are primarily concerned with the command and control of the execution of support missions which provide a specialized service not as part of operating forces, usually worldwide, to the Army. The functional MACOM's have subordinate organizations located and operating in the geographic areas assigned to unified combatant commanders. This chapter provides the results of the analysis of the missions, functions, and command and control of the functional MACOM's with regard to the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 and the study criteria.

5-2. US ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND.

a. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is a functional major command of the Army. TRADOC is responsible for developing and maintaining the Army training system which includes producing commissioned officers through the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) and managing the Junior ROTC program which is a motivational program for young people in high school. TRADOC has subordinate ROTC units located and operating in the geographic areas assigned to unified combatant commanders where there are schools which have an Army ROTC program. The ROTC units do not perform a mission in direct support of the wartime mission of a unified combatant commander. The units would remain in the theater in wartime as long as a ROTC program was in effect in a school.

b. The function of the ROTC units is training which is a function of the Secretary of the Army listed in Section 3013(b)(5), Title 10, US Code. The centralized management of the ROTC programs, under the TRADOC Cadet Command, provides for uniform standards for commissioning Army officers and efficient use of the resources and expertise necessary to manage the program. Based on these criteria, the ROTC units should remain under the command and control of TRADOC and not be assigned to or commanded by the unified combatant commanders of geographic areas.

c. Assigning the ROTC units to the unified combatant commander of a geographic area would separate the units from the central management of the TRADOC Cadet Command, causing an adverse impact on the standardization of the training of Army commissioned officers, burden the unified combatant commander with a peacetime mission which is not part of the wartime mission of the command, and require a duplication of resources and expertise which is now centrally located in TRADOC.

5-3. US ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND.

a. The US Army Materiel Command (AMC) is a functional major command of the Army. AMC is responsible for the life cycle materiel functions of all assigned materiel systems of the Army and DOD agencies including research and development, test and evaluation, procurement and production, storage and distribution, inventory management, maintenance, and disposal; scientific and technical information; rationalization; standardization and interoperability; security assistance; and industrial preparedness. AMC has subordinate units, organizations, and other elements located and operating in the geographic areas assigned to unified combatant commanders which fall generally in the following categories:

- (1) Project manager office elements.
- (2) Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) calibration and repair organizations.
- (3) OCONUS depots.
- (4) CONUS depot elements located OCONUS.
- (5) Logistics assistance, customer relations, liaison, and control organizations.
- (6) Miscellaneous activities.

b. The command and control arrangements for some AMC subordinate organizations located in the geographic area of a unified combatant commander is acknowledged in Army doctrine (FM 100-16, Support Operations: Echelons Above Corps) as a deviation from basic doctrine. Doctrinally, the Army component commander should command and control all US Army forces in the theater. However, doctrine acknowledges that this may not be feasible in all cases because of statutory requirements, economy-of-scale considerations, and other considerations. AMC is noted as a major example of the need to deviate from the basic doctrine. The logistics wholesale organizations of AMC in the theater remain under the command of AMC in peacetime and function under the provisions of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) or memorandum of agreement (MOA) with the Army component commander in the theater. In wartime, these organizations are under the operational control of the Army component commander in the theater. The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 brings this deviation from basic doctrine into question.

c. Project Manager Office Elements.

(1) Some AMC project manager offices have subordinate elements located and operating in the geographic areas of unified combatant commanders. They assist in the fielding, testing and hand-off of new systems being fielded OCONUS. They are located

as tenant units in the geographic area of a unified combatant commander to be in proximity to the Army forces in which the new systems are being fielded. The project manager office elements have no wartime mission in support of a unified combatant commander and would be dissolved under conditions of general war.

(2) The primary function of a project manager office is to manage the research, development and acquisition of a materiel system which is a function of the Secretary of the Army listed in Section 3013(b)(4), Title 10, US Code. The project manager office OCONUS elements are extensions of the CONUS based offices performing a function of the CONUS sustaining base. They are small organizations of only a few people and can function only as an integral part of the project manager offices. Based on these criteria, the OCONUS elements of the project manager offices should remain under the command and control of AMC and not be assigned to or commanded by the unified combatant commander of a geographic area.

(3) Assigning the subordinate elements of the project manager offices located in the geographic areas of unified combatant commanders to unified combatant commanders would render the units incapable of performing their mission. It would separate the unit from the materiel development base in AMC and remove a critical element from a major Army research and development (R&D) activity and insert a non-R&D element in the chain of command with the resultant loss in technical expertise to effectively direct the mission of the unit.

d. Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) Calibration and Repair Organizations.

(1) The AMC Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) Calibration and Repair Organizations are located and operating in the geographic area of a unified combatant commander. TMDE organizations are responsible for TMDE maintenance management and engineering support planning (calibration and repair support) for fielded TMDE. Two TMDE organizations operate radioactive waste disposal facilities for their respective theaters. They are located as tenant units in the geographic areas of unified combatant commanders to be in proximity to the supported Army forces. Support is provided to both deployable and non-deployable forces and other services within the geographic area service by the TMDE organization. TMDE organizations support the wartime mission of unified combatant commanders and remain in the theater of operations in wartime under the command of AMC and operational control of the Army component commander.

(2) The primary functions of the TMDE organizations are maintenance and repair of military equipment which are functions of the Secretary of the Army listed in in Section 3013(b)(10) and (11), Title 10, US Code. TMDE was established as an AMC centrally managed mission by Secretary of the Army Charter in

April 1982. TMDE calibration and repair is a highly specialized function which requires reliance on the technical and resource base in AMC. The cost of replicating this expertise and management overhead in the Army component commands would not be cost effective. The TMDE support structure prior to 1979 provided for theater commander control of TMDE support assets and structure. Long term and seemingly unsolvable problems highlighted by various inspection and audit, as well as by commanders, at all levels, led to a study and the current centrally managed structure. The TMDE support structure currently fully responds to supported command mission and priorities. The current relationship allows AMC and its TMDE worldwide support structure the flexibility to quickly realign and reconfigure its assets to provide complete and responsive support with a minimum of resources. The nature of weapon systems development and fielding often results in support TMDE being identified late in the cycle with resultant fast track fielding. Requirements for supporting new TMDE technologies and rapid changes in TMDE density presents a challenge that cannot be reasonably met by the relatively inflexible standard support structure relationships. The AMC TMDE support structure, with its new technology training base, direct access to the developmental process, to the commercial market places, and to the support activities, best meets the needs of the Army. Based on these criteria, the OCONUS AMC TMDE organizations should remain under the command and control of AMC and not be assigned to or commanded by the unified combatant commanders of geographic areas.

(3) Assigning the OCONUS AMC TMDE organizations to the unified combatant commanders of a geographic areas would not provide the commander within any more operational control than under the present command and control arrangement but would burden the unified combatant commanders with the management responsibilities of a highly specialized function. It would separate the TMDE organizations from the technical and resource base of AMC which will degrade the effective and efficient operation of the organizations. It would return TMDE support to the pre-1979 decentralized mode of operation which was demonstrably unsatisfactory.

e. OCONUS Depots.

(1) AMC has depots located and operating in the geographic area of a unified combatant commander. They are responsible for receipt, storage, and issue of supplies and equipment, and for depot maintenance (overhaul or renovation) of military equipment. They are located as tenant units in the geographic area of a unified combatant commander to be in proximity to the supported Army forces. The depots support the wartime mission of the unified combatant commander and remain in the theater of operations in wartime under the command of AMC and operational control of the Army component commander.

(2) The primary functions of the AMC depots are supplying, equipping, maintenance and repair of military equipment which are functions of the Secretary of the Army listed in in Section 3013(b)(3),(4),(10) and (11), Title 10, US Code. The depots are part of the Army wholesale logistics base which supports the combat service support organizations of the combat forces which are assigned to and commanded by the unified combatant commander. The current command and control of the AMC depots worldwide provides for economy of scale and efficiencies in operations. Centralized management provides for worldwide reallocation of resources to meet changing requirements, cost savings through Armywide procurements, and worldwide application of the full technical resources and professional capabilities of AMC. Based on these criteria, the AMC OCONUS depots should remain under the command and control of AMC and not be assigned to or commanded by the unified combatant commander of a geographic area.

(3) Assigning the AMC OCONUS depots to the unified combatant commander of geographic area would not provide the commander within any more operational control than under the present command and control arrangement but would burden the unified combatant commander with the management responsibilities of a portion of the Army wholesale logistics base which is a responsibility of the Secretary of the Army. It would separate the OCONUS depots from the AMC depot system which would defeat the effectiveness and efficiency of the single worldwide management of the Army's wholesale logistics system.

f. CONUS Depot Elements Located OCONUS.

(1) AMC CONUS depots have OCONUS elements located and operating in the geographic area of a unified combatant commander. They are responsible for receipt, storage, and issue of supplies and equipment, and for depot maintenance (overhaul or renovation) of military equipment. They are located as tenant units in the geographic areas of unified combatant commanders to be in proximity to the supported Army forces. The depots support the wartime mission of unified combatant commanders and remain in the theater of operations in wartime (less the theater readiness monitoring facilities) under the command of AMC and operational control of the Army component commander.

(2) The primary functions of the AMC depots are supplying, equipping, maintenance and repair of military equipment which are functions of the Secretary of the Army listed in in Section 3013(b)(3),(4),(10) and (11), Title 10, US Code. The depots are part of the Army wholesale logistics base which supports the combat service support organizations of the combat forces which are assigned to and commanded by the unified combatant commanders. The OCONUS elements are extensions of the CONUS based depots performing a function of the CONUS sustaining base. The forward based elements of the CONUS depots were established for economy and efficiency of operations to preclude extensive travel of personnel or shipment and return of equipment. The

OCONUS elements can function only as an integral part of CONUS depot. Based on these criteria, the OCONUS elements of the CONUS depots should remain under the command and control of AMC and not be assigned to or commanded by the unified combatant commanders of geographic areas.

(3) Assigning the OCONUS elements of the AMC CONUS depots to the unified combatant commanders of geographic areas would not provide the commander within any more operational control than under the present command and control arrangement but would burden the unified combatant commanders with the management responsibilities of a portion of the Army wholesale logistics base which is a responsibility of the Secretary of the Army. It would separate the OCONUS elements from the AMC CONUS depot system which would defeat the purpose of forward basing the OCONUS elements and render them incapable of performing the depot function.

g. Logistics Assistance, Customer Relations, Liaison, and Control Organizations.

(1) AMC has logistics assistance, customer relations, liaison, and control organizations located and operating in the geographic areas of unified combatant commanders. They are located as tenant units in the geographic areas of a unified combatant commanders to be in proximity to the supported Army forces. These organizations enable AMC to better support the wartime mission of unified combatant commanders. They remain in the theater of operations in wartime under the command of AMC.

(2) The AMC logistics assistance program includes a network of logistics assistance offices located at major Army field command headquarters and major installations in CONUS and overseas. Logistics assistance officers and representatives serve as the AMC commander's representative on all logistical matters of mutual interest, providing on-site technical assistance to users of AMC's fielded equipment with emphasis on solving day-to-day problems in supply and maintenance matters.

(3) Liaison and customer relations teams perform a similar function with foreign governments for security assistance support. The customer relations teams are part of the US Army Security Assistance Center which is the Army's Executive Agent to implement, administer and manage the Army's approved Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases and Military Assistance Programs, including the coordination of security assistance tasking with the US Army overseas commands. The customer relations teams are funded through the FMS Administrative Fund, managed by the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), which is generated from the 3% surcharge on FMS receipts. No US appropriated funds are involved. The customer relations teams are located in the geographic area of a unified combatant commander as a matter of convenience to be in proximity to the countries which they service as the representative of the Commander AMC and Commander

USASAC. The teams service countries without regard to the boundaries of the unified combatant commander in whose area they are located. Security assistance and FMS operations presently have only a peacetime role.

(4) The applicable logistics assistance office or a separately established AMC OCONUS headquarters (as in Europe) exercises command and control over all AMC activities which support the assigned theater. In wartime AMC - Europe is under the operational control of the Army component commander.

(5) The primary functions of the AMC logistics assistance, customer relations, liaison, and control organizations support supplying, equipping, maintenance and repair of military equipment which are functions of the Secretary of the Army listed in Section 3013(b)(3), (4), (10) and (11), Title 10, US Code. These organizations are part of the Army wholesale logistics base which supports the combat service support organizations of the combat forces which are assigned to and commanded by the unified combatant commanders. The OCONUS elements are extensions of the AMC headquarters performing a function of the CONUS sustaining base. The organizations were established for economy and efficiency of logistics support to the theater. The customer relations teams are part of the Army's and DOD's worldwide security assistance and FMS operations. The OCONUS elements can function only as an integral part of AMC. Based on these criteria, the AMC logistics assistance, customer relations, liaison, and control organizations should remain under the command and control of AMC and not be assigned to or commanded by the unified combatant commanders of geographic areas.

(4) Assigning the OCONUS AMC logistics assistance, customer relations, liaison, and control organizations to the unified combatant commanders of a geographic area would not provide the commander with any more operational control than under the present command and control arrangement but would burden the unified combatant commanders with the management responsibilities of a portion of the Army wholesale logistics base which is a responsibility of the Secretary of the Army. It would separate the OCONUS elements from the AMC CONUS base which would defeat the purpose of forward basing the OCONUS elements. They would no longer represent the AMC commander on logistics matters which is the sole reason for the existence of the organizations.

h. Research and Development Standardization Groups.

(1) The AMC Research and Development Standardization Groups are located and operating in the geographic areas of a unified combatant commander in the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Australia. The Groups do not directly support the wartime mission of a specific unified combatant commander but support the overall research and development program of AMC by initiating and maintaining technical liaison with leading scientists and research organizations. They are located as tenant units in the

geographic areas of unified combatant commanders to be in proximity to foreign research and industrial base scientific activities. Groups located in a wartime theater of operations during high intensity conflict would be disestablished.

(2) The primary function of the AMC Research and Development Standardization Groups is to support research and development, which is a function of the Secretary of the Army listed in Section 3013(b)(4), Title 10, US Code. The standardization mission of the offices in the United Kingdom and Australia are part of ABCA (America, Britain, Canada, and Australia) Armies Program which is managed by a Primary Standardization Office (PSO) in Washington, DC and by AMC as the US National Standardization Office (NSO). The OCONUS offices are responsive to the CONUS standardization offices and have no interface with the unified combatant commanders. The same is true for the Standardization Group in Germany except that their activities are related to NATO rather than ABCA. Based on this criteria the Groups should remain under the command and control of AMC and not be assigned to or commanded by the unified combatant commanders of the geographic areas.

(3) Assigning the AMC Research and Development Standardization Groups located in the geographic area of a unified combatant commander to a unified combatant commander would separate the unit from the AMC research base which provides essential scientific coordination and direction and from the materiel development community, which is the principal user of the product generated by this unit. It would remove a critical element from a major Army research and development (R&D) activity and insert a non-R&D element in the chain of command with the resultant loss in technical expertise to effectively direct the mission of the units.

i. Science and Technology Organizations.

(1) The AMC science and technology organizations are located and operating in the geographic area of the unified combatant commanders in West Germany and Japan. The organizations do not directly support the wartime mission of a specific unified combatant commander but support the overall research and development program of AMC and other DOD and US Government Agencies. The organizations support countermeasures to foreign technology threat and identify foreign equipment improvements which could benefit US weapons systems. They are located as tenant units in the geographic areas of the unified combatant commanders to be in proximity to foreign materiel sources. Groups located in a wartime theater of operations during high intensity conflict would be disestablished and assets used by in-country intelligence support organizations for wartime science and technology purposes.

(2) The primary function of the AMC science and technology organizations is to support research and development, which is a

function of the Secretary of the Army listed in Section 3013(b)(4), Title 10, US Code. Based on these criteria the Groups should remain under the command and control of AMC and not be assigned to or commanded by the unified combatant commanders of the geographic areas.

(3) Assigning the AMC science and technology organizations located in the geographic area of a unified combatant commander to a unified combatant commander would separate the unit from the materiel development and threat development communities, which are the principal users of the product generated by these organizations. It would burden the unified combatant commander with the management responsibilities of a mission which does not directly support the wartime mission of the command.

j. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Organizations.

(1) The AMC research, development, test and evaluation organizations (Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Cell - Panama, Tropic Test Center - Panama, ~~Cold Regions Test Center - Alaska~~, and Panama ~~and Alaska~~ Meteorological Teams) are located and operating in the geographic areas of unified combatant commanders in Panama ~~and Alaska~~. The organizations do not directly support the wartime mission of a specified unified combatant commander but support the overall research, development, test and evaluation programs of AMC by identifying, developing, testing and evaluating materiel for ~~cold~~ hot weather or low intensity conflict areas. They are located as tenant units in the geographic areas of the unified combatant commanders to be in proximity to appropriate weather and terrain factors or LIC program initiatives. The organizations remain in theater in wartime under the command of AMC and operational control of the Army component commander.

(2) The primary functions of the AMC research, development, test and evaluation organizations is to support research and development, which is a function of the Secretary of the Army listed in Section 3013(b)(4), Title 10, US Code. Based on this criterion the organizations should remain under the command and control of AMC and not be assigned to or commanded by the unified combatant commanders of the geographic areas.

(3) Assigning the AMC research, development, test and evaluation organizations to the unified combatant commanders of geographic areas would separate the units from the AMC research and development base which provides essential scientific coordination and direction and from the materiel development community, which is the principal user of the product generated by these units. It would remove a critical element from a major Army research and development (R&D) activity and insert a non-RDT&E element in the chain of command with the resultant loss in technical expertise to effectively direct the mission of the units.

k. Central Ammunition Management Office - Pacific.

(1) The Central Ammunition Management Office - Pacific (CAMO-PAC) was established to develop and exercise centralized ammunition logistics management in the Pacific Theater. CAMO-PAC performs specific peacetime and wartime missions in direct support of US Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (USCINCPAC), specifically retail/theater level management of ammunition. Functions performed by CAMO-PAC are doctrinally found in a Theater Army Materiel Management Center (TAMAC). The Commander, CAMO-PAC, is also dual hatted as the munitions staff officer for the US Army Western Command (WESTCOM). CAMO-PAC supports no commands/organizations outside the geographic area of the unified combatant commander.

(2) There are no criteria used in this study which support the present command and control of CAMO-PAC. Although the mission of CAMO-PAC is within the Secretary of the Army function of "supplying", the criteria used in this study has included only wholesale logistics organizations under the Secretary of the Army functions for exception unless other criteria apply. By doctrine, CAMO-PAC should be assigned to the Army component command of a unified combatant commander. There are no statutory or economy of scale management considerations to preclude assigning CAMO-PAC in accordance with doctrine. It supports no commands or organizations outside the geographic area of the unified commander and is not an integral part of a worldwide wholesale logistics structure. The fact that CAMO-PAC must support more than one Army MACOM within the geographic area of a unified combatant commander is not sufficient justification for not assigning CAMO-PAC to the Army component command of USCINCPAC in accordance with Army doctrine and the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. WESTCOM (soon to become the US Army Pacific) is the designated Army component command for USCINCPAC with resource coordinating authority for all commodities. CAMO-PAC should be considered for assignment to WESTCOM (or the US Army Pacific when it is activated).

5-4. US ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

a. The US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is a functional major command of the Army. USACE has subordinate organizations located and operating in the geographic areas assigned to unified combatant commanders. USACE OCONUS organizations provide peacetime and wartime support to both the Army component commander and the unified combatant commander. They are located as tenant units in the geographic areas of unified combatant commanders to be in proximity to the supported commands. The OCONUS organizations remain in the theater in wartime.

b. The OCONUS mission of USACE includes: as the DOD construction agent, accomplishing design and construction of facilities for US Forces and other governments when assigned; performing reimbursable engineering support to US military

installations; acquiring, managing and disposing of real estate where assigned to USACE; preparing planning and engineering studies in support of US economic development programs when requested; and performing civil works (water resources) in Hawaii, Alaska, Territories, and commonwealths. The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and the acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities of the Secretary of the Army is a function of the Secretary of the Army listed in Section 3013(b)(12), Title 10, US Code. By public laws since 1824, USACE has responsibility for civil works in the United States and its possessions and territories. These civil works responsibilities are not related to the wartime mission of a unified combatant commander. To provide economy of scale and efficiencies in operations, the Secretary of Defense has geographically divided the globe between USACE and the US Navy Facilities Command for DOD construction agent responsibilities. Additionally, the present worldwide command and control structure of USACE organizations is based on studies by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) and the Army Audit Agency (AAA) as directed by Congress. Memorandums of Agreement have been developed to provide for the wartime support role for the unified combatant commander. This preserves the authorities that the OCONUS element of USACE requires from USACE and provides the supported command the necessary operational control for wartime exigencies. Based on these criteria, the USACE elements located in the geographic areas of unified combatant commanders should remain under the command and control of the USACE and not be assigned to or commanded by the unified combatant commanders of geographic areas.

c. The command and control arrangement for USACE MILCON responsibilities provide for:

- Army-wide design/construction under one unified command.
- Worldwide application of the full technical resources and professional capabilities of USACE.
- Uniformity and continuity of design and construction criteria and standards worldwide and in alignment with Congressional statutory directions.
- Performance and accounting for major military construction on a worldwide unified basis.
- A broader financial base for standardization of S&A rates across all Army projects.
- Overall improvement and benefits from a systematized personnel, general administration, and management methods.

d. Assigning the OCONUS elements of USACE to the unified combatant commanders of geographic areas would cause the loss of

the large reservoir of professional and technical talent that can be called upon to solve technical and contractual problems; create a layered command structure where none exists; destroy the present policy of design review at one organizational level above the design accomplishment level, and cause the replication of USACE overhead functions at each level of command.

5-5. US ARMY INFORMATION SYSTEMS COMMAND.

a. The US Army Information Systems Command (USAISC) is a functional major command of the Army. USAISC has subordinate organizations located and operating in the geographic areas assigned to unified combatant commanders. USAISC OCONUS organizations provide peacetime and wartime support to Army component commanders, unified combatant commanders, and other DOD and government agencies. They are located as tenant units in the geographic areas of unified combatant commanders to be in proximity to the supported commands and agencies. The OCONUS organizations remain in the theater in wartime.

b. The command and control arrangements for the USAISC subordinate organizations located in the geographic areas of unified combatant commanders is acknowledged in Army doctrine (FM 100-16, Support Operations: Echelons Above Corps (EAC)) as a deviation from basic doctrine. Doctrinally, the Army component commander should command and control all US Army forces in the theater. However, doctrine acknowledges that this may not be feasible in all cases because of statutory requirements, economy-of-scale considerations, and other considerations. USAISC is noted as a major example of the need to deviate from the basic doctrine. The USAISC subordinate element in a theater of operations is the Theater Communications Command - Army (TCCA) in wartime. The elements of the TCCA function under the command of USAISC and under the operational control of the Army component commander in the theater. The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 brings this deviation from basic doctrine into question.

c. The signal elements assigned to the Army component commanders OCONUS which were engaged in the Defense Communications System (DCS), Base Communications (BASECOM), and other non-tactical communications were reassigned in the early 1960's to the US Army Strategic Communications Command (USASTRATCOM) from which USAISC evolved. This assignment was to assure uniform, interoperative, and economical joint communications worldwide. The 7th Signal Brigade in Europe was placed under the command of the USAISC 5th Signal Command, the TCCA, in accordance with EAC doctrine to bring all the theater level communications assets under the TCCA. This alignment simplified wartime transition by organizing theater signal assets in peace as they would be in war. It provides for the economic use of signal resources in the theater and efficiency in the management of theater communications.

d. The current command and control of USAISC OCONUS organizations worldwide provides for economy of scale and efficiencies in operations. Centralized management provides for engineering, acquiring, and installing equipment and systems with worldwide interoperability; worldwide reallocation of resources to meet changing requirements; standardization; cost savings through Armywide procurements; and worldwide application of the full technical resources and professional capabilities of USAISC. The cost of replicating this expertise and management overhead in the Army component commands would be prohibitive. The US Air Force also has a communications command similar to USAISC which is part of the Defense Communications System. The Secretary of the Army's Report to the Secretary of Defense and the Congress on the Defense Agencies and Department of Defense Field Activities (Title III of the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986), August 1987, provides an expanded discussion on the need for and the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the centralized Defense Communications System which is applicable, as well, to USAISC.

e. The OCONUS elements of USAISC do not appear to perform a Secretary of the Army function listed in the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. However, based on the economy of scale considerations and efficiency of operations criteria, the OCONUS elements of USAISC should be excluded from assignment to and command by the unified combatant commanders of geographic areas. There is no specific provision of the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 to exclude organizations based on these criteria. Exemption based on these criteria would be by the discretionary authority of the Secretary of Defense granted in the Act.

f. Assigning the OCONUS elements of USAISC to the unified combatant commanders of geographic areas would not provide the commander with any more operational control than under the present command and control arrangement but would burden the unified combatant commander with significantly increased management and procurement responsibilities. It would:

(1) defeat the effectiveness and efficiency of the single worldwide management of the Army's portion of the Defense Communications System.

(2) fragment the Army BASCOM system.

(3) severely hamper training, assignment, and management of personnel to maintain the unique commercial equipment which is used on long-haul and BASECOM.

(4) eliminate Army program objectives to constrain the proliferation of automation equipment and systems OCONUS in favor of standardized equipment and reliance on Armywide systems.

(5) greatly impede the initiative to reduce or eliminate dedicated circuits in favor of reliance on common user systems with attendant high cost reductions.

(6) remove the current capability to move equipment, units, and technicians between theaters to meet changing and contingency requirements.

(7) result in the establishment of many engineering, installation, and planning activities in lieu of the centralized support which now exists.

(8) impede Armywide visibility over the effectiveness of DCS, BASECOM, and automated system operations.

(9) encourage open competition for resources among the theaters instead of having a single Army manager to interface user requirements with Army resources.

(10) obstruct the Army objective of establishing an integrated Information Management mission area.

5-6. US ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND.

a. The US Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) is a functional major command of the Army. USACIDC has subordinate organizations located and operating in the geographic areas assigned to unified combatant commanders. USACIDC OCONUS organizations do not directly support the wartime mission of a unified combatant commander but provide both peacetime and wartime support to the Army component command. They are located as tenant units in the geographic areas of unified combatant commanders to be in proximity to supported Army commands. The OCONUS organizations remain in the theater in wartime.

b. The mission of USACIDC is to investigate Army felony crime and provide CID support to all Army echelons. Criminal investigation is part of administering the affairs of the Department of the Army which is a Secretary of the Army function listed in Section 3013(b)(9), Title 10, US Code. The centralized vertical command and control of USACIDC is based on repeated guidance from higher headquarters beginning in 1964 with the DOD Review Project Security Shield. In March 1971 the Secretary of Defense requested the Secretary of the Army "to develop a CID agency which has vertical control of all CID worldwide." USACIDC was established in September 1971. The OSD Task Force on "Evaluation of Audit; Inspection and Investigative Components of DOD" (May 1980), recommended that the Air Force and Navy adopt USACIDC's vertical structure to avoid undue command influence on operations. In May 1983 the GAO report "DOD Can Combat Fraud Better by Strengthening its Investigative Agencies" strongly endorsed the USACIDC's independence from supported units' chain of command and repeated the need for the Air Force and Navy to do likewise. The President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency in April 1985 adopted "Professional Standards for Investigations" stated that, to obtain the necessary independence, investigative organizations should exist outside the line/staff of units subject to investigation, and should report direct to the agency

head or his deputy. DOD Instr 5505.3 mandates that criminal investigative organizations have complete independence from supported commanders to initiate or terminate investigations and to use any legal techniques necessary, without impediment. Based on this criteria, the USACIDC elements located in the geographic area of a unified combatant commander should remain under the command and control of the USACIDC and not be assigned to or commanded by the unified combatant commander of a geographic area.

c. Assigning the OCONUS elements of USACIDC to the unified combatant commanders of geographic areas would be contrary to repeated guidance from higher authority in both the executive and legislative branches of the government. It would eliminate the autonomy which is crucial to objective, effective crime investigation; destroy top level quality control for significant/sensitive cases; and destroy the mechanisms for coordinating complex or multi-jurisdictional cases, and for effective liaison with investigative and law enforcement agencies.

5-7. US ARMY HEALTH SERVICES COMMAND.

a. The US Army Health Services Command (HSC) is a functional major command of the Army. HSC is responsible for providing fixed site medical support for the Army. HSC has three fixed site medical facilities located and operating OCONUS in the geographic areas of unified combatant commanders. They are located as tenant units in the geographic areas of unified combatant commanders to be in proximity to the supported population. The medical facilities support the wartime mission of unified combatant commanders and remain in the theater of operations in wartime.

b. The Tripler Army Medical Center (TAMC) in Hawaii is a fixed hospital under the peacetime command of HSC and the wartime command of the Army component commander in the event of execution of Pacific OPLANs. The TAMC commander is dual-hatted as the Surgeon of the Army component command. In peacetime TAMC performs the mission of a hospital located in the CONUS sustaining base; however, in wartime the mission changes to support the unified combatant commander of the geographic area.

c. The US Army Medical Department Activity (MEDDAC) -Panama is under the command and control of HSC in peacetime and under the command and control of USARSO in wartime. The MEDDAC, by treaty and Army direction, supports authorized beneficiaries in the Canal Zone as well as the mission of the unified combatant commander of the geographic area. Doctrinally, a medical command and/or a deployable hospital under the command and control of the Army component commander would normally exist in forward deployed areas. The MEDDAC in Panama has de facto served this function since the MEDDAC Commander is dual-hatted as the Surgeon of the Army component command. The nondeployable MEDDAC in Panama is an

anomaly from the time when the Canal Zone was part of the United States. The status of the MEDDAC is governed by the conditions and resource constraints of the Panama Canal Treaty.

d. The US Army Health Clinic, Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, is under the command and control of HSC through the Dwight David Eisenhower Army Medical Center, Fort Gordon, Georgia, in peacetime and wartime. The clinic cannot function independently, is located on US territory and should be considered as an extension of the CONUS sustaining base.

e. Medical support is part of servicing which is a function of the Secretary of the Army listed in Section 3013(b)(6), Title 10, US Code. The present peacetime command and control arrangements make the most economical and efficient use of scarce medical manpower resources providing an economy of scale. Except for Panama, these medical activities are located in US territory performing functions of the CONUS sustaining base. Based on these criteria the OCONUS HSC fixed site medical facilities should remain under the command and control of HSC in peacetime and not be assigned to or commanded by the unified combatant commanders of the geographic areas. The wartime change in mission of TAMC and MEDDAC - Panama would warrant the wartime change of command and control especially since the commanders are dual-hatted for both missions. The US Army Health Clinic in Puerto Rico should remain under the command and control of HSC in both peace and war and not be assigned to or commanded by the unified commander of the geographic area because the health clinic cannot operate independently of a larger MEDDAC or medical center.

f. Assigning the fixed site Army medical facilities to the unified combatant commanders of geographic areas in peacetime would require command and control headquarters in the geographic areas for these activities in peacetime which would duplicate the existing HSC management structure and be prohibitive because of resource constraints. It would burden the command with an extremely demanding peacetime medical support mission to the authorized beneficiaries in the local population.

5-8. US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND.

a. The US Army Intelligence and Security Command (USAINSCOM) is a functional major command of the Army. The mission of USAINSCOM is to conduct and coordinate intelligence collection, processing, analysis and reporting; electronic warfare; counterintelligence activities; operational security support; and related operations in support of the Army. The Commander, USAINSCOM, is the Commander of the Army Service Cryptologic Element (SCE). The Commander, USAINSCOM is the DA Service HUMINT (Human Intelligence) Manager and INSCOM is the DA Service HUMINT Agency. The Commander, USAINSCOM is responsible to the Department of the Army Senior Officer of the Intelligence Community (DA SOIC) for the supervision of designated Sensitive

Compartmented Information (SCI) security and service responsibilities. The mission of USAINSCOM is global and is conducted in the geographic areas of the unified combatant commanders. USAINSCOM has subordinate units, organizations, and other elements located and operating in the geographic areas assigned to unified combatant commanders which fall generally into four broad categories as follows:

(1) Fixed site signals intelligence (SIGINT) facilities with assigned and attached mobile assets under the SIGINT operational control of the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service (DIRNSA/CHCSS).

(2) Echelon Above Corps (EAC) Military Intelligence (MI) brigades/groups providing multidiscipline intelligence and electronic warfare support to a theater in both peace and war.

(3) Special mission organizations, usually conducting single or dual discipline intelligence operations of a global nature or providing unique support such as special security services.

(4) Organizations providing specialized training or administrative and logistic support to other INSCOM elements within a theater.

b. Fixed Site SIGINT Facilities and Related Organizations.

(1) Fixed site SIGINT facilities primarily support the peacetime intelligence collection mission of US Government national agencies as well as the peacetime intelligence requirements of unified combatant commanders. They are located as tenant units in the geographic area of unified combatant commanders to be in proximity to relevant targets of intelligence interest. These facilities would remain operational in a wartime theater of operations until untenable or the mission was discontinued.

(2) Command and control of the fixed site SIGINT facilities is based on Executive Order 12333 and National Security Council Directive (NSCD) No. 6. Those elements of the Army that form the Service Cryptologic Elements (SCE) of the CSS as defined in NSCD No. 6. function as part of NSA/CSS. The Army NSA/CSS organizations are identified in DOD Directive S-5100.20 and in the Congressional Budget Justification Book (CJB) compiled annually by NSA and submitted to Congress in support of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP). INSCOM provides the Army focal point for the worldwide management of these facilities and related mission organizations for NSA/CSS, thus providing an economy of scale in management resources, efficiency of management, and worldwide interoperability of operations and support systems.

(3) Section 3013(c)(7) of Title 10, US Code states that, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army is also responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the effective supervision and control of the intelligence activities of the Department of the Army. The Secretary of the Army exercises this supervision and control through the Commander, USAINSCOM, at Echelons Above Corps (EAC). (Intelligence activities at Echelons Corps and Below (ECB) collect tactical intelligence information by organizations organic to the combat forces. These forces are an integral component of a combat force and are usually assigned as part of a combat force. Intelligence activities at ECB are not as sensitive as those at EAC and, therefore, do not require the centralized management and oversight that EAC intelligence activities require in order to effectively carry out this responsibility of the Secretary of the Army. ECB organizations have a mission to collect against very specific intelligence targets directly related the parent organization tactical area of operation; whereas, EAC organizations collect against theater and extra-theater intelligence targets of interest to theater and national authorities.)

(4) Based on these criteria, the USAINSCOM fixed site SIGINT facilities and the USAINSCOM organizations which support these facilities and other NSA/CSS related missions should remain under the command and control of the USAINSCOM and not be assigned to or commanded by the unified combatant commanders of the geographic areas. The criteria warrant excepting these organizations from assignment to and command by the unified combatant commanders in order to provide efficient and effective support to both the unified combatant commanders and National Command Authorities. However, there is no specific provision of the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 to exempt organizations based on this criteria. Exemption based on this criteria would be by the discretionary authority of the Secretary of Defense granted in the Act.

(5) Assigning the USAINSCOM fixed site SIGINT facilities and the USAINSCOM organizations which support these facilities and other NSA/CSS related missions to multiple unified combatant commanders would not be in accordance with the intent of the applicable Executive Orders and DOD Directives pertaining to NSA/CSS. It would seriously fragment the management of the Army components of a worldwide integrated intelligence collection system which requires centralized management both at the NSA/CSS level as well as in the Army. Assignment would require a prohibitive resource cost in manpower and dollars to replicate the management and maintenance structure of USAINSCOM for each unified combatant commander. It would burden the unified combatant commanders with peacetime management responsibilities for organizations which have missions outside the interest of the unified combatant commander that may not contribute to the wartime mission of the command.

c. Echelon Above Corps (EAC) MI Brigades/Groups.

(1) The Echelon Above Corps (EAC) MI brigades/groups provide the theater level component for enemy ground forces intelligence support to the unified combatant commander, other Services, allies and Army component commanders. Each EAC MI brigade/group is tailored to support both the peacetime and wartime intelligence requirements of the supported unified combatant commander. Additionally, the EAC MI brigades/groups support the peacetime intelligence collection mission of US Government national agencies. They are located in the geographic areas of unified combatant commanders to be in proximity to relevant targets of theater and national intelligence interest as well as to be co-located in the area of the supported command. These units remain in a wartime theater of operations to support the mission of the unified combatant commander.

(2) The command and control arrangements for the EAC MI brigades/groups is acknowledged in Army doctrine (FM 100-16, Support Operations: Echelons Above Corps) as a deviation from the basic doctrine. Doctrinally, the Army component commander should command and control all US Army forces in the theater. However, doctrine acknowledges that this may not be feasible in all cases because of statutory requirements, economy-of-scale considerations, and other considerations. USAINSCOM is noted as a major example of the need to deviate from the basic doctrine. The EAC MI brigade/group functions under the command of the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and under the operational control of the Army component commander, with the exception of measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and offensive counterintelligence operations (OFCO). In peacetime USAINSCOM retains control of certain sensitive overt and controlled HUMINT operations. The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 brings this deviation from basic doctrine into question.

(3) Section 3013(c)(7) of Title 10, US Code states that, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army is also responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the effective supervision and control of the intelligence activities of the Department of the Army. The Secretary of the Army exercises this supervision and control through the centralized management headquarters of USAINSCOM at Echelons Above Corps (EAC). Centralized control is necessary to provide effective statutory accountability (operational, legal and financial) for sensitive intelligence operations conducted at EAC. (Intelligence activities at Echelons Corps and Below (ECB) collect tactical intelligence information by organizations organic to the combat forces. These forces are an integral component of a combat force and are usually assigned as part of a combat force. Intelligence activities at ECB are not as sensitive as those at EAC and, therefore, do not require the centralized management and oversight that EAC intelligence activities require in order to effectively carry out this responsibility of the

Secretary of the Army. ECB organizations do not conduct OFCO, MASINT or HUMINT operations. ECB organizations have a mission to collect against very specific intelligence targets directly related the parent organization tactical area of operation, whereas, EAC organizations collect against theater and extra-theater intelligence targets of interest to theater and national authorities.)

(4) In peacetime, the EAC MI brigades/groups are a complex mix of resources, including P2 and P3 (CCP, GDIP, FCI, S&IA and CRP). In peacetime the EAC MI brigades/groups have a significant mission responding to peacetime national level requirements and tasking and also serving as a command and control headquarters for certain USAINSCOM peacetime intelligence collection organizations. They serve as the interface between national collection systems and the tactical intelligence systems in theater at ECB. INSCOM provides the Army focal point for the worldwide management of the resources and missions related to these programs at EAC, thus providing an economy of scale in management of resources, effectiveness and efficiency of management, and worldwide flexibility in responding to mission priorities across theaters. Because tactical resources can be trained by doing actual peacetime collection missions thus resulting in a reduced requirement for strategic assets and the same headquarters element can be used to manage both strategic and tactical collection, there is also a significant economy by avoiding the necessity of providing the total required resources to satisfy National Level peacetime requirements and a complete second set of tactical resources to fully satisfy transition to war requirements. In wartime, the mission of the EAC MI brigades/groups changes to primarily responding to the requirements and tasking of the supported commander in the theater of operations. The peacetime resource mix and missions facilitates the transition to war by providing the EAC MI brigade/group with a ready pool of both strategic and tactical personnel with experience in actual intelligence operations and continuity of intelligence operations in the theater at no additional training or manpower costs to the Army. The doctrinal variations in command and control for the EAC MI brigades/groups allows for the flexibility to respond to these changing requirements. This variation in command and control permits the effective supervision and control of those sensitive intelligence activities of the Department of the Army by the Secretary of the Army and, yet, allows the Army component commander to control those missions of the EAC MI brigade/group which directly support the theater requirements of the unified combatant commander. In wartime, certain sensitive intelligence operations (OFCO, MASINT, HUMINT) remain under the control of USAINSCOM.

(5) Based on these criteria, the USAINSCOM EAC MI brigades/groups should remain under the command and control of the USAINSCOM and under the operational control of the unified combatant commanders of the geographic areas. These criteria warrant the variations in command and control in order to provide

efficient and effective support to both the unified combatant commanders and National Command Authorities. However, there is no specific provision of the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 to exempt organizations based on these criteria. The Act gives both the Secretary of the Army and the unified combatant commander certain roles in the supervision and control of activities of Army forces performing intelligence missions. The specific delineation of those respective roles is a matter to be determined by the Secretary of Defense within the framework of Title 10, US Code. Exemption from assignment to and command by the unified combatant commander of a geographic area based on these criteria would be by the discretionary authority of the Secretary of Defense granted in the Act.

(6) Assigning the USAINSCOM EAC MI brigades/groups to multiple unified combatant commanders would seriously fragment the integrated management and oversight of sensitive intelligence collection activities which are conducted worldwide. It would render certain intelligence operations ineffective since the targets are global in nature. If the EAC MI brigades/groups were assigned to the unified combatant commander, and the Secretary of the Army were no longer responsible for the effective supervision and control of the intelligence activities of these units, a new DOD intelligence management structure would be necessary to supervise and control intelligence operations through joint channels to the unified combatant commander. Assignment would require an increased resource cost in manpower and dollars to replicate the management and support structure of USAINSCOM for each unified combatant commander. It would burden the unified combatant commanders with peacetime management responsibilities for missions which may not contribute to the wartime mission of the command.

d. US Army Special Security Group.

(1) The US Army Special Security Group (USASSG) is the Army component of the Defense Special Security System (DSSS). The DSSS is a decentralized DOD worldwide system which provides special security support for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) to DOD, and other US Government and international agencies. USASSG has subordinate OCONUS detachments located in the geographic areas of unified combatant commanders which provide special security support services for Echelon Above Corps commands worldwide, USAINSCOM organizations, US Government and international agencies, and unique special security service support to Army Echelon Corps and Below (ECB) Special Security Offices (SSO). The USASSG EAC SSO detachments are located in the geographic areas of unified combatant commander to be in proximity to the supported command. Most of these units remain in a wartime theater of operations to support the mission of the supported command; however, some are dissolved or depart the theater, depending on the wartime location and mission of the supported agency or command. The current command and control results from decisions based on approved recommendations of the

DA Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS) completed in 1975; however, the doctrine for employment of the EAC SSO detachments is an area that has not been fully documented.

(2) The USASSG detachments which support Army components of unified commands and are located in the geographic area of a unified commander are: SSO USAREUR, SSO Berlin, SSO WESTCOM (USARPAC), SSO Korea, SSO Combined Field Army, SSO Combat Support Coordination Team Number One, SSO Combat Support Coordination Team Number Three, SSO Taegu, and SSO Zama. There are no criteria used in this study which support the present command and control of USASSG detachments which support Army component commands within the geographic area of a unified commander.

(a) The USASSG does not perform a mission which is a part of a Secretary of the Army function listed in Section 3013(b), Title 10, US Code. All Service Secretaries are responsible for the effective supervision and control of the intelligence activities of their departments as is the Secretary of the Army under Section 3013(c)(7), Title 10, US Code. All SSO's within DOD are subject to the same Executive Orders, Director of Central Intelligence Directives, Department of Defense Directives and Defense Intelligence Agency Manuals for the control and use of SCI. However, Army EAC is the only level within the Army, among the other Services, and among the unified and specified commands at which the SCI security support element is not assigned to and commanded by the supported command. Within the command structure of a unified command, the Army component commander is the only major commander without an organic SCI element. Therefore, there is no basis in the Act, other statutes or regulations which would serve as basis for exempting the USASSG detachments which support Army component commands of unified commands from assignment to the supported Army component command.

(b) The USASSG detachments which support the component commands remain in the theater in time of war and support the wartime mission of the command. The primary mission of the detachments is to support the component command. SSO's normally support other organizations in their geographic area to some degree; however, the EAC detachments which support the component commands provide no significant support to other organizations outside the unified command structure. There is nothing uniquely different about SCI support at Army EAC that would differentiate it from SCI support at other levels, among the other Services, and unified and specified commands.

(c) Support to ECB SSO's could continue to be provided by the component command SSO detachment in the same manner as at present without additional resources. Headquarters USASSG could continue to provide to the component command SSO detachments, the same worldwide supervision and support that it currently provides to the ECB SSO detachments to ensure the uniform implementation of SCI security policy, control and oversight without additional

resources and possibly with less management resources. Additionally, the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) of the component command could provide the necessary oversight for all detachments which support subordinate organizations of the command. Therefore, there are no significant economy-of-scale or efficiency considerations for the present command and control structure and the possibility of minor savings exists.

(d) Based on this criteria, the SSO detachments of USASSG which support Army component commands of unified commands and are located within the geographic area of a unified combatant commander should be considered for assignment to and under the command of the supported command.

(3) The remaining OCONUS USASSG detachments, which are located in the geographic area of a unified combatant commander, do not primarily support a subordinate component of a unified combatant commander. The missions of these detachments are to support the USAINSCOM field stations and other INSCOM subordinate organizations and other US Government and international agencies. They do not directly support the wartime mission of a unified combatant commander and may be dissolved or depart the theater in wartime depending on the wartime mission and location of the supported agency. Some of the detachments have unique classified missions and status which are best controlled and supported by USAINSCOM. The study concludes that command and control by USAINSCOM of the remaining OCONUS USASSG detachments, which primarily support USAINSCOM subordinate organizations and other US Government and international agencies, best serves the interests of the US Government, DOD and the unified combatant commanders.

(4) Assigning the EAC SSO detachments of USASSG which support Army component commands and are located in the geographic area of a unified combatant commander would be in accordance with the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. The Army component commander and the SIO would assume full responsibility for SCI security, oversight, and policy implementation for all organizations subordinate to the command. There is no indication that the Army SCI support under the current USASSG command and control presents a problem; therefore, reassignment would not resolve any known deficiencies. However, the independent "honest broker" role of the EAC detachments for enforcing SCI policy within the command would be decreased. Without a full assessment of SCI support at ECB and other services, which have the SCI elements assigned to the command, no conclusions can be made concerning the potential impact of reassignment on the quality of SCI support.

e. US Army Russian Institute.

(1) The US Army Russian Institute (USARI) is located and operates in the geographic area assigned to a unified combatant commander. USARI provides a graduate level program in Soviet political-military affairs taught in the Russian language. Except

for the USAINSCOM Foreign Language Training Center, Europe (FLTCE) which is attached to USARI, USARI does not support the wartime mission of a unified combatant commander. It is located as a tenant unit in the geographic area of a unified combatant commander to be in proximity to the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact Nations. USARI will be dissolved or redeployed in time of general war.

(2) The primary function of USARI is training, which is a function of the Secretary of the Army listed in Section 3013(b)(5), Title 10, US Code. It primarily supports the Foreign Area Officer Program of the Army and prepares attache personnel for assignment to the Soviet Union. Based on this criterion, USARI should remain under the command and control of the USAINSCOM (or another Army or DOD organization) but not be assigned to or commanded by the unified combatant commander of the geographic area.

(3) USARI could be under the command and control of any appropriate organization which provides overall support to the Army or DOD; however, assigning USARI to a unified combatant commander would burden the unified combatant commander with peacetime management responsibilities for an organization which does not contribute to the wartime mission of the command. Between command of USARI by the unified combatant commander or USAINSCOM, the present command and control of USARI better serves the interests of DOD and the unified combatant commander.

f. USAINSCOM Foreign Language Training Center, Europe.

(1) The USAINSCOM Foreign Language Training Center, Europe (FLTCE) is attached to the US Army Russian Institute (USARI) and is located and operates in the geographic area assigned to a unified combatant commander. It provides language enhancement training for linguists from INSCOM and USAREUR fixed and tactical SIGINT units and personnel from other Services. It is located as a tenant unit in the geographic area of a unified combatant commander to be in proximity to Army troop locations and supported INSCOM organizations. FLTCE will be dissolved or redeployed in time of general war.

(2) The primary function of FLTCE is training, which is a function of the Secretary of the Army listed in Section 3013(b)(5), Title 10, US Code. FLTCE was created by INSCOM to provide training for INSCOM personnel and to assist other MACOM's on SIGINT matters. It supports the readiness of USAREUR SIGINT units which contributes to the wartime mission of the unified combatant commander; however it was created for and primarily supports INSCOM organizations. Based on these criteria, FLTCE should remain under the command and control of the USAINSCOM and not be assigned to or commanded by the unified combatant commander of the geographic area.

(3) Assigning FLTCE to a unified combatant commander would burden the unified combatant commander with peacetime management responsibilities for an organization which will not become part of the wartime mission of the command. FLTCE is vital for the proficiency of INSCOM linguists; however, it could be under the command and control of any appropriate organization which would provide this service to INSCOM. If not, it would be necessary for INSCOM to reconstruct a similar unit to support INSCOM needs at an additional resource cost. Between command of FLTCE by the unified combatant commander or USAINSCOM, the present command and control of FLTCE better serves the interests of DOD and the unified combatant commander.

g. CONUS Based Operations and Support.

(1) The US Army Operational Group, the US Army Foreign Counterintelligence Activity, and the US Army Field Support Center have subordinate elements located and operating in the geographic area of a unified combatant commander. They are located as tenant units in the geographic area to place them in proximity to targets of high intelligence interest and of high potential value to US national level agencies and to unified combatant commanders or to support an INSCOM operational unit. In wartime, they would continue to contribute to the missions of unified combatant commanders, although possibly at somewhat reduced levels due to their forced relocation to friendly bases of operation.

(2) Section 3013(c)(7) of Title 10, US Code states that, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army is also responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the effective supervision and control of the intelligence activities of the Department of the Army. The Secretary of the Army exercises this supervision and control through the Commander, USAINSCOM, at Echelons Above Corps (EAC). Centralized control is necessary to provide effective statutory accountability (operational, legal and financial) for sensitive intelligence operations conducted at EAC. These USAINSCOM organizations conduct worldwide sensitive intelligence operations which require centralized management and oversight. The OCONUS detachments are integral part of CONUS based operations and are located OCONUS only to be in proximity to the target of intelligence interest or supported INSCOM intelligence operation.

(3) Based on this criteria, the OCONUS elements of USAINSCOM operations should remain under the command and control of USAINSCOM and not be assigned to or commanded by the unified combatant commander of the geographic area. However, there is no specific provision of the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 to exempt organizations based on this criteria. Exemption from assignment to and command by the unified combatant commander of a geographic area based on this criteria would be by the discretionary authority of the Secretary of Defense granted in the Act.

(4) Assigning the OCONUS elements of INSCOM CONUS based operational and support units to the unified combatant commander of a geographic area would destroy the operational and support capability of USAINSCOM to conduct worldwide intelligence collection operations which is the major reason for the existence of these USAINSCOM organizations. It would seriously fragment the worldwide management and oversight of sensitive intelligence collection activities, require an increased resource cost in manpower and dollars to replicate the management and support structure of USAINSCOM for each unified combatant commander, and burden the unified combatant commander with peacetime management responsibilities for missions which may not contribute to the wartime mission of the command.

h. Military Intelligence Battalion (Low Intensity)

(1) The Military Intelligence Battalion (Low Intensity) (Provisional) (MI Bn (LI)) is subordinate to the 513th MI Brigade. The battalion is currently deployed in the geographic area of a unified combatant commander and supports the peacetime and wartime mission of the unified combatant commander. It is attached to an INSCOM MI brigade/group located in the geographic area when it is deployed OCONUS.

(2) The battalion is a one-of-a-kind unit designed for rapid deployment to meet changing worldwide requirements and contingencies. The command and control arrangements are based on a pragmatic necessity to comply with the intent and spirit of Executive Order 12333 and National Security Directive No. 6 concerning SIGINT operations. Based on this criteria, the MI Bn (LI) should remain under the command and control of USAINSCOM and not be assigned to or commanded by the unified combatant commander of the geographic area. However, there is no specific provision of the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 to exempt organizations based on this criteria. Exemption from assignment to and command by the unified combatant commander of a geographic area based on this criteria would be by the discretionary authority of the Secretary of Defense granted in the Act.

(3) Assigning the MI Bn (LI) to the unified combatant commander of the geographic area would destroy the rapid deployment and contingency capability of the battalion which is the major reason for its existence. It would require the Army to replicate this capability for each contingency. Assignment would not provide the unified combatant commander with any more operational control than under the present command and control arrangement yet would sever the the battalion from the technical guidance, direction, and intelligence operational management provided by USAINSCOM. Additionally, it would not be in accordance with the intent of the applicable Executive Orders and DOD Directives pertaining to SIGINT operations.

i. More detailed information concerning the OCONUS organizations of USAINSCOM is contained in Appendix E to this study. The appendix is classified and distribution is limited.