

1. DATE 9 July 1973		2. DEPARTMENT ARMY		3. INSTALLATION Fort Campbell								
4. COMMAND OR MANAGEMENT BUREAU Third United States Army			5. INSTALLATION CONTROL NUMBER Tennessee 155 Kentucky 145		6. STATE/COUNTRY Kentucky							
7. STATUS Active			8. YEAR OF INITIAL OCCUPANCY 1942		9. COUNTY (U.S.) Christian & Trigg, Ky; Montgomery & Stewart, Tenn.							
11. MISSION OR MAJOR FUNCTIONS Support and training of a division and other non-divisional combat units.  *\$29,700 one-time cost for easement.			12. PERSONNEL STRENGTH									
			PERMANENT			STUDENTS			SUPPORTED			TOTAL (9)
			OFFICER (1)	ENLISTED (2)	CIVILIAN (3)	OFFICER (4)	ENLISTED (5)	OFFICER (6)	ENLISTED (7)	CIVILIAN (8)		
			a. AS OF 31 Dec 1972	1,823	13,862	2,242			14	220	6	18,167
			b. PLANNED (End FY 75)	2,449	19,437	2,205	0	0	19	235	0	24,341
			13. INVENTORY									
			LAND		ACRES (1)		LAND COST (\$000) (2)		IMPROVEMENT (\$000) (3)		TOTAL (\$000) (4)	
			a. OWNED		104,592		4,526		176,277		180,803	
			b. LEASES AND EASEMENTS		823		30*		0		30	
			c. INVENTORY TOTAL (Except land rent) AS OF 30 JUNE 19 72								180,833	
d. AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY								33,532				
e. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM (exclusive of family housing - \$27,000)								51,881				
f. ESTIMATED AUTHORIZATION - NEXT 4 YEARS (exclusive of family housing - \$76,700)								59,965				
g. GRAND TOTAL (c + d + e + f)								326,211				
SUMMARY OF INSTALLATION PROJECTS												
PROJECT DESIGNATION					AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM				FUNDING PROGRAM			
CATEGORY CODE NO. a	PROJECT TITLE b	PRIORITY	Page No c	TENANT COMMAND d	UNIT OF MEASURE e	SCOPE f	ESTIMATED COST (\$000) g	SCOPE h	ESTIMATED COST (\$000) i			
211	243 - Tactical Airfield Complex - Phase III	1	54		SF	114,900	8,420	114,900	8,420			
721	244 - EM Barracks Complex	1	56		MN	3,300	31,459	3,300	31,459			
721	245 - Barracks Modernization	1	58		MN	2,214	8,114	2,214	8,114			
740	45 - Commissary	4	59		SF	109,500	3,888	109,500	3,888			
	Total						51,881		51,881			

## FORT CAMPBELL, KY.—\$51,881,000

Fort Campbell is located 8 miles northwest of Clarksville, Tenn. The mission of this installation is to provide for the support and training of an airmobile division and other nondivisional combat units. The program provides the third phase of an airfield complex at Campbell Army Airfield. It also includes a barracks complex, barracks modernization, and a commissary.

*Status of funds*

	<i>Dollars in thousands</i>
Funded program not in inventory.....	\$33, 532
Unobligated projects, March 31, 1973 (actual).....	18, 337
Unobligated projects, June 30, 1973 (estimated).....	661

## DESIGN INFORMATION

Project	Design cost (thousands)	Percent complete Apr. 30, 1973
Tactical afd complex Ph 3.....	\$110	5
EM barracks complex.....	1, 110	25
Barracks modernization.....	180	20
Commissary.....	70	25

## ENLISTED BARRACKS SUMMARY

	<i>Men</i> <sup>1</sup>
Total requirement.....	11, 764
Existing substandard.....	<sup>2</sup> 11, 082
Existing adequate.....	276
Funded, not in inventory.....	3, 234
Adequate assets.....	3, 510
Deficiency.....	8, 254
Fiscal year 1974 program.....	5, 514
Barracks spaces occupied, March 15, 1973.....	10, 743

<sup>1</sup> 90 square feet per man—permanent party personnel; 72 square feet per man—trainees.

<sup>2</sup> Includes 4,458 spaces that can be made adequate.

## TACTICAL AIRFIELD COMPLEX

Mr. LONG. Please show us on the map where phase III of the tactical airfield complex would be located. What is at this site at the present time?

Colonel COATS. This is the location of the phase III airfield, which is located to the south, about 6 miles from the main airfield at Fort Campbell.

General COOPER. Located at the site now is really a quarter track for racing quarter horses. In essence, there is not much there.

## SUITABILITY OF FORT CAMPBELL FOR A FULL DIVISION

Mr. LONG. Is the acreage at Fort Campbell sufficient to allow the maneuvering of two brigades against a smaller force in training exercises?

General COOPER. Yes, sir. We have 104,000 acres there. It is not plush in terms of being able to maneuver the two brigades. It is marginally adequate for this particular type of division.

Mr. NICHOLAS. General Cooper, the investigative staff report last year which looked into, among other things, the Boatwright report, indicated that one of the criteria set in the Boatwright report was that approximately 60,000 acres was required to maneuver one brigade against an aggressor force, but that in order to maneuver two brigades, you need over 100,000 acres of actual maneuver area.

I believe Fort Campbell has only 66,000 acres of maneuver area.

General COOPER. You are correct. The 104,000 acres I gave you was the total area of Fort Campbell, which includes the cantonment. We can show on the map approximately where the cantonment area is, almost all in the eastern portion.

I think it is more than 66,000 if you include the areas where you have your ranges. Normally, you do not do too much maneuvering in the ranges.

I would agree that it is marginal. The Boatwright study was based on what was ideal in terms of maneuvering.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Could you effectively use two brigades in a maneuver exercise against an aggressor force, or is it fairly impractical to do so?

General COOPER. It would not be practical for armor units, certainly, but for the airmobile division, I would say it is marginal.

Colonel COATS. Sir, there is also the acreage of the Tennessee Valley Authority which is available for use under permit prohibiting firing. I believe there are about 200,000 acres, as I recall.

General COOPER. Colonel Richbourg would agree with you, Mr. Nicholas, more than he would with me in terms of whether it is practical or not. It is certainly marginal at best. Whether you can do it or not depends upon the alternatives you have.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Looking at the investigative staff report of last year, and quoting:

Maneuver area requirements are for moderately rough or broken terrain. A minimum acceptable standard of training, morale, and support requires at least 55,000 acres. This would permit maneuvering one of the three brigades against a numerically smaller force. It is regarded as desirable that 137,000 acres be available for this purpose in order to provide optimum efficiency in the operations and training. This larger acreage would permit the maneuvering of two brigades against a smaller force.

Would you like to expand your comments on this for the record?

General COOPER. Yes.

The choice was whether to locate the 101st at Fort Campbell or down at Hunter/Stewart. The big advantage we had at Hunter/Stewart was that we did have the acreage you have talked about, even more acreage. So, from the maneuver point of view, Fort Stewart of the Hunter/Stewart complex would clearly have been superior.

The fact that we had had the 101st at Fort Campbell before, the fact that we had a fair amount of permanent facilities but by no means all, led us to choose Fort Campbell, recognizing the deficiency in training area and recognizing that maneuvering two full brigades is not a large part of the training program.

#### STATUS OF BOATWRIGHT REPORT

Mr. LONG. Has the Army approved the Boatwright report, or are you still studying it?

General COOPER. The status of the Boatwright report is that it is being used as a source of data.

To answer your question specifically, it has not been approved as a study. It is used as a very valuable source of information.

Mr. LONG. If you are not basing your long-range stationing plans on the criteria and conclusions developed in the Boatwright report, what are you basing them on?

General COOPER. We are using as general, overall criteria for considering what stations we close, what stations we keep open, the criteria we provided the first day of the hearing.

Mr. LONG. Does the Army have another study which is more thorough or comprehensive than the Boatwright report?

General COOPER. The Army this year is reviewing the long-range stationing plan. We use the Boatwright study as a source of data, but we are not restricted to that.

Mr. LONG. Is the Boatwright report considered out of date? When was it done?

General COOPER. It was done in 1970. It has a lot of very useful information in it still. Some of the things have changed.

For example, some decisions have been made now as to where to place divisions that were to be brought back from Vietnam. To that extent, it is out of date.

It is also out of date in that it does not have all the new construction that has been built or approved since 1970.

Mr. LONG. Was it out of date when it was made, like some of these weapons systems that are obsolete when they are produced?

General COOPER. It was basically a very good study.

Mr. LONG. Are the criteria out of date?

General COOPER. In terms of the number of acres it takes to maneuver things? I would say some of those criteria would be out of date because of the fact that we have since run tests, for example, with the TRICAP Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, down at Fort Hood, Tex. That division has told us some things about helicopters in operations different from Southeast Asia. At the time the Boatwright study was made, we had detailed use of helicopters only in Southeast Asia. We have since run quite a few tests under the MASSTER program at Fort Hood.

#### TRAINING FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF WARS

Mr. LONG. In all these questions on maneuvering area criteria, adequacies of acreage, utilization of helicopters, and so on, are you thinking in terms of the same type of war as the Vietnam war? I gather there is some sort of model of war in your thinking. Is it conventional warfare, Vietnam-type warfare, or what is it?

General COOPER. We are trying to think of all types of possible warfare. Certainly, all-out nuclear warfare is one that we do little detailed planning for in the Army, other than the part that we get involved in in connection with Safeguard.

Mr. LONG. Why is that? I would think you would have to.

General COOPER. Although it is the worst type of war that we could anticipate, it is also probably the least likely. The further we go down the track without using nuclear weapons, the probability of their being used, in my opinion, goes down, even using them in a tactical sense.

If you start talking about a tactical nuclear war in Europe, which we are prepared for, but which we want to avoid, the question which arises

in everybody's mind is: Are you going to be able to limit the war to tactical nuclear weapons, or where tactical weapons stop and strategic weapons start?

Mr. LONG. We have spent a lot of money on tactical weapons.

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. If we spent a lot of money on tactical nuclear weapons, why are we not doing our training exercises with tactical nuclear warfare as a distinct possibility, rather than a remote possibility?

General COOPER. The remote possibility I referred to was general nuclear war. Tactical nuclear war is a greater possibility, but relative to conventional war we think is less.

We do train troops in the use of tactical nuclear weapons and maneuver, but we spend more time and effort on conventional because we think the conventional is more apt to happen and is more plausible.

Mr. LONG. I don't know whether that is a very helpful answer.

Colonel COATS. Mr. Long, if I may speak with regard to aviation, the aviation training is essentially being conducted for midintensity type environment, not the low intensity type we have in Southeast Asia and yet not the high level of nuclear play that you would have in general all-out nuclear conflagration.

There have been some changes, relatively minor changes, in some of the criteria for airfield support, for instance, one in the parking apron requirement.

We have gone to a mass type of parking apron as opposed to a pad with an asphaltic surrounding area. There have been some minor changes in the maintenance facility criteria based on the sizes of the aircraft.

Mr. LONG. I am more and more confused by your explanation. It sounds like you are, too. You don't really know what kind of a war to prepare for. It is impossible. In your preparations you sort of fall between two schools.

General COOPER. I don't think so.

Mr. LONG. The war you are preparing for is not guerrilla warfare, not nuclear warfare, not conventional World War II type warfare.

General COOPER. We have to be prepared for a spectrum of war because based on the way this country operates we don't start the war and we don't really choose the type of war to be fought.

In any case, we would try to limit the war.

Mr. LONG. That is what we like to think, General, and I hope you are right, but there are an awful lot of people who don't agree with that, and I must say I have had my doubts, too.

I don't know whether that has very much to do with it. The question is whoever starts a war, all wars get out of hand, whoever starts them and whatever the original idea is.

General COOPER. Using Korea, for example, where we had nuclear weapons and we thought the enemy didn't, in that case we specifically made a conscious decision at the top level not to use nuclear weapons.

In that case we had a clear superiority, but we did limit it because we thought it was in the best interests of the United States. That is really our governing factor.

Our governing factor in fighting of all these wars is—and should be—what is in the best interests of the United States.

## STUDY OF RELOCATION OF SOME UNITS FOR FORT CAMPBELL

Mr. LONG. I support that. Well, I certainly haven't gotten an answer from you that I can understand about what your criteria are. I note your construction program at Fort Campbell for fiscal years 1974 through 1978 totals \$111 million for military construction and \$104 million for family housing, a total of \$215 million.

Has the Army studied the possibility and the economies of putting either the airborne brigade or one of the airmobile brigades of the 101st at another base which is currently underutilized such as Fort Benning or Hunter/Stewart?

General COOPER. Yes, we have. We have done both of those in detail and I believe we provided some information to the committee specifically on Hunter.

Mr. LONG. The 101st, of course, is my favorite division since that is where my son served in Vietnam. Is there any other really good unit in the U.S. Army?

General COOPER. Oh, I think you will get chauvinistic responses from any good division commander and we hope they are all good or we expect them all to be good.

Mr. LONG. What are the costs and what are the savings?

General COOPER. Specifically versus Hunter?

Mr. LONG. Or Fort Benning.

General COOPER. I don't have those right with me, sir. I will provide those for the record.

Mr. LONG. Fine. Why don't you conduct a study of these costs and savings and report back to the committee in 3 months?

General COOPER. We can do that, sir.

[The information follows:]

The requirement for a study is acknowledged. Results of the study will be furnished to the committee in 3 months per their request.

General COOPER. With regard to Fort Benning, we still anticipate that we might bring the 2d Infantry Division back there so we didn't study that in as much detail as we did the Hunter/Stewart.

Mr. LONG. You have two-thirds of a division in Hawaii, two-thirds at Fort Riley, and you may have two-thirds of a division at Fort Benning. Why could you not have two-thirds of a division at Fort Campbell?

General COOPER. We could have two-thirds but we prefer to try to keep a whole division there if we can. As far as a division is concerned, it is better to have the whole division train together. In the case of Fort Riley, the reason we don't have a full division is because one-third of it is over in Europe.

In the case of Hawaii, the reason we don't have a full division there is we don't really have the space for all of the division.

## PREDEPLOYED EQUIPMENT IN EUROPE

Mr. LONG. As I understand it, we have several divisions that are on a readiness-to-fly basis to go over to the European theater if there were an attack there of some sort. Right?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. I understand that we have a lot of materials and equipment and everything stored over there ready to use.

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. On the other hand, I have heard echoes that the readiness-to-fly units are not as combat ready as we were originally led to expect. Could you comment on that either on or off the record?

General KJELLSTROM. Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment on that if I may.

Last fall we had the REFORGER exercise in which most of the First Infantry Division was deployed from Fort Riley to Europe. The afteraction reports of that exercise indicate that the equipment was ready and that it was a highly effective maneuver. We would like to provide the details to the committee for your review.

Mr. LONG. How long did it take you to get into action over there?

General KJELLSTROM. In a very limited time, sir, within the scenario of the plan.

Mr. LONG. This is an open hearing. If you prefer to answer this off the record, we can do that.

General KJELLSTROM. Sir, I don't have the details on the precise number of days.

Mr. LONG. I am interested to know just how fast you can do it.

General KJELLSTROM. It was very effective.

Mr. LONG. We are not going to have much time, as I understand it. I talked with some of the people in the London Institute for Teaching Studies, one of whom claimed that we probably only have about 60 hours if the Russians really went in there with a full blast.

General KJELLSTROM. Last summer I was in the storage area for the equipment, and I was very pleased with what I saw, Mr. Chairman. The equipment is ready. All the units have to do is move into the storage areas, refuel the vehicles, crank them up, and move on out.

During the Vietnam war, because of the shortage of personnel, deployments to Vietnam, shortage of repair parts, and the emphasis on Vietnam, the status of the equipment and supplies in Germany deteriorated. There has been a major effort in the last 2 years to improve this situation.

#### TROOPS STATIONED IN EUROPE

Mr. LONG. Assuming this improvement is as good as you say, would it be possible for us to have fewer people serving in the European theater, to bring some of those troops home, and still maintain some sort of an effective deterrent?

General KJELLSTROM. Sir, the number of people in the European area, of course, is a matter of—

Mr. LONG. It is about 500,000.

General KJELLSTROM. We have 198,000 Army personnel in the European area. The stationing of forces is a matter that has been determined by the President.

Mr. LONG. I understand that.

General KJELLSTROM. Upon the recommendations of the JCS.

Mr. LONG. Of course, Congress ought to have something to say about this, and Congress will.

I was asked by another Congressman to endorse a piece of legislation that would substantially cut down the number of people we have in Europe on the ground. The theory is that no amount of people are going to prevent a Russian victory because they have all their people right there ready to go.

What we want is a deterrent, enough people there so that we convince the Russians that if they moved in, they would involve the Americans, and, therefore, they would be taking a serious risk of a full-scale war.

Whether you have to have 200,000, who with all their dependents come to about 500,000, is a real question. I think we are all looking for some idea as to whether that can be cut down. Whether it can be cut down is going to be determined by how fast you can bring your people into action from the United States.

General KJELLSTROM. Sir, it has been stated by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff in other hearings that the precise number is one that is a judgmental item. Any indication that the United States is not going to fully support our NATO commitment is a sign of weakness during a period of negotiation with the Soviets and their allies.

I am not in a position to provide any finite answer.

Mr. LONG. I understand.

Expand for the record on this question of how fast we can move and whether we have improved our ability to move over there very rapidly.

General KJELLSTROM. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

The Army is prepared to provide forces for rapid reinforcement, on order of competent authority and with provision of adequate sealift and airlift to move the Army forces. How fast forces can move depends upon warning time, if any, and priorities of respective service force closures to satisfy the exact emergency presented by the enemy. Ability to move has improved to the limit of resources available. Subsequent reductions in resources reduce our ability to move rapidly.

For example, to move an Infantry, Mechanized and an Armored Division in World War II vintage (C-2) ships would require 37 days. Similar divisions moving by air and utilizing some C-5 aircraft would require 21 days. It is conceivable that a combination of fast shipping and airlift could reduce the closure to less than 21 days.

These examples of unit closures consider that required transportation is available to move these units when available and when the overseas commander requires the units closed. If other service force movement priorities preempted Army priorities, closure times could be significantly different, and could be later than desired.

General COOPER. If I might go off the record to give you some background.

[Discussion off the record.]

#### FACILITIES AFFECTED BY REDUCTION IN FORCES

Mr. LONG. Which facilities that you are requesting in the fiscal year 1974 program would not be required if an airmobile brigade and an assault battalion were relocated to another post?

General COOPER. The tactical airfield complex-phase III wouldn't be required because we would want to transfer the helicopters along with it. The barracks modernization and barracks complex would still be required.

Let me verify the barracks complex.

Colonel COATS. Would you say again the numbers of the units you were thinking of? As assault battalion? Is that what you are asking sir? A brigade?

Mr. LONG. Airmobile brigade and assault battalion.

Colonel COATS. Sir, in the airmobile division the aviation assets are pooled in the aviation group. The major portion of the lift assets are pooled in the form of a couple of lift battalions.

General COOPER. Let me cut you off. That is normally correct but if we put them very far away we would move a certain percentage of the helicopters with them.

Let me amend my earlier comment. We would not need that new enlisted men's barracks complex. We would need the barracks modernization and we would need the commissary, maybe not exactly that same size, but we do need a new commissary.

Mr. LONG. Let us go back to the question of training the groups together, and this is one reason you mentioned that you would like to keep the division together, so that the division can train together. Can the division actually train together? Is the acreage sufficiently small so that you really can't effectively maneuver two brigades, much less the three brigades, in a training exercise?

Do you lose anything in the training itself by putting another battalion with its air support at another location?

General COOPER. You don't lose too much in training. What you are going to maneuver in essence is the entire division, or almost the entire division. You lose a lot in moving them away in terms of the training up to the level of where you are maneuvering two brigades against another force because you lose the morale and esprit by not having the whole division together.

The division commander has a split responsibility. He has to consider how close it is. Now, if it is 40 miles away that is one thing, but if it is several hundred miles away, you lose a lot.

The difference in what you are talking about and what I am talking about is how important is it in the total division complex to be able to maneuver in essence the entire division at one time, and I would say to you that the amount of time you would really maneuver the entire division is a relatively small amount.

I will try to provide it for the record, but I would guess it is 5 or 10 percent of the time.

[The information follows:]

During calendar year 1973 the 101st Airborne Division has scheduled a total of six division field exercises, each being 2 weeks in duration. Five of the six exercises involve the division headquarters and from one-third to two-thirds of the division's maneuver and support elements. These five exercises account for 20 percent of the training year. The sixth exercise involves the entire division and accounts for an additional 4 percent of the training year.

Mr. LONG. Would it be fair to say that one of the main reasons for wanting to have the division together is command and control of the division, for morale, and for this type of thing which any commander obviously wants to have?

General COOPER. Command control, individual training, unit training certainly up to the battalion level, and individual brigade level.

Mr. LONG. Could you expand for the record on why the individual training would be better if the whole division is at one post rather than one-third of it someplace else?

General COOPER. It is more psychological than it is anything else. Also you want to be sure you have the same standards. These people are all recruited for the 101st Division and they really want to go to

the home of the 101st Division. They don't want to go to some outlying post.

If you do that, the individual brigade commander can perhaps build up his separate morale and esprit but you are better off having them there together.

Mr. LONG. Is commanding a division a much greater responsibility than it used to be?

General COOPER. Yes, sir. You have a lot more equipment. You have at least as many problems with the people.

Mr. LONG. We only had about four or five fighting divisions in Vietnam. All the rest were support, weren't they?

General COOPER. No; we had up to nine divisions in Vietnam.

Mr. LONG. Fighting regularly?

General COOPER. Oh, yes, sir. I could tick them off if you wanted me to.

Mr. LONG. No, that is all right.

Does a major general still command a division?

General COOPER. A major general still commands a division but he has a lot more responsibilities in terms of—

Mr. LONG. It must take one of your really top drawer major generals to be put in that command responsibility.

General COOPER. Yes, sir, and General Cushman who commands the 101st is certainly of that caliber.

In many cases he now has to go out and recruit troops. General Cushman had an extensive program where he sent, I think, as many as 1,000 recruiters out to try to build his division up to strength.

Mr. LONG. I wonder why we need so many three- and four-star generals, if one of the most important assignments is commanding a division. I would think it would be.

You have a great many three- and four-star generals. As I understand it, there are almost as many as we had when the Army was four times its present size.

General COOPER. That is beyond my responsibility.

General KJELLSTROM. I have been involved in that one, sir, and I would like to have a long discussion with you some other day.

Mr. LONG. I don't want to take the time on that.

General KJELLSTROM. Some other day.

#### SCOPE OF TACTICAL AIRFIELD COMPLEX

Mr. LONG. It seems that phase III of the tactical airfield complex, if built, would provide substantially more in the way of apron and maintenance space than are set out in the criteria of the Boatwright Report.

[The Boatwright Report calls for 432,000 square yards of parking aprons and 405,000 square feet of aircraft maintenance facilities to support the 422 aircraft of an airmobile division, whereas the fiscal year 1974 request would provide a total of 625,000 to 737,000 square yards of parking aprons and 510,339 square feet of maintenance space.]

Can you explain for the record the fact that you now seem to require so much more space?

[The information follows:]

The aviation complex at Fort Campbell is being built to meet current Department of the Army permanent criteria, not the study criteria developed in the

Boatwright Report. DA criteria are presented in TM 5-803-4, Planning of Army Aviation Facilities.

The Boatwright study had a broad mission to develop a long range stationing plan for the Army and serve as a guide for MCA planning. Criteria developed for the evaluation of installations were not intended as precise measures of requirements but as flexible standards for determining the relative capabilities of installations.

TM 5-803-4 envisions a base airfield and two base heliports for an airmobile division due to aircraft density. The Boatwright study stated that two was the minimum number of airfields/heliports to be considered for an airmobile division. The Boatwright study further recognized that the use of multiple airfields/heliports will cause some increase in the overall requirements in order that unit integrity may be maintained.

The Boatwright report considered that essential and desirable requirements for aviation facilities were the same in most instances except for helicopter pads and some taxiways. These pads and taxiways were considered as being built to combat zone standards and used for limited periods of time.

The Boatwright airfield criteria were qualified "as not to be considered as fixed measures of an airfield's capability." The configuration or function of existing facilities at a specific installation varies considerably so that their utility in meeting requirements may result in considerable differences from the general criteria.

The Boatwright report figures cited were the study criteria for facilities for only the organic aircraft of an airmobile division. The current requirements at Fort Campbell are for facilities to support 439 authorized aircraft. This includes not only the 422 aircraft organic to the 101st Airborne Division (airmobile) but also the aircraft assigned to the U.S. Army garrison and a heavy helicopter company. The heavy helicopter company is authorized 9 each CH-54 helicopters.

All existing, adequate facilities of the installation have been incorporated into current planning. Phase III provides a separate base heliport and will complete the planned aviation complex.

Mr. Long. Provide a detailed analysis for the record on the areas required for the types of aircraft stationed at Fort Campbell in each of phases I, II, and III.

[The information follows:]

Primary Aviation Facilities Required and Provided at Fort Campbell by Phase

<u>Phase</u>	<u>Unit (Aircraft)</u>	<u>Maintenance Hangars<sup>1/</sup></u>		<u>Rotary Wing Parking Apron</u>	
		<u>Authorized* (SF)</u>	<u>Provided (SF)</u>	<u>Authorized (SY)<sup>2/</sup></u>	<u>Provided (SY)<sup>3/</sup></u>
I	Assault Support Helicopter Bn (48 CH-47s)	126,000		100,800 (20,010 rigid pavement, remainder least first cost (l.f.c.))	
	Heavy Helicopter Co (9 CH-54s)	24,745		17,980 (3,890 rigid pavement, remainder l.f.c.)	
		<u>150,745</u>	149,972	<u>118,780</u> (23,900 rigid)	41,200 rigid 102,400 l.f.c.
	Direct Support Maintenance Co	32,600	32,400		
II	2 Assault Helicopter Bn (78 aircraft each) 1 Transportation Corps Bn (5 UH-1s) Assault Support Helicopter Bn (2 UH-1s)	99,900		185,485*	
		<u>99,900</u>	99,200	<u>185,485</u>	153,000 rigid
III	Air Cavalry Squadron (85 aircraft)	64,900		96,711	
	Division Artillery (58 aircraft)	50,000		65,991	
		<u>114,900</u>	114,900	<u>162,702*</u>	140,450 rigid

\* TM 5-803-4 as revised.

1/ Criteria based on providing hangar space for 50% of the 25% of authorized aircraft in organizational maintenance and 75% of the 15% of the fleet in direct support (DS) maintenance. All the units above have organic DS maintenance.

2/ Criteria based on providing parking space for 75% of authorized aircraft. Allowances are based on general configuration and do not include maintenance hangar aprons, shoulders, or other flexible pavement areas. Specific siting may permit adherence to basic criteria with less than the allowable space.

3/ Includes maintenance hangar aprons.

Mr. LONG. Provide for the record the aircraft associated with phase 3 of the tactical airfield complex at Fort Campbell. Show the units, their missions, and whether they must be collocated with the remainder of the division?

[The information follows:]

Phase 3 will provide aviation facilities for the 143 rotary wing aircraft of the Air Cavalry Squadron and Division Artillery of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). Both units are organic to the division and must be collocated with the rest of the division for the integration of the unique functions they perform.

The mission of the Air Cavalry Squadron is to perform reconnaissance security and economy of force operations. The mission of the Aviation Battery of the Airmobile Division Artillery is to increase the combat effectiveness of the Airmobile Division Artillery by providing aerial observation posts for the acquisition of targets and adjustment of artillery fires on those targets as well as immediately responsive aviation support for the necessary command and control of the division artillery and its attached units. The mission of the Aerial Field Artillery Battalion is to provide direct fire support to maneuver forces of the airmobile division.

The aircraft assignment by type for these units follows :

Unit	OH-58	UH-1H	AH-1G
2/17 Air Cavalry Squadron .....	30	28	27
3/77 Aviation Battery, 101st Division Artillery .....	16	3	3
4/77 Aerial Field Artillery Battalion .....		3	36
Total (143) .....	46	34	63

Mr. LONG. Will this complete the airfield requirement at Fort Campbell?

General COOPER. Phase 3 will complete the airfield requirements based on current stationing plans.

Mr. LONG. What ranges are available, by type, for training with armed helicopters at Fort Campbell? Must some types of training be conducted elsewhere, if so where?

General COOPER. The ranges available at Fort Campbell are limited but adequate for the aerial gunnery training for the armed helicopters. Pilots and gunners previously qualified may fire modified training firing tables for all weapons systems with an instructor pilot on board.

Initial gunnery qualification must be conducted on the larger ranges at Fort Rucker due to the increased range safety requirements.

Mr. LONG. What type follow-on aircraft are you considering?

General COOPER. The utility tactical transport aircraft system (UTTAS) and the advanced attack helicopter (AAH).

#### BARRACKS COMPLEX

Mr. LONG. What units or personnel will occupy the barracks complex requested for Fort Campbell?

General COOPER. The proposed EM barracks complex will house the 1st and 2nd brigades of the 101st Airborne Division (airmobile) plus small elements of the Division Support Command.

Mr. LONG. Mr. Davis?

#### BOATWRIGHT STUDY

Mr. DAVIS. This is the first time I have run into the Boatwright report. Would you give me the background on that? What did it attempt to do? Where does it stand now?

General COOPER. The Boatwright study was undertaken in connection with the phase down in Vietnam where we had nine divisions. The question was where are we going to station the troops and what was the stationing plan going to look like after we finished phasing down in Vietnam. Major General Boatwright was the head of the study which is the reason for its name.

He got together a large number of officers. I think they had as many as 34 or 35 officers plus supporting help working full time on this study. They went out and looked at all of the installations.

They then went down and started developing criteria which were a little bit more specific than we would like to be held to as the number of acres per maneuvering unit. They came up with a list, among other things, of what are your best division station posts and where we should station divisions that were brought back from Vietnam.

They looked at the training centers. They looked at all of the different aspects of the stationing plan, but the genesis of the study was really where were you going to put the divisions brought back from Vietnam. The report is quite thick. It has a lot of extremely valuable data developed by going out on the ground, being sure that everything said in the report back in Washington existed in the field.

We can give you a separate briefing on it sometime if you would like. It would take about a half hour.

Mr. DAVIS. When was it started?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. June 1969, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. It was submitted when?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. November 1970.

General COOPER. But it was never, as I mentioned earlier, approved as a study. It was basically reviewed by the Chief of Staff of the Army to use as a basis for information used in planning.

#### COMMISSARY

Mr. DAVIS. Did that report attempt to set criteria or requirements for commissaries?

General COOPER. Not that I know of. The criteria for commissaries and supporting facilities for the most part are established by the Department of Defense for all services. We have a separate DOD manual—4270.1 M. I guess it is. The Department of Defense instruction is what it is called. It establishes such criteria as the number of square feet per man in barracks space, 21,000 square feet for a gym, for 1,000 to 3,000 people or so.

We have a copy of it here if you are interested.

This is the document I was referring to the Construction Criteria Manual.

Mr. DAVIS. What is the date on that? What I am trying to get at is when the specific item of commissary requirements was last reviewed?

General COOPER. This was published on October 1, 1972. I am not sure of the date of the document that this supersedes. Mr. Fitz tells me that the previous document was 1968.

Mr. LONG. Will you see that my office gets a copy of that report?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. I would very much like to see it. And the committee also, if you will, General.

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. And anybody else here who would like to have one. Would you like to have one?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, I would. I am concerned about this.

[The copies were provided.]

Mr. DAVIS. In relation to this specific commissary request here, for 109,500 square feet, I note that the existing facility apparently is about 55,000 square feet. The justification sheet indicates that upon completion of the new facility 16 temporary buildings totaling 77,000 square feet will be demolished.

Can you bring that together for me?

General COOPER. We would demolish both the buildings that were World War II temporary that were used for commissary purposes and are no longer needed. We also would demolish buildings that were on the site where we are building the new commissary so we don't necessarily get a one-to-one correspondence.

#### DIVISION STRENGTH

Mr. DAVIS. The justifications here show a contemplated increase in enlisted strength of about 4,000, an increase of about 400 officers, and a decrease of about 280 civilian personnel. What is this substantial increase in military personnel?

General COOPER. They are building the 101st up to full strength. It was considerably below full strength and the difference in these numbers is primarily due to the fact that we are going to build it up to 100 percent strength.

Mr. LONG. Which is how many men, General?

General COOPER. Oh, I don't have it specifically. It is roughly 15,000.

Mr. LONG. 15,000 is the full strength division?

General COOPER. Yes.

Mr. LONG. In peacetime? It is bigger in wartime; right?

General COOPER. In wartime, for example, in Vietnam we had units at 110 percent strength to allow for casualties and people going out, but normally in wartime you would have them at 100 percent also.

Mr. LONG. I thought in World War II we had divisions that averaged 20,000.

General COOPER. Divisions were bigger in World War II than they are now and I think—this is a personal opinion, not necessarily authorized—in trying to keep the total number of divisions up one of the steps we went through many years ago was to reduce the size of the divisions.

That is slightly cynical but you had to keep five divisions in Europe. You didn't have the total number of people so what you did was to reduce the size of divisions and say you still had five divisions.

Mr. LONG. Don't Russian divisions run about half our size? Ten thousand? I wonder if that wouldn't be more manageable in view of the tremendous responsibility a division has gotten to be.

General COOPER. That is another straightforward reason for reducing the size of the division, because of control.

## CIVILIANIZATION

Mr. DAVIS. As you know, General Cooper, over in the other subcommittee we have been setting aside money and having considerable discussion about the so-called civilianization program and that seems to be working in the other direction here at Fort Campbell.

General COOPER. Fort Campbell is primarily the 101st Division and we can't civilianize the troops directly. We can and to provide such things as civilian KP's, so that the troops that are there can be used on their military duties as opposed to KP, but you won't find a large potential for civilianization within a division post.

Where you will find it much more is where you have administrative duties or where you have supply duties, but even there was can overdo it. We ended up in deep trouble in Vietnam for overcivilianizing our depots and we couldn't get the civilians to go to Vietnam and we didn't really have an adequate number of supply military people, depot people, trained. General Kiellstrom can comment on that.

So you have to be careful. But the division at Fort Campbell is not the place you would expect to see a large degree of civilianization.

General KJELLSTROM. The Army is proposing to substitute 10,000 civilians for 10,000 military positions in the fiscal year 1974 budget. We are actually eliminating 11,700 military from our fiscal troops basis because of the support tail related to the 10,000 military spaces eliminated.

We have substituted in the training base, within-base operations—and you will find base operation support at Fort Campbell—and also within the medical program and the logistics area. Even though it is not evident in the figures for Fort Campbell, I would be very happy to provide you the specifics on the civilianization program as it applies to Fort Campbell. I am confident that there is a civilianization effort that applies at Fort Campbell as well as most other continental U.S. positions, camps, and stations.

[The information follows:]

The Army's civilianization program includes a civilian conversion quota of 197 positions at Fort Campbell, Ky. The Army plans to civilianize 132 positions at the medical department activities (MEDDAC) and 65 positions within the U.S. Army garrison. These positions are in such occupational areas as medical care and treatment, supply, clerical, motor transport, and food service (except KP). These conversions will all be from military to direct-hire civilians. No contract labor is programed for Fort Campbell.

Mr. LONG. Mr. Davis, do you have many more questions?

## COMMISSARY PATRONAGE

Mr. DAVIS. I have just one more on this commissary situation. I think we ought to have, in view of the substantial facility contemplated here, a breakdown, if it is available, between onpost personnel and others who would be included in these 17,000 families to be served by this new commissary.

Would those figures be available?

General COOPER. Yes, sir. I can give you a rough estimate. We have, for example, at Fort Campbell about 2,400 families that are living off post in quarters and we have about 2,854 quarters on the post. This is through the 1973 program.

The people off the post definitely come to the commissary on the post because the savings are significant. They average about 30 percent. As a matter of fact, people drive many, many miles and I think probably waste gasoline and car mileage to go to commissaries to save that 30 percent.

Mr. DAVIS. We have about 5,000 accounted for out of the 17,000. Where are the rest of those? Where is that other 12,000?

General COOPER. 12,000 families?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes.

General COOPER. We have a fair number of retired people.

Mr. DAVIS. Let us not take the time but I wish you would for the record give us as good a breakdown as you can as to what is the basis for those 17,000 families that are cited in the justification. Would you?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

Based on a customer survey conducted at the Fort Campbell commissary, plans for the 101st Airborne Division attaining full strength and a projection of other authorized families it is estimated that the commissary will serve 17,000 families by fiscal year 1974. Following is a breakdown of the anticipated family patronage:

<i>Category</i>	<i>Number</i>
Army personnel quartered on the installation.....	2, 848
Army personnel assigned to but living off the installation.....	5, 081
Other military personnel not assigned to Fort Campbell who use the commissary .....	2, 650
Retired and other miscellaneous authorized families.....	3, 809
Expected increase in Army families to complete fill of the 101st Airborne Division .....	2, 128
Anticipated increase in retired and other miscellaneous authorized families .....	484
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>17, 000</b>

Mr. DAVIS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

FORT GORDON, GA.

Mr. LONG. Turn to Fort Gordon, Ga.

Mr. Reporter, please put page 60 in the record.

[The page follows:]

1. DATE 9 July 1973		2. DEPARTMENT ARMY		3. INSTALLATION Fort Gordon			4. COMMAND OR MANAGEMENT BUREAU Third United States Army			5. INSTALLATION CONTROL NUMBER Georgia 055			6. STATE/COUNTRY Georgia		
7. STATUS Active		8. YEAR OF INITIAL OCCUPANCY 1941			9. COUNTY (U.S.) Richmond Jefferson, Columbia & McDuffie			10. NEAREST CITY Augusta, 12 miles Northeast			11. MISSION OR MAJOR FUNCTIONS  Provides facilities and support for the US Army Signal School, US Army General Hospital, and assigned STRAF Units. Provides support for reserve components.  * Includes trainees ** \$700 one-time cost for easement.				
12. PERSONNEL STRENGTH												13. INVENTORY			
PERMANENT			STUDENTS			SUPPORTED			TOTAL						
OFFICER (1)	ENLISTED (2)	CIVILIAN (3)	OFFICER (4)	ENLISTED (5)	OFFICER (6)	ENLISTED (7)	CIVILIAN (8)				TOTAL (9)				
a. AS OF 31 Dec 1972	727	5,023	2,663	722	10,886	467	859	616			21,963				
b. PLANNED (End FY 78)	891	5,906	4,272	739	9,114	5	14	0			20,941				
LAND		ACRES (1)		LAND COST (\$000) (2)		IMPROVEMENT (\$000) (3)		TOTAL (\$000) (4)							
a. OWNED	55,518		965		109,113		110,078								
b. LEASES AND EASEMENTS	8		1**				1								
c. INVENTORY TOTAL (Except land sum) AS OF 30 JUNE 19 72										110,079					
d. AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY (Exclusive of family housing - \$4,655)										47,966					
e. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM										23,780					
f. ESTIMATED AUTHORIZATION - NEXT 4 YEARS (Exclusive of family housing - \$19,116)										49,399					
g. GRAND TOTAL (c + d + e + f)										231,224					
SUMMARY OF INSTALLATION PROJECTS															
PROJECT DESIGNATION					TENANT COMMAND		AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM		FUNDING PROGRAM						
CATEGORY CODE NO. a	PROJECT TITLE b			Page No c	UNIT OF MEASURE d	SCOPE e	ESTIMATED COST (\$000) f	SCOPE g	ESTIMATED COST (\$000) h						
				<b>PRIORITY</b>											
721	85 - EM Barracks Complex			1 61	MN	2,028	19,212	2,028	19,212						
721	103 - Barracks Modernization (EW)			1 63	EW	645	1,018	645	1,018						
740	74 - Commissary			38 64	SF	98,190	2,924	98,190	2,924						
740	100 - Automotive Self Help Garage			37 65	SF	17,000	626	17,000	626						
	Total						23,780		23,780						

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## FORT GORDON, GA.—\$23,780,000

Fort Gordon is located 12 miles southwest of Augusta, Ga. The mission of the installation is to support the U.S. Army Southeastern Signal School, the U.S. Army Military Police School, and assigned STRAC units. It also currently operates an Army training center. The program will provide a barracks complex, modernization of barracks for enlisted women, a commissary, and an automotive self-help garage.

*Status of funds*

Funded program not in inventory.....	\$47,966,000
Unobligated projects, Mar. 31, 1973 (actual).....	2,803,000
Unobligated projects, June 30, 1973 (estimated).....	0

## DESIGN INFORMATION

Project	Design cost (thousands)	Percent complete Apr. 30, 1973
EM barracks complex.....	\$600	25
Barracks modernization EW.....	61	25
Commissary.....	125	25
Automotive self-help garage.....	50	100

*Enlisted barracks summary, Fort Gordon, Ga.*

	Men/women <sup>1</sup>
Total requirement.....	10,343
Existing substandard.....	<sup>2</sup> 7,905
Existing adequate.....	<sup>3</sup> 135
Funded, not in inventory.....	418
Adequate assets.....	553
Deficiency.....	9,790
Fiscal year 1974 program.....	2,873
Barracks spaces occupied, Mar. 15, 1973.....	10,023

<sup>1</sup> 90 ft<sup>2</sup> per man—permanent party personnel ; 72 ft<sup>2</sup> per man—trainees.

<sup>2</sup> Includes 6,423 spaces that can be made adequate.

<sup>3</sup> Includes 15 private housing.

Mr. LONG. Do the personnel figures shown for Fort Gordon reflect the base realignment actions?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. I recognize that this barracks complex is for trainees, but would it be possible to make greater use of community support in Augusta to meet the barracks requirements for bachelor personnel other than students?

General COOPER. It would be possible. Augusta is a relatively depressed area. The city of Augusta is going down in strength. We can do that for the officer personnel. Our basic policy is that we want to try to keep the students on the post. Among other things, if there are students on temporary duty you have a fairly high per diem and in almost every case we can show that it is cheaper to provide Government facilities on the post than to pay the individuals per diem.

We also prefer to keep students on the post so as to get better use of their time when they are there.

## CONSTRUCTION IMPACT OF REALIGNMENT AT FORT GORDON

Mr. LONG. Would you provide for the record an analysis of the construction which will be required and which will not be required at Fort Gordon as a result of the realignment?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

**MILITARY CONSTRUCTION IMPACT OF ARMY REORGANIZATION/REALIGNMENT,  
FORT GORDON, GA.**

The Army Reorganization/Realignment had no impact on the fiscal year 1974 military construction program planned for Fort Gordon.

Urgent requirements for three projects totaling \$3,632 million were generated. Financing of these requirements is planned by reprogramming funds from fiscal year 1973. Two other projects totaling \$8,086 million are planned for inclusion in future MCA programs through fiscal year 1978.

Three projects totaling \$12,691 planned in Fort Gordon's intermediate MCA program will no longer be required.

Mr. LONG. Have you reviewed the scope of each of the projects requested here in fiscal 1974, including the commissary, to insure that the projects are still needed?

General COOPER. Yes, we have.

Mr. LONG. Is the training load at Fort Gordon being studied in connection with that of Fort Dix?

General COOPER. No, not specifically because the training load at Gordon is advanced individual training. The primary training we are concerned about at Fort Dix is the basic combat training and Gordon is not a basic combat training post.

Mr. LONG. There is no overlap of training that has to be considered?

General COOPER. Well, there are two aspects to this.

First of all, in the review of Fort Dix we are reviewing the Army training centers, the basic training centers, and they are just the six individual training centers.

Separately there are places such as Gordon and McClellan, that have advanced individual training. For example, the MP's now have their advanced individual training at Gordon which is scheduled to move to McClellan. We are looking to see if that advanced individual training could be moved to Dix. I want to differentiate between the study on the basic training and the study on backfill.

**FORT JACKSON, S.C.**

Mr. LONG. Fort Jackson, S.C.

Insert page 66 in the record.

[The page follows:]

1. DATE 9 July 1973	2. DEPARTMENT ARMY	3. INSTALLATION Fort Jackson																																																																													
4. COMMAND OR MANAGEMENT BUREAU Third United States Army		5. INSTALLATION CONTROL NUMBER South Carolina 455																																																																													
6. STATE/COUNTRY South Carolina		7. STATUS Active																																																																													
8. YEAR OF INITIAL OCCUPANCY 1917		9. COUNTY (U.S.) Richland																																																																													
10. NEAREST CITY Columbia		11. MISSION OR MAJOR FUNCTIONS Command, training and logistical support of a major Army Training Center, and a US Army Reception Station. Support of summer reserve component training.																																																																													
12. PERSONNEL STRENGTH		13. INVENTORY																																																																													
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th rowspan="2"></th> <th colspan="3">PERMANENT</th> <th colspan="4">STUDENTS</th> <th rowspan="2">TOTAL (2)</th> </tr> <tr> <th>OFFICER (1)</th> <th>ENLISTED (2)</th> <th>CIVILIAN (3)</th> <th>OFFICER (4)</th> <th>ENLISTED (5)</th> <th>OFFICER (6)</th> <th>ENLISTED (7)</th> <th>CIVILIAN (8)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>a. AS OF <u>31 Dec 1972</u></td> <td>937</td> <td>19,977</td> <td>3,086</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>24,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>b. PLANNED (End FY 75)</td> <td>832</td> <td>4,731</td> <td>2,313</td> <td>0</td> <td>15,292*</td> <td>4</td> <td>10</td> <td>3</td> <td>23,185</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>			PERMANENT			STUDENTS				TOTAL (2)	OFFICER (1)	ENLISTED (2)	CIVILIAN (3)	OFFICER (4)	ENLISTED (5)	OFFICER (6)	ENLISTED (7)	CIVILIAN (8)	a. AS OF <u>31 Dec 1972</u>	937	19,977	3,086						24,000	b. PLANNED (End FY 75)	832	4,731	2,313	0	15,292*	4	10	3	23,185	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>LAND</th> <th>ACRES (1)</th> <th>LAND COST (\$000) (2)</th> <th>IMPROVEMENT (\$000) (3)</th> <th>TOTAL (\$000) (4)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>a. OWNED</td> <td>52,593</td> <td>1,550</td> <td>113,610</td> <td>115,160</td> </tr> <tr> <td>b. LEASES AND EASEMENTS</td> <td>6</td> <td>3**</td> <td>0</td> <td>3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>c. INVENTORY TOTAL (Except land rent) AS OF 30 JUNE 19 <u>72</u></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>115,163</td> </tr> <tr> <td>d. AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY (Exclusive of family housing - \$11,064)</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>23,228</td> </tr> <tr> <td>e. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>2,902</td> </tr> <tr> <td>f. ESTIMATED AUTHORIZATION - NEXT 4 YEARS (Exclusive of family housing - \$12,420)</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>47,185</td> </tr> <tr> <td>g. GRAND TOTAL (c + d + e + f)</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>188,478</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	LAND	ACRES (1)	LAND COST (\$000) (2)	IMPROVEMENT (\$000) (3)	TOTAL (\$000) (4)	a. OWNED	52,593	1,550	113,610	115,160	b. LEASES AND EASEMENTS	6	3**	0	3	c. INVENTORY TOTAL (Except land rent) AS OF 30 JUNE 19 <u>72</u>				115,163	d. AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY (Exclusive of family housing - \$11,064)				23,228	e. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM				2,902	f. ESTIMATED AUTHORIZATION - NEXT 4 YEARS (Exclusive of family housing - \$12,420)				47,185	g. GRAND TOTAL (c + d + e + f)				188,478
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721	105 - EW Barracks w/Mess	1	67		EW	370	2,902	370	2,902																																																																						

## FORT JACKSON, S.C.—\$2,902,000

Fort Jackson is located at Columbia, S.C. The mission of the installation is to command and support an Army training center. It also commands and supports a U.S. Army reception station and supports Reserve components summer training. The program consists of barracks with dining facilities for enlisted women.

*Status of funds*

Funded program not in inventory.....	\$23, 228, 000
Unobligated projects, Mar. 31, 1973 (actual).....	363, 000
Unobligated projects, June 30, 1973 (estimated).....	-----

## DESIGN INFORMATION

Project	Design cost (thousands)	Percent complete Apr. 30, 1973
EW barracks with mess.....	\$75	25

*Enlisted barracks summary, Fort Jackson, S.C.*

	Men/women <sup>1</sup>
Total requirement.....	22, 522
Existing substandard.....	13, 089
Existing adequate.....	<sup>2</sup> 10, 171
Funded, not in inventory.....	2, 340
Adequate assets.....	12, 511
Deficiency.....	10, 011
Fiscal year 1974 program.....	370
Barracks spaces occupied, Mar. 15, 1973.....	13, 305

<sup>1</sup> 90 ft.<sup>2</sup> per man—permanent party personnel; 72 ft.<sup>2</sup> per man—trainees.

<sup>2</sup> Includes 370 private housing.

Mr. LONG. What barracks are enlisted women at Fort Jackson using now?

General COOPER. The accommodations that are now in use by these women are some temporary barracks spaces. I have the specific building numbers if you want, but basically they are the World War II mobilization type.

## ARMY RECEPTION STATIONS

Mr. LONG. Provide for the record information on the Army's reception stations. Show which are of recent construction, when the others will be replaced or modernized, and what utilization has been experienced and what is anticipated.

Also indicate what consideration has been given to joint service utilization of these reception stations.

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

Modern reception stations are located at Fort Jackson, S.C. (November 1972) and Fort Dix (March 1973). Others planned, by date, are:

	Fiscal year
Fort McClellan, Ala. (WAC Center).....	1974
Fort Ord, Calif.....	1975
Fort Polk, La.....	1976
Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.....	1977
Fort Knox, Ky.—Date has not been established since it is outside the 5-year plan.	

Utilization was at 90 percent of capacity as of the third quarter fiscal year 1973. Anticipated utilization for fiscal year 1974 is expected to be at 75-80 percent of capacity due to a programed reduction in the total number of accessions in fiscal year 1974.

Reception stations are collocated with the Army training centers and are organized for the purpose of processing Army accessions who will receive basic combat training (BCT) at that center. In general, it would not be practical or feasible to use Army reception stations for joint service use since they are not located contiguous to other services (Air Force and Navy) training facilities. Similarly, the use of Air Force or Navy reception centers would not appear to be advantageous to the Army. However, the Army would be willing to discuss this with the other services.

Mr. LONG. Is Fort Jackson one of your firm, basic training centers?  
General COOPER. Yes, sir.

FORT McCLELLAN, ALA.

Mr. LONG. Next is Fort McClellan, Ala.  
Please insert in the record pages 68 and 69.  
[The pages follow :]

1. DATE 9 July 1973		2. DEPARTMENT ARMY		3. INSTALLATION Fort McClellan											
4. COMMAND OR MANAGEMENT BUREAU Third United States Army			5. INSTALLATION CONTROL NUMBER Alabama 102		6. STATE/COUNTRY Alabama										
7. STATUS Active		8. YEAR OF INITIAL OCCUPANCY 1915		9. COUNTY (U.S.) Calhoun	10. NEAREST CITY Anniston - 7 miles southwest										
11. MISSION OR MAJOR FUNCTIONS Supports the WAC Center and Schools (Basic and Officer Candidate Courses), Noble Army Hospital and the US Army Police School. Supports USAR and USMC Units.  * Includes trainees, transients, and students				12. PERSONNEL STRENGTH		PERMANENT		STUDENTS		SUPPORTED		TOTAL			
				(1)	ENLISTED (2)	CIVILIAN (3)	OFFICER (4)	ENLISTED (5)	OFFICER (6)	ENLISTED (7)	CIVILIAN (8)	(9)			
				a. AS OF 31 Dec 1972	500	3,697	1,182	253	3,220				8,852		
				b. PLANNED (End FY 75)	576	2,819	1,212	380	*5,119	5	3	0	10,114		
				13. INVENTORY											
				LAND		ACRES (1)		LAND COST (\$000) (2)		IMPROVEMENT (\$000) (3)		TOTAL (\$000) (4)			
				a. OWNED		41,229		757		60,107		60,864			
				b. LEASES AND EASEMENTS		4,509		0		0		0			
				c. INVENTORY TOTAL (Except land rent) AS OF 30 JUNE 19 72								60,864			
				d. AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY								2,787			
e. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM								19,505							
f. ESTIMATED AUTHORIZATION - NEXT 4 YEARS (Exclusive of family housing - \$3,492)								21,793							
g. GRAND TOTAL (c + d + e + f)								104,949							
SUMMARY OF INSTALLATION PROJECTS															
PROJECT DESIGNATION															
CATEGORY CODE NO.	PROJECT TITLE			Page No	TENANT COMMAND	UNIT OF MEASURE	AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM		FUNDING PROGRAM		ESTIMATED COST (\$000)				
a	b			c	d	SCOPE	ESTIMATED COST (\$000)	SCOPE	ESTIMATED COST (\$000)						
				No			e		h						
				PRIORITY			f		g						
171	171 - Alter Training Facilities			1	69A		558		558						
171	255 - Academic Facilities Additions (WAC Basic)			1	70	SF	77,864	2,695	77,864	2,695					
610	259 - Alteration & Addition to WAC Headquarters			8	71	SF	18,000	333	18,000	333					
721	163 - EW Barracks			1	72	EW	645	2,739	645	2,739					
721	250 - Housing & Training Facility/WAC Band			1	73	EW	34	1,035	34	1,035					
721	251 - WAC Reception & Processing Building			1	74	EW	341	3,849	341	3,849					
721	263 - Barracks Modernization			1	75	MN	1,652	3,543	1,652	3,543					
724	257 - Bachelor Officers Quarters			1	76	MN	100	1,560	100	1,560					
740	258 - Gymnasium			1	77	SF	30,704	1,261	30,704	1,261					

1. DATE		2. DEPARTMENT		3. INSTALLATION				
2 Apr 1973		ARMY		Fort McClellan				
SUMMARY OF INSTALLATION PROJECTS (Continued)								
LINE ITEM DESIGNATION					AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM	FUNDING PROGRAM		
CATEGORY CODE NO. a	PROJECT TITLE b	Page No	TENANT COMMAND c	UNIT OF MEASURE d	SCOPE e	ESTIMATED COST (\$000) f	SCOPE g	ESTIMATED COST (\$000) h
821	252 - Utilities Extension	78				1,932		1,932
	Total					19,505		19,505

## FORT McCLELLAN, ALA.—\$19,505,000

Fort McClellan is located 7 miles northeast of Anniston, Ala. The mission of the installation is to support the Chemical Center and Chemical School, and the Women's Army Corps (WAC) center and school. The WAC center and school conducts basic training and Officer Candidate courses. The installation also supports the Third Army NCO Academy and Noble Army Hospital. The program provides an addition to the academic facilities, alteration and addition to WAC headquarters, barracks for enlisted women, a housing and training facility for the WAC band, a WAC reception and processing building, barracks modernization for enlisted women, bachelor officer quarters, a gymnasium, extension of utilities, and alteration to training facilities.

*Status of funds*

Funded program not in inventory.....	\$2, 787, 000
Unobligated projects, Mar. 31, 1973 (actual).....	333, 000
Unobligated projects, June 30, 1973 (estimated).....	0

## DESIGN INFORMATION

Project	Design cost (thousands)	Percent complete Apr. 30, 1973
Academic facilities addition.....	\$120	0
Alteration and addition to WAC headquarters.....	18	0
EW barracks.....	130	0
Housing and training facilities WAC band.....	50	0
WAC receipt and process building.....	150	0
Barracks modernization EW.....	116	25
Bachelor officer quarters WAC.....	140	0
Gymnasium.....	60	0
Utilities extension.....	100	0
Alterations to training facilities.....	40	0

*Enlisted barracks summary, Fort McClellan, Ala.*

	Men/women <sup>1</sup>
Total requirement.....	6, 393
Existing substandard.....	<sup>2</sup> 4, 588
Existing adequate.....	<sup>3</sup> 25
Funded, not in inventory.....	1, 040
Adequate assets.....	1, 065
Deficiency.....	5, 328
Fiscal year 1974 program.....	2, 672
Barracks spaces occupied, Sept. 24, 1972.....	3, 946

<sup>1</sup> 90 square feet per man—permanent party personnel; 72 square feet per man—trainees.

<sup>2</sup> Includes 2,251 spaces that can be made adequate.

<sup>3</sup> Private housing.

*Bachelor officer quarters summary, Fort McClellan, Ala.*

	Men/women <sup>1</sup>
Total requirement.....	443
Existing substandard.....	<sup>1</sup> 319
Existing adequate.....	<sup>2</sup> 25
Funded, not in inventory.....	0
Adequate assets.....	25
Deficiency.....	418
Fiscal year 1974 program.....	100
Occupying BOQ's, Sept. 24, 1972.....	319

<sup>1</sup> Includes 160 spaces that can be made adequate.

<sup>2</sup> Private housing.

## REALINEMENTS AT FORT MCCLELLAN

Mr. LONG. What is the effect of the base realignment package on Fort McClellan?

General COOPER. The effect of the base realignment package on Fort McClellan is to move that military police school and the military police brigade from Fort Gordon to McClellan. That is the primary impact.

Mr. LONG. Would this move require a net addition of about \$16 million in facilities at McClellan?

General COOPER. That is correct. If you want the long range that is correct. We pulled the chemical school out of there. We could put the military police school into where the chemical school was but for the 4th AIT brigade we will require additional facilities.

Mr. LONG. I am very much interested in this whole question of whether these realignments saved anything, or whether we just aren't moving people around. Are you asking for new buildings for them when they were moving out of old, but reasonably serviceable buildings at their former stations?

Aren't we doing an awful lot of that?

General COOPER. No, sir. When we are moving people out, for example, the 4th AIT brigade, they are being moved out of substandard facilities that couldn't be made permanent.

Mr. LONG. You call them substandard, but isn't this a question of definition?

General COOPER. No, sir; well, it is a question of definition. Anything is a question of definition.

Mr. LONG. You just say the existing building is no good to help justify a new building to put them in. You never admit that you waste anything. I am trying to find out to what extent there will be a lot of construction as a result of these realignments.

The whole purpose of the realignment so far as the public is concerned is to save money, to save construction and other costs. Instead, you keep coming up with new construction requirements.

General COOPER. We are very far behind in terms of total permanent barracks facilities, so the realignment doesn't affect that specifically.

Most requirements for barracks that we get as a result of these moves normally would have been required at the place where the group left. And you are correct, the way you save money in realignments is to close bases down and to reduce the number of people. Most of the savings in our realignment package resulted from reductions in numbers of people required.

## SAVINGS FROM ARMY REORGANIZATION

Mr. LONG. Yesterday we couldn't find any operating savings, at all, and there were only very insignificant savings in the construction items as a result of these realignments.

Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LONG. Will you put that in the record. I very much want to see this.

General COOPER. We provided, in great detail, for example, what we had built before and what the future requirements are.

General KJELLSTROM. If I may, Mr. Chairman, there are short-term increased costs in connection with realignment and reorganization. However, there are annual recurring savings which we can validate estimated at \$190 million. I would like to provide the details for the record, if I may, because we do have them very carefully substantiated in this effort.

Mr. LONG. I hope you will. I hope you make it convincing.  
[The information follows:]

Annual recurring savings as a result of the CONUS reorganization, 1973, announced in January 1973, are now expected to be \$188 million, as follows:

*Annual operating cost savings when action is completed*

<i>Action</i>	<i>Millions</i>
Disestablish: Continental Army Command, Combat Developments Command, Third U.S. Army; establish: Training and Doctrine Command, Forces Command-----	\$23.3
Safeguard management action-----	39.4
Army Materiel Command reorganization-----	85.4
Surgeon General reorganization-----	2.7
Other management actions: DA staff and agency reductions, Chemical School disestablishment, reduce activities at Fort Holabird, Md-----	37.2
<b>Total</b> -----	<b>188.0</b>

As the reorganization is implemented, one-time costs will be incurred. These costs will be incurred in the fiscal year 1973-75 time period. Reorganization savings, offset by one-time costs, are expected to be as follows in the fiscal year 1973-78 time period:

<i>Fiscal year:</i>	<i>Millions</i>
1973 -----	<sup>1</sup> 34.6
1974 -----	<sup>2</sup> 10.7
1975 -----	166.8
1976 -----	188.0
1977 -----	188.0
1978 -----	188.0
<b>Total</b> -----	<b>706.9</b>

<sup>1</sup> Represents a net cost.

<sup>2</sup> Fiscal year 1974 savings are not specifically identified as line item reductions in the Army's Fiscal Year 1974 President's Budget. Most of these reductions are in the Operation and Maintenance, Army Appropriation Budget Submission, where they are included under the heading of "Reduction in Civilian Employment—Army Realignment and Reorganization."

It should be noted that the savings shown in the Fiscal Year 1974 column were assumed during formulation of the Fiscal Year 1974 President's Budget.

LOCATION OF MILITARY POLICE TRAINING

Mr. LONG. Why does the Army move military police training to Fort McClellan rather than, for example, to Fort Dix?

General COOPER. Fort McClellan is an installation primarily for the WAC's. It gets to be marginal in terms of the size with just WAC's. We can, by moving the MP's there, get the total strength of McClellan up to the point, long term, where it becomes a viable post, although it is one of the posts that is close to the limit of maybe 10,000.

Mr. LONG. Using your criteria, how would you rate Fort McClellan and Fort Dix for military police training?

General COOPER. I would tend to rate them about equal. I would give Dix the upper hand in terms of having some existing permanent facilities.

The original idea was to close down Fort Dix, but if you don't close down Fort Dix then we have to look again, and we are, whether it would be preferable to move the MP's to Fort Dix.

#### LOCATION FOR WAC TRAINING

Mr. LONG. What about the suitability of each of the locations, Dix and McClellan, for WAC training?

General COOPER. McClellan has quite a lot of facilities right now for the WAC's. It needs quite a bit more. I would say the facilities are roughly comparable. The only reason for wanting to continue at McClellan would be the fact that they are already there and we don't want to move them from one place to another.

But again we are looking at the possibility of moving the WAC's there. We are also looking at the possibility of putting WAC's at the other Army training centers.

Instead of having five battalions of WAC's, all at McClellan, we could locate one battalion at each of five centers. That is one of the possibilities we are looking at.

#### STUDY OF UTILIZATION OF FORT MCCLELLAN

Mr. LONG. Is the Army restudying the long-term utilization of Fort McClellan?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

If I might go off the record for a second.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LONG. Supply for the record the military personnel, and operation and maintenance costs of running Fort McClellan. Also, show the real property maintenance costs for this post. Indicate the replacement cost of the facilities here.

[The information follows:]

Real property, personnel, and other operating costs—Fort McClellan, Ala.

Activity	Fiscal year—		
	1972	1973	1974 <sup>1</sup>
Backlog of essential maintenance and repair.....			286,000
Initial cost of improvements.....			60,107,000
Replacement cost (excluding land).....			228,406,000
<hr/>			
Real property maintenance.....	5,328	4,826	4,213
Other operating costs.....	2,718	4,781	2,282
Personnel:			
Military expense.....	4,656	4,785	5,262
Civilian cost.....	7,741	8,354	8,771

<sup>1</sup> Estimated.

## WOMEN'S ARMY CORPS

Mr. LONG. Provide for the record the present and forecasted strength of the Women's Army Corps, the jobs which will be open to women, where WAC's will be stationed, and the training load for women.

[The information follows:]

As of February 28, 1973, there were 17,015 members in the Women's Army Corps: 1,064 officers, warrant officers, and 15,951 enlisted women. Present plans are to approximately double officer strength by the end of fiscal year 1978. The WAC expansion program projects enlisted strength as follows:

Fiscal year:

1973	-----	15,900
1974	-----	20,000
1975	-----	22,000
1976	-----	23,000
1977	-----	23,500
1978	-----	23,800

Out of an Army total of 482 enlisted military occupational specialties (MOS), 434 are available to women. Women are only restricted from participating in 48 combat-related MOS. Similarly, all officer MOS (excluding medical) are open to WAC officers except those involving a combat role.

WAC personnel will continue to be stationed at those existing locations having WAC units. Strength is projected to increase at all of these installations, some proportionately more than others. This is especially the case at basic training and advanced individual training facilities.

The training load at the U.S. WAC Center/School, Fort McClellan, for fiscal year 1974 is projected for 2,360.

Mr. LONG. Which of the projects requested here are not in support of the WACs?

General COOPER. The first project or 171-altering training facilities, is for the M.P.'s. All the rest of them are for the WACs.

## FORT McPHERSON, GA.

Mr. LONG. Fort McPherson, Ga.

Insert page 79 in the record.

[The page follows:]

1. DATE 9 July 1973		2. DEPARTMENT ARMY		3. INSTALLATION Fort McPherson								
4. COMMAND OR MANAGEMENT BUREAU Third United States Army		5. INSTALLATION CONTROL NUMBER Georgia 115		6. STATE/COUNTRY Georgia								
7. STATUS Active		8. YEAR OF INITIAL OCCUPANCY 1885		9. COUNTY (U.S.) Fulton	10. NEAREST CITY Atlanta							
11. MISSION OR MAJOR FUNCTIONS Headquarters US Army Forces Command				12. PERSONNEL STRENGTH								
				PERMANENT			STUDENTS		SUPPORTED		TOTAL	
				OFFICER (1)	ENLISTED (2)	CIVILIAN (3)	OFFICER (4)	ENLISTED (5)	OFFICER (6)	ENLISTED (7)	CIVILIAN (8)	TOTAL (9)
				a. AS OF 31 Dec 1972	54	302	701					1,057
				b. PLANNED (End FY 75)	739	1,415	2,325	0	0	0	0	4,479
				13. INVENTORY								
LAND		ACRES (1)		LAND COST (\$000) (2)		IMPROVEMENT (\$000) (3)		TOTAL (\$000) (4)				
a. OWNED		505		154		9,645		9,799				
b. LEASES AND EASEMENTS								0				
c. INVENTORY TOTAL (Except land rent) AS OF 30 JUNE 19		72						9,799				
d. AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY								0				
e. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM								1,804				
f. ESTIMATED AUTHORIZATION - NEXT 4 YEARS								9,091				
g. GRAND TOTAL (c + d + e + f)								20,694				
SUMMARY OF INSTALLATION PROJECTS												
PROJECT DESIGNATION												
CATEGORY CODE NO. a	PROJECT TITLE b			Page No c	TENANT COMMAND d	AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM e		FUNDING PROGRAM f				
	PROJECT TITLE b			Page No c	TENANT COMMAND d	AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM e		FUNDING PROGRAM f				
721	49 - Barracks Modernization			1 80	MN	448 1,804		448 1,804				
	PROJECT TITLE b			Page No c	TENANT COMMAND d	AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM e		FUNDING PROGRAM f				
	PROJECT TITLE b			Page No c	TENANT COMMAND d	AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM e		FUNDING PROGRAM f				

## FORT MCPHERSON, GA.—\$1,804,000

Fort McPherson is located near Atlanta, Ga. The mission of this installation is to provide support for activities of Headquarters, Third United States Army. The program provides barracks modernization.

*Status of funds*

Funded program not in inventory-----	0
Unobligated projects, Mar. 31, 1973 (actual)-----	0
Unobligated projects, June 30, 1973 (estimated)-----	0

## DESIGN INFORMATION

Project	Design cost (thousands)	Percent complete Apr. 30, 1973
Barracks modernization-----	\$116	20

*Enlisted barracks summary, Fort McPherson, Ga.*

Total requirement-----	<sup>1</sup> Men 658
Existing substandard-----	<sup>2</sup> 508
Existing adequate-----	<sup>3</sup> 15
Funded, not in inventory-----	0
Adequate assets-----	15
Deficiency-----	643
Fiscal year 1974 program-----	448
Barracks space occupied, Dec. 31, 1972-----	345

<sup>1</sup> 90 ft.<sup>2</sup> per man—permanent party personnel; 72 ft.<sup>2</sup> per man—trainees.

<sup>2</sup> Includes 448 spaces that can be made adequate.

<sup>3</sup> Private housing.

## FORSCOM HEADQUARTERS

Mr. LONG. Why did the Army select Fort McPherson as U.S. Army Forces Command Headquarters?

General COOPER. The Army, as part of the reorganization that was announced in January of this year, looked at various installations. The main purpose of the reorganization was better management of the Army. We selected Fort McPherson as being a post readily available. There were people there from the 3d Army which was going to be phased out who could also be used in Forces Command.

It was an interim decision designed to accommodate the reorganization. It is one of the installations we will look at in terms of our long-range study to see if that is the best location, long term, for Forces Command.

Mr. LONG. So it is being restudied?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. Supply for the record the costs of operating Fort McPherson, of real property maintenance, the replacement value of the facilities, and so forth.

[The information follows:]

*Real property, personnel, and other operating costs, Fort McPherson, Ga.*

Activity:	<i>Cost (thousands)</i>
Backlog of essential maintenance and repair.....	0
Initial cost of improvements.....	\$9, 645
Replacement cost (excluding land).....	38, 337

	Fiscal year—		
	1972	1973	1974
Real property maintenance.....	3, 949	4, 097	3, 403
Other operating costs.....	1, 927	4, 106	2, 024
Personnel:			
Military expense.....	3, 788	4, 909	4, 502
Civilian cost.....	6, 245	8, 161	9, 610

† Estimated.

Mr. LONG. I note that the replacement value of facilities here is only about \$37 million. Is that correct?

General COOPER. That is correct.

Mr. LONG. What would you have to spend to provide a modern headquarters and supporting facilities here?

General COOPER. I don't have the exact estimate but it would be \$20 or \$30 million probably.

#### FORT RUCKER, ALA.

Mr. LONG. Fort Rucker, Ala.

Insert page 81 in the record.

[The page follows:]

1. DATE 9 July 1973		2. DEPARTMENT ARMY		3. INSTALLATION Fort Rucker														
4. COMMAND OR MANAGEMENT BUREAU Third United States Army			5. INSTALLATION CONTROL NUMBER Alabama 252		6. STATE/COUNTRY Alabama													
7. STATUS Active		8. YEAR OF INITIAL OCCUPANCY 1942		9. COUNTY (U.S.) Dale and Coffee	10. NEAREST CITY Daleville													
11. MISSION OR MAJOR FUNCTIONS Support of the Army Aviation School and Center whose mission is to provide individual pilot training for all fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft and advanced training for organization maintenance and development of aviation doctrines and techniques.  * \$500 one-time cost for easement.				12. PERSONNEL STRENGTH			PERMANENT			STUDENTS			SUPPORTED			TOTAL (9)		
				OFFICER (1)	ENLISTED (2)	CIVILIAN (3)	OFFICER (4)	ENLISTED (5)	OFFICER (6)	ENLISTED (7)	CIVILIAN (8)							
				a. AS OF 31 Dec 1972	1,517	3,951	3,127	875	837	17	33	14	10,371					
				b. PLANNED (End FY 75)	1,210	3,044	2,676	899	767	10	34	1	8,641					
				13. INVENTORY														
				LAND		ACRES (1)		LAND COST (\$000) (2)		IMPROVEMENT (\$000) (3)		TOTAL (\$000) (4)						
				a. OWNED		59,102		868		92,896		93,764						
				b. LEASES AND EASEMENTS		5		0*		0		0						
				c. INVENTORY TOTAL (Except land rent) AS OF 30 JUNE 19 72									93,764					
				d. AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY									11,741					
e. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM									3,987									
f. ESTIMATED AUTHORIZATION - NEXT 4 YEARS (Exclusive of family housing - \$14,328)									42,229									
g. GRAND TOTAL (c + d + e + f)									151,721									
SUMMARY OF INSTALLATION PROJECTS																		
PROJECT DESIGNATION																		
CATEGORY CODE NO. a	PROJECT TITLE b	Priority	Page No	TENANT COMMAND c	UNIT OF MEASURE d	AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM		FUNDING PROGRAM										
						SCOPE e	ESTIMATED COST (\$000) f	SCOPE g	ESTIMATED COST (\$000) h									
100	203 - Upgrade Airfield Facilities	1	81A				534		534									
721	194 - EW Barracks	1	82		EW	155	1,051	155	1,051									
721	196 - Barracks Modernization	1	83		MN	501	2,402	501	2,402									
Totals								3,987		3,987								

## FORT RUCKER, ALA., \$3,987,000

Fort Rucker is located at Daleville, Ala. The mission of this installation is support of the Army Aviation Center which trains individual pilots for fixed and rotary wing Army aircraft. It also supports advanced training for organizational maintenance of aircraft. The program consists of barracks for enlisted women, barracks modernization, and upgrading of the airfield.

*Status of funds*

	<i>Thousands</i>
Funded program not in inventory.....	\$11,741
Unobligated projects, Mar. 31, 1973 (actual).....	1,265
Unobligated projects, June 30, 1973 (estimated).....	437

## DESIGN INFORMATION

Project	Design cost (thousands)	Percent complete Apr. 30, 1973
EW barracks.....	50	0
Barracks modernization.....	110	20
Upgrade airfield facility.....	30	0

*Enlisted barracks summary, Fort Rucker, Ala.*

	<i>Men/women<sup>1</sup></i>
Total requirement.....	4,093
Existing substandard.....	<sup>2</sup> 11,037
Existing adequate.....	524
Funded, not in inventory.....	496
Adequate assets.....	1,020
Deficiency.....	3,073
Fiscal year 1974 program.....	656
Barracks spaces occupied.....	2,019

<sup>1</sup> 90 square feet per man—permanent party personnel; 72 square feet per man—trainees.

<sup>2</sup> Includes 918 spaces that can be made adequate.

## CONSOLIDATION OF HELICOPTER TRAINING

Mr. LONG. All Army helicopter training is to be consolidated at Fort Rucker; is that correct? Will it be fully utilized?

General COOPER. That is correct. We are consolidating all of the training. We took the primary training out of Wolters and we took Cobra training, plus some other training, out of Hunter. The facilities will be utilized and we will need a few additional facilities in order to be able to take on this additional work.

Mr. LONG. Will the project for \$534,000 to upgrade airfield facilities here complete the requirements?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. Can you show us what areas will be improved by the fiscal year 1974 project for airfield facilities?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. While he is looking for that, provide for the record the long-range program at Fort Rucker. Will there be any need to modify or expand the range facilities here?

General COOPER. We will provide that.

[The information follows:]

*Fort Rucker, Ala.—Long-range program*

Facility class program for fiscal years 1975-78:	Thousands
Operational .....	\$474
Training .....	3,903
Maintenance and production.....	
R.D.T. & E.....	6,100
Supply .....	
Hospital and medical.....	10,013
Troop housing.....	14,138
Administrative .....	1,186
Community support.....	3,396
Utilities .....	3,019
<b>Total .....</b>	<b>42,229</b>

Mr. LONG. Also show us what ranges you use for AH-1G training, and tell us if you will need more range facilities.

General COOPER. Colonel Coats.

AIRFIELD FACILITIES

Colonel COATS. First, let me show you the different facilities to be improved. At Highbluff, stagefield, five concrete pads, are required for parking and refueling.

Two additional runways are required, one at TAC X and each stagefield. Twenty-eight off post. Pinnacle hover points are required.

At Lowe Field a security fence is required to provide security for the AH-1G cobra helicopters. Supplemental facilities are required at seven of the stage fields. Fixed control towers and airfield lighting are also required at some of these stagefields.

Mr. LONG. Make sure that you identify in the record those areas. Of course, showing them to us is one thing and making it clear in the record where they are is quite another thing.

Colonel COATS. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

IMPROVEMENTS REQUIRED TO FACILITATE CONSOLIDATION OF FLIGHT TRAINING AT FORT RUCKER

Improvement	Name	Site	
		Location	Coordinates
Security fencing.....	Lowe Army Airfield.....	1 mile north of main cantonment.....	EK 188696
Control towers.....	Hatch Stagefield.....	2 miles north of Hanchey Army Heliport.....	EK 311700
	TAC Runkle.....	10 miles west of main cantonment.....	EK 706660
	Lewisville Stagefield.....	30 miles north of main cantonment.....	FL 275202
	Longstreet Stagefield.....	9 miles northwest of Lowe Army Airfield.....	FK 154834
Additional runways.....	TAC X.....	2 miles east of Samson, Ala.....	EK 973437
	ECH Stagefield.....	2½ miles north of Lowe Army Airfield.....	FK 186737
Runway lighting.....	TAC X.....	do.....	FK 186737
	ECH Stagefield.....	do.....	FK 186737
	Longstreet Stagefield.....	do.....	FK 186737
Stagefield fire stations.....	Allen.....	8 miles southeast of Daleville, Ala.....	FK 285558
	Toth.....	6½ miles south of Pinkard, Ala.....	FK 372565
	Hurt.....	5 miles northeast of Lowe Army Airfield.....	FK 350725
	Hooper.....	1½ miles northeast of main post.....	FK 247754
	Highbluff.....	4 miles northwest of Hartford, Ala.....	FK 201470
	Hatch.....	do.....	FK 201470
	Longstreet.....	do.....	FK 201470
Stagefield House.....	TAC X.....	do.....	FK 201470

Mr. LONG. What ranges do you use for AH-1G training? Have you answered that question?

Colonel COATS. No, I have not and I will have to provide that for the record.

[The information follows:]

Blacksmill, Matteson and Range 5 are used for aerial gunnery training. No additional aerial gunnery range construction is programed within the next 5 years.

FORT STEWART, GA.

Mr. LONG. All right.

Fort Stewart, Ga.

Insert in the record page 84.

[The page follows:]

1. DATE 9 July 1973		2. DEPARTMENT ARMY		3. INSTALLATION Fort Stewart									
4. COMMAND OR MANAGEMENT BUREAU Third United States Army			5. INSTALLATION CONTROL NUMBER Georgia 305		6. STATE/COUNTRY Georgia								
7. STATUS Active		8. YEAR OF INITIAL OCCUPANCY 1941		9. COUNTY (U.S.) Long, Liberty, Bryan, Tattnal	10. NEAREST CITY Hinesville								
11. MISSION OR MAJOR FUNCTIONS Support Annual Field Training for National Guard and USAR Units, and provide armor and artillery ranges for training Active Army and Reserve components.  * Includes Hunter Army Airfield.				12. PERSONNEL STRENGTH*									
				PERMANENT		STUDENTS		SUPPORTED					
				OFFICER (1)	ENLISTED (2)	CIVILIAN (3)	OFFICER (4)	ENLISTED (5)	OFFICER (6)	ENLISTED (7)	CIVILIAN (8)	TOTAL (9)	
				a. AS OF <u>31 Dec 1972</u>	616	3,130	1,651	6	0	23	123	0	5,549
				b. PLANNED (End FY 75)	683	7,007	1,282	0	0	7	37	0	9,016
13. INVENTORY													
LAND		ACRES (1)	LAND COST (\$000) (2)		IMPROVEMENT (\$000) (3)		TOTAL (\$000) (4)						
a. OWNED		279,270	4,693		45,147		49,840						
b. LEASES AND EASEMENTS							0						
c. INVENTORY TOTAL (Except land rent) AS OF 30 JUNE 19 <u>72</u>							49,840						
d. AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY							3,301						
e. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM							264						
f. ESTIMATED AUTHORIZATION - NEXT 4 YEARS (Exclusive of family housing - \$17,640)							53,418						
g. GRAND TOTAL (c + d + e + f)							106,823						
SUMMARY OF INSTALLATION PROJECTS													
PROJECT DESIGNATION													
CATEGORY CODE NO. a	PROJECT TITLE b				Page No c	TENANT COMMAND d	AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM e		FUNDING PROGRAM f				
	PRIORITY						SCOPE	ESTIMATED COST (\$000) g	SCOPE	ESTIMATED COST (\$000) h			
823	103 - Gas Generating Plant				1 85			264		264			

## FORT STEWART, GA.—\$264,000

Fort Stewart is located at Hinesville, Ga. The mission of this installation is to operate and maintain the U.S. Army Flight Training Center, support annual field training for National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve Units, and provide armor and artillery ranges for training active Army and Reserve components. The program provides a gas generating plant.

*Status of funds*

	<i>Thousands</i>
Funded program not in inventory.....	\$3,301
Unobligated projects, Mar. 31, 1973 (actual).....	1,038
Unobligated projects, June 30, 1973 (estimated).....	0

## DESIGN INFORMATION

Project	Design cost (thousands)	Percent complete Apr. 30, 1973
Gas generating plant.....	\$18	0

## STATUS OF HUNTER ARMY AIRFIELD

Mr. LONG. You propose to retain Hunter Army Airfield in an inactive status. Yet there is pressure from the community to release it. Why does the Army propose to retain it?

General COOPER. We propose to retain it in a caretaker status because as we look at the long-range stationing plan the Hunter/Stewart complex is a candidate for a division post or division installation in the event we brought a unit back from Germany or elsewhere.

We are working closely with the people from the city of Savannah to see whether they can use those facilities. As a matter of fact, there was a meeting down there earlier this week or late last week.

They are specifically interested in the hospital, and even though we are going to keep it in standby, we have agreed that they could take it over if they would leave the Secretary of the Army the option of recovering it.

What we will try to do is accommodate their interests and our interests at the same time, at least until such time as——

Mr. LONG. Then they would have to keep most of it fairly clear for you if you need to reclaim it.

General COOPER. We anticipate that the hospital would be used as a hospital. The other facilities would have to be put to a use was compatible with our being able to recover it.

Mr. LONG. Can you show us on a map the Hunter/Stewart complex and also explain what possibilities you have of developing other airfield facilities if you should lose Hunter?

General COOPER. We don't have the Hunter/Stewart complex on a map here this morning. We have no other place that has nearly as good airfield facilities as Hunter.

Mr. LONG. So you have no other possibilities?

General COOPER. I don't know of any other. If there are any others I will provide them for the record.

[The information follows:]

The only other possibilities, such as Fort Stewart and Fort Bliss, would require extensive construction of new aviation facilities.

## COST OF DEVELOPING NEW AIRFIELD

Mr. LONG. You do have a lot of acreage there. Is there sufficient acreage to put an airfield facility there?

General COOPER. At Stewart?

Mr. LONG. Yes, sir.

General COOPER. Oh, yes. You mean if we gave up Hunter?

Mr. LONG. Yes.

General COOPER. Oh, yes, there is plenty of acreage on which to put it at Stewart, but in view of the large investment in the SAC base at Hunter, we would not want to give that up if there appeared to be a possibility that we would put a division in that complex.

Mr. LONG. What is the acreage?

General COOPER. There are 279,000 acres at Stewart.

Mr. LONG. Can you provide for the record a cost estimate to construct alternative facilities, based on a likely loading?

General COOPER. For the airfield facilities?

Mr. LONG. Yes.

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

On the order of present-day costs, it would be comparable to facilities we had to build at Campbell and then some. It would be in the order of \$50 million, I would guess.

[The information follows:]

The cost to provide Army aviation facilities at Fort Stewart to support an air mobile type division is estimated to be \$24 million. This cost estimate does not include troop support facilities that would be required and assumes no utilization of facilities at Hunter AAF.

## UTILIZATION OF FORT STEWART BEING STUDIED

Mr. LONG. What is the current use of Fort Stewart? Is this mission being restudied?

General COOPER. The mission at Fort Stewart is being restudied; yes, sir. The current mission, mostly training of Reserves and National Guard, we expect to continue, but we are certainly looking at it from a point of view whether we want to station an active division there.

## GAS GENERATING PLANT

Mr. LONG. What is the requirement for a gas generating plant?

General COOPER. The requirement for the gas generating plant is based on the fact that we can't get a firm contract to provide all of the gas that we need. By this gas generating plant we are able to insure that during the peak heating load, we will have adequate gas available on the installation to provide the heat.

## FIFTH ARMY

Mr. LONG. Turn to 5th Army.

Insert page 86 in the record.

[The page follows:]

INSTALLATION SUMMARY  
[In thousands of dollars]

5th Army	Prior authorization	Proposed authorization	Proposed funding
Fort Bliss, Tex.....		6,087	6,087
Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.....		3,893	3,893
Fort Hood, Tex.....		15,094	15,094
Fort Sam Houston, Tex.....		11,738	11,738
Fort Polk, La.....		29,276	29,276
Fort Riley, Kans.....		34,918	34,918
Fort Sheridan, Ill.....		762	762
Fort Sill, Okla.....		9,477	9,447
Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.....		44,482	44,482
<b>Total.....</b>		<b>155,697</b>	<b>155,697</b>

MISSIONS OF 5TH ARMY INSTALLATIONS

Mr. LONG. Briefly, what are the major missions at each of the posts for which you are requesting funds in the 5th Army?

General COOPER. Fort Bliss is primarily for the Air Defense School where we do all of the air defense work.

Fort Benjamin Harrison is primarily the Adjutant General School and Finance School.

General KJELLSTROM. If I may add, Fort Benjamin Harrison is the focal point for the Army's military pay system, a highly centralized computer operation, and also the new home of our central accounts office, so it is really the home of financial transactions within the Army.

General COOPER. Fort Hood is a two division post.

Fort Sam Houston is the headquarters of the 5th Army primarily used for medical training and the new Health Services Command.

Fort Polk is a basic training center, primarily.

Fort Riley is the location of the 1st Infantry Division, less the portion stationed in Germany.

Fort Sheridan is used for the headquarters of the Recruiting Command and also the Veterinary School, plus Fort Sheridan will have an Army readiness region for the Reserves.

Fort Sill is the home of the Field Artillery.

Fort Leonard Wood is another one of our primary basic training centers and also advance individual training primarily for engineers.

MAJOR REALINEMENTS IN 5TH ARMY

Mr. LONG. Now, what major mission changes are planned as a result of Army reorganization or base realignment announcements?

General COOPER. For each of these installations?

Mr. LONG. What major mission changes?

General COOPER. There are no major changes. At Fort Sam Houston there is a change in that we established the Health Services Command there. There is a change at Fort Sheridan. Moving the recruiting command there. Those are the only ones I would consider significant changes.

FORT BLISS, TEX.

Mr. LONG. All right. Let us turn to Fort Bliss, Tex.

Insert page 87 in the record.

[The page follows:]

1. DATE 9 July 1973		2. DEPARTMENT ARMY		3. INSTALLATION Fort Bliss										
4. COMMAND OR MANAGEMENT BUREAU Fifth United States Army				5. INSTALLATION CONTROL NUMBER Texas 125 & 095 New Mexico 125										
7. STATUS Active		8. YEAR OF INITIAL OCCUPANCY 1893		9. COUNTY (U.S.) El Paso Texas and Dona Ana Otero, New Mexico										
11. MISSION OR MAJOR FUNCTIONS U. S. Army Air Defense Center: Commands and furnishes administrative logistical and environmental support to all activities and units assigned or attached to Fort Bliss; provides administrative and logistical services to the U.S. Army Air Defense Board in research, development, firing, and testing of air-defense missile systems; supports activities of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command and the U.S. Army Human Research Unit; operates U.S. Army Training Center (AD); maintains and supports guided missile equipment and training; and coordinates and supports the annual missile firing of units in the US, overseas and NATO nations. *Includes Wm Beaumont Army Hospital ** \$100 one-time cost for easement.				12. PERSONNEL STRENGTH *										
				PERMANENT		STUDENTS		SUPPORTED		TOTAL				
				OFFICER (1)	ENLISTED (2)	CIVILIAN (3)	OFFICER (4)	ENLISTED (5)	OFFICER (6)	ENLISTED (7)	CIVILIAN (8)	TOTAL (9)		
a. AS OF 31 Dec 1972				2,223	12,587	4,504	538	1,184					21,036	
b. PLANNED (End FY 75 )				1,911	11,661	4,550	592	2,610		70		199	18	21,611
13. INVENTORY														
LAND		ACRES (1)		LAND COST (\$000) (2)		IMPROVEMENT (\$000) (3)		TOTAL (\$000) (4)						
a. OWNED		1,056.953		4,405		173,703		178,108						
b. LEASES AND EASEMENTS		68,567		0**		0		0						
c. INVENTORY TOTAL (Except land rent) AS OF 30 JUNE 19		72						178,108						
d. AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY										5,537				
e. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM										6,087				
f. ESTIMATED AUTHORIZATION - NEXT 4 YEARS										39,564				
g. GRAND TOTAL (c + d + e + f)										229,296				
SUMMARY OF INSTALLATION PROJECTS														
PROJECT DESIGNATION														
CATEGORY CODE NO. a	PROJECT TITLE b	Page No c	TENANT COMMAND c	UNIT OF MEASURE d	AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM			FUNDING PROGRAM						
					SCOPE e	ESTIMATED COST (\$000) f	SCOPE g	ESTIMATED COST (\$000) h						
721	329 - Barracks Modernization (EW)	1 88		EW	160	371	160	371						
721	330 - Barracks Modernization	1 89		MN	2,240	5,716	2,240	5,716						
Total						6,087		6,087						

## FORT BLISS, TEX.—\$6,087,000

Fort Bliss is located in El Paso, Tex. The mission of this installation is to provide facilities and support for the U.S. Army Air Defense Center, U.S. Army Air Defense School, and U.S. Army Air Defense Board. Fort Bliss supports and supervises units in their annual missile firing training and provides logistical support for William Beaumont General Hospital. It also operates an Army training center. The program provides barracks modernization for enlisted women and barracks modernization for enlisted men.

*Status of funds*

	<i>Thousands</i>
Funded program not in inventory.....	\$5, 537
Unobligated projects, Mar. 31, 1973 (actual).....	2, 750
Unobligated projects, June 30, 1973 (estimated).....	2, 750

## DESIGN INFORMATION

Project	Design cost (thousands)	Percent complete Apr. 30, 1973
Barracks modernization EW.....	\$20	20
Barracks modernization.....	260	20

*Enlisted barracks summary, Fort Bliss, Tex.*

	<sup>1</sup> Men/women
Total requirement.....	9, 299
Existing substandard.....	<sup>2</sup> 15, 962
Existing adequate.....	<sup>3</sup> 29
Funded, not in inventory.....	0
Adequate assets.....	29
Deficiency.....	9, 270
Fiscal year 1974 program.....	2, 400
Barracks spaces occupied, Mar. 15, 1973.....	7, 396

<sup>1</sup> 90 ft.<sup>2</sup> per man—permanent party personnel; 72 ft.<sup>2</sup> per man—trainees.

<sup>2</sup> Includes 13,110 spaces that can be made adequate.

<sup>3</sup> Private housing.

Mr. LONG. Will the modernized barracks provide satisfactory facilities with a reasonable useful life?

General COOPER. Yes, sir. These are permanent existing barracks which we will modernize, to install the partitions, latrines, and so forth, to current standards, to modernize the older type barracks.

They will provide fully adequate facilities for the long term.

## FORT BENJAMIN HARRISON, IND.

Mr. LONG. Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.

Insert page 90 in the record.

[The page follows:]

1. DATE 9 July 1973		2. DEPARTMENT ARMY		3. INSTALLATION Fort Benjamin Harrison							
4. COMMAND OR MANAGEMENT BUREAU Fifth United States Army			5. INSTALLATION CONTROL NUMBER Indiana 175		6. STATE/COUNTRY Indiana						
7. STATUS Active			8. YEAR OF INITIAL OCCUPANCY 1906		9. COUNTY (U.S.) Marion						
11. MISSION OR MAJOR FUNCTIONS Support of Army Adjutant General School, Army Finance School, Defense Information School and major satellites, including 35 USAR Centers throughout Michigan and Indiana.			12. PERSONNEL STRENGTH			10. NEAREST CITY Indianapolis, 14 miles Southwest					
			PERMANENT			STUDENTS		SUPPORTED		TOTAL	
			OFFICER (1)	ENLISTED (2)	CIVILIAN (3)	OFFICER (4)	ENLISTED (5)	OFFICER (6)	ENLISTED (7)	CIVILIAN (8)	TOTAL (9)
a. AS OF 31 Dec 1972			457	1,404	4,471	758	1,945	22	36	216	9,309
b. PLANNED (End FY 78)			399	871	1,526	633	1,806	92	619	228	6,174
			13. INVENTORY								
			LAND		ACRES (1)	LAND COST (\$000) (2)		IMPROVEMENT (\$000) (3)		TOTAL (\$000) (4)	
a. OWNED					2,680	271		47,590		47,861	
b. LEASES AND EASEMENTS					0	0		0		0	
c. INVENTORY TOTAL (Except land rents) AS OF 30 JUNE 19										47,861	
d. AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY (Exclusive of family housing - \$394)										16,991	
e. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM										3,893	
f. ESTIMATED AUTHORIZATION - NEXT 4 YEARS (Exclusive of family housing - \$5,184)										6,466	
g. GRAND TOTAL (c + d + e + f)										75,211	
SUMMARY OF INSTALLATION PROJECTS											
PROJECT DESIGNATION											
CATEGORY CODE NO. a	PROJECT TITLE b	Page No c	TENANT COMMAND c	UNIT OF MEASURE d	AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM			FUNDING PROGRAM			
					SCOPE e	ESTIMATED COST (\$000) f	SCOPE g	ESTIMATED COST (\$000) h			
721	77 - EM Barracks w/o Mess - Medical	1	91	MN	75	746	75	746			
721	95 - EW Barracks w/o Mess	1	92	EW	304	2,167	304	2,167			
721	97 - Barracks Modernization	1	93	MN	580	980	580	980			
Total						3,893		3,893			

## FORT BENJAMIN HARRISON, IND.—\$3,893,000

Fort Benjamin Harrison is located 14 miles northeast of Indianapolis, Ind. The installation supports the Army Finance Center and School, the Adjutant General School, and the Defense Information School. The program provides two barracks; one for enlisted medical personnel, the second for assigned enlisted women. Also included is modernization of barracks for enlisted men.

*Status of funds*

	<i>Thousands</i>
Funded program not in inventory.....	\$16,991
Unobligated projects, Mar. 31, 1973 (actual).....	1,556
Unobligated projects, June 30, 1973 (estimated).....	468

## DESIGN INFORMATION

Project	Design cost (thousands)	Percent complete Apr. 30, 1973
EM barracks without mess med.....	\$30	5
EW barracks without mess.....	80	2
Barracks modernization.....	50	25

*Enlisted barracks summary, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.*

	<sup>1</sup> Men/women
Total requirement.....	1,887
Existing substandard.....	<sup>2</sup> 2,901
Existing adequate.....	0
Funded, not in inventory.....	491
Adequate assets.....	491
Deficiency.....	1,396
Fiscal year 1974 program.....	959
Barracks spaces occupied, 15 Mar. 1973.....	1,972

<sup>1</sup> 90 square feet per man—permanent party personnel; 72 square feet per man—trainees.

<sup>2</sup> Includes 895 spaces that can be made adequate.

Mr. LONG. This is a relatively small post. Provide for the record the military personnel and operations and maintenance costs of operating the post and also the real property maintenance costs.

Also show the replacement value of the facilities here.

[The information follows:]

*Real property, personnel and other operating costs, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.*

Activity and cost in thousands of dollars:

Backlog of essential maintenance and repair.....	287
Initial cost of improvements.....	47,590
Replacement cost (excluding land).....	180,842

	Fiscal year—		
	1972	1973	1974 <sup>1</sup>
Real property maintenance.....	5,496	5,832	4,887
Other operating costs.....	3,971	3,412	3,865
Personnel:			
Military expense.....	3,914	3,698	1,894
Civilian cost.....	5,846	7,330	6,689

<sup>1</sup> Estimated.

Mr. LONG. Is this one of the installations you are studying?

General COOPER. We are studying all installations including Benjamin Harrison.

#### BARRACKS AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT

Mr. LONG. According to figures in the justification book, you have 1,386 permanent barracks spaces, and are proposing to build another 379. This will provide a total of 1,765 versus a requirement of 1,887. Is that correct?

General COOPER. That is correct.

Mr. LONG. That is only about 120 below your requirement. Since this is a school post, and is located in a populated area, could you not make greater use of community support and avoid the additional construction requested here?

General COOPER. For the students, as I mentioned in response to an earlier question, when they are entitled to per diem it is better to provide them with quarters on the post and also for student activities it is better that they be there.

Mr. LONG. There are also permanent party personnel here who train the students who do not need to live on post, and who are not entitled to per diem. You have, as well, personnel connected with the Finance Center, et cetera?

General COOPER. This gets back to the basic question we discussed some time ago, as to what is the policy for housing people off post. Normally we want to provide good facilities on the post for everybody up through the grade of captain, not just the enlisted men.

The thrust the question has raised several times is do we differentiate between units where you have to keep the people on the post like the 101st versus an administrative post such as Fort Benjamin Harrison? We do differentiate.

We would be much more apt, if we change our mind, to permit the administrative people to live off post. There is no question of our letting all enlisted men choose whether to live off or on the base.

#### FORT HOOD, TEX.

Mr. LONG. Fort Hood, Tex.

Insert page 94 in the record.

[The page follows:]

1. DATE 9 July 1973		2. DEPARTMENT ARMY		3. INSTALLATION Fort Hood								
4. COMMAND OR MANAGEMENT BUREAU Fifth United States Army			5. INSTALLATION CONTROL NUMBER Texas 255		6. STATE/COUNTRY Texas							
7. STATUS Active		8. YEAR OF INITIAL OCCUPANCY 1942		9. COUNTY (U.S.) Bell & Coryell		10. NEAREST CITY Killeen						
11. MISSION OR MAJOR FUNCTIONS Responsible for command, training and logistical support of one Armored and one TRIGAP division, a Corps headquarters and numerous miscellaneous support units; support of reserve forces summer training.				12. PERSONNEL STRENGTH		PERMANENT		STUDENTS		SUPPORTED		TOTAL
				OFFICER (1)		ENLISTED (2)		CIVILIAN (3)		OFFICER (4)	ENLISTED (5)	OFFICER (6)
* \$200 one-time cost for easement.				a. AS OF 31 Dec 1972		4,196 34,891 3,416			85	165	98	42,851
				b. PLANNED (End FY 75)		4,036 36,520 3,416		0	0	66	154	13
13. INVENTORY												
LAND			ACRES (1)		LAND COST (\$000) (2)		IMPROVEMENT (\$000) (3)		TOTAL (\$000) (4)			
a. OWNED			208,566		6,777		237,670		244,447			
b. LEASES AND EASEMENTS			9,552		0*		11		11			
c. INVENTORY TOTAL (Except land rent) AS OF 30 JUNE 19 72									244,458			
d. AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY									(Exclusive of family housing - \$29,098) 78,348			
e. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM									(Exclusive of family housing - \$19,447) 15,094			
f. ESTIMATED AUTHORIZATION - NEXT 4 YEARS									(Exclusive of family housing - \$84,900) 126,732			
g. GRAND TOTAL (c + d + e + f)									464,362			

PROJECT DESIGNATION				SUMMARY OF INSTALLATION PROJECTS					
CATEGORY CODE NO.	PROJECT TITLE	Page No	PRIORITY	TENANT COMMAND	UNIT OF MEASURE	AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM		FUNDING PROGRAM	
						SCOPE	ESTIMATED COST (\$000)	SCOPE	ESTIMATED COST (\$000)
a	b	c	d	e	d	e	f	g	h
113	308 - Improve Robert Gray AAF	95	1		SY	203,666	5,270	203,666	5,270
134	314 - Approach Control - ILS, Robert Gray AAF	96	1				1,903		1,903
721	323 - Barracks Modernization	97	1		MN	2,293	7,291	2,293	7,291
724	297 - Air Condition 4 BOQs	98	1		MN	120	630	120	630
	Total						15,094		15,094

## FORT HOOD, TEX., \$15,094,000

Fort Hood is located at Killeen, Tex. The mission of this installation is to command, train and support an armored division, a TRICAP division, and a corps headquarters; and to support Reserve components summer training. The program consists of improvement of the Robert Gray Army Airfield, an approach control and instrument landing system for the airfield, barracks modernization and air-conditioning of bachelor officer quarters.

*Status of funds*

	<i>Thousands</i>
Funded program not in inventory.....	\$78, 348
Unobligated projects, Mar. 31, 1973 (actual).....	8, 078
Unobligated projects, June 30, 1973 (estimated).....	2, 464

## DESIGN INFORMATION

Project	Design cost (thousands)	Percent complete Apr. 30, 1973
Improve Robert Gray AAF.....	\$260	5
Appr control and ILS Gray.....	100	15
Barracks modernization.....	375	20
Air-condition 4 BOQ's.....	150	10

*Enlisted barracks summary, Fort Hood, Tex.*

	<sup>1</sup> Men
Total requirement.....	20, 651
Existing substandard.....	<sup>2</sup> 18, 659
Existing adequate.....	<sup>3</sup> 42
Funded, not in inventory.....	6, 312
Adequate assets.....	6, 354
Deficiency.....	14, 297
Fiscal year 1974 program.....	2, 293
Barracks spaces occupied, Mar. 15, 1973.....	19, 243

<sup>1</sup> 90 ft.<sup>2</sup> per man—permanent party personnel; 72 ft.<sup>2</sup> per man—trainees.

<sup>2</sup> Includes 9,477 spaces that can be made adequate.

<sup>3</sup> Private housing.

*Bachelor officer quarters summary*

	Men
Total requirement.....	1, 306
Existing substandard.....	<sup>1</sup> 1, 251
Existing adequate.....	<sup>2</sup> 983
Funded, not in inventory.....	0
Adequate assets.....	983
Deficiency.....	323
Fiscal 1974 program.....	120
Occupying BOQ's, Mar. 15, 1973.....	592

<sup>1</sup> Includes 120 spaces that can be made adequate.

<sup>2</sup> Includes 676 private housing.

## LONG-RANGE CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

Mr. LONG. Can you provide for the record your long-range construction program by category of facilities and fiscal year?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

LONG RANGE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM (FISCAL YEAR 1975-78); FORT HOOD, TEX.

Facility class	1975	1976	1977	1978
Operations.....	1,237			
Training.....				
Maintenance and production.....	3,787		3,559	5,618
R.D.T. & E.....				
Supply.....				
Hospital and medical.....	22,780		1,325	2,650
Administrative.....		1,167		
Troop housing.....	33,872	18,156	26,016	765
Community support.....		3,805		
Utilities.....	1,155			
Real estate access roads.....			840	
Total.....	62,831	23,128	31,740	9,033

STATUS OF PRIOR-YEAR CONSTRUCTION

Mr. LONG. What is the status of prior-year construction at this installation?

Mr. CARTON. The fiscal 1970 program at Fort Hood is now virtually complete. The post office is 100-percent complete and the barracks complex is 99-percent complete. The fiscal 1972 program is under construction, sir, with the percentage of completion about 60 percent.

For the fiscal 1973 program, the moving target simulator building has been placed under contract and is 15-percent complete. The enlisted men's barracks complex has been placed under contract and is 1-percent complete. The field house is 2-percent complete.

We expect to open bids within the next month on the commissary, dental clinic, hangar with shops, and helicopter parking and maintenance facilities.

Mr. LONG. When do you propose to award contracts for the hangar and parking apron provided last year?

Mr. CARTON. In late May or June, sir.

IMPROVEMENTS TO GRAY ARMY AIRFIELD

Mr. LONG. You are requesting \$5,270,000 for improvements to Gray Army Airfield. Can you show us this on the map and explain why you can't use the facilities at Gray to meet part or all of the requirements for which last year's airfield projects were provided?

Mr. GRAY. This is the existing Gray Army Airfield right there.

Colonel COATS. The facilities that were to be built in the fiscal year 1973 program at Fort Hood are to provide the maintenance facilities for the helicopters of the two divisions that are located there.

Currently at Robert Gray Army Airfield we have about 78 aircraft that are stationed there. These belong to the nondivisional aviation units and are located there; these facilities fully utilize maintenance hangars at Robert Gray.

The project to provide for the maintenance hangars and parking apron at Hood Army Airfield was to provide the maintenance facilities for those aircraft at that site. The overall analyses of the facilities for both airfield complexes were provided, I believe, for the record in the hearings last year.

General COOPER. Let me amplify that answer and more specifically answer your question.

Right now at Gray they have helicopters stationed there which they have to move any time that they have flight operations, so we don't want to compound the problem because it restricts us very heavily when we start operations to move the troops out of there.

Again in connection with your question of getting troops to Europe in a hurry, we need to improve the airfield and we also need to be able to operate using it fully.

FORT SAM HOUSTON, TEX.

Mr. LONG. Fort Sam Houston, Tex.

Insert page 99 in the record.

[The page follows:]

1. DATE 9 July 1973		2. DEPARTMENT ARMY		3. INSTALLATION Fort San Houston.									
4. COMMAND OR MANAGEMENT BUREAU Fifth United States Army			5. INSTALLATION CONTROL NUMBER Texas 265		6. STATE/COUNTRY Texas								
7. STATUS Active		8. YEAR OF INITIAL OCCUPANCY 1870		9. COUNTY (U.S.) Bexar		10. NEAREST CITY San Antonio							
11. MISSION OR MAJOR FUNCTIONS Headquarters, Fifth US Army and Support of the Brooke Army Medical Center: Provide administrative and logistical support (medical, supply, and hospital facilities excepted), training areas, and supply and maintenance for above, their subordinate activities and units, and other Army activities or units generally located within the Fifth US Army Area of Responsibility.  *Includes Brooke AMC				12. PERSONNEL STRENGTH *									
				PERMANENT				STUDENTS				SUPPORTED	TOTAL
				OFFICER (1)	ENLISTED (2)	CIVILIAN (3)		OFFICER (4)	ENLISTED (5)	OFFICER (6)	ENLISTED (7)	CIVILIAN (8)	(9)
				a. AS OF 30 Dec 72	1,714	8,696	5,627	704	1,800				18,541
				b. PLANNED (End FY 78)	1,591	3,890	4,480	771	1,599	1	0	188	12,520
				13. INVENTORY									
LAND		ACRES (1)		LAND COST (\$000) (2)		IMPROVEMENT (\$000) (3)		TOTAL (\$000) (4)					
a. OWNED		3,147		1,464		73,685		75,149					
b. LEASES AND EASEMENTS		1		0		0		0					
c. INVENTORY TOTAL (Except Land rent) AS OF 30 JUNE 19 72								75,149					
d. AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY								24,973					
e. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM								11,738					
f. ESTIMATED AUTHORIZATION - NEXT 4 YEARS								35,206					
g. GRAND TOTAL (c + d + e + f)								147,006					
SUMMARY OF INSTALLATION PROJECTS													
PROJECT DESIGNATION													
CATEGORY CODE NO.	PROJECT TITLE			Page No	TENANT COMMAND	UNIT OF MEASURE	AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM		FUNDING PROGRAM				
a	b			c	d	e	f	g	h				
	PRIORITY												
721	82 - EM/EW Barracks			1	100	MN	1,100	9,474	1,100	9,474			
721	84 - Barracks Modernization (EW)			1	101	MN	180	932	180	932			
724	83 - Air Condition - 6 BOQs			1	102	MN	360	1,332	360	1,332			
	Total							11,738		11,738			

## FORT SAM HOUSTON, TEX.

\$11,738,000

Fort Sam Houston is located at San Antonio, Tex. This installation serves as headquarters, 5th U.S. Army and provides support to the Brooke Army Medical Center. It provides administrative and logistical support (medical, supply, and hospital facilities expected), training areas, and supply and maintenance for the above units, their subordinate activities and units, and other Army activities or units generally located within the 5th U.S. Army area of responsibility. The program provides barracks for enlisted men and women, modernization of barracks for enlisted women, and air conditioning for bachelor officer quarters.

*Status of funds*

Funded program not in inventory.....	\$24,973,000
Unobligated projects, March 31, 1973 (actual).....	6,011,000
Unobligated projects, June 30, 1973 (estimated).....	0

## DESIGN INFORMATION

Project	Design cost (thousands)	Percent complete Apr. 30, 1973
EM/EW barracks.....	387	25
Barracks modernization EW.....	61	20
Air-condition 6 BOQ's.....	69	30

*Enlisted Barracks Summary, Fort Sam Houston, Tex.*

	<i>Men/women</i> <sup>1</sup>
Total requirement.....	7,376
Existing substandard.....	<sup>2</sup> 11,469
Existing adequate.....	<sup>3</sup> 56
Funded, not in inventory.....	3,965
Adequate assets.....	4,021
Deficiency.....	3,355
Fiscal year 1974 program.....	1,280
Barracks spaces occupied, Mar. 15, 1973.....	7,193

<sup>1</sup> 90 square feet per man—permanent party personnel; 72 square feet per man—

<sup>2</sup> Includes 221 spaces that can be made adequate.

<sup>3</sup> Private housing.

*Bachelor Officer Quarters Summary, Fort Sam Houston, Tex.*

	<i>Men</i>
Total requirement.....	1,115
Existing substandard.....	387
Existing adequate.....	<sup>1</sup> 322
Funded, not in inventory.....	500
Adequate assets.....	822
Deficiency.....	293
Fiscal year 1974 program.....	360
Occupying BOQ, Mar. 15, 1973.....	296

<sup>1</sup> Private housing.

## ADMINISTRATIVE SPACE

Mr. LONG. You have requested additional administrative space here in past years' programs. Now you are moving a headquarters into this base. Can you get along with the administrative space you have for the next few years?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

In fact the Health Services Command wanted us to modify one specific building as part of the reorganization. We considered that, although in the long term they will need the modernization we would get along with the existing administrative space and perhaps consider additional modernization of that in the 1975 program.

Mr. LONG. Very good.

We will now adjourn the committee and resume at 2 o'clock.

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

#### U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY

Mr. SIKES. The committee will come to order.

We are now ready to consider the construction request for the U.S. Military Academy.

Insert page 212 in the record.

[The page follows:]

1 DATE 1 Feb 73		2 DEPARTMENT ARMY		3 INSTALLATION United States Military Academy								
4 COMMAND OR MANAGEMENT BUREAU Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army			5. INSTALLATION CONTROL NUMBER New York 993		6 STATE/COUNTRY New York							
7 STATUS Active		8 YEAR OF INITIAL OCCUPANCY 1802		9 COUNTY (U.S.) Orange	10 NEAREST CITY Newburgh - 10 miles North							
11. MISSION OR MAJOR FUNCTIONS  To instruct and train the Corps of Cadets, the members of which will be the future officers of the Regular Army Establishment.				12 PERSONNEL STRENGTH								
				PERMANENT		STUDENTS		SUPPORTED		TOTAL		
				OFFICER (1)	ENLISTED (2)	CIVILIAN (3)	OFFICER (4)	ENLISTED (5)	OFFICER (6)	ENLISTED (7)	CIVILIAN (8)	(9)
				a. AS OF 31 Dec 72	962	1,351	2,986		3,951*			9,250
				b. PLANNED (End FY 78)	831	1,039	2,920		4,417*			9,207
				13 INVENTORY								
LAND		ACRES (1)	LAND COST (\$000) (2)		IMPROVEMENT (\$000) (3)		TOTAL (\$000) (4)					
a. OWNED		15,974	1,841		98,913		100,754					
b. LEASES AND EASEMENTS												
c. INVENTORY TOTAL (Except Land rent) AS OF 30 JUNE 19 72												
d. AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY												
e. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM												
f. ESTIMATED AUTHORIZATION - NEXT 4 YEARS												
g. GRAND TOTAL (c + d + e + f)												
* Cadets												
SUMMARY OF INSTALLATION PROJECTS												
PROJECT DESIGNATION												
CATEGORY CODE NO.	PROJECT TITLE			TENANT COMMAND	UNIT OF MEASURE	AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM		FUNDING PROGRAM				
a	b			c	d	SCOPE e	ESTIMATED COST (\$000) f	SCOPE g	ESTIMATED COST (\$000) h			
	Page No.											
510	88 - New Hospital				BD	100	25,000	100	25,000			
721	114 - Barracks Modernization				MN	575	2,245	575	2,245			
890	112 - Utilities Extension						2,900		2,900			
	Total						30,145		30,145			

## U.S. Military Academy, N.Y.

\$30,145,000

The United States Military Academy is located 10 miles south of Newburgh, N.Y. The mission of the Academy is to instruct and train the corps of cadets, the members of which will be the future officers of the Regular Army establishment. The program consists of a new hospital, barracks modernization and extension of utilities.

*Status of funds*

Funded program not in inventory-----	\$54, 882, 000
Unobligated projects, March 31, 1973 (actual)-----	691, 000
Unobligated projects, June 30, 1973 (estimated)-----	0

## DESIGN INFORMATION

Project	Design cost (thousands)	Percent complete Apr. 30, 1973
New hospital-----	1, 085	70
Barracks modernization-----	106	70
Utilities extension-----	55	60

*Enlisted barracks summary, U.S. Military Academy, N.Y.*

	Men <sup>1</sup>
Total requirement-----	1, 962
Existing substandard-----	<sup>2</sup> 575
Existing adequate-----	0
Funded, not in inventory-----	0
Adequate assets-----	0
Deficiency-----	1, 962
Fiscal year 1974 program-----	575
Barracks spaces occupied, Sept. 30, 1972-----	638

<sup>1</sup> 90 ft.<sup>2</sup> per man—permanent party personnel ; 72 ft.<sup>2</sup> per man—trainees.

<sup>2</sup> Includes 575 spaces that can be made adequate.

MR. SIKES. The request is for \$30,145,000, of which \$25 million is for a new hospital. You are also asking for a barracks modernization and extension of utilities.

I believe, Colonel Lombard, you are the principal witness on this subject.

General COOPER. We have General Pixley, from the Office of the Surgeon General, who is a surgeon himself, to describe from a technical point of view the need for the new hospital, and Colonel Lombard to describe in detail the circumstances concerning the design and costs.

## STATEMENT ON COSTS AND DESIGN OF HOSPITAL

MR. SIKES. Very well. Colonel Lombard, you have a statement which we will put in the record.

[Colonel Lombard's statement follows:]

## STATEMENT BY COL. HARRY W. LOMBARD, NEW YORK DISTRICT ENGINEER, REGARDING COST AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE PROPOSED USMA HOSPITAL

1. Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege for me to provide information for you today regarding the cost and design aspects of the proposed new hospital at the U.S. Military Academy. I will first address high

cost factors encountered at West Point and the approach we are using to counter these cost pressures. Then I will briefly describe the design of the hospital.

2. The Corps of Engineers has been seeking ways to counter the high cost of construction at West Point for a number of years. We also have taken some new actions specifically for the hospital project.

(a) Monumental type construction using granite facing increased early project costs. However, the new hospital has been sited out of the cadet area. Therefore, we plan to use precast concrete panels for the exterior walls.

(b) Labor practices and low productivity has caused construction cost penalties. In the design of the hospital we are making maximum use of components which reduce onsite costs. For example, the precast concrete wall panels will be fabricated away from the West Point area. Structural steel rather than reinforced concrete is being used for the building frame. Dry board walls will be used wherever possible in lieu of plaster to reduce manpower requirements. In our design reviews we continue to seek additional labor saving substitutions.

(c) The nature of the terrain at West Point has resulted in construction cost premiums on some earlier projects. Flat buildable terrain is very limited at West Point. Additionally, rock outcroppings are prevalent. The siting of the proposed hospital has been studied closely to minimize site problems.

These studies compared possible general locations and then after selection of the Washington Gate location, addressed possible positioning within this site. The result of all the studies is a configuration that minimizes excavation required for the building, parking areas, and entrance roads. Extensive soil borings, 35 holes of approximately 1,200 linear feet, and subsurface water explorations have been made to insure that the contract documents adequately describe the site conditions. These site explorations do not indicate any unusual subsurface conditions.

(d) Design features of some past projects have resulted in cost penalties. We are seeking on the hospital project to insure that economy, esthetics and functional aspects are all considered. To assist in the development of the design, we are using a construction management consultant. This consultant firm has extensive construction experience in the metropolitan New York area. This firm's practical experience in construction techniques and labor conditions has complemented the expertise of the architect-engineer design firm. Not only will omissions in plans which could later result in costly changes be reduced, but value engineering suggestions will provide a more economical design. Action has been taken to benefit from experience on other hospitals. The Corps of Engineers has teams inspecting military hospitals under construction or recently completed. The lessons learned from these inspections are being incorporated into the USMA hospital design.

(e) Lack of competition on major projects at West Point has been a problem. A number of actions have been taken recently to stimulate competition. Bids are actively solicited. Specifications which would hamper contractors' operations are minimized. Generous construction durations are specified to eliminate overtime costs. Whenever possible, projects are broken into several small contracts because com-

petition for smaller contracts has been granted. Innovative contracts have been utilized. A two-step, turnkey contract was utilized on the recently completed bachelor officers quarters. A fixed-price incentive contract is being utilized on the cadet activities center. We are currently studying ways of contracting for the hospital project to increase its attractiveness to bidders. As the project bid packages are developed during the next several months, we will incorporate features which show promise of generating competition.

3. Two causes of high construction costs, while beyond our control, must be considered. The high rate of construction cost escalation is recognized in our project cost estimate. Cognizance has also been taken of the competition of nonmilitary construction projects in the West Point area on available resources. No major area projects are underway currently. Authorization and funding of the hospital as a part of the fiscal year 1974 program would permit its construction to follow the cadet activities center and to precede expected major nonmilitary projects. The expected major projects in the area are the development of a major airport at Stewart Field, the construction of a pumped storage electrical generating facility at Storm King Mountain, and the construction of an additional bridge across the Hudson River linking Newburgh and Beacon. When started, these projects will have a significant effect on construction resources in the mid-Hudson Valley region.

4. Now I would like to discuss briefly the design of the hospital. The hospital will contain 100 beds with associated support facilities and clinics. It will be fully air conditioned and will be slightly over 157,000 square feet in size. Parking is to be provided for 431 cars. The renderings displayed on the easel show the exterior appearance of the hospital. Precast architectural concrete panels will be used on the facade. The color of this concrete should be similar to the light gray cadet uniforms. The design of the project is about 85 percent complete. Final plans are scheduled to be submitted by the architect-engineer by the end of June 1973. I believe that we have a competent design team and are producing a facility which when completed will adequately fulfill USMA's hospital requirements.

#### CONTROL OF CONSTRUCTION COSTS AT WEST POINT

Mr. SIKES. You are requesting \$30 million this year and plan to request another \$50 million in the next 4 years.

The committee has been very disturbed in recent years, as I am sure all of you have, with the construction costs at West Point. We have recognized the need for new construction and of modernization, but we have had reservations about whether to approve many items because construction seems to cost more there than it does almost anywhere else.

We recognize the difficulties you have encountered. Efforts are being made to bring these costs down, or at least to prevent them from going up as fast as they have been.

Have you been able to make any progress in either reducing or controlling construction costs?

Colonel LOMBARD. I believe that we have, yes, sir.

Mr. SIKES. Tell us why?

Colonel LOMBARD. All right, sir, I will.

It is appropriate, when faced with a situation like this, to identify, as best we can, the source of the high costs so they can be addressed in an intelligent manner.

In examining the situation at West Point, we find many factors that contribute to high costs in that area, some of which we can address ourselves to in future construction and some of which we have fewer options with regard to.

For example, in the early days of the expansion of the facilities at West Point, by and large activity was concentrated around the cadet intensive central area surrounding the plain at West Point. This meant, among other things, that monumental type construction with granite facing was required. This was done in the face of a decreasing supply of qualified stonecutters and increasing costs associated with that kind of very specialized work.

Our cost reduction action, therefore, was to limit the amount of monumental type construction to be undertaken. The fact is that monumental construction has been limited for some time now to the central cadet area, where it was felt to be essential in order that the West Point scene would be preserved.

Mr. SIKES. That, of course, is very important. There is a tradition about the institution that should not be lost. Yet I recognize the very high cost of trying to preserve it.

Colonel LOMBARD. In all other areas, we have departed from that type of construction.

Mr. SIKES. What does that account for? Ten percent? Five percent?

Colonel LOMBARD. It is higher than that. I would guess in the neighborhood of 15 percent, perhaps, in aggregate costs. The Cadet Activities Center now under construction, \$15 million to \$20 million worth of work, is brick surfaced. A sizable reduction in costs has resulted from the use of brick as opposed to granite, had we chosen to go that route.

#### LOCATION OF HOSPITAL

With specific regard to the hospital, the major project under consideration at this particular point in time, the hospital has been sited away from the cadet area, out of that area normally associated with monumental construction.

Mr. SIKES. Is it so far away that it is not convenient?

Colonel LOMBARD. In my view, it is not; no, sir.

Mr. SIKES. How far is it?

Colonel LOMBARD. It is on the Washington Road near the Washington Gate.

Mr. SIKES. What is the distance in miles?

General COOPER. It is at least a mile.

Colonel LOMBARD. It is over a mile.

General COOPER. You would expect the cadets probably to take a bus to go there.

Mr. SIKES. A mile does not seem to be an unreasonable distance.

Colonel LOMBARD. About a mile and six-tenths, probably, up to the hospital by the roads that are in existence.

Mr. SIKES. Will you indicate the site on the map? I think I see what you are talking about.

Colonel LOMBARD. It is the large red building at the top there, sir. It is easy walking distance for a cadet who wishes to visit a roommate in the hospital. It is a very difficult walking distance for a cadet who does not feel well.

Mr. SIKES. Go ahead.

#### LACK OF COMPETITION FOR LARGE PROJECTS

Colonel LOMBARD. We found that generally within the area of West Point there was a lack of competition. By this I mean that construction in the area tended to be concentrated in a few firms. They tended, time after time, to be successful bidders in our competitive bid process.

We have found that about the best approach to increased—

Mr. SIKES. Has that situation improved? Do you have more competition?

Colonel LOMBARD. It depends on the size of the job, sir. The situation has not materially improved for extremely large projects. We are finding, though, in projects in the \$1 to \$2 to \$3 million range, competition is very much on the upswing. We are getting 6, 8, or 9 bids on a job, where previously we would have gotten perhaps 2 or 3.

We did find in the Cadet Activities Center that the same contractor who has dominated much of the work in the West Point area was the successful bidder. On the other hand, that project is being run on a fixed price plus incentive basis. So, we have altered the contracting technique to provide us with detailed audits and with what we hope will be more successful cost control procedures.

We have in that sense innovated in connection with that project. We did not, however, end up with a different prime contractor than the company that has dominated construction in the area for some time.

#### LABOR

We have a situation with regard to labor where, compared to many areas, labor is generally not as productive as we would like it to be. It is high-priced. This is partly because skills are not available in the area in sufficient quantities, and need to be brought from some distance away. It is partly related, I suppose, to the overall union situation in the area, with which I am not too familiar in detail.

I am, however, aware that on the hospital, particularly, we have made intense efforts to make this a labor nonintensive project.

Mr. SIKES. Are you having any success?

Colonel LOMBARD. I believe we have; yes, sir. We have reduced very drastically the wet trades involved—the concrete, painting, and plaster work, which requires a great deal of on site labor effort—in favor of dry board construction where that is acceptable, in favor of pre-cast concrete panels that can be assembled off site under controlled conditions and moved to the site and assembled. We have taken concrete out of the frame of the building and put structural steel in. This type of thing reduces the requirements for on site labor.

#### FOUNDATION

Mr. SIKES. What about foundations? Are you going to get to that?

Colonel LOMBARD. Yes. We investigated the foundation under this project probably as exhaustively as any that has ever been built. There

were a total of some 35 holes, 1,200 feet of borings, test pits, well points. All this has indicated to us that we are not in a rock situation. We are in an overburden situation.

[Brief recess.]

#### LABOR PRACTICES

Mr. DAVIS. We have been concerned about some of the practices that have gone on up in this area. Are you paying portal-to-portal costs based upon traveltime from New York City in some of the construction trades?

Colonel LOMBARD. No, sir, we are not. Portal-to-portal costs, as I assume you mean it, is applying the hourly wage of the trade to the time traveled from home to the job as opposed to paying a flat sum for travel pay. We pay some trades—that is, the contractors pay some trades—a flat sum for travel in addition to their hourly wage.

Mr. DAVIS. What kind of payment do they receive?

Colonel LOMBARD. The common laborer does not receive any travel pay, sir. Asbestos workers, for example, were paid in October of 1972, the latest data that I have specifically on the subject, some \$8 a day travel. That differs by trade. It differs by labor group.

The International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, local No. 5, contract calls for \$4.50 travel a day.

Mr. DAVIS. Does the payment that they receive mean they are actually spending 8 hours a day on the job, or is some of their traveltime taken out of that?

Colonel LOMBARD. My understanding, sir, is whatever number of hours they spend on the job is the number of hours they are paid for at the hourly rate.

#### LABOR NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. DAVIS. What is the immediate prospect with respect to these wage costs? When will they be renegotiating their contracts?

Colonel LOMBARD. Sir, I do not know the specific date. I believe we have another year to go under the negotiated arrangement, which was originally a 3-year arrangement, as I understand it. I do not negotiate with the labor unions. I simply reflect in my contract bid documents the provisions of the Davis-Bacon law and labor rates provided to me by the Department of Labor, and require the contractor to pay those as minimums in the prosecution of the work, whether he uses union or nonunion labor.

Mr. DAVIS. Do you have any indications that the concern expressed about some of these practices on the part of Members of Congress, which includes members of this committee, has had any effect upon costs up in this area?

Colonel LOMBARD. Sir, I cannot say whether there has been any effect on the negotiations between the representatives of the employers and the representatives of the unions.

As far as our procedures are concerned, there certainly has been a tremendous effort applied and pressure felt to insure that our estimates are more valid, that our feasibility studies are undertaken in a timely manner and are more thorough, that designs are initiated early in order that preconstruction estimates can be more precise, and the like.

All of those comments apply specifically to this hospital.

## CONSTRUCTION IN THE AREA

Mr. DAVIS. What is the general situation on construction in this area? In the past, we have had evidence of noncompetition because of the heavy construction program in the area. Is that situation the same? Are we still competing against a great many other people for construction, both governmental and private?

General COOPER. There has been a cutback in both State and Federal funds, and that has decreased the volume of construction at both West Point and in the New York City area.

The recent decision on the \$6 billion of pollution funds may affect that, because there are large backlogs of sewage projects in the New York City area that the State and the city are unable to undertake because of the lack of funds.

We think the boom in office building construction is declining since the realization rental rates are not offsetting the high cost of construction for these buildings. Some companies I know of personally have moved from New York City to Houston rather than pay the increased rent.

The planned urban renewal projects are being reevaluated and reduced in scope in line with budget decreases.

This, again, is in accordance with the administration's policy. The consensus of agencies performing construction in the New York area was that they were and would continue constructing at a lower than normal level now and during the West Point hospital construction.

We got this opinion from the Orange County Planning Board, the State Department of Highways, the State University Construction Fund, and several other State and local agencies.

That does not mean that the West Point construction is a major part of the construction in the area, but it does mean there has been a general decline, so this is probably a good time to proceed with the construction of the hospital at West Point.

Colonel LOMBARD. There are a number of rather major construction efforts that we anticipate will get underway in the West Point Area in the next year or so.

There are, for example, at least two powerplants that come to mind immediately—the Orange and Rockland Counties powerplant, and the Storm King powerplant. If they in fact do get underway, they will represent a large drain on the available construction resources in the area.

There is a rather large bridge scheduled to be constructed at Newburgh, N.Y., between Newburgh and Beacon, which will also employ a number of workers. That should not get underway for a while.

In addition to this, there are the recently announced plans of the Metropolitan Transit Authority to develop their facility, previously Stewart Air Force Base, now the MTA's facility at Stewart Field, into a rather large project. It is my understanding that some initial effort will be undertaken rather shortly, within a year, on that project, but not a sizable effort so far as the requirements for construction workers are concerned.

Looking at that picture and the likelihood of these major projects coming along in the next year or so, in my own view the beginning of next year is a good time to get underway with this hospital. That is one reason we are anxious to do so.

Mr. DAVIS. I think we should ask that there be put in the record a statement expanding on what you have given us concerning man-years of construction effort in the area for the past 3 years, and what you project for the next 3 or 4 years, as far as you have the information available to you.


Colonel LOMBARD. Yes, sir.  
[The information follows:]

The attached graph indicates the level of construction in the Mid-Hudson Valley area over the last 3 years and that projected for the next 4 years. Since no agency maintains this type of evaluation and there is no central listing of programmed construction, the sources of data are included herein for reference:

- a. N.Y. State Department of Public Works, Mr. Everett Clark (914-454-8000, ext 204).
- b. N.Y. State Department of Commerce, Mr. Bill Granger (518-474-8671).
- c. N.Y. State Department of Highways (see Department of Public Works).
- d. N.Y. State Department of Labor, Mr. Clay Jepsen, Labor Market Analyst (518-457-6119).
- e. N.Y. City Department of Labor, Mr. Abraham Berman (212-488-4814).
- f. Central Hudson Gas & Electric, Mr. Helser (914-561-1000).
- g. Orange & Rockland Utilities, Mr. Alex Peschel (914-783-9008) (or) Mr. Ken Fields (914-352-6000).
- h. Consolidated Edison (Power), Mr. Charles Lohrfink (914-428-8140).
- i. Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), Mr. Chuck Martin (914-564-7200) (or) Mr. Carlsen (516-293-9850) or (212-757-4040).
- j. Power Authority of the State of New York, Mr. Asa George (212-265-6510).
- k. State University Construction Fund, Mr. Gastman or Mr. Fitzgerald (518-474-7544).
- l. Orange County Board of Health, Dr. Tyces (914-294-7961).
- m. Orange County Building Trades Council (Unions), Mr. Bill Mims (914-562-2141).
- n. Orange County Planning Board, Mr. Joel Shaw (914-294-5151).
- o. Rockland County Planning Board, Mr. Bill Chase (914-638-0500).
- p. Dutchess County Planning Board, Mrs. Caroline Raymond (914-485-9890).
- q. Putnam County Planning Board, Mr. Steven Estrin (914-225-3641).
- r. Dodge (McGraw-Hill), Mr. Don Emery (212-997-6176).

Note: Data collected were in dollars of construction placement per month. These costs have been converted to man-years by using a value of \$24,000 equal to 1 man-year. This value was based on average man-hour rate including overhead and profit of \$14/hour for a 35-hour week, 50-week year.

CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY IN THE  
MID-HUDSON VALLEY AREA FOR  
1971 - 1978



Mr. SIKES. Will you proceed, General.

#### STATEMENT ON MEDICAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

General PIXLEY. Mr. Chairman, I will present a brief overview of the medical support requirements of the hospital.

First, I would like to point out that, in addition to the normal inpatient and outpatient services provided for the cadets as well as for the military personnel and dependents at the garrison, West Point also has a mission to provide hospitalization and evacuation for 10 counties of the State of New York, and this includes evacuation and hospitalization for specific Department of Defense units—Stewart Airfield, Schenectady General Depot, Watervliet Arsenal, and Camp Smith during summer activities.

Mr. SIKES. Does that include civil defense, or is it purely military?

General PIXLEY. Military, sir. Also, military personnel who are assigned to guided missile sites in the northern New Jersey, and southern New York area.

#### HEALTH SERVICE PROVIDED

(Slide.) On this first chart, I would like to provide a quick overview of the spectrum of health care services provided at the hospital:

Dental services, including oral surgery.

Eye, ear, nose, and throat.

Gynecology and obstetrics.

Medical.

Mental hygiene.

Psychiatric services.

Optometry.

Ophthalmology.

Orthopedic services, which is very important because of the extensive athletic program at West Point.

Pediatric services.

Immunization services.

Dispensary services.

General outpatient.

Surgical.

Physical examination.

Physiotherapy.

Neuropsychiatry.

Oral surgery.

Inhalation therapy services.

Dermatology.

Podiatry.

Finally, electrocardiography and electroencephalography and radioisotope diagnostic and therapeutic services.

The professional staff at West Point consists of some 28 Medical Corps officers, some 28 Army Nurse Corps officers, 2 veterinarians, 16 Dental Corps officers, 3 Army Medical Specialist Corps officers—a dietitian, an occupational therapist, and a physiotherapist—17 Medical Service Corps officers, 208 enlisted medical personnel, and 106 civilians.

## DEFICIENCIES OF PRESENT FACILITY

(Slide follows:)

## EXISTING HOSPITAL DEFICIENCIES

1. Poor location: (a) Noisy; (b) Congested; (c) Limited access; (d) No parking space; (e) No room for expansion.

2. Old facility: (a) Developed piecemeal since 1923; (b) Last major expansion 1943; (c) Utilities systems inadequate: Need major expansions; (d) Space not conducive to modern medical practices.

3. Inadequate space: (a) For sick call area; (b) Pharmacy; (c) Optometry; (d) Medical/surgical clinic; (e) EKG area; (f) Emergency area; (g) Laboratory; (h) Mental hygiene consultation service; (i) Medical supply; (j) Pediatric (inpatient).

General PIXLEY. Concerning deficiencies, I would prefer to avoid rehashing the old items which I think the committee has heard before: the poor location of the present hospital, and weaknesses of the old facility.

I would like to concentrate specifically on certain areas of the hospital where we feel there is inadequate space at present.

Concerning sick call, the sick call area is small. During periods of high upper respiratory rate, the cadets do overflow into the aisles, competing with dependents for care.

We are told by managers that the pharmacy space at present occupies a space of one-fourth the requirement for the current workload. I shall have more charts on this later.

The optometry service is currently cramped. There is one eye lane on the 3d floor and one on the 2d floor.

The medical-surgical clinics do not really have sufficient space for all the physicians who work there. In an attempt to conserve the critical physicians' availability in an All-Volunteer Army, we would like to see two examining rooms for every one physician to speed up the flow of the care of patients. It is less than 1-to-1 per physician at present. It will be slightly less than two rooms for every physician with the new projected hospital.

Concerning the electrocardiographic service area, this is currently located in an unventilated old toilet area. The space is very tight.

The emergency room consists of only one room for multiple casualties if they occur.

The laboratory space is somewhat constricted. Some of the equipment currently is out in the aisles.

The mental hygiene clinic services are currently provided in three separate areas of the hospital.

Medical supply has been for years provided in the basement of the old hospital. It is unsatisfactory from the standpoint of linen control.

Finally, the pediatric or child cases must be mixed with the adults on frequent occasions when the load goes up. This is undesirable from the standpoint of controlling infections.

For the record and for the committee's interest, perhaps the members would like to look at some of these pictures during the afternoon, or you may keep them for the future.

Mr. SIKES. Very well. Thank you.

## PRESENT HOSPITAL

When was the present hospital built?

General PIXLEY. 1923, sir. It started away back in 1884. The intensive construction program started in 1923.

There was an addition, I believe, in 1943. This was the last major alteration.

General COOPER. The original building was started in 1884 but was later torn down.

Mr. SIKES. What are you going to do with this building?

General PIXLEY. I would like the engineers to address this.

Colonel LOMBARD. With the present hospital? There are a number of space requirements for it. They are defined in the master plan and consistent with that plan. It has been formulated for some time.

Specifically, for example, a dental clinic would be located in that building.

In addition to this, the cadet store activities, which involve the issuance of clothing and this type of thing to the cadets, will be brought together and assembled into that building.

We think with somewhat minimum modifications that building would suit that purpose very nicely.

Those activities are now spread over quite some distance at West Point. Some of them are conducted in cadet rooms, and some of them are just done wherever the facility happens to be available at that point in time.

Mr. SIKES. Go ahead, Doctor.

## WORKLOAD

[Slide follows:]

AVERAGE DAILY BEDS OCCUPIED BY FISCAL YEAR -- USMA HOSPITAL

<u>PERSONNEL CATEGORY</u>	<u>FY 66</u>	<u>FY 67</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 69</u>	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72*</u>	<u>PROJECTED FOR FUTURE</u>
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY	14	13	15	14	12	10	8	10
CADETS	23	21	22	22	20	23	19	21
DEPENDENTS OF ACTIVE DUTY	16	17	17	16	12	9	10	12
DEPENDENTS OF RETIRED/ DECEASED	6	7	7	8	8	8	8	11
RETIRED	5	6	7	7	10	8	6	11
OTHERS	2	2	3	2	1	2	1	1
TOTAL	66	66	71	69	63	60	52	66

\* Added per committee request.

General PIXLEY. Concerning workload, let us address two factors. The average daily bed occupancy for the last 6 fiscal years prior to fiscal year 1972 was 67. This chart fails to reveal the average occupancy for fiscal year 1972. I have those figures which I can provide for the record.

Fiscal year 1972, we want to be honest, for some reason was low. There was a 52 average bed occupancy throughout the year.

Average daily beds occupied this fiscal year; that is, this fiscal year starting last July, for the months of July through March, fluctuated from a low of 41 for December, which one would expect because the cadets go home for the holidays, to an average high of 60 beds occupied during the month of November.

Based on population served, an average of 66 average daily beds occupied is projected for fiscal year 1974. These estimates are based on DOD formulas.

Mr. LONG. Have you anything later than fiscal year 1971?

General PIXLEY. I have fiscal year 1972. Would you like that category by category? I just read off—

Mr. LONG. Will you give us fiscal year 1972 and fiscal year 1973?

General PIXLEY. Yes, sir. I just read that.

Mr. LONG. Could you tell us that again, please? Why couldn't those figures have been written down on that chart?

General PIXLEY. I should have had it done.

For fiscal year 1973, this year, I gave you the low of 41 for the month of December, and the high of 60 for November.

Major PEACOCK. Active duty military for fiscal year 1972, beds occupied was 8; cadet, 19; retired military, 6; dependents of active duty military, 10; dependents of retired and deceased military, 8; other, 1. Total, 52.

Mr. LONG. Fifty-two. So, it has gone down. You have in 1968, 71; in 1969, 69; in 1970, 63; and in 1971, 61.

What is the number so far in fiscal year 1973?

Major PEACOCK. We have figures July through March for fiscal year 1973.

Beginning in July, it was 56 total; August, 59; September, 56; October, 51; November, 60; December it dropped to 41; January, 46; February, 51; and March, again 51.

Mr. SIKES. Is there any accounting for the fact that the number of beds in use seems to be dropping?

General PIXLEY. No, sir. We cannot really account for that, but we think it will increase in the future.

Retired personnel and their dependents continue to receive care at military hospitals. We think it is inevitable that the figure will go up.

Mr. LONG. We want the facts so far. To date, they show that bed use is going down. Yet you have projected for the future as if bed use were going up.

General PIXLEY. I think probably you have heard this before, but when a military hospital is 80 percent occupied, it is considered full.

Mr. LONG. General, please, the facts now. I think you should read the table.

Mr. SIKES. I suspect we had better suspend and get this vote, and come back.

Mr. LONG. While we are gone, could you please redo that table and give us—

Mr. SIKES. I do not know if they can redo the table. Why not have them provide the information for the record.

Mr. LONG. Write it in pencil and project it on the screen.

[Brief recess.]

Mr. SIKES. General, are you ready to proceed?

General PIXLEY. Sir, the question was the average daily beds occupied for fiscal year 1972.

The average for the first 9 months of this fiscal year is 52.

Mr. SIKES. Proceed.

[Slide follows:]

	<u>POPULATION SERVED</u>	
	<u>AVERAGE STRENGTH</u> <u>FY 1970</u>	<u>PROGRAMMED</u> <u>STRENGTH</u>
ARMY	2,450	2,357
NAVY/MARINE	8	8
AIR FORCE	107	41
DEPENDENTS OF ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY	11,390	9,400
RETIRED MILITARY	3,500	5,500
DEPENDENTS OF RETIRED & DECEASED	4,000	6,000
SATELLITED SERVED	299	299
CORPS OF CADETS	3,772	4,417
CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES	2,630	2,650
	<u>28,156</u>	<u>30,672</u>

General PIXLEY. Concerning the population served, we would like to show you this chart. There has been no significant change from 1970 to 1972. The Department of Defense picked this year, 1970, as the base when they approved the plan to go ahead and have a new West Point hospital.

Mr. SIKES. Does "programed strength" mean the end of fiscal year 1974?

General PIXLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIKES. And subsequent years?

General PIXLEY. Yes. This is also based on the long-range stationing plan of the Army.

Mr. LONG. From 1971 to 1972, it went down from 61 to 52. Then in 1973, it stayed at 52.

That seems to be in line with what people tell me about bed occupancy going down in hospitals all over the United States.

General PIXLEY. The ambulatory care load is increasing.

Mr. LONG. That does not speak well for that projection you have made for the future.

General PIXLEY. No, sir, it does not. But there are three things that should be considered, and we simply do not have a way of getting a handle on the impact.

No. 1, the closing of St. Albans and No. 2 the closing of Valley Forge, which has been used for more complicated cases.

Mr. LONG. It is a brand new ball game. Based on the kind of movement that your data historically have been showing, I do not think you have a right to throw out a statistic like that without any justification.

General COOPER. If I might interject—

Mr. LONG. Whoever concocted that projection for the future did not do you or us any service.

General COOPER. I think they projected that at the time they started the design several years ago. When I reviewed this program for the first time myself in January, I was struck, as you were, with the decrease right now. I said, "Let's assume it is going to level off at 50 for various reasons, such as you indicate. What then would be the size of the hospital?" As a matter of fact. I said, "How would you size the hospital if you had to start the design all over again?"

The answer I got back, when they put in all the various factors, including dispersion, male-female, and so forth, was that the patient load of about 52 or so would equate to a 75-bed hospital.

Then I said, "How much money could we save in this hospital if we reduced the number of beds from 100 to 75, remembering that you keep all of these clinics approximately the same because the outpatient load remains the same?"

The answer I got back was a very rough estimate of maybe as much as \$1 million, although the design is now about 85 percent complete.

#### NEED FOR NEW HOSPITAL

Mr. LONG. You are saying West Point needs a new hospital. We are going to raise the question whether the military academy needs a new hospital, in view of this data.

General COOPER. Everyone that I know except you, sir, is convinced they need a new hospital.

I spoke to this at great length to Dr. Wilber, the head of the Department—

Mr. LONG. Am I supposed to roll over and play dead because of this?

General COOPER. No, sir. I am just telling you—

Mr. LONG. Let's leave that out, then, because so far as I am concerned, we are going to go into this all over again.

What you tried to tell me is what General Sverdrup tried to tell me when I was at West Point on the Board of Visitors. People had decided that a new hospital was needed and there was no sense in going into this again.

General COOPER. We are perfectly willing and we will certainly go into it. We ought to be able to convince you that they need a new hospital. The question of the size—

Mr. LONG. I want to go into the question of whether you need one at all.

General COOPER. Would you like to go into that now?

Mr. LONG. Yes, sir.

The present hospital has 135 beds, is that not true?

General COOPER. I thought it was rated generally as a 100-bed hospital. You had them count the specific beds while you were up there?

Mr. LONG. They told me there was room for 135 beds, is that right or not?

General PIXLEY. It will accommodate 135 beds.

General COOPER. It is carried on the books—

Mr. LONG. You never used that many.

General PIXLEY. No, sir.

Mr. LONG. You use 100.

General PIXLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. Your average occupancy has gotten down to 52, which is not much more than one-third of what you could handle potentially in beds. Is that not right?

General PIXLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. That in itself raises a very interesting question about whether we need a new hospital.

Let us move on to some other things.

#### CADET HOSPITALIZATION

This hospital is claimed to be needed for the cadets, is that not right?

General PIXLEY. Yes, sir. That is one of the reasons.

Mr. LONG. You need it for the cadets. Is that the reason or not?

General COOPER. That is the primary reason.

Mr. LONG. Under the law, you cannot justify the building of a new hospital for retired people. They can only use existing hospitals on a space-available basis. Is that right?

General PIXLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. When I went up there, I was told they needed these beds for the cadets. So, we took a look at it from that point of view.

Would you put that chart back up on the screen again?

Of the total of 135 beds which you could occupy, you have been running around 22 for cadets for the last 7 or 8 years, and now we are down to 19 in fiscal 1972 and, presumably, the same thing holds true in fiscal 1973. Is that right?

General PIXLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. Now if you need the new hospital for cadets, those figures don't give very strong support to that statement, do they?

General COOPER. The cadets are the primary users. This doesn't mean they are the majority users.

Mr. LONG. We are not talking about tearing down this hospital. We are trying to raise the question, General, whether we should build another one, and whether the argument for building another one is that you don't have enough room for cadets?

General COOPER. It is not a question of room, sir. It is a question of the adequacy of the facility.

Mr. LONG. We are going to get to the other facilities a little later. Let us just stick to the question of beds here. Of the 135 beds that you can have in this hospital if you want to, you are only using now about 19 for cadets and this is declining amount compared with what it has been in the past.

#### PERSONNEL ELIGIBLE IN PROGRAMING FOR NEW HOSPITALS

When you come to dependents of active duty personnel you are down to six. Can a hospital be built under the law for dependents of active duty personnel? No. The only people you can build this hospital for under the law are cadets. Am I right?

General PIXLEY. Active duty and cadets.

Mr. LONG. And the active duty military. Between the active duty military and the cadets you have 27. You can't build a new hospital for dependents of active duty personnel, can you?

Major PEACOCK. I don't believe that is right, sir.

When we program all of our hospitals, we consider the dependents, active duty military, all the legal users.

Mr. LONG. I understand they are legal users but the question is can you build a new hospital—

Major PEACOCK. We are authorized under DOD criteria to program space and construct facilities for these categories of people.

Mr. LONG. I understand they can use it on a space available basis once it is built. I want to know, can you build a new hospital—

General COOPER. Solely for that purpose, or can you size the hospital to include that projected demand?

Mr. LONG. Of course, this is going to raise the question of whether you need the hospital. See what I mean?

Major PEACOCK. We can. We can also add 5 percent for retired.

Mr. LONG. Can you build for these people if the hospital is otherwise adequate without including them? That is what I want to know. This goes to the question of whether you have to have a new hospital. Can you answer that?

General COOPER. The answer to your question, as I understand it, is that we can build and size a new hospital based on the active duty military, which in this case would include the cadets and dependents of active duty personnel. From my understanding of the criteria, you are also allowed to program 5 percent in for retired personnel.

That is the way you size the hospital.

Mr. LONG. Let us assume that you can do that, that you can build a new hospital based on your active duty military, your cadets, your dependents of active duty military, and 5 percent for retired.

What is the 5 percent for retired? How many beds would be occupied by the retired?

General COOPER. In our original computation that was three or four.

Mr. LONG. Three or four.

#### NUMBER OF BEDS

In all that means 37 beds. So 37 out of the 135 beds in the present hospital would be justified?

General COOPER. You are comparing the total number of people actually in beds with the theoretical maximum capacity.

Mr. LONG. Of course I am.

General COOPER. That is not a fair comparison.

Mr. LONG. I don't know why it isn't. You are proposing to build a new hospital which will only have 100 beds instead of 135, so you will be reducing the number of beds if you build your new hospital. Isn't that right?

General COOPER. One hundred operating beds in the present hospital. We could put more beds in the new hospital we are building, too. I think we are building a comparable number of beds in terms of the total design.

Mr. LONG. Then you cannot justify a new hospital which will have the same number of beds or fewer beds than this hospital purely on the number of beds used by active duty, cadets, and dependents of active duty, plus a small number for retired, can you?

General COOPER. We are not justifying the new hospital on the need for beds. We are justifying a new hospital because of the obsolescence of the present hospital. Then there is a separate question as to how big the new hospital should be.

Mr. LONG. Let us get to this and let us get an admission in the record because, after considerable questioning, the officials at West Point finally came around to saying what you have just gotten through saying, namely, that there is no need for new beds.

Mr. DAVIS. For additional beds.

Mr. LONG. Or additional beds. This hospital has all the beds you need to handle all the people who are entitled to use it.

Is that right?

General COOPER. That is correct.

Major PEACOCK. Beds are not the question.

Mr. LONG. They are not the question. But that was not the message which I think you were inclined to leave with us a little while ago, was it?

General COOPER. No, sir. My intention all along was to justify the need for a new hospital based on the obsolescence of the present hospital. When you start discussing the size of the new hospital, then we get into the details you are talking about. If you wanted my personal opinion, I would say that 100 beds for the new hospital is oversized based on my estimates.

The medics don't necessarily agree with me. But I went through the same line of reasoning you did in looking at the more recent numbers of patients.

On the other hand, when they started the design of this hospital the 66 average load translated into a 100-bed hospital and it made sense.

## OUTPATIENTS

Mr. LONG. You tell me that the new hospital is needed to accommodate increased patients and increased staff. Are you talking about outpatients, since we are not talking about inpatients?

General COOPER. We are talking about outpatients, sir, not about inpatients. I am sure of that.

Mr. LONG. So any need for a new hospital is based on outpatient use; is that correct?

General COOPER. You also need to replace the existing facilities for the inpatient use.

Mr. LONG. Well, right, but if you don't need a new hospital for inpatients, the big question we are trying to raise now is do we need one for outpatients?

General COOPER. Yes, sir. You need additional facilities. You probably are aware that at many of the Army hospitals we have made additions to provide better clinics, better outpatient clinics for people.

Mr. LONG. Is this need based on an increased number of outpatients?

General COOPER. The scope of the entire hospital is based not only on an increase in the number of outpatients but also on the need to provide better service to those outpatients, so we will have much better clinics than we have now. It is now just a question of numbers.

Mr. LONG. For fiscal 1971 and 1972 there is a substantial decrease in the number of total outpatient visits in the West Point Hospital.

General COOPER. Going back to 1962, and I guess we would have to do this to get a trend, I think you find an increase of about 40 percent, slightly less than 40 percent, in the number of outpatients.

Mr. LONG. You haven't given us those. The point is from 1971 to 1972 you have a substantial decline.

Major PEACOCK. About 30, sir.

Mr. LONG. No, I have a decline from—

General COOPER. We are looking at a daily average.

Mr. LONG [continuing]. 154,291 to 135,233.

General COOPER. There was a decrease in the daily average clinic visits from fiscal year 1971 to 1972, that is correct.

Mr. LONG. Then on what do you base your argument that you need a new hospital because of increased outpatient use?

General COOPER. If you go back to 1962—

Mr. LONG. Where are those figures?

General COOPER. Fiscal year 1966, outpatient use was 370; 1967, 375. In 1968 it is 426; fiscal year 1969, 423; fiscal year 1970, 443; 1971, 444; 1972, 412.

Mr. LONG. What are these? Average daily?

General COOPER. Average daily clinic visits.

Mr. LONG. You have been telling me that outpatient use is increasing. How do you account for the decline in outpatient use from 1971 to 1972? We are entitled to wonder why it went down. What is the average daily number of outpatients so far, in fiscal 1973?

General COOPER. I don't have those, but the outpatient clinic has been overcrowded for many years.

Mr. LONG. If there is any justification for this hospital it is because of outpatient use. Is that your point?

## QUALITY OF PRESENT FACILITIES

General COOPER. That is part of my point. The existing beds, even though they are adequate in number, are not adequate in terms of providing proper medical treatment for the people.

Mr. LONG. The beds looked fine to me.

General COOPER. The beds look fine, but look at some of those pictures there, the obstetrics delivery room, for example. Dr. Wilbur said it was the only place he had ever seen where there was an emergency door on the other side of the obstetrics room. And in many places they have to wash bedpans right next to ice machines.

Mr. LONG. You are not talking about beds. You are talking about quality of facilities.

General COOPER. Not specifically beds, but the overall facility.

Mr. LONG. Aren't you talking about the quality of the facility?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. The cadets don't use these obstetric facilities, do they?

General COOPER. That is correct; dependents of the active duty personnel do.

Mr. LONG. We only have a couple of obstetric cases a day, isn't that true? So the obstetrics department is not a heavy user of hospital services.

General COOPER. That is correct. That was just one example, maybe a poor example.

Mr. LONG. I would like to know whether you are going to stick to the original concession you made on the fact that the beds are not a problem. Or are you going to keep coming back at me with this—

General COOPER. I am going to keep coming back at you and say the number of beds is not a problem but the facility to support the patients in the beds is a problem.

Mr. LONG. That is your point?

General COOPER. That is my point. The second point is that we need better outpatient facilities for those cadets.

Mr. LONG. Quantitatively the hospital is big enough. It is qualitatively you are talking about?

General COOPER. Quantitatively in terms of the number of beds it is large enough.

Mr. LONG. But qualitatively you feel you don't have the facilities to take care of the people there in the way a hospital ought to take care of them, right?

General COOPER. That is correct.

Colonel LOMBARD. It is not large enough in terms of square feet either, sir, quantitatively.

## CLINIC VISITS BY CADETS

Mr. LONG. When we get to this question of outpatients, do you have any figures on the number of cadets that use this hospital for an outpatient facility?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

[Slide follows:]

CLINIC VISITS

Personnel category	Daily average fiscal year 1972	Projected daily average fiscal year 1974
Active duty military.....	65	70
Cadets.....	146	150
Retired military.....	23	30
Dependents of active duty military.....	124	105
Dependents of retired and deceased military.....	40	50
Other.....	14	15
Total.....	412	420

Mr. LONG. That does not square with the figures I was given when I was at West Point. Hospital officials estimated the cadets were about 5 to 8 percent of the outpatients.

General PIXLEY. These are official figures.

Major PEACOCK. These are official figures for fiscal year 1972. Of course you have 1972 figures but whether for a week, month, or a day I am not sure, but these are the official figures that the Surgeon General's statistics office has provided us.

General COOPER. Colonel McCabe gave you these, sir, when you were at West Point? Colonel Maupin gave you those figures?

Colonel MAUPIN. No.

Mr. LONG. Colonel Olvey took me around.

General COOPER. And presented you with statistics that said 5 to 8 percent of the clinic visits—

Mr. LONG. Of the outpatient visits a day are cadets.

Major PEACOCK. I would say that is probably a poor guess, sir.

Mr. LONG. I talked to the cadets while I was there, and I used my eyes. From what I gather there are no cadets who use the outpatient facilities. I couldn't see any cadets in the outpatient facility in the entire hospital. I met a number of cadets, and I talked to them about the hospital facilities in general. Their reaction was they simply don't use the hospital on an outpatient basis and are discouraged from using it on an outpatient basis.

The cadets are substantial users of the beds because they have a lot of broken bones. But the overwhelming proportion of these outpatient visits are not cadet visits.

Since there seems to be a very big difference, we want verified figures on outpatient usage. I want them for all the years which they have been using them, the number of outpatients and who they are. Here we have this for fiscal 1972.

General COOPER. Those differ significantly from what you just said.

Mr. LONG. They certainly do. They differ significantly from what I saw because I saw no cadets, none at all.

General COOPER. On the other hand, when I went through the hospital at the end of February, I saw a fair number of cadets. I saw more noncadets than cadets, but it was in roughly the ratio of 2 to 1.

Mr. LONG. Since there is a real disparity in fact here I think we want somebody to look into this who represents—

General COOPER. Was that given to you in writing, sir? So we can pin it down, can you tell us who it was? Not that we want to skewer him, but we want to find the source.

Mr. LONG. Yes. I believe it was the deputy director of the hospital, Colonel McCabe.

Major PEACOCK. I was on the survey team for the Surgeon General's office that went up and made the survey at West Point a couple of years ago and we were there from Monday morning at 8 o'clock and throughout the week and in the hospital all the operating hours. During the mornings you could hardly get through the hallways it was so crowded with cadets.

Mr. LONG. There are a lot of people in the hospital, but I didn't see any cadets. I saw a lot of women, babies in mother's arms. I saw enlisted personnel and others, but I saw practically no cadets.

#### HISTORY OF BEDS OCCUPIED AND CLINIC VISITS BY PATIENT CATEGORY

General COOPER. We will get the statistics and we will run down the source of this. Then we will get back to you.

[The information follows:]

AVERAGE DAILY BEDS OCCUPIED - USMA HOSPITAL

ACTUAL FY 62 thru Nine Months of FY 73

	FY 62	FY 63	FY 64	FY 65	FY 66	FY 67	FY 68	FY 69	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	(9 Mos) FY 73	Pro- jected FY 74	Long Range Projection*
AD Military	14	14	13	14	14	13	15	14	12	10	8	8	8	10
Dependents of AD Military	15	15	16	18	16	17	17	16	12	9	10	10	10	12
Retired Military	2	3	4	6	5	6	7	7	10	8	6	8	9	11
Dependents of Retired/ Deceased Military	3	3	5	5	6	7	7	8	8	8	8	9	9	11
Cadets	24	23	20	18	23	21	22	22	20	23	19	16	18	21
Other	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	2	1	2	1	1	1	1
Total	59	59	59	62	66	66	71	69	63	60	52	52	55	66

\* Based on Army Stationing and Installations Plan dated 1 July 1972, revised 1 January 1973.

CLINIC VISITS -- USMA HOSPITAL

ACTUAL FY 62 THRU NINE MONTHS OF FY 73

<u>PATIENT CATEGORY</u>		<u>FY 62</u>	<u>FY 63</u>	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 65</u>	<u>FY 66</u>	<u>FY 67</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 69</u>	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73**</u>	<u>Long Range Proj***</u>
Active Duty	Total	18250	18250	20862	19345	20440	21170	23424	23360	27740	24090	23790	24455	29958
Military	Daily Avg	50	50	57	53	56	58	64	64	76	66	65	67	82
Dependents of Military	Total	28470	34675	40626	36135	35770	34675	39162	37960	40515	45625	45384	38690	50348
	Daily Avg	78*	95*	111	99	98	95	107	104	111	125	124	106	138
Retired Military	Total			2928	3650	4015	4380	5124	5110	6205	7300	8418	9125	12065
	Daily Avg	Not Defined		8	10	11	12	14	14	17	20	23	25	33
Dependents of Retired/Deceased Military	Total			2562	5475	5840	6205	5490	5110	6570	12410	14640	16425	19555
	Daily Avg	*	*	7	15	16	17	15	14	18	34	40	45	54
Cadets & Others****	Total	61320	59495	62952	52195	68985	70445	82716	82855	80300	72635	58560	55115	62830
	Daily Avg	168	163	172	143	189	193	226	227	220	199#	160#	151#	172
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>108040</b>	<b>112420</b>	<b>129930</b>	<b>116800</b>	<b>135050</b>	<b>136875</b>	<b>155916</b>	<b>154395</b>	<b>161330</b>	<b>162060</b>	<b>150792</b>	<b>143810</b>	<b>174756</b>
	<b>Daily Avg</b>	<b>296</b>	<b>308</b>	<b>355</b>	<b>320</b>	<b>370</b>	<b>375</b>	<b>426</b>	<b>423</b>	<b>442</b>	<b>444</b>	<b>412</b>	<b>394</b>	<b>479</b>

\* FY 63 includes totals for Dependents of both Active Duty and Retired/Deceased

\*\* FY 73 is a projection based on 9 months actual and 3 months projection

\*\*\* Based on Army Stationing and Installations Plan dated 1 July 1972, revised 1 January 1973

\*\*\*\* Cadets make up approximately 8% of this category. Also included are Foreign Personnel & Reserves on Active Duty for Training

# FY 1971 (Cadets 179); FY 1972 (Cadets 146); FY 1973 (Cadets 134); pre-FY 1971 breakouts not available

Mr. LONG. This is critical to the whole question of the use of this hospital. At West Point I was told that if there was any justification for a new hospital it was a justification which was based on outpatient use, not on inpatient use.

Mr. DAVIS. I don't think there is anything here in the record, and I have been on that board of advisers, too, to say the justification for a new hospital is based on that. If the question is on additional beds, that is a horse of a different color.

General COOPER. We clearly need much better outpatient facilities.

Mr. LONG. You want a better hospital.

General COOPER. That is correct.

#### COST OF RENOVATING PRESENT HOSPITAL

Mr. LONG. I am not an expert on hospitals. To me it looked like a pretty good hospital. I happen to have been a professor at Johns Hopkins, and I have been a frequent user of the Johns Hopkins Hospital. All I can tell you is that compared with the outpatient use at Johns Hopkins Hospital where people sit in the halls for hours and hours, your hospital looks like a dream hospital. Johns Hopkins is one of the great hospitals of the world, or so they like to think.

General COOPER. I would state categorically if their facilities are less desirable or worse than the ones at West Point they should get a new hospital, too.

Mr. LONG. I am sure they feel that way. The question is, though, who is going to pay for it.

You know, we all need new things. This whole country is full of need. The problem that I have in justifying something like this is whether you need it more than we need other things.

Assuming that you are right in saying that the existing hospital is not in very good shape qualitatively, why can't it be remodeled?

Why can't it be remodeled instead of building a new one?

Colonel LOMBARD. It can be, sir.

Mr. LONG. It can be.

Colonel LOMBARD. The obvious answer is it can. The question is what would it cost, what would it involve, and is it the smart thing to do? It would depend a little bit on what criteria you wanted to apply with regard to what clinics were to be provided and what clinics were not; what equipment was to be provided that is not now available to the hospital, or what equipment that is now available to the hospital requires replacement; what kind of updating of the electrical systems, the ventilating systems, the utility systems in general, is required.

Mr. LONG. Could you give us a detailed breakdown of the costs of repairing these facilities?

Colonel LOMBARD. No, sir, I can't do that unless I know what it is I am supposed to do.

Mr. LONG. Have you looked at these costs?

Colonel LOMBARD. Yes, sir, and we have examined in some depth the question of remodeling this facility in order to provide proper medical care.

Mr. LONG. Can we have your figures?

Colonel LOMBARD. Yes; I have about eight options that I can give to you. One of the problems that we would need to consider is parking capacity which is not available at the present hospital, due in part to

the construction of the science building directly across the street from it, as I am sure you are aware, in what used to be the parking area that supported the hospital. On the question of parking, to what extent should parking be provided in connection with the medical facility at West Point?

That is a major factor in determining what is feasible, what is not, and what the costs involved are.

Mr. LONG. Parking was never mentioned to me as a problem.

Colonel LOMBARD. No, sir; however, that is one of the factors that I would have to consider in responding to your question, so let me take an option that involves no additional parking to what is there right now. It adds a 53,000-square-foot dental clinic building or addition to the building on the south side to provide the facilities that are required on the south side, with an additional entrance ramp leading into the building.

The cost is about \$21 million.

Mr. LONG. You are getting at something else now when you are talking about dental facilities, aren't you?

Colonel LOMBARD. I am talking about a 53,000-square-foot building—excuse me, sir—that would need to be added in order to meet the space criteria that have been defined.

Mr. LONG. The question of whether we have enough space is something I think that we ought to let go for a little while. Why don't you give us these various options for the record, and particularly I think we would like to know the cost of making this hospital a pretty good hospital without spending a huge amount of money.

Colonel LOMBARD. All right, sir.

[See page 493-495.]

Colonel LOMBARD. The specific option that I just attempted to define, and I would like for you to understand that these are very, very quick estimates that were prepared; they are not detailed design—

Mr. LONG. I hope you will give us better estimates than what you came up with on your future projections because this material is going to be looked into.

We are not going to rest with the figures you give us. We are going to go behind them.

Colonel LOMBARD. I understand that.

Mr. LONG. We want to know the physical deficiencies, such as the high pressure steam system, and the electrical service and branch wiring, and what it would cost to replace them.

Because you have thought a lot about what you want there, perhaps you could give us something you feel would be a minimum facility which would improve the hospital qualitatively. All you need, if you need anything, is to improve the hospital qualitatively and to remedy some of the deficiencies you were talking about such as the door to the obstetrics room, the emergency door being on the wrong side of the bed.

Right?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. You have given us a list of 10 space deficiencies. You say the cadet sick call area is so limited that the line of waiting cadets frequently extends out of the sick call area past the pharmacy.

As I say, I never saw any cadets there the day I was at the hospital, so it must have been quite a day when you got these figures.

The pharmacy occupies a space one-quarter the area needed; the emergency area and other hospital activities are cramped. Can you give us your estimates of what it would cost to provide adequate space for those activities?

I would like to know if space could be found to house the dental clinic, the ambulance dispatch, the cadet store, and the admissions office elsewhere on the military reservation.

I would also like to know the cost of replacing the deficient equipment. It would be important to inform the committee as to why the excess 35-bed area, which hospital officials say they could convert into beds but never have, could not be converted into a facility to house some of these hospital activities—such as cadet sick call, the pharmacy and the emergency room—that the Army says are located in very cramped quarters.

Right? Do you follow me?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

The plan for expansion (Gray Book) for the U.S. Military Academy provides for using the present hospital structure to house the Department of Admissions, the cadet store, a triage and ambulance dispatch point and dental clinic once the new hospital is completed. Currently, the Department of Admissions occupies 5,120 square feet of office space in the Post Headquarters, Building 600, on floors 1B, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Space allocation is insufficient considering current authorized strength, projected personnel increases and assigned functions. Functional assignment has not been possible and the present facilities are inadequate for effective and efficient operations. This space currently occupied by the Department of Admissions is needed for the expansion of other activities located in the headquarters building.

The cadet store and related subactivities are presently located in several temporary locations scattered throughout the post. The cadet store proper occupies space in cadet barracks which was originally programed for cadet use. Cadet Store operations such as book issues, uniform issues, and clothing displays have no assigned location and must take place in whatever space can be found, to include: the dining hall, class and lecture rooms, gymnasium areas and the transportation motor pool garage. A small issue point is located in building 720 occupying space required for cadet activities.

The dental clinic is located in three separate areas of the present hospital and in a separate building programed for other requirements. This clinic is inadequate because of a lack of functional arrangement.

The triage and ambulance dispatch point which is currently in the present hospital would remain in order to minimize loss of cadet time in obtaining medical treatment. To move this function elsewhere away from the center of cadet activity would be self defeating.

Construction planning and programing at USMA assumed eventual availability of the existing hospital for these functions. Because of this assumption, modification of the Post Headquarters (fiscal year 1965) did not provide space increases for expanding activities located in that area which would eventually be relocated to the old hospital facility. Likewise, the Washington Hall barracks complex (fiscal year 1965) did not provide spaces for the Cadet Store activities now located therein. There are no alternative facilities available. If the hospital building cannot be made available, other facilities should be constructed to house these activities.

Another associated cost springs from the need to replace medical equipment in the existing hospital which is deficient by present health care standards. This cost, not included in the MCA package, is estimated to be 4.0 million.

There appears to be excess capacity in the existing facility between the original capacity and the rated operating capacity. The actual difference between the so-called "constructed capacity" and the "operating beds" at this hospital is 30, as shown on the DD form 1391. The suggestion that this extra bed space be converted to other uses is reasonable and this approach has been taken already. In October 1971, the Surgeon General reduced the number of operating beds to the present level of 100 and, since that time, one 14-bed ward has been

converted in connection with the expansion of the laboratory facility on another floor. Those activities displaced by this expansion were relocated into this converted ward area. Due to the hospital configuration and the impact of the dispersion requirement the remaining excess area (16 beds and 1,450 square feet) is still required during peak periods. Hospital records indicate that this area was opened and utilized for several days each month during calendar year 1972 and was open continuously during the month of February when occupancy rates were at their highest. Currently, this ward is open at least once each week.

This indicates that this area is not available to be converted to other uses because it is already fully utilized.

The 116 beds discussed above exceed the 100 beds programed for the new West Point hospital. The reason for this difference is that a modern hospital designed to include single, double and four-bed rooms requires less dispersion and provides a more optimum bed occupancy than the old concept of large open wards.

#### COMPARISON WITH COST OF OTHER HOSPITALS

Mr. LONG. Some of your hospital activities are cramped, but you have room for 35 additional beds. Why can't that be converted?

If the hospital is to be built here, you have a hospital which costs \$211,385 per bed. I am informed this is six times the cost of building some recently improved military hospitals.

You have a 116-bed hospital at Fort Devens, Mass., which would be \$6 million compared with your \$19,683,000 bid price and the \$25 million that you are talking about, so it is from a third to one-quarter the cost although it has 16 beds more than the proposed West Point Hospital.

General COOPER. We had some detailed figures and that hospital was awarded in December of 1968 and it had a different area cost factor and a few other things.

Mr. LONG. Let us take 1972, Pease Air Force Base, N.Y.

General COOPER. I can give you what we computed. The cost of the West Point Hospital, on a comparative cost per square foot, is about \$134 per square foot versus \$92 a square foot at Fort Devens.

Mr. LONG. Why do you have to have so much more square footage at a hospital with just a few more beds, or even fewer beds?

Major PEACOCK. Outpatient space, sir. The number of beds is not a good factor on which to judge the size of a hospital.

Mr. LONG. Will you find out what the outpatient use of these other hospitals is for us?

Major PEACOCK. The space requirement you mean?

Mr. LONG. Yes.

Major PEACOCK. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. I would like to know what the outpatient burden is at one of the local hospitals in Washington or at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore.

I would like the Army to find that out and compare it because that doesn't strike me as being such an enormous outpatient use.

Major PEACOCK. There is a difficulty in comparing military hospitals and civilian hospitals and civilian hospitals because the ratio of outpatient care—

Mr. LONG. Maybe you can find out what the outpatient use is at some of the other military hospitals.

General COOPER. We will compare it with Fort Devens and some of the Air Force hospitals.

Mr. LONG. All right.

[The information follows:]

COMPARISON OF USMA HOSPITAL WITH OTHER MILITARY HOSPITALS

	West Point Army Hospital	Fort Devens Army Hospital	Pease Air Force Hospital
Number of beds.....	100	116	70
Population served.....	32, 172	35, 387	30, 094
Programed output visits.....	174, 756	209, 880	97, 244
Year programed.....	74	69	72
Net area by function:			
Hospital lobby.....	555	222	405
Headquarters administration.....	4, 130	3, 969	3, 354
Registrar division.....	2, 422	1, 151	1, 200
Food service division.....	6, 680	7, 924	4, 853
Supply and services.....	9, 715	4, 460	7, 629
Department of hospital clinics.....	2, 129		1, 045
Medical/surgical clinic.....	3, 754	1, 957	1, 689
Department of orthopedics.....	4, 927	1, 647	
General practice clinic.....	4, 598	4, 139	4, 325
Physical examination section.....	280	1, 593	1, 055
Padiatric clinic.....	2, 070	1, 630	1, 650
Mental hygiene clinic.....	2, 360		446
OB/GYN clinic.....	2, 137	1, 596	1, 970
Dental clinic.....	1, 581	2, 012	4, 197
Surgical suite.....	4, 973	3, 697	2, 440
OB, labor and delivery.....	2, 430	2, 534	1, 965
Nursery.....	750	1, 869	1, 720
Central materiel section.....	2, 636	2, 721	1, 305
Pharmacy.....	1, 724	1, 671	1, 790
Radiology.....	3, 365	2, 596	2, 712
Pathology.....	3, 470	3, 913	1, 761
Physical therapy.....	2, 445	1, 430	1, 285
Patient services.....	3, 462	1, 642	1, 390
Military public health.....			350
Aero medicine clinic.....			1, 432
Toilets/lockers/gear.....		1, 980	
Nursing units.....	21, 369	17, 461	11, 982
Total net area.....	95, 290	77, 350	67, 202
Total gross area.....	157, 344	122, 881	100, 105

SITE

Mr. LONG. The question has been raised that this costs so much because it is a very particularly expensive site. Could you reexamine the cost of building a hospital at another site where it would be less expensive?

General COOPER. On the West Point Reservation?

Mr. LONG. I suppose so; yes.

General COOPER. We obviously can, sir. I believe that the cost can't be reduced significantly at any other feasible location from where we are presented located.

Recognizing that the cost of this hospital seemed outrageously high to proponents as well as to people who might be neutral to start off with, we have looked in detail at that specific cost of \$25 million and I would like Colonel Lombard to tell you what—

Colonel LOMBARD. We have done some other work on site investigations, too. The idea of putting the hospital somewhere else on the West Point Reservation is not a new one, sir, and there have been a number of studies on siting of the hospital.

ESTIMATED COST OF CONSTRUCTION

General COOPER. I don't think he means just on siting. You mean some of the other steps, detailed design review and hospital design itself?

Mr. LONG. Building of different materials. This stone to me is hideous. You may like it but I think it is the ugliest stuff I ever saw.

I gather that building at West Point is very expensive because of the type of building materials you use.

Colonel LOMBARD. This hospital is not going to be built of monumental construction and it is not going to be granite face. It was sited in the general support facility area of the Academy when the initial expansion plan for the Academy was developed, and that site is generally the same as is now being proposed.

There have been alternate sites considered. There have been architect-engineer studies conducted to determine the relative feasibility of alternate sites, and in every case we have come back to the conclusion that the least expensive option is to site and to build this hospital in the Washington Gate complex area.

That meant then that we had to go to work on how do we build this thing cheaper, what is forcing all of our costs at West Point to go so high, and how do we get some of those factors out of this hospital specifically.

Mr. LONG. That is another question I would like to ask. What you are doing with the unions that produce some of the outrageously high costs? I gather there are other factors besides the union that produce high costs.

Is that right?

General COOPER. That is right.

Colonel LOMBARD. Yes, sir, there are. With regard specifically to this hospital site, we have employed the services of a construction management consultant, Tischman Realty Construction Corp., from New York City—the agency that built the World Trade Center for the New York Port Authority, to identify them to you—to examine the designs being produced by Leo Daly of Omaha, who is the architect-engineer on this hospital, from the constructability point of view with the specific view in mind to getting out of this hospital those factors which are labor intensive and to replace those with similar and functionally comparable methods of construction that would let us address the labor problem more directly than we have been able to in the past.

As a result of that we have done a whole lot of things, sir. We have changed from a concrete frame building which required that the concrete be placed on site to a steel frame building.

Mr. LONG. And still you come up with a \$25 million figure after you do all these things?

Colonel LOMBARD. Yes, sir.

General COOPER. Let me interject. When we still come up with the \$25 million figure and we started off with \$25 million it looks as if we didn't make much progress.

Actually the latest estimate I got was below the \$25 million figure by maybe as much as \$2 million. In the original \$25 million estimate we were using 6.5 percent escalation for 1973 and 6 percent for years beyond that as we have in all these other figures in our fiscal year 1974 request. But if you take in the actual cost escalations of 10 percent or more that we have had recently, we think that the cost will come close to \$25 million although we reduced it about \$2 million or so by this design review. The savings have been eaten up.

## UTILIZATION OF PRESENT HOSPITAL FACILITIES

Mr. LONG. You built onto your gym, which I went through. You must have a half dozen gymnasiums there, right?

General COOPER. At West Point we have one major gym.

Mr. LONG. You go from one gym to another.

General COOPER. There might be some other ones.

Mr. LONG. One gym after another has been built there; isn't that right?

General COOPER. There have been additions to the main gymnasium. I don't know if there is any new gymnasium as such.

Colonel LOMBARD. It is all in the same complex, not all built at one time.

Mr. LONG. You kept adding to the gym. Tell me why can't that be done with this hospital. Why can't you just continue to use this hospital, but build a small building which can take over some of the outpatient work and relieve the strain on the building?

Colonel LOMBARD. Well, because addressing this old facility—

Mr. LONG. Especially since your workload doesn't seem to be increasing. It seems to be declining.

Colonel LOMBARD. Then we are really addressing this facility in isolation and we are ignoring the fact that in the overall expansion plan of the Academy there has been in fact provision made to utilize this particular facility once the new hospital comes into being.

There have been a number of decisions taken as the expansion has been accomplished with regard, for example, to space requirements in the administrative headquarters of West Point, in the cadet store activity, in the issuance of clothing and equipment to the cadets, and to the provision of dental facilities, all of which have revolved around presumptions that eventually a hospital would be constructed and the old hospital building would be available to be utilized for those purposes; so it is not true that there has been no planning with regard to using this old facility once the new facility comes into being.

General COOPER. Colonel Lombard, you didn't quite answer the question.

Could we add on to the present hospital? One, we don't have the space available in that particular area.

Mr. LONG. The land area?

General COOPER. The land area would be very difficult.

Mr. LONG. You are not going to demolish this building, are you?

General COOPER. No, sir, but you ask could we build an addition onto it to come up to the same—

## SITE

Mr. LONG. Where are you proposing to put it?

General COOPER. The new hospital is going to be up by Washington Gate.

Mr. LONG. Which is how far away?

General COOPER. 1.6 miles.

Colonel LOMBARD. It is a little over a mile and a half and it is up by the laundry at the north end of the post out past the Lee housing area.

General COOPER. You probably went through the Washington Gate when you were up there. We can show you on the map.

Colonel LOMBARD. It is the red square on the top of the chart.

General COOPER. We have added onto the gymnasium but we have ended up with some very marginal facilities. I don't know if you have been all through the bowels of the gym.

Mr. LONG. We will come to the gym a little later.

Don't you feel that is going to create some real problems? Isn't the present hospital located much closer to where most of the cadets live, work, and study?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. So the new one is going to be quite away from the central cadet area.

Colonel LOMBARD. That is right.

Mr. LONG. Is that a good idea?

Colonel LOMBARD. I believe it is under these circumstances, sir, and I believe it is the most acceptable of the several choices that are available.

#### HOSPITALS IN THE AREA

Mr. LONG. What do you think about the community around West Point? Are you arguing that the community is growing and you need a new hospital for that reason? Some of the people who favored this seemed to argue on the basis that this is the only hospital in the general area and they needed it for that reason.

Are you basing the argument on that?

General COOPER. No, sir; that wasn't the basic argument.

Mr. LONG. You are not relying on that at all?

General COOPER. There is a definite trend on the part of the Office of Secretary of Defense, Dr. Wilbur, to try to get better triservice use of all hospital facilities. Now that the St. Albans Hospital is being closed down by the Navy in the New York area, the load at West Point will increase, but we could hardly use that as a primary justification for the original scope of the hospital.

Mr. LONG. Under the law you can't use it.

General COOPER. Not at the time we started the design. St. Albans was an active duty Navy hospital, so West Point will have the only major military hospital that I know of in the New York City area. To the extent that there are additional military requirements we would expect—

Mr. LONG. Some of the other members of the Board of Visitors at West Point were arguing that, "You need a new hospital because this is the only one for a long distance." That was a loose argument, but they felt that it offered some support for the new hospital.

I want to point out that Stewart Field, which accounts for 7.5 percent of the population which uses this hospital, will soon be closed and be converted to a jet port. Therefore, that should shrink as a source of use.

Colonel LOMBARD. No, sir.

General COOPER. Most of the people at Stewart Field are working at West Point. When we close down Stewart Field, we are going to have to build additional facilities for them at West Point so they would continue to use the hospital. Even if they lived off the base, they would still continue to use the hospital.

Colonel LOMBARD. Those people are part of the West Point complement; yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. I might point out that there are seven hospitals of various types within 45 miles of West Point so they aren't totally without hospital facilities. But I gather that is not relevant.

Please put in the record the hospitals that are in this area and the distance from West Point.

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

HOSPITALS OF VARIOUS TYPES WITHIN 45 MILES OF WEST POINT—DISTANCE

Hospital	Distance	Number of beds	Type
VA hospital, Castle Point, N.Y.....	18 miles.....	258	General medical and surgical.
VA hospital, Montrose, N.Y.....	20 miles.....	1,543	General medical and surgical and NP.
Cornwall Hospital, Cornwall, N.Y.....	6 miles.....	126	General medical and surgical.
St. Luke's Hospital of Newburgh, Newburgh, N.Y.....	12 miles.....	251	Do.
Craig House, Beacon, N.Y.....	16 miles.....	49	Psychiatric.
Highland Hospital, Beacon, N.Y.....	do.....	124	General medical and surgical.
Matteawan State Hospital, Beacon, N.Y.....	do.....	1,292	Mental defective and psychiatric.
Peekskill Hospital, Peekskill, N.Y.....	12 miles.....	113	General medical and surgical.

Mr. LONG. What other major hospitals are there in the area, and how heavy is their utilization? Provide details for the record.

[The information follows:]

HOSPITALS OF VARIOUS TYPES WITHIN 45 MILES OF WEST POINT—UTILIZATION

Hospital	Number of beds	Percent occupied	Type	Stay <sup>1</sup>	Outpatient services
VA hospital, Castle Point, N.Y....	258	88.4	General medical and surgical.	Long term....	Organized outpatient department.
VA hospital, Montrose, N.Y.....	1,543	84.4	General medical and surgical and NP.	do.....	Do.
Cornwall Hospital, Cornwall, N.Y.....	126	77.0	General medical and surgical	Short term....	No organized outpatient department.
St. Luke's Hospital of Newburgh, Newburgh, N.Y.....	251	90.4	do.....	do.....	Organized outpatient department.
Craig House, Beacon, N.Y.....	49	71.4	Psychiatric.....	Long term....	No organized outpatient department.
Highland Hospital, Beacon, N.Y.....	124	76.0	General medical and surgical	Short term....	Do.
Matteawan State Hospital, Beacon, N.Y.....	1,292	69.7	Mental defective and psychiatric.	Long term....	Do.
Peekskill Hospital, Peekskill, N.Y.....	113	92.0	General medical and surgical.	Short term....	Do.

<sup>1</sup> Short term—over 50 percent of all patients admitted stay less than 30 days; long term—over 50 percent of all patients admitted stay 30 days or more.

Mr. LONG. What specialties does the Cornwall Hospital provide? Could it absorb some of your retired workload?

[The information follows:]

Cornwall Hospital, Orange County, N.Y., is a short-term, non-Government, not-for-profit, general medical and surgical hospital.

Statistical data: 126 beds, 4,599 admissions (September 30, 1970 to September 30, 1971), 97 census (September 30, 1970 to September 30, 1971), 77-percent occupancy (September 30, 1970 to September 30, 1971), 13 bassinets, 504 births (September 30, 1970 to September 30, 1971).

Specialties: Postoperative recovery room, pharmacy, X-ray therapy, radium therapy, electroencephalography, inhalation therapy department, physical therapy department, emergency department, volunteer services department.

There is no organized outpatient department at Cornwall Hospital. As in most civilian hospitals, patients are referred by private physicians to the hospital for inpatient care and any necessary followup outpatient care in areas of physical therapy, inhalation therapy, and X-ray therapy. Routine care is provided by private physicians and community health centers.

Mr. LONG. Tell us for the record where is the 1,500 bed VA hospital at Montrose, N.Y., in terms of the population center of the retired population you are serving?

[The information follows:]

The estimated center of the retired population served by the USMA Hospital is approximately 4 miles south of Beacon, N.Y., and 5 miles southeast of Newburgh, N.Y. The 1,543 bed VA hospital at Montrose, N.Y., is approximately 20 miles from this estimated center. The site of the proposed new USMA Hospital is approximately 7 miles from this estimated center.

#### GYMNASIUM

Mr. LONG. Is the gymnasium another one of your items?

General COOPER. No, sir, not in fiscal 1974. I will say for the future, having looked at the gym, that we do need to do something about it.

Mr. LONG. The Board of Visitors recommended that renovation of the cramped gymnasium be contingent upon further expansion of the Cadet Corps beyond the present strength of 3,800.

General COOPER. Well, the Cadet Corps is supposed to go to 4,400.

Mr. LONG. Things don't always work out the way they are supposed to.

General COOPER. That is correct.

Mr. LONG. I also talked to a tremendous number of cadets about the gym. I just walked up and shook hands with them. Six of them were my own appointees. I asked them to speak quite frankly, and they did. Then I talked to a lot of others at random. They did not know who I was. I asked them about the gym. Without exception, these cadets thought the gym facilities were great. They thought that was one of the strong features of the Academy.

I will say that I received a letter from one of my appointees who has been an officer for several years who did say he thought the gym was inadequate and needed to be improved. But that is the only response I have ever gotten from the people I talked to which indicated a strong need for a new gym.

General COOPER. You mean a completely new gym as opposed to further fixing the existing one?

Mr. LONG. I don't think they proposed to add a new gym. They proposed to spend \$9.5 million to build a very substantial gym addition. I don't think this was a proposal to eliminate the present facilities, but \$9.5 million is a good hunk of money. There is no sense in spending it if present facilities are adequate.

I want you to know the kind of consumer survey that I made among the cadets. I didn't find a single cadet who had any quarrel with the hospital. There was only one mild beef—that cadets were discouraged from using the outpatient facilities.

Some cadets felt they were sort of given the brushoff; "Nothing wrong with you. Get the heck out of here," or something like that.

What that means I don't know. But only one or two felt that way. Most of them seemed to feel the hospital was fine, and they never had any problems.

That concludes my questioning on West Point.

Mr. Davis?

#### PRESENT HOSPITAL

Mr. DAVIS. Just for purposes of reviewing now, this hospital is to have 157,000-plus square feet. What is the square footage on the present structure?

General COOPER. Approximately 113,400 square feet.

Mr. DAVIS. The present hospital was built as a hospital? It was built for that purpose originally, was it not?

General COOPER. That is correct.

Mr. DAVIS. Is it structurally sound? Is there any structural problem in connection with renovating the existing structure to modernize it and to make the supporting facilities more adequate, Colonel, that you are aware of?

Colonel LOMBARD. No, sir; I think it is basically a sound building. Maintenance that perhaps should have been done on it over the years has not been done in anticipation of the new hospital being built, and the same particularly applies to the utility systems. It is not air-conditioned, for example.

#### PREVIOUS REQUESTS FOR HOSPITAL

Mr. DAVIS. Is this the first time that the request for a new hospital has been before this committee?

Colonel LOMBARD. No, sir.

General COOPER. The hospital was previously authorized and funds were appropriated for it. It was approved in fiscal year 1966 but we didn't build it. It was approved again in fiscal year 1969, really a deficiency request, and all the bids at that time were too high. The low bid was \$8.6 million and it was decided that it was too much above the authorization of \$6.5 million.

That particular building was smaller in scope than the present one we are talking about.

Mr. DAVIS. Less beds as well as—

General COOPER. No; not less beds, but less total square feet. I believe that building was about 117,000 square feet itself.

Colonel LOMBARD. It started around 117,000 and one version of it was around 122,000 square feet.

#### DECISION ON SITE

Mr. DAVIS. When was the decision made as to the site?

Colonel LOMBARD. The site, sir? The location?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes.

Colonel LOMBARD. I believe early in the days of the grey book plan for expansion of the facilities at West Point this hospital was to be located in the area which was set aside for support facilities, generally to be built in the Washington Gate area.

The siting remained at that location until a year or a year and a half ago, and I was not in the New York district at that point so I

am not too sure of the exact timing, but one of the earlier actions of the Planning Advisory Board under General Trudeau that was set up specifically to address costs at West Point was to question this siting of the hospital and to determine whether, in fact, this was the best place to build the hospital.

General COOPER. It was in January 1972 that the Planning Advisory Board recommended the hospital be resited to the Stony Lonesome area.

Colonel LOMBARD. I guess than the earlier action of the Planning Advisory Board that I was thinking of was the question of the present hospital: Can it be made to do the job? The conclusion at that point was that the new hospital was required.

The question was raised as to whether the hospital should perhaps be sited in the Stony Lonesome area rather than in the Washington Gate area, part of the rationale being that the Stony Lonesome area was the newest developmental area at West Point, likely the site of any future quarters that might be built at West Point and the location of the newest and what would ultimately be the main entrance at West Point.

The question was addressed and it was determined that the present location is the cheapest, very frankly, one for the hospital that meets the same criteria.

One of the reasons was that in the Washington Gate site, although the foundation of the hospital will pose normal construction problems associated with building on overburden, those problems are considerably less expensive than the ones associated with building in rock. We have a lot of rock in the Stony Lonesome area which simply cannot be avoided and which would be extraordinarily expensive to excavate.

We have the same problems as far as remoteness of site, difficulty of access, and this type of thing for the cadet population, so that didn't seem to be a discriminant at all.

The cost of the hospital, sited in the Washington Gate area and meeting the criteria that were set forth for it to meet, was less than the comparable facility in Stony Lonesome.

General COOPER. The Board of Visitors, when it was at the Military Academy from April 28 to May 1, also strongly opposed relocating it from the Washington Gate area to Stony Lonesome.

Mr. DAVIS. Was that this year or last year?

General COOPER. No; this was last year.

Mr. LONG. You were on that board of visitors last year.

Mr. DAVIS. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. DAVIS. Getting back on the record, when was the decision made to reject the recommendation of the advisory committee and to revert to the Washington Gate site?

General COOPER. It was shortly after that April meeting that the Secretary of the Army made the determination. Then the final approval to proceed with the design of the hospital was given by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense on October 24, 1972.

Colonel LOMBARD. Sir, I believe there may be a little problem with semantics. At least I am not clear on the reference.

The advisory committee sounds like TAC, the architect's collaborative, which is the architect that is in fact now updating the master plan at West Point under the guidance of the planning advisory board headed by General Trudeau and I didn't know but what there might be some confusion as to who had made the recommendation.

It is my understanding that the original recommendation that the site at least be considered for relocation came from the architect-engineer, the organization known as the architect's collaborative, as opposed to having been a decision on the part of the planning advisory board.

General COOPER. But the TAC was working for the planning advisory board. They recommended to the planning advisory board and the planning advisory board adopted their recommendation.

Colonel LOMBARD. What they recommended was to investigate the site and determine what the facts were with regard to that possible site. That is what led us into that investigation.

The conclusion of it was that the Planning Advisory Board accepted siting of the hospital in the Washington Gate area.

General COOPER. At its meeting on the 17th of May, according to the information given to me, the Planning Advisory Board ended up in a tie vote, 5 to 5.

Colonel LOMBARD. They met again in late 1972. They met again in October of 1972, at which time that subject was discussed again.

Mr. LONG. They ended up in a tie vote. Then what happened?

General COOPER. They ended up in a tie vote. This was before the visit of the Board of Visitors. But the Secretary of the Army decided we had been messing around with the location long enough and he made the decision, "That's it. Stop."

Mr. LONG. The architectural advisory board was split 5 to 5 on what?

General COOPER. No, the Planning Advisory Board was split 5 to 5 as to whether they should change their original recommendation to relocate the hospital from the Washington Gate to the Stony Lonesome.

Mr. LONG. So far as the experts were concerned they were about split as to whether you should build the hospital you are proposing or move it somewhere else; is that right?

General COOPER. That is right. I would say that the meeting that Colonel Lombard is referring to was the Planning Advisory Board meeting on October 13, 1972, and at that time we said we were planning to go ahead with it. We in essence told them of the decision and they didn't object. They are an advisory board; they are not the governing factor.

The Secretary of the Army made the decision.

#### COST OF RENOVATING PRESENT HOSPITAL

Mr. DAVIS. I am not sure whether we have this for the record or not. I think what we need is a refinement of the cost estimates for renovating the present structure to provide a 100-bed hospital with adequate supporting facilities. Then, if you want to, submit a statement as to any deficiencies that would exist after such a renovation had taken place, compared to the new hospital which you propose.

Mr. LONG. That is a very thoughtful proposal.

Mr. DAVIS. You told us there were a number of alternatives. I think you can gather from the colloquy here that we are interested in taking the existing structure, which is basically a sound structure, built as a hospital, and modernizing it, tearing out what you need to tear out, relocating functions within that existing structure to do the best possible job. Then we need to see where we stand costwise and with respect to adequacy of facilities as compared to building a new structure.

Is that definite enough for you?

General COOPER. I think that is consistent with what Dr. Long asked for earlier.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you.

[The information follows:]

A modern 100-bed hospital, with adequate clinical and support areas sized to support the design population cannot be provided in the 113,398 gross square feet of the existing hospital. If this proposed hospital is to be decreased in total square footage, it is only reasonable that a portion of the beds also be eliminated. Even then, some additional space must be provided by new construction.

A possible plan to provide a 65-bed hospital, which is not recommended by the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense (Health and Environment), is presented below.

a. Renovate the existing hospital building to provide suitable space for administration, support services, and inpatient care, as indicated below:

<u>Proposed Hospital Alteration</u>		
<u>Function</u>		<u>Net Square Feet</u>
Hospital Lobby		320
Command & Administration		3,415
Nursing Service Administration		470
Registrar Division		1,960
Food Service Division		4,987
Supply & Service Division		7,207
Surgical Suite		4,405
Obstetrics, Labor & Delivery Service		1,855
Nursery		630
Central Materiel Service		2,264
Radiology Service		3,033
Pathology Service		3,320
Physical Therapy Clinic		2,580
Patient Services		3,068
Dental Clinic		4,556
Nursing Units (65 beds)		<u>14,518</u>
	TOTAL	58,588 NET Square Feet
		93,077* GROSS Square Feet

\*This figure represents the gross usable area within the existing hospital. Approximately 20,300 gross square feet of low ceiling basement area are not considered suitable for hospital use and are, therefore, not included in the scope of alterations.

b. Construct a separate outpatient facility adjacent to the existing hospital, which would house the following functions and contain 22,345 net square feet, distributed as indicated.

<u>Outpatient Addition</u>		
<u>Function</u>		<u>Net Square Feet</u>
Department of Hospital Clinics		1,872
Department of Medicine & Surgery		3,359
Department of Orthopedics		4,200
General Practice Clinic		4,028
Physical Examination Section		280
Pediatric Clinic		1,740
Mental Hygiene Section		1,473
Eye, Ear, Nose, Throat Clinic		2,164
Obstetrics & Gynecology Clinic		1,713
Pharmacy Service		<u>1,516</u>
	TOTAL	22,345 NET Square Feet
		35,497 GROSS Square Feet

Cost of construction, under this plan is presented below:

	<u>Current Cost</u>	<u>Midpoint of Construction</u>
New Outpatient Facility (4-Story)	\$ 4,413,000	
Special Foundations	<u>1,000,000</u>	
	\$ 5,413,000	\$ 6,925,000*
Utility Connections & Site Work	\$ 1,200,000	1,535,000*
Alteration to Hospital		
New lighting & Elec Service	\$ 575,000	
Heating & Central A/C system	1,200,000	
Nat'l Elec Code update & required shielding	300,000	
Provide add'l emergency pwr generating capacity	200,000	

	<u>Current Cost</u>	<u>Midpoint of Construction)</u>
Install 2 new elevators in existing shafts	150,000	
Revise plumbing & toilet layouts	600,000	
Communications & Patient monitoring systems	350,000	
Hospital & Food service equipment	1,000,000	
Interior partitions remove & replace	600,000	
Replace doors & windows	240,000	
Floor & ceiling finishes	345,000	
Misc repair to building exterior	240,000	
Premium for working in occupied facility, phasing construction, protection, etc.	<u>2,900,000</u>	
	\$ 8,700,000	\$12,827,000**
TOTAL	\$15,313,000	\$21,287,000

\* 1st Quarter FY-76

\*\* 3rd Quarter FY-77

In addition to the above, the following requirements deserve consideration:

a. Adequate parking should be provided. Two alternatives are feasible:

(1) Construction of a high rise parking structure in an already congested area adjacent to the existing hospital at an estimated cost of \$4,700,000.

(2) Continuation of the undesirable bussing from outlying parking areas.

b. Provide alternate facilities to house the Cadet Store and admissions office which are currently included in the programmed conversion of the existing hospital building (FY 1978). No adequate facilities are available for this purpose. It is estimated that construction of these facilities would incur added cost of \$3,628,200 if programmed in FY 1975.

Rehabilitation of this hospital to obtain the desired 93,077 SF gross area for patient care and hospital service with interruption of medical services held to a minimum during the period of construction will require multiple relocation of many departments and services with a major impact on every square foot of the existing building. Work in areas where special precautions must be taken to minimize patient discomfort will contribute greatly to the high cost and will extend the period of construction.

There are basically two approaches to this construction project that could be undertaken each with its own unique associated problems and impact on hospital operations and patient care:

a. Construction of the new outpatient facility of 35,497 SF and (after this building is completed and occupied) the rehabilitation of the existing hospital. Those areas vacated by the clinical functions that move into the new outpatient addition would then be renovated first. Those functional areas listed above as remaining in the existing hospital building would have to be relocated on a temporary basis into other areas as the renovation progresses. With this approach the renovation could not be started before the spring of 1976 and would have a project duration of about three years.

During this period of construction, hospital operations will be seriously impaired as numerous dislocations of various departments and services will be required as the renovation of the existing building proceeds. With each relocation there will be an associated draw down in work loads that can be accomplished and disruption of hospital services as the moves take place. Because construction will have to be accomplished around an on-going operation, contractor access to various portions of the present building will have to be restricted as will the hours during which construction can be accomplished so as to minimize the disruption to inpatient care. In areas such as food service, operating suite, and delivery suite which can't be relocated, renovation will have to be accomplished on a piece meal basis which will hamper both the hospital and the contractor in their respective missions. Noise and the increased traffic both inside and around the hospital caused by the contractor personnel will have a disruptive effect throughout the period of construction both on the staff and patient.

b. Construction of an interim type facility (semi-permanent, pre-engineered structure in conjunction with the construction of the new outpatient addition. This interim facility would be completed before the outpatient addition and would allow for the temporary relocation of certain functions from the existing hospital structure so that renovation of the existing hospital could begin in the spring of 1975 with a project duration of about three years. The length of project

duration and the cost for the interim facility would depend on the size of the interim facility that is constructed.

The larger the interim facility, the higher will be the cost of this facility but more space could be turned over in the existing hospital at one time for renovation, thus reducing the length of time required for completion of the renovation portion of this project. An interim facility of between 50,000 SF and 90,000 SF would be required and would cost between \$3,800,000 and \$6,500,000 to construct. If this approach is adopted a portion of the \$2.9 million previously estimated to be paid as a premium for working in occupied areas should be subtracted when adding on the cost of the interim facility. Consideration must also be given to adding the cost of delay while awaiting completion of interim facilities.

The major problem with using an interim facility during this construction project is that the structure could not be located adjacent to the present hospital because of space limitations. This split site operation of the hospital would create serious problems both from the standpoint of hospital operations and patient care. Hospital operations would be seriously impaired because of the necessity for the medical staff having to move back and forth between two different hospital locations numerous times each day in order to properly conduct patient care and supervision of hospital operations. This method of construction will also require multiple relocation of numerous hospital departments which seriously disrupts hospital operations and patient care during both the preparation and moving phases. Patient care will be disrupted and hindered in the same way as discussed under the other alternative construction method discussed in paragraph a above, however, added to these problems will be the necessity of outpatients having to move back and forth between two separated locations to complete their course of care. This will add to both parking and transportation problems for the outpatient and will aggravate the patient seeking care.

This plan for renovation of the existing hospital with a new outpatient addition in lieu of the construction of a new modern, self contained hospital with adequate clinical and support areas would result in a facility having many of the same problems currently existing in the present facility. The site would be more crowded than it currently is, noisy, and practically inaccessible for a large number of uses to include emergency and service vehicles. The parking problems for both staff and patients will not have been alleviated in fact, they will have been compounded. The scope of this project would not allow for any increase in workload resulting either from closing of other military hospitals in the area or changes and innovations in the practice of medicine that will surely come about in the future.

Mr. LONG. Congressman McEwen.

Mr. McEWEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not believe I have any questions.

Mr. LONG. Very well.

#### CONSTRUCTION COSTS

Mr. LONG. Can you tell us, for the record, if the board which reviews construction costs has had any noticeable effect on the local labor agreements?

[The information follows:]

The following summarizes the effect claimed by CISC on labor agreements in the West Point area :

Trade	Date	Negotiated	CISC Allowed
Bricklayers.....	June 1972.....	\$0. 84	0. 53
Laborers.....	April 1972.....	. 70	. 60
Operating engineers.....	January 1972.....	. 72	. 60
Painters.....	April 1972.....	1. 265	. 60
Steelworkers.....	January 1972.....	1. 04	. 60

It is to be noted that these contracts were short term agreements and some have already been renegotiated and/or appealed.

Mr. LONG. Are materials costs also high in this area, or is it mostly labor costs which are exorbitant?

General COOPER. Material costs are generally no higher at West Point than in New York. For some items there are added shipping costs.

Mr. LONG. What has been your recent bid experience here?

General COOPER. No major contracts have been awarded recently. In general, the smaller size contracts advertised resulted in good competition. Although one project exceeded the programed amount, fiscal year 1971 and fiscal year 1973 project costs are well below the station totals for those program years. I will provide details for the record.

[The information follows:]

#### BIDS RECEIVED SINCE JAN. 1, 1972

Project	Authorization (Dollars times 1, 001)	Date bids open	Number of bids	Range of bids (Dollars times 1, 000)
Acad. facility alteration.....	1, 040	Feb. 23, 1972	5	928-1, 278
Diagonal walk.....	1 26	Mar. 15, 1972	10	28-74
Washington-Ruger Rd interchange.....	2 3, 708	June 14, 1972	2	987-1, 165
Expansion of Camp Buckner.....	1, 864	Jan. 9, 1973	10	1, 287-2, 180
Stonefacing.....	661	Jan. 10, 1973	3	839-917
Modification to utilities.....	968			
Electrical.....		Jan. 17, 1973	8	374-462
Water.....		Jan. 17, 1973	9	151-330
Mechanical room.....	(*)	Jan. 17, 1973	5	41-64
Science research lab.....		Apr. 5, 1973	9	104-140

<sup>1</sup> Part of Washington Hall complex line item.

<sup>2</sup> Includes improvement of Cullum Rd around the Plain that was completed in February 1973 at a cost of \$801,824 and relocation of Washington Monument at a cost of \$91,000.

<sup>3</sup> Added scope to Academic Facilities Alteration.

## STATUS OF PRIOR PROGRAMS

Mr. LONG. Provide for the record the status of prior-year programs at West Point.

[The information follows:]

## FISCAL YEAR MCA PROGRAM

Project	Authorization	CWE	Construction percent complete
Cadet Activities Center .....	\$27,552,000	\$27,024,000	73

## FISCAL YEAR 1971 MCA PROGRAM

Secondary sewage treatment .....	3,299,000	1,428,900	89
Academic facilities alteration .....	1,040,000	1,036,331	98
Washington-Ruger Rd. interchange .....	3,708,000	1,996,324	
Washington-Ruger and Thayer-Cullum intersections .....		(1,103,500)	75
Widen Cullum Rd .....		(801,824)	100
Relocate Washington Monument .....		(91,000)	100
Range expansion .....	472,000	424,800	99
Station total .....	8,519,000	7,746,455	

## FISCAL YEAR 1973 MCA PROGRAM

Camp Buckner expansion .....	1,864,000	1,427,000	13
Stone facing .....	661,000	930,000	8
Modification to utilities .....	968,000	629,000	
Electric package .....		(415,552)	13
Water package .....		(167,916)	22
Hotel Thayer mechanical room .....		(45,532)	31
WPC Monitoring Station .....	30,000	60,000	(?)
Total .....	* 3,523,000	3,046,000	

<sup>1</sup> \$990,000 reprogrammed from station total after congressional notification makes effective authorization \$4,289,000.

<sup>2</sup> Bid opening tentatively scheduled for August 1973.

Mr. LONG. What are your plans for providing an interchange or alternate road facilities in the area near the cadet activities center?

General COOPER. Washington-Ruger Road and Thayer-Cullum Road intersections are being constructed by Pelvern Construction Co. Notice to proceed was issued July 1972 on the \$987,000 contract with scheduled completion in September 1973. Contract is 75 percent complete. The Washington-Ruger Road intersection is being reconstructed to improve sight distances, alignment, and grades on Ruger Road, to provide separation of pedestrian and vehicular traffic, and includes a pedestrian tunnel for cadet access to the activities center. At Thayer-Cullum Road the intersection is being rearranged to encourage through traffic to use Cullum Road.

## COST OF WEST POINT HOSPITAL

Mr. LONG. I note from information provided the committee staff that the Military Academy hospital is substantially higher in both square-foot and per-bed costs than other hospitals are, even after adjusting for cost escalation and local construction costs. Why is this, and why is it necessary? You know what I am talking about.

General COOPER. Yes. I quoted figures to you earlier—\$134 per square foot.

Mr. LONG. Compared with \$92 in 1972. This is adjusting for the time factor and the local cost factors and everything else.

General COOPER. The only reason I can provide now is the fact that this hospital is being designed 6 years later. We do put a lot more equipment and more sophisticated equipment in a hospital, which requires different wiring, different ductwork, and so forth. That would cause some increase.

I cannot say exactly how much. We will provide an additional analysis for the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LONG. Fine. I appreciate that.

[The information follows:]

Review of the cost comparison of the proposed West Point Hospital and other military hospitals as provided to Committee Counsel has been completed and the following additional information is provided.

a. Improvements in the state of the art of medical care facilities in the past two years have resulted in increases in costs because of upgraded standards for electrical, mechanical, environmental, and fire protection systems which have been incorporated in the West Point design. For example, new standards adopted by the Veterans Administration, HEW, and the American Society of Heating, Ventilation and Refrigeration Engineers have brought about better, but more expensive systems for temperature and humidity control, air conditioning and filtration. Also, new NFPA fire codes have required such things as higher fire ratings for walls and doorways along the major paths of egress from the building. In addition, recent developments in diagnostic and therapeutic equipment, as well as new codes and standards, have placed greater demands on the quantity and reliability of electrical service, its flexibility, and the number of service terminals required.

b. Several prime and subcontractors who have recently bid on projects at West Point were contacted informally and questioned with regard to the magnitude of risk and contingency factors that they had applied to their bids. From the responses given, we have concluded that contractors add a factor of 50% to all labor costs at West Point as compared to similar projects in other areas. The following are reasons they gave for the higher contingency costs they add to West Point projects:

- (1) Travel allowances for mechanical trades and other transportation charges.
- (2) Adequate finishing trades are not indigenous to the area.
- (3) Requirements to maintain utilities are more restrictive than at other bases.
- (4) Soil conditions at West Point have a built-in element of risk.
- (5) Lost time due to functional requirements of West Point as a National attraction for visiting dignitaries of high ranks and for large numbers of tourists.
- (6) Unsubstantiated claims inferring non-competitive bidding practices by some contractors and local unions.

c. Our recent experience at West Point indicates a lack of bidding competition on projects of the magnitude of the hospital. Our current estimate reflects this experience, and under normal competitive bidding conditions, could be 10% higher than the low bid which we hope to receive. When comparing a preliminary estimate at West Point with ongoing or completed construction costs at other locations, the allowance for less competitive conditions is considered valid and should be recognized. We are continuing in our efforts to improve the competitive bidding climate at West Point.

The United States Military Academy was established in 1802 on the site of a key American Revolutionary War fortress. The choice was a fortunate one because the isolation of the spot, its rugged natural beauty and its historic associations all made positive contributions to the development of the academy. However, from a construction point of view, it presents many and unique problems due to its hilly terrain and the high rock table.

Therefore, any statistical approach to construction cost that does not address itself to all of the above considerations is inappropriate. The following table compares recently constructed military hospitals with the proposed West Point hospital reflecting the above considerations, and, accordingly, the total adjusted cost (Column 12) is considered a more valid comparison than those previously submitted.

A COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED USMA HOSPITAL WITH  
OTHER MILITARY HOSPITALS OF APPROXIMATELY THE SAME SIZE

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Location	Award Date (Month & Calendar Year)	Building Area (SF)	Number of Beds	Bid Price for Building Only (See Note 1)	Bidg Cost (SF)	Geographic Construction Cost Index	Estimated Midpoint of Construction (Month & Calendar Year)	Initial Comparative Cost per SF (See Note 2)	20% Labor Factor Adjustment (See Note 3)	State of the Art Modification (See Note 4)	Potential Savings Based on a Low Bid Under Good Competition (-10%)	Total Adjusted Comparative Cost per SF (See Note 5)
Pease AFB, N. H.	8-72	103,304	70	5,724,375	55.41	0.96	8-73	96.08	19.22	N/A		115.30
Barksdale AFB, La.	5-69	111,170	75	3,459,000	31.11	0.92	2-70	80.82	16.16	15.00	-	111.98
England AFB, La.	6-69	104,793	75	3,232,000	30.84	0.92	3-70	80.02	16.00	15.00	-	111.02
Ft. Devens, Mass.	12-68	125,132	116	6,190,000	49.47	1.15	12-69	102.69	20.54	16.00	-	139.23
USMA, West Point, NY	2-74 (est)	157,344	100	18,788,000 (est)	119.41 (est)	1.30	5-75 (est)	137.91 (est)	-	-	13.79 (deduct)	124.12

Note 1: Costs shown are bid prices except for USMA which represents the estimated bid price.

Note 2: Comparative costs are computed by adjusting Column 5 costs to reflect the comparable construction costs at West Point, and cost growths to a common time factor based on the mid-points of construction, - e.g., for Pease AFB, the computation would be:

$$\begin{array}{r}
 \text{(Col 5)} \\
 55.41 \times \frac{\text{Geographic Adjustment } 1.30}{0.96} \times \frac{\text{Cost Growth Adjustment } 1275}{1150} \times \frac{\text{10\% Contingency and 5\% S\&A } 1.155}{1.155} = \$96.08
 \end{array}$$

Note 3: An adjustment of 20% of the unit price has been added on the basis of the results of contractor interviews related in subparagraph b above.

Note 4: An adjustment to reflect changes in the state of the art of medical care (see subparagraph a above) derived from current projects to upgrade existing hospitals.

Note 5: Total adjusted comparative cost equals the total of columns 8 thru 11.

**Mr. LONG.** Provide for the record data on the cost of this hospital by functional areas.

[The information follows:]

USMA HOSPITAL  
Space Utilization Cost

Sheet No.	Function	Gross Area	Cost/SF	Area Cost
1	Hospital Lobby	612	\$137.30	\$ 84,028
2	Command and Administration	4,039	103.00	415,936
4	Nursing Service Administration	519	103.00	53,447
5	Registrar Division	2,672	103.00	275,163
6	Food Service Division	7,371	138.45	1,020,441
8	Supply & Service	10,721	86.95	932,298
11	Department of Hospital Clinics	2,349	103.00	241,900
13	Department of Medicine/Department of Surgery	4,143	114.40	474,042
16	Department of Orthopedics	5,437	114.40	622,102
	General Practice Clinic	5,074	114.40	580,567
20	Physical Exam Section	309	114.40	35,356
21	Pediatric Clinic	2,284	114.40	261,335
22	Mental Hygiene Clinic	1,465	108.70	159,246
23	EENT Clinic	2,604	125.85	327,739
25	OB/GYN Clinic	2,358	114.40	269,802
26	Dental Clinic	1,745	137.30	239,589
27	Surgical Suite	5,488	343.25	1,883,756
29	OB, Labor and Delivery	2,682	228.85	613,722
30	Nursery	828	171.65	142,118
31	Central Materiel Section	2,909	194.50	565,830
32	Pharmacy	1,902	157.90	300,326
33	Radiology	3,713	228.85	849,646
35	Pathology	3,829	163.60	626,501
37	Physical Therapy - Rehabilitation	2,698	137.30	370,435
38	Patient Service	3,820	103.00	393,384
40	Nursing Units - 100 Beds	23,581	143.00	3,372,555
41	Mechanical Room	9,989	68.65	685,745
42	Circulation	40,651	143.00	5,813,906
43	Docks, Entrances 7 Covered Walks	1,558	57.20	89,085
	<b>Totals</b>	<b>157,350</b>		<b>\$ 21,700,000</b>

COST OF SMALLER HOSPITAL

Mr. Long. Could the cost and size of this hospital be scaled down?  
Provide that for the record.  
[The information follows:]

Although strict application of the DOD criteria results in a requirement for approximately 65 beds as shown below, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health and Environment after reviewing all aspects has determined that the 100-bed facility be constructed as soon as possible.

<u>BED REQUIREMENTS AT REDUCED SCOPE</u>	
<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>NO. OF BEDS</u>
Active Duty	8.20
Cadets	22.61
Dependents of Active Duty Personnel	<u>15.51</u>
Sub Total	46.32
Retired + Dependents of Retired	Use 5% <u>2.31</u>
	Sub Total <u>48.63</u>
Dispersion	33% <u>16.05</u>
	<u>64.68</u>
	65

COSTS & AREA FOR REDUCED SCOPE  
(65 BED HOSPITAL)

<u>Function</u>	<u>Gross Area</u>	<u>Cost/SF</u>	<u>Area Cost</u>
Hospital Lobby	320	\$137.30	43,936
Command and Administration	3,415	103.00	351,745
Nursing Service Administration	470	103.00	48,410
Registrar Division	1,960	103.00	201,880
Supply & Service	7,207	86.95	626,649
Dept of Hospital Clinics	1,872	103.00	192,816
Dept of Medicine/Dept of Surgery	3,359	114.40	384,270
Dept of Orthopedics	4,200	114.40	480,480
General Practice Clinic	4,028	114.40	460,803
Physical Exam Section	280	114.40	32,032
Pediatric Clinic	1,740	114.40	199,056
Mental Hygiene Clinic	1,473	108.70	160,115
EENT Clinic	2,164	125.85	272,339
OB/GYN Clinic	1,713	114.40	195,967
Dental Clinic	1,501	137.30	206,087
Surgical Suite	4,405	343.25	1,512,016
OB, Labor and Delivery	1,855	228.85	424,517
Nursery	630	171.65	108,140
Central Materiel Section	2,264	194.50	440,348
Pharmacy	1,516	157.90	239,376
Radiology	3,033	228.85	694,102
Pathology	3,320	163.60	543,152
Physical Therapy - Rehabilitation	2,580	137.30	354,234
Patient Service	3,068	103.00	316,004
Nursing Units - 65 Beds	14,518	143.00	2,076,074
Mechanical Room	9,989	68.65	685,745
Circulation	34,292	143.00	4,903,756
Docks, Entrances & Covered Walks	1,558	57.20	89,118
Food Service	4,987	138.45	690,450
Total Gross Area	<u>123,717</u>	<u>Bldg Cost</u>	<u>\$16,933,617</u>
		(incl escalation to Mid 75)	

Function

	<u>Gross Area</u>	<u>Cost/SF</u>	<u>Area Cost</u>	
1 Yr's Escalation at 8%			\$ 1,354,689	
		<u>TOTAL BUILDING COST</u>		\$18,288,306
Site Work & Utilities (Incl escalation to Mid 75)			2,500,000	
1 Yr's Escalation at 8%			<u>200,000</u>	
		<u>TOTAL SITE COST</u>		<u>2,700,000</u>
		<u>TOTAL COST OF REDUCED HOSPITAL</u>		\$20,988,306*
Additional design costs				650,000**

\*The costs per square foot shown above are the same figures used in the previously furnished cost by functional area for the present design. These costs were based on FY 74 programing with midpoint of construction in June 1975. An 8% escalation factor has been applied to the total assuming a year's delay for redesign and approvals.

\*\*This is over and above the original design cost of \$1,350,000 that has already been spent on design of this facility.

## BARRACKS MODERNIZATION

Mr. LONG. What useful life do you anticipate from the barracks which you are proposing to modernize at a cost of \$22.40 a square foot?

General COOPER. These buildings have been well maintained and, except for the mechanical and electrical systems which are included in the scope of modernization, are very sound structures. Under normal usage the barracks, when modernized, can be expected to have a useful life of approximately 25 years.

## UTILITIES EXTENSION

Mr. LONG. Is the utilities extension related solely to the new hospital? What other facilities, if any, will it support? If the hospital were not approved this year, could the utilities be delayed?

General COOPER. The utilities extension project supports three post needs—the existing facilities at the north end of post (Washington Gate area), hospital and future functions to be relocated to the Washington Gate area. The existing electrical service to the north end of post is below minimum private utility industry standards. A portion of the project provides a second primary feeder to the substation feeding the following facilities: 600 units of family housing; the post fire station; 2 elementary schools; the post laundry; the new PX retail store, warehouse, and service station; a new BOQ; the combined maintenance area, and the post motor pool. The second feeder will provide a parallel feeder, thereby eliminating the blackouts now experienced in the event of cable malfunction and will permit maintenance to be performed without disruption of service. The telephone cabling portion of the project provides 600-pair telephone cable; 300 pairs are for the hospital, 100 pairs are for existing facilities indicated above; 100 pairs are for Camp Buckner and other outlying areas; 100 pairs are for future users of the Washington Gate industrial area. Since duct space is limited, the only economical way to meet the requirement is to run the single 600-pair cable to serve all needs. The project also includes extension of water and sewage system to the ski lodge in the major winter outdoor recreational area for cadets, their guests, military personnel, and dependents. The facility presently lacks adequate fire protection and sanitary services. The remaining utility items are related primarily to the hospital.

Portions of the utilities primarily related to the hospital could be delayed without major impact. The previously discussed portions of electric, telephone, water, and sewage services could not be delayed without impacting on efficiency, operations and morale. Any further delay in providing the second primary electric feeder would result in the continuation of poor service to a large number of facilities and users. More than six electrical interruptions of between 6 and 24 hours have occurred in this area over the past year. A substantial portion of telephone service is needed now. It is not economical to run a smaller telephone cable now, only to replace it with a large cable in the future. Water and sewage service to the recreation area should also be improved at the earliest possible date.

Mr. LONG. I thank you very much for your patience.

The committee is adjourned until Friday at 10 o'clock.

General COOPER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 4:05 p.m.]

THURSDAY, MAY 17, 1973.

## NATO INFRASTRUCTURE AND REPROGRAMING

## SESSION CLOSED

Mr. SIKES. The committee will come to order.

The committee is meeting today to discuss the fiscal year 1974 NATO infrastructure program and a related reprogramming request. We have witnesses who are here particularly for this purpose. This, of course, is an essential part of our committee hearings and it is likely that we will be required to discuss subjects which necessitate a closed session.

Before the motion is made for a closed session is there any discussion?

Mr. TALCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I have a couple of questions.

Mr. SIKES. Very well.

Mr. TALCOTT. I understand that there will be a motion that today's meeting of our subcommittee and the markup on the NATO infrastructure reprogramming be in executive session and I would like to ask who classified the material and why.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Nicholas, are you prepared to provide that information?

Mr. NICHOLAS. The detailed justification sheets for this program have been classified confidential by the Defense Department. That will have to be fully discussed during the meeting. In addition, some of the proposed questions, and the answers to them, deal with information which is NATO secret information which should not be discussed in open session.

Mr. TALCOTT. So the only part that is going to be confidential or secret today will be that which pertains to NATO and our allies in the NATO countries?

Mr. NICHOLAS. In addition, there are some Army projects which will be discussed today which are also classified.

Mr. TALCOTT. Our meeting will be recorded so that everything will be available in the record except that material that is classified will be held from—

Mr. SIKES. Will be available to the committee.

Mr. TALCOTT. Right. I have no objection. As a matter of fact, I believe under those circumstances the meeting should be closed.

Mr. SIKES. Very well.

Do you have a motion, Mr. Patten?

Mr. PATTEN. I move that today's meeting of the Military Construction Subcommittee and the markup immediately following be held in executive session.

Mr. SIKES. Very well. The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Mr. Sikes.

Mr. SIKES. Yes.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Mr. Patten.

Mr. PATTEN. Yes.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Mr. McKay.

Mr. MCKAY. Aye.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. Aye.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Mr. Talcott.

Mr. TALCOTT. Aye.

Mr. SIKES. A quorum of the committee having been present and having voted in the affirmative, the meeting will be closed.

Now, Mr. PATTEN, if you will chair the hearing today I would be most appreciative. The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations are meeting with the Defense Subcommittee in a very important session and I feel that I must be present for that session.

Will you proceed?

Mr. PATTEN. We are glad to have Mr. Loveland before the committee. I think first we would like to hear your statement.

General COOPER. Mr. Loveland from the U.S. Mission NATO will make the presentation on the NATO infrastructure.

Mr. PATTEN. Would you prefer to put your statement in the record, Mr. Loveland, or would you rather read it?

Mr. LOVELAND. We have two possible approaches, Mr. Chairman. I have a short 5-minute statement and the long one can go in the record, or I can read the longer statement, whichever you wish.

Mr. PATTEN. Suppose you read the short statement and we put the long one in the record.

#### STATEMENT OF J. T. LOVELAND, U.S. NATO

[The statement follows:]

##### FISCAL YEAR 1974 INFRASTRUCTURE HEARINGS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before your committee to support the proposals of the Department of Defense for an authorization of \$80 million and an appropriation of \$40 million for fiscal year 1974 as the U.S. share of the common funded NATO infrastructure program. Since fiscal year 1968, the U.S. contribution to the NATO infrastructure program has been funded under "Authorizations and Appropriations for Military Construction Army." This program provides the facilities necessary to support NATO military forces and which are intended for common use or have a high degree of common interest. The term covers such varied items as airfields, air defense facilities, communications, missile sites, war headquarters, nuclear storage sites, pipelines, and POL depots. It does not normally cover general purpose depots, troop billets, and other logistics support facilities closely related to national standards and practices, although a one-time exception has been made to fund such facilities from this program as reimbursement for certain of the U.S. costs for relocation from France. I will discuss this in more detail later.

The NATO commonly funded infrastructure program was inaugurated by the North Atlantic Council in 1951 as a follow-on to a similar program begun in 1950 by the Western European Union countries. The NATO infrastructure program has been a most successful common endeavor, and has been credited with fostering a large part of the cohesion among the Allies. Essential military facilities costing about \$3.4 billion have been completed, and facilities worth another \$1 billion are under construction or programmed. The program has given NATO a network of modern airfields, an efficient system of POL distribution and storage, common communications without which the NATO command structure could not function, essential air defense warning installations, and air and naval navigational aids. By jointly financing these and other types of facilities designed to enhance the effectiveness of NATO forces, NATO nations have demonstrated in a most realistic way their determination to provide for the common defense.

Now that the program has provided most of the basic facilities required in the common defense, its character is gradually changing. The requirement for

major air and naval installations has given way to the new requirement for modernization and expansion of existing basic facilities. Airfields must be improved so that they can support today's more complex aircraft. The POL system should be modified to insure its ability to function in an emergency independently of that part of the system located in France. Progress in communications technology has resulted in dramatic changes. The NATO Satellite Communications System (SATCOM) is based on the U.S. interim defense communication satellite system. Replacement satellites (SATCOM phase 3) are programmed and funded for launch in 1975. Another example is the semiautomation and integration of NATO's early warning system to provide a control and reporting system for the air defense of Allied Command Europe. Finally, in order to make the program fully responsive to the needs of the NATO "flexible response" strategy and associated force planning, we are providing facilities to support reinforcement on the flanks, improved air defense, and conventional capabilities for NATO air forces.

The new orientation of the program is providing a large proportion of the facilities needed by U.S. forces. In particular, it supports controlled humidity storage which maintains in good condition equipment of our dual-based forces. The program also includes aircraft survival measures which were implemented by the U.S. Air Force, with the approval of Congress, on a "pre-financed" basis in order to insure early construction.

The 1973 NATO program includes a second phase of the air weapons training facility in the Mediterranean which replaces the facility lost in Libya. It also contains vital facilities for the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean.

We have previously announced that we had made great strides in maximizing U.S. benefits from the program. The major single benefit has come from our success in persuading our Allies to share up to about \$100 million of our costs in relocating our forces from France. In effect, the Defense Planning Committee (the North Atlantic Council less France) agreed in 1969 to cost-share, under certain conditions, up to that amount if our military services can provide and justify sufficient fund requests. As reported to you previously, NATO has agreed to continue the agreement through end of calendar year 1973 by providing funds "a priori." This permits us to use NATO money to implement construction rather than spend U.S. funds which have to be recouped after projects are completed. NATO's final installment has now been made available in slice XXIII and U.S. services are using this money as fast as possible.

In response to U.S. requirements, NATO has agreed to automatic deletion procedures to reduce or avoid future backlogs of infrastructure projects. These procedures apply to slice XXI, approved in 1971, and subsequent annual slice programs. We have told you that similar procedures are being developed for application to slices XX and prior. In fact, we expect within 2 or 3 years, to have virtually closed out all slice programs prior to slice XXI. In this connection we have made major strides this year. Some urgency in these efforts has resulted because inflation in Europe has rendered available infrastructure funds insufficient to pay for all of the projects programmed in early years. Our Allies have endorsed the U.S. position that new funds will not be added to old infrastructure slice programs. Thus, projects must compete for available programmed funds within each slice, or drop out of the program when funds allocated for that slice are gone.

In 1970 the NATO Defense Planning Committee approved the financing of a 5-year infrastructure program for the years 1970-74 (slices XXI through XXV), and agreed that the ceiling be set at \$700 million (though the United States and some other countries believed it should be \$840 million). The agreement provided that NATO military commanders would program those urgent military requirements which could be accomplished within the ceiling and report back the financial condition after programming of slice XXIV in 1973. The ceiling of \$700 million included relocation costs from France for United States and Canadian forces. The cost-sharing formula (U.S. share 29.67 percent) remains unchanged, but the recent devaluations of the dollar will result in a higher U.S. dollar cost.

There are two factors which serve to reduce our share of this total amount of money used in the infrastructure program. First, in 1970, the Euro-Group (NATO less France, Portugal, United States, Iceland, and Canada) offered an additional \$420 million (closer to \$450 million in devalued dollars) over a 5-year period to the infrastructure program as part of the European defense improvement program (EDIP) to permit urgent implementation of the NATO aircraft shelter program. This permitted early recoupment of U.S. pre-financing funds spent on this program and relieved the pressure on programmed infrastructure money to

allow funding of additional NATO Integrated Communications System (NICS) projects. When the EDIP contribution is considered, the effective U.S. share reduces to approximately 18-20 percent.

The second factor is that host nations provide the land, access roads, and utility connections for each NATO infrastructure project. These host nation contributions are estimated to average about 13 percent of costs paid by NATO common funding. If these costs were added to the total, the U.S. contribution would drop another 3 to 4 percent.

We have also taken steps to maximize U.S. industrial participation in the infrastructure program. During our negotiations concerning the NATO Integrated Communications System (NICS), when our Allies insisted on a sharing of the production, we insisted on modifying the NATO rule which allowed host nations to include taxes and customs, in their comparison of bids (even though NATO did not have to pay these levels), thus favoring local or regional firms. The final agreement gave us satisfaction on the taxes and customs issues and guaranteed that 38 percent of the production would be carried out by U.S. contractors, with a possibility of as much as 58 percent, depending on the competitive strength of U.S. industry. Recent dollar devaluations will help maximize U.S. industry's participation. Secretary Laird also told his DPC colleagues that he expected the new policy on bid comparison to be extended to the remainder of the infrastructure program. Negotiations are now underway and we expect success shortly.

We continue to enjoy a greater benefit from this NATO program than could be expected from the size of our contribution. If we exclude facilities which are used in common by all nations—facilities which would in any case have required common funding—we have had significant success in convincing NATO that U.S. projects are worthwhile. In 1968 we informed you that slice XVIII included U.S. projects in the amount of 40 percent of all projects for use by national forces. In slice XIX this percentage rose to 47 percent; for slice XX to 55 percent; for slice XXI, 68 percent; for slice XXII, 58 percent; and 59 percent for slice XXIII. In the six annual programs therefore well over 50 percent of all national user projects were programmed for benefit of U.S. forces but our formal contribution remains at 29.7 percent of the entire program. It is apparent therefore that we have a distinct financial interest in the continuing success of the NATO infrastructure program. As long as we can fit our national programs into the available common funds the United States will benefit directly from this NATO effort. In addition Secretary Laird proposed last December a new category of infrastructure projects in support of "stationed forces." We are exploring with the U.S. military authorities the best way to take advantage of such a new category. We would hope to expand it to include many of the items such as warehouses and other logistic support facilities which are now ineligible for NATO funds.

A word about the prospects for the infrastructure program in the remainder of this decade is in order. As a result of inflation, an insufficient initial allocation of money, the need for more sophisticated equipments, and various delays in production and construction, none of the funds approved in February 1970 for the 1970-74 period remain for Slice XXV (1974). To prevent a hiatus in the infrastructure program, additional funds (estimated at \$180 million, of which the U.S. share is 29.67 percent or \$53 million) are required for Slice XXV to meet the most urgent military requirements. On November 17, 1972, Secretary Laird advised the chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees that we would support an increase in the current 5-year program (Slices XXI-XXV) to fund Slice XXV. The NATO Defense Ministers agreed to the U.S. position at their December 1972 meeting. In addition, the Ministers agreed in principle to a continuation of the program in the period 1975-79 and instructed the NATO military authorities and the Defense Planning Committee to work out the details. The DPC in permanent session is working out necessary financial arrangements and will report back to NATO Ministers in June 1973.

I should like now to describe briefly, first, the NATO system for processing infrastructure projects; and second, how the U.S. mission to NATO (USNATO) arrived at its estimate for U.S. obligations for infrastructure.

Each year the major NATO commanders draw up a list of construction or modernization projects which they consider essential for the support of their forces. These projects are reviewed by all participating nations within the NATO Military Committee, the NATO Infrastructure Committee and finally within the Defense Planning Committee (which is the North Atlantic Council Without France). The projects finally selected make up the yearly infrastructure program

or slice. In the United States each proposed annual slice is reviewed thoroughly within the executive branch starting with the interested U.S. subordinate military commands and continuing through the U.S. Commander in Chief Europe and the Commander in Chief, Atlantic, to Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military departments the Department of State and all interested offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The final NATO slice is really an approved list of military construction requirements and nothing more. After slice approval, the host country in which a project is to be built takes full responsibility for the work. It must obtain the necessary land (at its own expense), plan utilities connections and access roads (which it later builds at its own expense), prepare engineering plans and specifications, and develop cost estimates. When all is ready, the host country submits the project with all supporting data to the NATO Payments and Progress Committee for construction authorization and fund commitment. Before agreeing, the Payments and Progress (P. & P.) Committee satisfies itself that the project still represents a valid military requirement, conforms to NATO criteria, is reasonable in cost, and is in other respects eligible under NATO infrastructure rules.

When the P. & P. Committee authorizes construction of an infrastructure project, the United States obligates funds from its annual appropriation for its share of that project. Let me explain briefly how we estimate our costs for fiscal year 1974. The estimate is completed largely by the U.S. NATO staff in Brussels because it has daily contact with our allies on infrastructure matters. This staff is the U.S. agency closest to the plans and progress of the various "host" countries.

Last September, U.S. NATO made a careful review of the NATO infrastructure project backlog; that is, of all projects included in previously approved annual slices which had not yet been authorized by the P. & P. Committee for actual construction. The basic records—that is, the host country semiannual reports—were checked. Information was collated for all locations by project category and by cost-sharing agreement, on the amount of money already authorized by the P. & P. Committee, and on the amount of money remaining to be authorized. This initial step thus provided a firm base from which to start. To this project backlog, U.S. NATO then added its estimate of the contents of the subsequent slices which would require funding during fiscal year 1974. For example, slice XXIII was approved by NATO in February 1973, and Slice XXIV is scheduled for approval this summer. From this total of project backlog plus planned projects for fiscal year 1974, U.S. NATO then subtracted the amount of those projects which it estimated would be given funding authorization by the P. & P. Committee before the beginning of fiscal year 1974; that is, before July 1, 1973. This may be shown in tabular form, as follows:

(1) As of June 30, 1972, value of projects in slices II through XXII yet to be authorized by the NATO R. & P. Committee totaled \$440 million.

(2) Add value of projects in slice XXIII, approved in February 1973, \$187 million.

(3) Deduct estimated P. & P. Committee authorizations during fiscal year 1973, \$307 million.

(4) Total value of work to be funded as of July 1, 1973, \$320 million.

(5) To this we must add slice XXIV, scheduled for approval in the summer of 1973, \$184 million.

U.S. NATO then applied country planning factors such as economic conditions, availability of contractor effort, and pace at which Ministry of Defense construction personnel are expected to process fund requests. From this calculus, we estimate the fund requests to be approved within NATO in fiscal year 1974.

In defense of our entire request, I should like to submit the following facts. In 1971, in recognition of a substantial carryover in both authorization and appropriation from fiscal year 1971, DOD requested for fiscal year 1972 only \$20 million of both authorization and new obligation authority to satisfy the estimated requirement for \$55 million of U.S. obligations to the NATO infrastructure program. Congress further cut these figures to \$15 million in authorization and \$14 million in appropriation. We have been able to live, precariously, within those figures only because some \$30 million of U.S. obligations for NATO communications were slipped into fiscal year 1973. That slippage constituted a mortgage against our fiscal year 1973 funds, and we find ourselves in a position where without special additional authorization, we would have to call a halt to all future NATO fund authorizations until our fiscal year 1974 authorization has been passed by Congress. Since we have already two phases of commitment against the approved projects involved, such a delay caused by unilateral U.S.

considerations would have major political repercussions. In addition, as a result of the February 12, 1973, devaluation of the dollar, an additional \$23 million will be required in fiscal year 1973.

When considered in terms of the two separate dollar devaluations in a period of 14 months (December 1971 and February 1973), the effect has been to increase U.S. infrastructure requirements by \$42 million. This problem has been compounded by the increasing cost of construction in Europe, approximating the 8 to 10 percent annual increase in construction costs in the United States. Steps are being taken to utilize authorizations contained in earlier military construction authorizations acts, and to reprogram available "Military construction, Army" funds to meet this increased NATO infrastructure requirement in fiscal year 1973. We urge you, therefore, not to reduce either the authorization of \$80 million nor the appropriation of \$40 million for fiscal year 1974.

Even with the granting of our full request, we expect to be some \$14 million short in new obligation authority in fiscal year 1974 because of dollar devaluation, European inflation, and certain projects which have had to slip from fiscal year 1973 because of lack of U.S. funds.

In addition, since even with the above exceptional actions, we will have approximately zero carryover into fiscal year 1974, we will be dependent on a prompt continuing resolution authority for both funds and authorization in order to allow us to continue to participate in this important and sensitive program after June 30, 1973.

Mr. PATTEN. Now you may proceed with your short statement.

Mr. LOVELAND. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, this line item in the "Military construction, Army" program covers the U.S. share of the NATO infrastructure program, which provides commonly funded facilities necessary to support U.S. and other forces committed to the defense of NATO. Much of the program provides facilities and systems for common use by some or all NATO Forces which must be funded collectively; for example, the NATO pipeline system, early warning and air defense networks, and the NATO satellite communications system. The remainder, while of sufficient common interest to warrant infrastructure funding, is intended for use by forces of a single nation, or two or more nations.

#### SHARE FOR SUPPORT OF U.S. FORCES

In this category, the United States has been very successful in recent years in securing a large proportion of projects for support of U.S. forces. Recent annual slices have provided, on the average, over \$5 worth of facilities for U.S. Forces for every \$3 of U.S. contribution to single and joint user projects. We have every reason to expect this favorable ratio to continue.

In addition, our NATO allies have agreed to cost-share up to a maximum of about \$100 million for our relocation expenses from the move out of France. Because of fund limitations on the infrastructure program (from which the reimbursements must be taken), the payments to the United States have been stretched over 5 years but will be completed in calendar year 1973.

The first recoupment phase of the relocation effort was completed with the reimbursement to the United States of \$28 million on December 31, 1970. The remainder is being paid to the United States by NATO and final installments are contained in slice XXIII, approved in February 1973. These NATO funds are used directly to finance relocation projects from a list we submitted to NATO, thus obviating the need to expend United States funds and then recoup from NATO at a later date. The NATO payments are turned over to the United States military services for implementation of the relocation projects.

The Euro-Group (NATO less France, Portugal, Canada, Iceland and the United States) is continuing to implement its offer of an additional \$450 million to the infrastructure program as part of the European defense improvement program (EDIP). Among other benefits, this has allowed us a faster recouplement of the United States funds spent to prefinance aircraft shelters. In addition, the EDIP allows NATO to complete its aircraft protection program without depleting the infrastructure funds, and permits faster implementation of the NATO Integrated Communications System (NICS) which is so urgently required.

As we have informed you in the past, we are progressing with modernization of the rules governing the NATO infrastructure program. We have reached agreement on limiting to about 2½ years the period between programming of a project and its implementation. While this new agreement covers work in slice XXI and forward, we have also made significant progress toward closing out old slices. This purging process will reduce our share of future contributions for current programs to a flat 29.7 percent from as high as 43.7 percent in the oldest slice (or to 18 percent if Euro-Group EDIP contributions are added to the total infrastructure program).

Secretary Laird informed you in November 1972 that we intended to request additional funds in the current slice group (XXI-XXV) in order to allow a normal-sized slice XXV (1974) on the order of \$180 million, thus approximating the size of program for 1970-74 which the United States had originally supported. The NATO Defense Ministers agreed to the United States position during their meeting in December 1972 and, in addition, they agreed to a continuation of the program in the 1975-79 period.

Secretary Laird also announced that the United States intended to liberalize NATO's contracting procedures to give U.S. industry a better chance at NATO contracts.

We are confident that an agreement will be reached shortly on this matter within NATO committees.

We are also seeking to establish a new category of infrastructure projects in support of "stationed forces" which we would hope to utilize in support of U.S. forces.

#### FISCAL YEAR 1974 REQUIREMENTS

In support of the NATO infrastructure program, which we view as being of continuing financial, political and military benefit to the United States, we estimate a requirement in fiscal year 1974 of \$80 million in new authorization. Through the use of recoupments from pre-financed projects and fiscal year 1973 carryover, we believe at the time the budget was put together that we could meet U.S. commitments in fiscal year 1974 with only \$40 million of new obligational authority. With dollar devaluation and European inflation, we now see the need for an additional \$14 million which will have to be reprogrammed later.

In defense of our entire request I should like to submit the following facts. Last year we reported that there was considerable risk that previous cuts in authorization for the NATO infrastructure program, and slippages in the program which had enabled us to live within the reduced authorizations, might catch up with us in fiscal year 1973. This

proved to be correct. In addition, we are faced with a \$42 million additional requirement resulting from two devaluations of the dollar in a period of 14 months—December 1971 and February 1973. This has caused us to take exceptional measures to permit continuation of this multilateral program through fiscal year 1973 and into fiscal year 1974 until Congress passes the fiscal year 1974 Military Construction Act. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I strongly recommend that our fiscal year 1974 request of \$80 million in authorization and \$40 million in appropriation be approved without reduction.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PATTEN. Thank you, Mr. Loveland.

#### JUSTIFICATION MATERIAL

Mr. PATTEN. Insert page 283 of the Army justification book in the record.

[The page follows:]

#### INSTALLATION SUMMARY

[In thousands of dollars]

U.S. Army, Europe	Prior authorization	Proposed authorization	Proposed funding
Various, Germany.....		12,517	12,517
Europe Various, NATO.....		80,000	60,000
Total.....	0	92,517	72,517

Mr. PATTEN. Let us turn to NATO infrastructure.

Insert page 290 in the record.

[The page follows:]

1. DATE 1 Feb 1973		2. DEPARTMENT ARMY		3. INSTALLATION NATO Infrastructure										
4. COMMAND OR MANAGEMENT BUREAU United States Army, Europe			5. INSTALLATION CONTROL NUMBER		6. STATE/COUNTRY NATO Countries - Various									
7. STATUS		8. YEAR OF INITIAL OCCUPANCY		9. COUNTY (U.S.)		10. NEAREST CITY								
11. MISSION OR MAJOR FUNCTIONS The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed within the framework of the United Nations for the defense of a way of life, not only by means of essential military measures, but also by co-operation in political, economical, social and cultural fields. The signatory countries undertook to preserve peace and international security, and to promote stabilities and well-being in the North Atlantic area. The NATO Infrastructure program is a commonly financed cost-sharing program for providing military facilities required by NATO commanders in member countries for use by NATO forces in support of NATO defense plans. The annual US budget request for infrastructure is to provide funds for the US contribution based upon previously agreed cost-sharing formulas.				12. PERSONNEL STRENGTH		PERMANENT		STUDENTS		SUPPORTED		TOTAL		
				OFFICER (1)		ENLISTED (2)	CIVILIAN (3)	OFFICER (4)	ENLISTED (5)	OFFICER (6)	ENLISTED (7)	CIVILIAN (8)	(9)	
				a AS OF										
				b PLANNED (End FY)										
				13. INVENTORY		LAND		ACRES (1)	LAND COST (\$000) (2)		IMPROVEMENT (\$000) (3)		TOTAL (\$000) (4)	
a OWNED														
b LEASES AND EASEMENTS														
c INVENTORY TOTAL (Except land rent) AS OF 30 JUNE 19														
d AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY														
e AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM										80,000				
f ESTIMATED AUTHORIZATION - NEXT 4 YEARS														
g GRAND TOTAL (c + d + e + f)														
SUMMARY OF INSTALLATION PROJECTS														
PROJECT DESIGNATION														
CATEGORY CODE NO.	PROJECT TITLE			TENANT COMMAND	UNIT OF MEASURE	AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM		FUNDING PROGRAM						
a	b	PRIORITY	Page No.	c	d	e	ESTIMATED COST (\$000) f	g	ESTIMATED COST (\$000) h					
	T74001 - NATO Infrastructure	1	291		DLR		80,000		60,000					

Mr. PATTEN. At this point I think it would also be well to insert in the record the remainder of the justification material.

[The remainder of the justifications follow :]

1 DATE 1 Feb 1973	2 FISCAL YEAR 1974	3 DEPARTMENT ARMY		4 INSTALLATION NATO Infrastructure								
5. PROPOSED AUTHORIZATION \$ 80,000,000		6. PRIOR AUTHORIZATION P.L.	7. CATEGORY CODE NUMBER AAA	8. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 01005A	9. STATE/COUNTRY NATO Countries							
10 PROPOSED APPROPRIATION \$ 60,000,000		11 BUDGET ACCOUNT NUMBER 6400	12 PROJECT NUMBER T74001	13 PROJECT TITLE NATO Infrastructure								
SECTION A - DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT			SECTION B - COST ESTIMATES									
14 TYPE OF CONSTRUCTION	18 PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIMARY FACILITY NA			20 PRIMARY FACILITY	U/M QUANTITY UNIT COST COST (\$000)							
a. PERMANENT	a. NO. OF BLDGS	b. NO. OF STORIES	c. LENGTH	d. WIDTH	e.	f.	g.	h.	i.	j.		
b. SEMI-PERMANENT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	e. DESIGN CAPACITY		f. GROSS AREA		b.							
c. TEMPORARY	g. COOLING		CAP COST '15		c.							
15 TYPE OF WORK	19 DESCRIPTION OF WORK TO BE DONE			d.								
a. NEW FACILITY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Provide essential facilities in established categories for the operational effectiveness of NATO forces.			21 SUPPORTING FACILITIES								
b. ADDITION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				a.								
c. ALTERATION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				b.								
d. CONVERSION				c.								
e. OTHER (Specify)				d.								
16 REPLACEMENT					e.							
17 TYPE OF DESIGN					f.							
a. STANDARD DESIGN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					g.							
b. SPECIAL DESIGN					h.							
c. DRAWING NO.					i.							
					j.							
					22 TOTAL PROJECT COST					\$ 80,000		
23 QUANTITATIVE DATA (U/M _____) NA			25 REQUIREMENT FOR PROJECT									
a. TOTAL REQUIREMENT			This project is required to meet the estimated US share of the multinational NATO Common Funded Infrastructure Program. The funds will be used to meet US obligations during the FY 74 time frame as projects in established categories are approved by the NATO Payments and Progress Committee for funding. Such projects are from a backlog of construction requirements previously approved in SACEUR and SACLANC annual programs. The request for FY 74 takes into account unused authorization and funds as well as recumpments received from projects previously pre-financed by the United States and now considered eligible for common funding.									
b. EXISTING SUBSTANDARD												
c. EXISTING ADEQUATE												
d. FUNDED, NOT IN INVENTORY												
e. ADEQUATE ASSETS (c + d)												
	AUTHORIZED	FUNDED										
f. UNFUNDED PRIOR AUTHORIZATION												
g. INCLUDED IN FY _____ PROGRAM												
h. DEFICIENCY (a - e - f - g)												
24 RELATED PROJECTS	None											

1 DATE 1 Feb 1973	2 FISCAL YEAR 1974	3 DEPARTMENT ARMY	4 INSTALLATION NATO Infrastructure
5 PROJECT NUMBER T74001		6 PROJECT TITLE NATO Infrastructure	

Since late 1951, the North Atlantic Council has approved successive annual programs, or slices, of common Infrastructure, and a Euro-Group program (to which the US does not contribute), which at the end of FY 1972 is estimated to be over \$4.8 billion. This is all being financed collectively by NATO member countries under the terms of the various cost-sharing agreements.

SLICES	THE INFRASTRUCTURE COST-SHARING FORMULA					INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM (EST) <sup>1/</sup>	
	I	II-VII	VIII-XI	XII-XV	XVI-XXIV	Slices II thru XXIV	
	COST-SHARING APPROVED IN						
COUNTRY	1950	*Jun 1960	Feb 1957	Feb 1961	Jan 1966 (With France)	Feb 1970 (Without France)	(\$Million)
Belgium	13.18%	5.462%	4.39%	4.24%	4.61%	5.30%	Airfields (220 airfields) . . . . . 1,768
Canada	-	6.021%	6.15%	5.15%	5.48%	6.31%	Communications (Ace high, SATCOM, and NATO wide) . . . . . 822
Denmark	-	2.767%	2.63%	2.87%	3.07%	3.54%	POL (6,300 miles pipelines, 440 million Imp. gallons storage) . . . . . 664
France	45.46%	15.041%	11.87%	12.00%	13.16%	-	Naval Facilities . . . . . 334
Germany	-	-	13.72%	20.00%	21.86%	25.18%	Radar Warning Installations . . . . . 144
Greece	-	0.750%	0.87%	0.67%	0.65%	0.76%	Special Ammunition Sites . . . . . 403
Italy	-	5.681%	5.61%	5.97%	6.58%	7.58%	Missile Sites (NIKE-HAWK-Pershing) . . . . . 318
Luxembourg	0.45%	0.155%	0.17%	0.17%	0.18%	0.20%	NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) . . . . . 308
Netherlands	13.64%	3.889%	3.51%	3.83%	4.23%	4.87%	Other Projects . . . . . 421
Norway	-	2.280%	2.19%	2.37%	2.59%	2.98%	
Portugal	-	0.146%	0.28%	0.28%	0.30%	0.35%	
Turkey	-	1.371%	1.75%	1.10%	1.10%	1.26%	
United Kingdom	27.27%	12.758%	9.88%	10.50%	10.42%	12.00%	TOTAL 4,882 <sup>2/</sup>
United States	-	43.679%	36.98%	30.85%	25.77%	29.67%	
TOTAL	100.00%	100.000%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	

\*This formula replaces the shares previously applied in Slices II, III, IVa and IVb to VII.

<sup>1/</sup> Plus EURO Group programs \$450.7 million (airfields) not requiring US contribution.

<sup>2/</sup> Of this amount, the US agreed to contribute approximately \$1.60 billion under the various cost-sharing agreements.  
NATO Obligation-\$3.836 billion, as of 30 June 1972.

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1. DATE	2. FISCAL YEAR	3. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECT DATA (Continued)	4. DEPARTMENT	5. INSTALLATION
1 Feb 1973	1974		ARMY	NATO Infrastructure
6. PROJECT NUMBER		7. PROJECT TITLE		
T74001		NATO Infrastructure		
<p><u>NATO INFRASTRUCTURE</u></p> <p>Infrastructure is the NATO term for facilities required to support the deployment and operation of NATO military forces, including the U.S. forces committed to NATO. Initially, it included fixed facilities, such as: airfields, communications, POL, naval facilities, etc. With changes in modern weapons systems, the term now includes certain associated mobile facilities. A recent example is the Satellite Communication System.</p> <p>Facilities solely for the use of national forces are called "National Infrastructure" and are funded by national budgets. Those requested by NATO international commanders for training of NATO forces in peacetime and for operational use in wartime are called "Common Infrastructure." Such facilities are financed collectively by member governments; however, the acquisition of necessary land and provision of certain utilities remain a national responsibility of the host country.</p> <p>"Common facilities" established on a national territory and financed in common by members of the alliance can be used by the forces of each member country. The country on whose territory the facilities are established (the host country) should not alone bear the entire cost. Some member countries, due to geographical position, require a greater number of facilities than others; hence, it would be unfair to impose too heavy a financial burden on them. A contribution from the other countries, some of which may be users of the facilities, is therefore the only fair way of sharing the cost. The host countries still bear the additional cost of providing land, public utilities and access roads.</p> <p>The common financing of the facilities is worked out on the basis of a cost-sharing formula agreed to by all NATO member countries. It is established in accordance with three essential criteria: (1) the contributive capacity of member countries, (2) the advantage accruing to the user country, and (3) the economic benefit for the host country. The contributive capacity of the member countries is calculated on the basis of the gross national product, which is the best available indication of the wealth of a country and its capacity to pay. The U. S. share has been progressively reduced and is presently 25.77% (as a result of the partial French withdrawal from the Infrastructure Program, the U. S. share becomes 29.67% on projects in which France does not participate but the total dollar share for the cost-sharing period does not change).</p>				

## MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FUNDING OF NATO INFRASTRUCTURE

Mr. PATTEN. Would you discuss the past history with regard to the funding of the NATO infrastructure program out of the military construction appropriation and authorization?

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir; I would be pleased to.

As you know, the program transferred from the military assistance to military construction in fiscal year 1968. In the intervening years we have tried to forecast, on an admittedly unscientific method because the program will not yield to more scientific approaches, our best estimates of the annual cost of the United States.

As of the start of fiscal 1973 we had a carryover of some \$18 million in authorization and some \$14 million in funds. This year we have been forced to extraordinary measures, such as the increase of appropriations under section 703 of the Military Construction Act, and to additional recoupments from the Air Force shelter program in order to have sufficient funds to meet our obligations through fiscal 1973.

Our present forecast is that at the end of fiscal 1973, this coming June 30, we will have virtually nothing remaining in authorization and funds.

This, of course, is going to require that we do something exceptional in order to get sufficient authorization to continue into fiscal year 1974.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that is the general history, the financial history, of the program.

Mr. PATTEN. Is most of the money we appropriate spent for construction?

Mr. LOVELAND. If "most" means 51 percent, yes, sir. Something like 30 percent goes into communications, another 10-15 percent goes into radar stations, but generally something over 50 percent into construction.

Mr. PATTEN. A recent report by the General Accounting Office pointed out that the United States makes various contributions, including infrastructure, to the NATO organization and that these are all provided out of different pockets. Could you provide up-to-date information on what the U.S. contributions to the NATO organization are for the record?

Mr. LOVELAND. We will put it in the record; yes, sir.

## U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO PROGRAMS

Mr. PATTEN. The GAO points up that, because these contributions come from various appropriations, there is no overall understanding of what our total contributions are. This is probably true. They recommend that contributions to NATO be handled out of one appropriation. Do you have any comments on this suggestion? How would it affect your operations?

Mr. LOVELAND. At U.S. mission to NATO, I have responsibility for NATO infrastructure and U.S. contributions to NATO military headquarters and agencies, as well as the NATO civil budget. We have a single comptroller for us who takes care of these funds, so I don't really see any improvement by consolidating the various budgets, par-

ticularly in that one of them is State Department money, that is, the running of the NATO civilian headquarters in Brussels.

It wouldn't be particularly bothersome.

Mr. PATTEN. Does your comptroller oversee the State Department appropriations, or do you have knowledge of them at least?

Mr. LOVELAND. No, sir, he doesn't. I handle those directly with the State Department, so my office, which is called the Infrastructure and Logistics Division of the U.S. Mission NATO, is really the one place where they all come together.

Mr. LONG. Would the chairman yield?

Mr. PATTEN. Yes.

Mr. LONG. If they do all come together in your office and there is that central oversight, which I think is very good, why not lay it out so that we all understand it and see it?

Mr. LOVELAND. No problem in the world furnishing this for the record, sir. We can do it with relatively little difficulty. But I don't believe that there is any reason to mix O&M funds with construction funds because most of my budgets have to do with O&M, whereas the biggest budget is construction.

Mr. LONG. But it does seem to be useful to lay it all out so we all see it. We are all busy people.

Mr. LOVELAND. I would be happy to do so.

Mr. LONG. One of the major problems of our foreign aid is that it goes out in so many different facets that very few people in Congress, even on the committees, know what is being spent. When we are presented with a full list of all the items that are being hidden under various rugs it is absolutely staggering.

Mr. LOVELAND. This particular one isn't so awfully bad.

Mr. LONG. I am inclined to agree. It doesn't seem to be that big. I think, nevertheless, the whole principle is sound. Let us get it out so we know what we are doing all in one piece.

Mr. LOVELAND. Surely.

[The information follows:]

The U.S. mission to NATO (USNATO) has responsibility for U.S. contributions to the following programs: NATO infrastructure, NATO military headquarters and agencies, and the NATO civil budget. The fiscal year 1974 requests are as follows:

NATO infrastructure—\$80 million authorization and \$40 million appropriation.

NATO military headquarters—\$33 million.

NATO civil budget (this budget is included in State Department appropriation request)—\$7.7 million.

Requests above do not include additional requirements resulting from U.S. dollar devaluations.

#### COST SHARING FOR EXPENSES OF RELOCATING FROM FRANCE

Mr. PATTEN. You mentioned the status of the cost sharing for our expenses in relocating from France. I know that the mechanics of the way the United States has been paid back for these costs, or NATO has paid for them, have been different at different times.

At the present time we are receiving a direct quarterly payment from NATO into the services' accounts in order to provide for the construction projects which are required because of this relocation.

Is this correct?

Mr. LOVELAND. This is correct.

Mr. PATTEN. Can you provide for the record the way in which these funds have been allocated between the services for each fiscal year that this program has been in effect, and what is anticipated in calendar year 1973?

Also provide for the record a list of the projects and their costs which have been authorized and funded by the Congress, and those for which no congressional authorization has been sought, which have been accomplished in this way.

Also show those proposed for calendar year 1973.

Mr. LOVELAND. A clarification on the last line, please.

"Those proposed for calendar year 1973." Those projects done with NATO funds, or those proposed in fiscal year 1973 MCA?

Mr. PATTEN. Oh, no. The calendar year.

Mr. LOVELAND. All right. I will provide a full status report on our recoupment of funds from NATO for relocation.

[The information was classified and furnished for the Committee files.]

Mr. LOVELAND. Incidentally, in achieving this recoupment we could have picked up the money directly each quarter. There was a limit of 2 million Infrastructure Accounting Units (IAU) which were worth about \$3 each at that time. We could have picked it up and held it against possible expenditures.

As it is we have left it in the NATO bank and not drawn it until we needed it to pay contractors. In this way we have avoided the loss for devaluation since when we pick these things up they will be IAU's and they will be at the new rate. That is why we are getting a little more out of the program than we had foreseen.

Mr. PATTEN. Is it correct that to the extent that the Congress has already provided funds for these projects the requirements for new obligational authority for the services is reduced?

Mr. LOVELAND. Well, sir, there was only one instance where Congress provided funds and NATO provided funds. This was the fiscal year 1970 appropriation. Eventually most of those projects were funded by NATO directly and the additional funds were reprogrammed by the Army and the Air Force.

Mr. PATTEN. Do you have the projects and the amount for the Air Force and for the Army that were handled that way?

Mr. LOVELAND. It exists. I will put it in the record.

[The information was classified and furnished for the committee files.]

Mr. PATTEN. All right.

Isn't the Navy in on that, too?

Mr. LOVELAND. No, sir. The Navy had no relocation.

Mr. PATTEN. The Army's WARLOC program has been held up by the Defense Subcommittee. Some of the projects for which we were requesting cost sharing were for storage areas related to the WARLOC program. What is the status of these projects?

Mr. LOVELAND. I am sorry, sir; I don't know what WARLOC means.

Mr. PATTEN. Army now calls it WAR L-O-C, doesn't it? I thought it was called WARLOC. Anyway, it is the program for which dehumidified storage for construction equipment, et cetera, was planned in Belgium and I guess some in England. Those projects had been held

up, presumably because the WARLOC program has not proceeded in the way the Army anticipated.

Mr. LOVELAND. This is correct that the projects which we expected to put under contract this summer or even earlier for what we call the LOC package in both the U.K. and the Benelux have been held up pending a decision on the general LOC question.

Mr. PATTEN. Are you planning to reprogram the money from those projects to other projects which are in your priority list for accomplishment under the FRELOC program, or are you planning to just await further developments?

Mr. LOVELAND. It is my understanding from EUCOM that there is a reclama in on the LOC package and that, pending the decision on that reclama, they are reserving those funds, but if the reclama fails, those funds will be used for the next priority relocation project.

Mr. PATTEN. Have we been able to program our highest priority relocation projects in this manner?

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir. We have programed from the top down, yes, sir.

#### EFFECT OF DEVALUATION

Mr. PATTEN. You made the statement that we should continue to get \$5 worth of facilities for every \$3 we put into the infrastructure program. Devaluation will not affect this ratio but it will affect the amount of facilities we actually get. Is this correct?

In other words, if you lose 5 percent, say, in devaluation—

Mr. LOVELAND. But that isn't the way we lose it. The way we lose it is we put more dollars into our share of the real value of the facility. Thus, they are costing us more but still we are getting \$5 worth of facilities for every \$3 we contribute to the program.

Mr. LONG. Would the Chairman yield?

Mr. PATTEN. Yes.

Mr. LONG. Are these real contributions or is this based on rather nominal contributions based on valuations of what they put in in terms of services and land.

Mr. LOVELAND. No; this is money.

Mr. LONG. This is hard money, just as hard as our money.

Mr. LOVELAND. A little harder.

Mr. LONG. Fine.

Mr. PATTEN. Forgetting \$5 worth of facilities, if you have a devalued dollar you are going to get less facilities, aren't you?

Mr. LOVELAND. No, sir; we are putting more dollars into it. Our commitment is in a thing called IAU's. Thus, when an IAU as worth \$2.80 it cost us less to put in our 30 percent.

If Congress acts on this latest February 1973 devaluation, an IAU will be worth \$3.38, it will cost us that much more for our share of the total value.

It is more dollars but it is really the same number of ounces of gold, if you would like to express it that way.

Mr. MCKAY. That is predicated on our putting in more than we are now putting in?

Mr. LOVELAND. No, sir; it is predicated on our putting in 30 percent of the absolute value of the program.

Mr. MCKAY. That is true, but as a result of devaluation we have to put more dollars in to make that 30 percent.

Mr. LOVELAND. We do indeed have to put more dollars in as we do—

Mr. MCKAY. So that is predicated on the fact that we have to increase the amount of money we have to put in to meet our 30 percent.

Mr. PATTEN. That is why they are here.

Mr. LOVELAND. Something more. We already have two levels of commitment to a program of this size and the size is valued in absolute terms and not in dollars.

Mr. PATTEN. If we hadn't had the devaluation, would you be asking for the \$80 million and the authorization for the \$40 million?

Mr. LOVELAND. The two devaluations have cost us \$42 million, sir.

Mr. LONG. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman.

What would you be asking for?

Mr. LOVELAND. \$42 million less than—

Mr. LONG. I mean the figure you would be asking if it weren't for the devaluation.

Mr. LOVELAND. We would be asking for \$38 million in authorization.

Mr. LONG. Instead of \$80 million?

Mr. LOVELAND. About \$12 million in appropriations.

Mr. LONG. Instead of \$40 million?

Mr. LOVELAND. Well, no; instead of \$54 million.

Mr. LONG. I hope we get those figures in the record because they are rather startling. Don't you think they are?

Mr. LOVELAND. I was startled when I had to find the money to obligate against my unliquidated obligations, yes, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. Couldn't you find that in the \$750 million we authorized for transfer in the defense budget?

General KJELLSTROM. I would like to respond to that, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

The military construction appropriation funds are not available for transfer under the provisions of section 735 of the Defense appropriation bill. Nor are we suggesting that military construction funds be included in that transfer authority with the exception of our operation and maintenance of family housing dilemma which I discussed at our opening hearing.

Mr. PATTEN. I think, in keeping with our intent, that would be a good idea.

Do you know what the rate of return to the United States is for all of our other contributions to the NATO organization?

Mr. LOVELAND. It is pretty hard to evaluate.

Mr. PATTEN. Can you provide it for the record?

Mr. LOVELAND. The problem is that almost all of the rest of the programs are O. & M. programs and return on O. & M. is pretty difficult to evaluate. It is O. & M., operation and maintenance, funds for international headquarters. Thus, what are our returns? You can't evaluate them.

#### ELIGIBILITY OF STATIONED FORCES FOR NATO FUNDING

Mr. PATTEN. You mentioned that you are seeking a new category of "stationed forces", which we would hope to utilize in support of U.S. forces. What does this mean, and what types of forces and

facilities would it be likely to cover? When would you expect to see this new category approved by NATO?

Mr. LOVELAND. The meaning of "stationed forces" is those forces stationed outside of their own boundaries. The idea which Mr. Laird presented to the Ministers was that our forces are outside their own boundaries; they do not have home facilities to use. Therefore, they need new facilities, barracks, messhalls, chapels, PX's, all of this kind of thing, and until now NATO's philosophy has been not to build such facilities which are considered to be logistics facilities and the responsibility of the user nation.

Thus, NATO builds operational facilities. The country builds its maintenance facilities, its own troop maintenance facilities. This, of course, has meant that the Army, for one, gets very little out of the infrastructure program. They get pipelines, and missile sites, and some controlled humidity storage facilities, but mostly what the Army needs are training grounds, and barracks, and messhalls, and such.

Mr. Laird's point was that we think for the U.S. forces in Europe there should be a special category to cover to a greater extent this kind of facility. I doubt very much that it will ever extend to chapels, and PX's and theaters, but there appears to be some reason to believe that we can get our allies to agree to some amount of this kind of a program and we would hope to be able to negotiate it into the next 5-year program which will start in 1973.

Mr. PATTEN. Wouldn't the leasing of family housing be justified?

Mr. LOVELAND. No, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. As compared to a theater, for example.

Mr. LOVELAND. As I would see it, it would be barracks and direct support of troops.

Mr. PATTEN. And you are not thinking of leased family housing?

Mr. LOVELAND. \_\_\_\_\_.

Mr. PATTEN. \_\_\_\_\_.

Mr. LOVELAND. \_\_\_\_\_.

Mr. LONG. Would the chairman yield?

Mr. PATTEN. Yes.

#### REDUCTION IN U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE

Mr. LONG. Perhaps this isn't the appropriate time to answer this question. If it isn't, just say so and postpone your answer to another point in the hearing. There are a lot of proposals for cutting down our presence in NATO. I got one the other day for my endorsement which talked about reduction. I was startled.

Later the author of this particular proposal told me that he would wipe out our commitment completely. That is his idea of reduction. I would think many people feel that we ought to reduce our NATO presence somewhat. Even if we should keep our presence there, and even if it should be strong, it should be reduced.

What would be the impact on new construction? We can't go back and tear down the buildings that are already there—so I would suppose that a reduction in our presence might have a big impact on the new construction, and might even wipe out the need for it.

Are you taking this possibility into account? Give us some information on that.

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir, we are taking this into account and historically every time we have reduced, it has cost us a little more money. If we maintain our commitment to NATO and, say, station the forces here in the United States and commit them to a 15-day reaction time or something, this means that we have to build more controlled humidity storage. We have to put more money into the maintenance of facilities to receive these forces when they come back over. Much depends on what happens. If I might go off the record——

Mr. PATTEN. OK.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LONG. Not all the proposals would involve our positioning troops here for a quick sendover. Some of them would simply face the reality that there has to be a real war over there.

What we want is enough presence to show the Europeans that we are interested in the place and that we would probably get involved, but any real war would be probably one in which we start throwing missiles fast, rather than sending people over.

I don't know much about war, but I think I see a fat cat operation if I have ever seen one. I wouldn't want to see us send a lot of troops to Europe if we got into a conventional type of war because, it would seem to me, the Russians would have a tremendous advantage there, if they were really in earnest and wanted to come in. Sending troops over there might just be throwing them into a meat grinder.

Mr. LOVELAND. Of course the whole NATO strategy which was changed at U.S. instigation is that we do want a choice in response. We do want to be able to make that choice and we want to give ourselves a pause long enough to decide whether we are going to destroy the whole world or whether we can confine it there.

Mr. LONG. Sure.

Mr. LOVELAND. If you wipe out our commitment to NATO——

Mr. LONG. I wouldn't want to do that.

Mr. LOVELAND. I am not talking about whether you personally wanted to do it, but if Congress wiped it out——

Mr. LONG. I doubt if Congress would wipe it out, but I do think Congress is in a mood to reduce it somewhat.

Mr. LOVELAND. Reducing it and maintaining our commitment would not cost us any less money and it probably would cost a little more. Reducing it, period, would cost some less money, but when you figure that almost 50 percent of the entire program is for facilities for use in common, that is, communications, radar, et cetera, this has nothing to do with how many forces we have there.

Mr. LONG. You need the infrastructure. You need a road whether a lot of people go over it or a small number.

Mr. LOVELAND. Well, particularly radars and communications.

Mr. LONG. But that wouldn't apply to other parts of our defense budget.

Mr. LOVELAND. No, sir.

Mr. LONG. That could be substantially reduced, but for military construction you don't think it would be affected very much.

Mr. LOVELAND. I think that is correct.

Mr. PATTEN. I don't want to press the point, Mr. Loveland, but categorically is this area your business? I mean you have no direct responsibility for these decisions?

Mr. LOVELAND. No, sir; I am not involved in strategic decisions.

Mr. LONG. I didn't ask him that.

Mr. PATTEN. I am not saying that critically. I am just saying that insofar as we are here officially, you are not part of the strategic decisionmaking?

Mr. LOVELAND. You couldn't be more right.

Mr. LONG. One more question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PATTEN. Right.

#### DEHUMIDIFIED WAREHOUSES FOR PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT

Mr. LONG. When I was in Europe several years ago they were in the process of building a number of these dehumidified warehouses. Has that program been completed?

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir. The last part of it is under construction now. Now, as you heard previously, there are some more that need to be built if we go into the LOC concept.

General KJELLSTROM. If I may add to that, Mr. Long. I was in Europe last summer, went into many of the dehumidified warehouses and saw firsthand the results of our efforts. They are very promising, and I mentioned the other day the Reforger exercise where we used the equipment that is stored in the dehumidified warehouses.

We are going to provide an afteraction report for the record. But they are working very satisfactorily.

Mr. LONG. I would like to know how much of that project we have completed. It seemed to me like a great idea. I saw a lot of that equipment standing in the mud and rain and was told it would take 6 months or more to get it in operation. I could believe that. I liked the idea of these dehumidified warehouses. I would be interested to know if you can provide for the record just how much of that program has been carried through.

General KJELLSTROM. We would be very happy to, sir.

[The information was classified and was furnished for the committee files.]

Mr. PATTEN. In the event that the United States was to withdraw additional troops and leave our equipment in Europe would there be a large need for additional dehumidified warehouse space?

Mr. LOVELAND. I see that to be true.

Mr. LONG. I am not quite sure I understand that. I would think whether the troops were all over there or whether some were there and some were here, you would still need about the same number of vehicles for the same number of troops for getting into action.

General KJELLSTROM. If I may, sir. I think this gets into the strategy area and it depends upon the assumptions we use and the criteria.

If we were to withdraw a division, which we are not in favor of, of course, and if the determination were made that the equipment would remain in Europe, Mr. Patten's statement is correct. We do have division sets of equipment in Europe now for divisions stationed in the United States.

We also have nondivisional, or support unit, sets of equipment, so it depends upon the assumptions in the plan placed in effect.

Mr. LONG. Let us say that you would station a hypothetical division in the United States instead of in Europe. Where would that division's equipment be right now, in use rather than in a warehouse?

General KJELLSTROM. Yes, sir.

For example, the elements of the 1st Infantry Division stationed at Fort Riley have identical sets of equipment in Europe.

Mr. LONG. I see what you mean. You have two sets of equipment.

General KJELLSTROM. That is correct.

If the 1st Division stationed at Fort Riley were deployed in Europe in the event of an emergency, a unit would undoubtedly be activated from within the resources of the Reserve components which would utilize the equipment at Fort Riley.

Mr. LONG. I understand.

Mr. PATTEN. Do you have anything to add, General?

General COOPER. If you have equipment being used and the troops are looking at it every day, you don't require the dehumidified storage; but if you are keeping it in storage for a long period of time, you really have to provide much better conditions.

#### AUTOMATIC DELETION PROCEDURES

Mr. PATTEN. In cleaning up the old slices in which we are obligated to pay a higher proportion of the costs, are we merely getting dead projects off the books, or is there a real possibility that projects which were approved, and were perhaps nice to have, and have been put off may reemerge several years later due to a change in requirements? Does the United States have many projects like this in older slices?

Mr. LOVELAND. The projects which are remaining in the older slices, practically none of which are for the support of U.S. forces, are generally those on which we have not been able to provide some precondition; that is, land, local utilities; some reason has prevented us from implementing the projects.

We have looked at these projects time after time. They have proved themselves to be of genuine military interest and requirement. They are not nice to have. We have chopped out the nice-to-have ones well before now. The ones that are remaining are projects that General Goodpaster very definitely wants, but we are not going to have enough money to do everything now with inflation.

We think that this is a healthy situation in that it will force nations to do everything they can if they really want those projects because we are handling them on a first-come-first-served basis and many of these will again emerge as candidates for future year funds.

But in the meantime we will have cleaned up this 20-year tail on this program.

#### STATUS OF PREFINANCING AND REIMBURSEMENTS

Mr. PATTEN. We have asked in past years about the status of pre-financed projects. As you know, the committee, except in emergencies, frowns on providing funds for projects for which we may or may not get reimbursed several years later.

What is the status of our prefinanced projects? How much have we collected, and how much are we going to collect? Do you have a table which shows this? Provide the table for the record.

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir. We will leave a table for the record.

[The information follows:]

FY 1974 Infrastructure Hearings  
SUMMARY OF PREFINANCING AND RECOUPMENTS  
(\$ Millions)

	As of 12-31-71				As of 12-31-72			
	A	N	AF	Total	A	N	AF	Total
<b><u>PREFINANCING SUMMARY</u></b>								
1. Estimated total prefinanced	101.2	10.1	187.2	298.5	100.7	14.7	203.7	319.1
2. Less: Amount non-recoupable <u>A/</u>	52.6	-	74.7	127.3	52.8	-	81.8	134.6
3. Net amount potentially recoupable	48.6	10.1	112.5	171.2	47.9	14.7	121.9	184.5
4. Less: Amount recouped	43.7	.6	27.6	71.9	46.1	.7	32.2	79.0
5. Balance potentially recoupable <u>B/</u>	4.9	9.5	84.9	99.3	1.8	14.0	89.7	105.5 <u>1/</u>
<b><u>A/ NON-RECOUPABLE - TOTAL</u></b>	52.6	-	74.7	127.3	52.8	-	81.8	134.6
6. Projects in excess of the \$28 million FRELOC	34.8	-	22.2	57.0	34.8	-	21.4	56.2
7. Aircraft survival measures above NATO eligibility standards	-	-	38.0	38.0	-	-	42.1	42.1
8. Difference between original and final estimates	-	-	4.2	4.2	-	-	6.4	6.4
9. Other ineligible	17.8	-	10.3	28.1	18.0	-	11.9	29.9
<b><u>B/ POTENTIALLY RECOUPABLE - TOTAL</u></b>	4.9	9.5	84.9	99.3	1.8	14.0	89.7	105.5
10. Included in approved slice - total	3.1	.2	10.5	13.8	.7	-	18.7	19.4
a) Billed, awaiting recoupment	2.7	.1	3.3	6.1	.3	-	.6	.9
b) Authorized by NATO, not yet billed	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.2	5.2
c) Waiting authorization	.4	.1	7.2	7.7	.4	-	12.9	13.3
11. Not yet in approved slice	1.8	9.3	20.4	31.5	1.1	14.0	11.9	27.0
12. Aircraft survival measures (TAB V)	-	-	54.0	54.0	-	-	59.1	59.1 <u>1/</u>

1/ \$40.2 million received from European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP) as of 16 March 1973 (received subsequent to 12-31-72)

Mr. PATTEN. Why did we build aircraft shelters above NATO standards? Did we gold-plate them? Are NATO standards too low?

Mr. LOVELAND. I think categorically I can say NATO standards are too low because of the unavailability of funds to go higher. Generally what we are talking about is that NATO was required to limit their support to only 70 percent of the in-place tactical aircraft because of the limitation on funds.

Our Air Force believes that 100 percent of your aircraft should be protected and that an empty shelter is as good a protection as a full shelter in that the enemy doesn't know which shelter has an airplane in it, so that you would be better off to build 150 percent shelters for your aircraft.

Obviously somewhere you have to make a decision on cost effectiveness, but in any case our Air Force has built shelters for 100 percent of their aircraft. We believe this to be a good idea and we believe that SHAPE eventually will go to that criteria.

In that case we will recoup some more of our funds.

Mr. PATTEN. I was surprised that your answer goes to whether we cover all of them or 70 percent, but as far as the structure itself is concerned, the way we build it, there is no difference between NATO standards and ours?

Mr. LOVELAND. No, sir. Our shelter is one of the NATO standard designs which has been built by the Italians, the Greeks, and the Turks, as well as the United States.

Mr. PATTEN. To that extent we are not building a Cadillac?

Mr. LOVELAND. It is no more expensive than the German standard shelter, or the Norwegian standard, or the British standard. The advantage to the United States is that a U.S. company furnishes the steel liners and the doors which account for about 50 percent of the cost of the shelter.

Mr. PATTEN. Is any progress being made in getting NATO to agree to a higher percentage of shelters as compared to aircraft in the force?

Mr. LOVELAND. No progress will be made in that until we finish the 70 percent. Then we expect to raise them gradually to 85 percent and perhaps eventually to 100 percent.

Mr. PATTEN. If NATO agreed to this percentage, would we get our money back?

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. What has been the progress on recoupments for these aircraft shelters?

Mr. LOVELAND. We have collected \$42 million. We told you last year we had \$54 million coming but that we didn't expect to be able to recoup it until next fiscal year, until fiscal year 1974. We already have \$42 million of that.

Mr. PATTEN. How do you explain this accelerated recoupment?

Mr. LOVELAND. I would like to claim credit for it, sir, but it just happened.

Mr. PATTEN. Why did you elect to show some of these recoupments as being applied in fiscal year 1973 and some as being carried over to fiscal year 1974?

Mr. LOVELAND. We are carrying some of them over into 1974, because we got more than we had anticipated.

Mr. PATTEN. Isn't it true that you didn't really have authorization to spend that money in fiscal year 1973?

Mr. LOVELAND. We didn't have authorization to spend all of it, no; \$24 million remains of recoupments received.

Mr. PATTEN. Wasn't the reason for selecting the particular figure put in the 1973 column, that it was the total amount of authorization you had left and, therefore, you had to carry it over?

Mr. LOVELAND. In the 1974 budget, yes, but in the 1973 budget we show \$24 million because that was our best estimate at the time.

Mr. PATTEN. But we are talking about the 1974 budget.

Mr. LOVELAND. Now we backed into the amount that we charged against 1974.

Mr. PATTEN. So when you get the increased authorization, then you can spend this additional money which has been carried over.

Mr. LOVELAND. Exactly.

Mr. PATTEN. Then let us ask: Have your actual recoupments exceeded, or do you anticipate they will exceed, the amounts shown in the fiscal year 1974 budget?

In other words, does this mean we can reduce the new obligational authority provided the Army?

Mr. LOVELAND. No, sir. I think the total for fiscal year 1973 and 1974 will be about \$50 million. This, of course, is \$6 million over that which is estimated in the fiscal year 1974 budget. However, the additional \$6 million will be required over and above the amounts requested particularly since we are rather short on the NOA we are asking for.

The \$50 million is made up of about \$47 million we have recouped already and I do not foresee more than about another \$3 million in the next fiscal year. The reason for this is that in order to get that advanced recoupment of \$42 million we had to agree not to put in during the calendar year 1973 any more requests for recoupment on aircraft shelters. This \$50 million total is, of course, \$6 million over the budget estimate.

General COOPER. That total, \$50 million for the fiscal years 1973 and 1974, is the figure I used in my testimony the first day.

Mr. PATTEN. The budget at this time shows a total of—

General COOPER. The budget was \$44 million.

Mr. LOVELAND. But the \$50 million is the one we are working with now. We have \$47 million of it. I do not believe that we will have more than about \$50 million. Starting in January next year we could go after the rest, but the length of the procedure won't allow reuse during fiscal year 1974.

We will have to take credit for that in fiscal year 1975.

Mr. PATTEN. Will you explain that in greater detail for the record.

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

A summary table on authorization-funding of the NATO infrastructure program for fiscal year 1973 and 1974 is provided below:

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1973		Fiscal year 1974	
	Per President's budget	Revised	Per President's budget	Revised
<b>Status of authorization:</b>				
Reprogramming (sec. 703) <sup>1</sup> .....		20,650		
Available, beginning of year.....	18,255	18,255	4,255	105
Authorization enacted (add).....	58,000	58,000	80,000	80,000
<b>Total available</b> .....	<b>76,255</b>	<b>96,905</b>	<b>84,255</b>	<b>80,105</b>
Obligations (less).....	72,000	96,800	60,000	80,000
<b>Available end year</b> .....	<b>4,255</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>24,255</b>	<b>105</b>
<b>Status of funds:</b>				
Reprogramming (sec. 703) <sup>1</sup> .....		20,650		
Unobligated, begin, year.....	14,216	14,216	4,216	66
NOA (add).....	38,000	38,000	40,000	40,000
Repayments transferred (add).....	24,000	24,000	20,000	26,000
<b>Total available</b> .....	<b>76,216</b>	<b>96,866</b>	<b>64,216</b>	<b>66,066</b>
Obligation (less).....	72,000	96,800	60,000	80,000
<b>Unobligated end year</b> .....	<b>4,216</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>4,216</b>	<b>-13,934</b>

<sup>1</sup> Congressional approval requested by letter dated May 7, 1973.

#### STATUS OF FUNDING AND AUTHORIZATION

Mr. PATTEN. This question may be repetitive.

One of the things that the General Accounting Office report pointed out is that there has, in past years, been a rather large amount of carryover of both authorization and funding available at the end of the fiscal year. Why is the situation different in fiscal year 1973?

Mr. LOVELAND. A question of mortgage, sir. Every year we have forecast what we thought we should spend that year. We had several difficulties, political difficulties, technical difficulties.

A number of projects, and big projects, had to be slipped back from one fiscal year to the next. Now, in my mind those carryovers were to care for those slipped projects.

This year many of those projects have caught up, one of which was a satellite program which cost \$20 million, which eats a long way into a \$40 million appropriation, and \$42 million additional for devaluation.

Mr. PATTEN. What extraordinary steps have you taken to stretch out the rate of obligation in fiscal year 1973 in order not to run out of authorization, or funds, or both?

Mr. LOVELAND. A few large projects amounting to something in the neighborhood of \$20 million are being slipped from fiscal year 1973 to, we hope, the very early part of fiscal year 1974, if indeed any authorization and funds remain in the early part of fiscal year 1974.

#### COSTS OF RELOCATION FROM FRANCE

Mr. PATTEN. What is the situation with regard to the prefinanced projects for the relocation from France which we have apparently written off?

Mr. LOVELAND. There were almost \$60 million of such projects and they were in bits and pieces. They were painting a room. They were repairing the roof. They were doing a little bit of work on a road. But there were lots of them.

When we started the recoupment of these monies, it became quite evident that we were going to spend as much money in researching the records in order to come up with auditable bills as we were going to recoup on such projects.

We, therefore, chose \$28 million of this about \$60 million worth for which we got NATO recoupment. We wrote off the rest of it because we had more than enough whole new projects which needed to be built to use up the NATO commitment to this program.

Therefore, we believed it to be cost effective and useful to spend NATO's money in the first instance rather than trying to recoup bits and pieces because \$42 million worth of bits and pieces is a lot of bits and pieces.

Mr. PATTEN. It wasn't because there was some doubt as to whether they really resulted from this move?

Mr. LOVELAND. No, sir. It was just too difficult to do. The NATO commitment was limited at that time to \$96 million. We had plenty of good projects to build with that money. Therefore, it was the most cost effective way of getting NATO to participate.

#### STATUS OF CLAIM AGAINST FRANCE

Mr. PATTEN. What is the status of our claim against France for costs incurred as a result of our moving out? Has our Embassy there pressed for an answer?

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir; the Embassy has pressed for an answer and there have been discussions with the last French Government.

Unfortunately, the French Government has changed since then and we have not yet been able to pick up the thread, but we expect to soon, I believe.

Mr. PATTEN. How about the other NATO nations which have claims against France? Have they had any better luck?

Mr. LOVELAND. They are following us. We are trying to have parallel movement with the United States slightly in front, so that if the U.S. claim gets favorably treated the NATO claim should also get similar treatment.

Mr. PATTEN. If there is any real anticipation that this will get paid back in the next couple of years, would it be applied to the NATO infrastructure, or construction in Europe, or has it been determined how the funds would be spent?

Mr. LOVELAND. I have no idea. I do know that a percentage of what we get back from France will have to go back to NATO, since they picked up a portion of our expenses in getting out of France, so that part will, of course, be lost in the infrastructure accounts of the other countries, but what happens to the U.S. portion of it I don't believe anyone has addressed yet.

Mr. PATTEN. In what portion of the ongoing NATO infrastructure program is France participating?

Mr. LOVELAND. Rather minor; principally only the NADGE program which is a SAGE-like program, early warning, and air defense.

#### RECEPTION FACILITIES

Mr. PATTEN. There are various parking aprons, freight terminals, and other types of facilities which would be used for aerial reinforcement of our troops in Europe which we have built or are building.

What is the status of our proposal to make these eligible for NATO funding?

Mr. LOVELAND. I might have to call for a little help. Bob, do you have that?

Commander QUINN. Some of these items have been included in the existing airfield category.

Mr. LOVELAND. But it is included in slice XXV or new sets of slices.

Commander QUINN. We have a few projects in the current group. Some of the projects are already in current slices of infrastructure. We expect to expand on these later.

Mr. PATTEN. If we withdraw further troops from Europe, hopefully by agreement on mutual reductions, won't we require more of these facilities, and should not we act now to get them in NATO's criteria?

Mr. LOVELAND. I think there is confusion here between reception facilities and prepositioned storage facilities. As I see it, the reception facilities would be large enough as we plan them now. The storage facilities, as we said a few minutes ago, would have to be increased.

Mr. PATTEN. You can't say whether we ought to alter our criteria in order to get more of a contribution?

Mr. LOVELAND. Once we have the criteria, the number of facilities needed is a matter of military judgment at that time.

#### SUPPORT FOR F-14 AND F-15 AIRCRAFT

Mr. PATTEN. Have either the F-14 or the F-15 aircraft been committed to NATO?

Mr. LOVELAND. Can we supply that for the record?

Mr. PATTEN. It would seem that these high performance aircraft would be the best equipped to deal with the sophisticated and heavy threat in the NATO area. Is it not logical to assume that they would be used here?

Mr. LOVELAND. Sorry, sir; as I said before, I am not a strategist.

Mr. PATTEN. Do you want to go off the record?

General COOPER. We could go off the record, but I cannot provide you with any more information.

Mr. LONG. Then let's stay on the record.

General COOPER. That is not in our area.

Mr. LOVELAND. Could we provide it for the record?

Mr. LONG. Yes.

[The information follows:]

The F-15 has been programed into four NATO-committed squadrons in Europe. The F-14 is not in a program against overseas requirement.

Mr. PATTEN. If NATO is to pay for any special facilities required for these aircraft, how soon must we commit them to NATO and request expanded criteria?

Mr. LOVELAND. Each year there is an operation called the DPQ, the defense planning questionnaire. The nations commit forces and equipment. Until a particular piece of equipment appears in one of the annual DPQ's, it is not really eligible for NATO infrastructure money.

We can, however, do our planning with NATO military authorities before that time to be ready for the moment when we do commit.

Mr. PATTEN. What planning have you done?

When do you expect the first squadron?

Mr. LOVELAND. Is that for the record?

Mr. PATTEN. Yes.

General COOPER. We have people here from the Office of the Joint Staff.

Commander Quinn, do you know the answer to that question?

Commander QUINN. A date? No, sir.

Mr. NICHOLAS. How far in advance of the date at which the aircraft actually show up there, would you have to get them in your DPQ in order to get the benefit of a NATO infrastructure funding as opposed to having to prefinance, which is a costly and wasteful procedure?

Mr. LOVELAND. A couple of years.

First you have to program it, then you have to get the facilities constructed. So 2 or 3 years leadtime is approximately what you need. But before you can commit anything, you have to have made a decision to actually have those aircraft in Europe.

Mr. PATTEN. In other words, right now we are not halfway through the decision; we are not even 75 percent down the road to making a decision.

Mr. LOVELAND. We will provide that for the record, sir. The decision is not being made by anybody in the room.

#### SUPPORT OF NEW SHIPS AND NAVAL WEAPONS

Mr. PATTEN. Are NATO criteria for naval facilities sufficiently broad to allow the programing of facilities in support of the Navy's new ships ships such as hydrofoils, hovercraft, and sea control ships?

Mr. LOVELAND. Generally, yes.

In some of the cases we will have to broaden them; we are currently involved in broadening criteria in order to support the Navy's logistic support concept in the Mediterranean. Generally, we have had little difficulty with the naval criteria.

Mr. PATTEN. What about supporting facilities for the newer weapons such as the Harpoon missile and the V/STOL aircraft, LAMPS, et cetera, which the Navy is proposing?

Mr. LOVELAND. For the record?

Mr. PATTEN. Yes.

[The information follows:]

The United States will request NATO infrastructure funding to support new weapon systems as well as new type ships and aircraft. NATO has been very cooperative in approving infrastructure projects for improved military hardware committed to NATO. No difficulty is anticipated in obtaining NATO acceptance of infrastructure funding of facilities for these and similar items.

Mr. LOVELAND. I am not aware of any.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Are the existing criteria sufficient?

Mr. LOVELAND. It depends on what Harpoon requires. If it requires another 2,000 feet of maintenance facility, we will have to broaden the criteria.

Mr. NICHOLAS. The LAMPS is being deployed. Has the Navy talked to anybody about their requirements?

Commander QUINN. There is no trouble getting additional facilities for the naval category, because the naval category has no specific

written criteria. If you can justify a committed weapon system, NATO will tend to support it.

SUPPORT FOR HOMEPORTED UNITS

Mr. PATTEN. Have any additional facilities in support of the 6th Fleet and homeporting in the Mediterranean been included in NATO Slice programs?

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir; in slices XXIV and XXV certain of these facilities have been included.

Mr. PATTEN. Will you provide for the record what has been done and what is anticipated in the outyears?

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

Facility requirements for the Sixth Fleet and homeporting that have been included in NATO approval of slice XXIII and NATO recommended slice XXIV:

NATO INFRASTRUCTURE SLICES XXIII, XXIV

(CLASSIFIED)

Projects currently under consideration for inclusion in slice XXV (calendar year 1974) are as follows:

NATO INFRASTRUCTURE SLICE XXV

(CLASSIFIED)

Possible projects for consideration in the outyears—slices XXVI and beyond are as follows:

NATO INFRASTRUCTURE SLICE XXVI AND BEYOND

(CLASSIFIED)

Mr. PATTEN. By project?

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir.

SLICE XXV AND SUBSEQUENT SLICES

Mr. PATTEN. You mentioned that NATO approved a sufficient additional program to cover slice XXV, which corresponds to the fiscal year 1974 program. How much more did they approve?

Mr. LOVELAND. They have not come up with an exact figure. However, it is in the range of \$165 million.

Mr. PATTEN. What level of effort was approved for 1975-79? And how does this compare with past programs?

Mr. LOVELAND. Here again this is an ongoing effort. The military commands, the NATO military commands, have just come in with their program, asking for a little over \$3 billion for the next 5 years.

Mr. PATTEN. What major areas will receive emphasis in the coming programs?

Mr. LOVELAND. One of the big areas is forward defense; that is, pushing the POL storage and other storage facilities up forward of the Rhine. Additional areas are reception facilities, which you mentioned earlier; improvements in early warning and air defense control system; tactical air control; there are several areas. And above all, communications facilities.

## NICS

Mr. PATTEN. What progress has been made in the NICS program?

Mr. LOVELAND. We have programed the first half of the project as we see it in the 1970's period.

As I told you before, the satellite has already been put out to contract, for some \$60 million. The switching devices are under study. We expect that in the next 2 years we will have contracted for most of the first half of this program.

The second half is contained in the 1975-79 program.

## AIRCRAFT SHELTERS

Mr. PATTEN. Is the aircraft shelter program for NATO forces nearly complete?

Mr. LOVELAND. We have nearly all of the money for the NATO-supported part from the European defense improvement program. That is to say that the United States put money into this particular project.

We will come very close to completing the first 70 percent of pro-

About two-thirds of those are either completed or under construction now. We expect that in the next year and a half they will all be either completed or under construction.

Mr. PATTEN. I do not know whether this question is a little bit broader. You are referring to what the United States has done?

Mr. LOVELAND. No, sir. I am referring to what all of NATO has done and the program is worth \$450 million.

## SATELLITE GROUND TERMINAL FACILITIES

Mr. PATTEN. Discuss the need for satellite ground terminal facilities. Where are the slice XXIV facilities to be located?

Mr. LOVELAND. The ground terminals are necessary for communication with the satellite. They are generally located in each of the NATO capitals and at each of the NATO military commands.

There will, in addition, be certain mobile terminals to allow for the use of the system in time of combat.

Mr. PATTEN. What about the personnel?

Mr. LOVELAND. The personnel are planned to be national personnel. The various host countries will operate their own terminals, as is the case at this time with the current satellite.

The satellite we are putting up is the second set of NATO satellites. Right now there is a terminal at Norfolk that the U.S. Navy operates, and other countries have similar terminals near their capitals.

Mr. PATTEN. In addition to actual shelters for aircraft, what other types of airfield physical hardening is being provided?

Mr. LOVELAND. All of the facilities necessary to allow the weapons system to survive; that is, the crews, the power equipment, the fire trucks, the necessary facilities to be able to respond to a first strike.

## POL PROJECTS

Mr. PATTEN. Could you discuss the need for various slice XXIV POL projects in Germany, Belgium, and Scotland?

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir.

Generally they are required to increase the on-base storage on air bases for U.S. forces, to get them up to NATO standards of storage.

## FISCAL YEAR 1974 PROJECTS

Mr. PATTEN. What are some of the other projects which you expect to fund in fiscal year 1974 and why are they needed?

Can you provide additional information on this for the record.

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir, I prefer to provide it for the record.  
[The information follows:]

A forecast of items to be approved for implementation by the NATO Payments and Progress Committee during FY 1974 is as follows:

<u>Projects by Category</u>	<u>Slice 23 &amp; Prior*</u>	<u>Slice 24*</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
I. <u>Signals</u>			
SATCOM III )			All items are sequential segments of NATO communications systems which have the ultimate goal of providing the NATO Intergrated Communications System (NICS). These include satellite and secure communications plus early warning and missile firing systems. Replacement of worn out and obsolete equipment is also included as part of the total program.
Additional Ground Stations )			
Modification of SATCOM II )	8.7		
Ground Terminals )			
Secure Voice (2nd increment)	5.0		
NICS TARES	11.0		
Message Entry System	0.6		
MATELO	0.7		
Replacement of SCARS )			
Replacement ACE HF Equipment )		6.9	
Medium Speed. Telegraphic System )			
in ACE plus Message Entry System )			
NICS Projects		1.8	
Other Misc. Items		<u>1.0</u>	
		<u>1.0</u>	
	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>	
	27.0	9.7	
II. <u>POL, WHQ, Naval Bases</u>			
a. <u>POL</u>			
Bellheim/Kehl Pipeline	5.0		Items are to improve operating efficiency and survivability of the existing Pipeline system. This is provided through interconnections between portions of the existing pipelines and also commercial lines, plus improvements in safety and operating procedures. Items also provide for stub pipelines which extend eastward into the expected area of usage.
Correction of Deficiencies at 4 locations	1.0		
Remote Control Pipeline safety equipment - 4 lines	1.0		
RMR connection	0.5		
Construction of 2 Depots Ser 110 and 111		2.0	

\* In millions of Infrastructure Accounting Units (IAU). Currently, one IAU equals \$3.04. When Congress ratifies the February 1973 dollar devaluation, the value of one IAU will increase to \$3.38.

<u>Projects by Category</u>	<u>Slice 23 &amp; Prior</u>	<u>Slice 24</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
<u>II. POL, WHQ, Naval Bases</u>			
a. <u>POL continued</u>			
Depot extension in Belgium, Ser 107a		0.6	
Netherlands Pipeline, Ser 105		1.0	
Turkey Pipeline & Depot, Ser 120		0.8	
Other Misc. Items	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	
SUBTOTAL	8.0	4.9	
b. <u>WHQ</u>			
NORTHAG/2 ATAF WHQ	5.5		Protected War Headquarters (WHQ) is an existing NATO program, with which the US firmly concurs, that provides for hardened protected structures for each of the major NATO commands for use in the event of war. The three listed WHQ's are the last in this program. The Naples blast protection is provided for elements of the US Navy which relocated from Malta.
SHAPE WHQ	7.0		
BALTAP Static WHQ	3.0		
Naples Blast Protection (Slice 24 projects not expected)	<u>0.5</u>		
SUBTOTAL	16.0		
c. <u>Naval Bases</u>			
SACLANT Slice 23 - all projects	1.2		Projects provide for modification of Storage Depots to accommodate conversion of US ships from NSFO to Navy Distillate Fuel.
SHAPE Slices 22, 23 - all projects (Slice 24 projects not expected)	<u>0.8</u>		
SUBTOTAL	2.0		
d. <u>Miscellaneous</u>			
Greece Frontier Fortifications	2.4		Exceptions to normal criteria. One time NATO approval for improvements in the Greece-Turkey defense line. Controlled Humidity Storage is for US use. Forward storage sites provide for initial supply of expendable war stocks near the expected area of usage. (These sites are expected to become part of the NATO Infrastructure criteria).
GH Storage, Pirmassens	1.5		
Turkey Fortifications	0.6		
Forward Storage Sites	2.5		
Other Misc. Items	<u>2.0</u>		
(Slice 24 projects not expected) SUBTOTAL	9.0		

Projects by CategorySlice 23 & PriorSlice 24RemarksIII. Airfields

Norway - Evenes	0.3		Items are for upgrade of airfields due to conversion to larger, newer, and/or more sophisticated aircraft.
Denmark - Vorlose	0.7		
Belgium - Melsbroek	0.5		
Germany - Buchel	0.4		
Germany - Wildenrath	0.3		
Germany - Lahr	0.3		
Italy - Pisa	0.3		
Italy - Aviano	0.4		
Greece - Micra	0.7		
Greece - Tymbakion		1.3	
UK - Bentwaters & Upper Heyford	0.6		
Other Misc. Items	<u>5.0</u>		
SUBTOTAL	9.5	<u>1.3</u>	

IV. Missiles

HAWK - Italy	0.3		PERSHING items are for completion of sites already in the NATO program. Other items are improvements to sites to accommodate newer, more improved, missiles.
HAWK - U.S.	1.6		
HAWK - Germany	0.9		
NIKE - Belgium	0.5		
SAS - U.S.	0.3		
PERSHING - U.S.	4.8		
PERSHING - Germany	0.4		
Other Misc. Items	1.0		
(No Slice 24 items expected)			
SUBTOTAL	<u>9.8</u>		

TOTAL

81.315.9

NATO Grand Total

97.2 IAUsUS Share Grand Total  
Plus: Deferrals )\$98.6 million  
10.0 million - CIP 67)   
from FY 1973 )

3.0 million - Relocation

TOTAL FY 1974 Potential

8.0 million - Dollar Devaluation  
\$119.6 million

Mr. PATTEN. I note that an additional maintenance facility is included at Ramstein. What is the relationship of this project to maintenance facilities previously requested in the Air Force military construction program?

Mr. LOVELAND. Sorry, you caught me cold. I will provide it for the record.

[The information follows:]

The Ramstein maintenance facility in the fiscal year 1973 MCAF supports cargo aircraft which are not committed to NATO. The maintenance facilities in slice XXIV of the NATO infrastructure program support tactical fighter aircraft which are committed to NATO and require separate maintenance facilities.

Mr. PATTEN. Provide for the record the relationship of projects included at Sigonella and Souda Bay to those being funded through Navy military construction projects.

[The information follows:]

At Sigonella and Souda Bay, as at other facilities in the NATO area, MILCON funding is requested for personnel support facilities. NATO infrastructure funding is requested for operational support facilities. In those instances where direct NATO funding will not be responsive enough to provide an urgently required facility in a timely manner the facility will be prefunded, thus programing will appear in both the MILCON and infrastructure programs.

Mr. PATTEN. Incidentally, I was at Sigonella in February, I think.

We were also briefed by the new commander of the 6th Fleet for over an hour. I think that was in Naples, or at the Embassy in Rome, when we went on our interparliamentary trip.

#### SUPPORT FOR HELICOPTERS

In view of the development of the TRICAP division at Fort Hood, what progress has the Army made in expanding NATO criteria to include helicopter support facilities?

General COOPER. As to the specific NATO criteria I cannot answer, but we have many helicopters in the Army in units other than TRICAP. I would have to defer to Mr. Loveland.

Mr. LOVELAND. To date I am not aware of any current push for helicopter support facility criteria. And as I remember the Army's answer last year, it was that they already had their facilities and they were not planning to deploy new helicopters to Europe.

Mr. NICHOLAS. If that is the case, why are they developing a TRICAP division for possible use in Europe?

Mr. LOVELAND. Let's give that for the record.

[The information follows:]

The 1st Cavalry Division (TRICAP) was formed at Fort Hood, Tex., in May 1971 to evaluate the TRICAP concept, refine organizations, and develop tactics and techniques for integrating armor, airmobile, and air cavalry forces. —

General COOPER. You just asked a question about helicopter facilities and their eligibility under NATO criteria.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Right.

General COOPER. We are still developing techniques on the best way to use the helicopters. That is part of what TRICAP is doing now.

Mr. NICHOLAS. But the testimony the other day was that it was being developed for limited or medium intensity war, which would include a NATO-type conflict, and presumably this division is in the force structure because it might be pulled into NATO—

General COOPER. That is correct.

Mr. NICHOLAS. Or because you might want to put a division like that in the NATO area.

General COOPER. That is correct. But I understood the question to be about the specific criteria in NATO infrastructure and whether or not they applied to helicopter facilities.

I would have to defer to Mr. Loveland. I would assume they are comparable to airfield facilities.

Mr. NICHOLAS. They are not currently funded out of NATO infrastructure. The question is, what are the Army and other appropriate authorities doing to try to expand the criteria. Here you are developing a division which is supposed to be used in NATO, and which is very dependent on helicopters for artillery support, for all of its maneuver type—

General KJELLSTROM. May we go off the record?

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. PATTEN. How about the TRICAP program you conduct at Fort Hood?

All right, provide something for the record.

Mr. PATTEN. Now, the gentleman on my left, do you wish to be recognized?

#### PERCENTAGE OF U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO EACH SLICE

Mr. DAVIS. Yes. I have a few questions, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. PATTEN. Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. In the outline of the slice XXIV that is in the hands of the committee, you have listed the percentages of the various contributing nations. Is there anything classified about that information?

Mr. LOVELAND. I do not believe that there are percentages for contributing nations in that document. It is in the unclassified document we handed you. And the answer to the question is no.

Mr. PATTEN. All right. And this has already been put in the record; has it not?

Mr. NICHOLAS. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS. All right.

Now these percentages seem to vary. Does that mean that the contributions of the various countries are reviewed and altered from year to year or from slice to slice?

Mr. LOVELAND. There is no routine procedure whereby this happens; when one nation feels it is contributing too much, which to date has only been the United States, we negotiate again.

You will notice that each time our share has dropped.

We intend that in the 1975-79 program it will again drop to our de facto percentage of the current situation whereby we contribute 30 percent to the normal infrastructure program and zero percentage to the European defense program. So that our de facto percentage is something like 18 to 20—

Mr. DAVIS. When you use that, you are including the contributions made by the host countries for acquisition of land?

Mr. LOVELAND. No, sir, this is money.

Mr. DAVIS. How do you get from the 29.6—

Mr. LOVELAND. The current slice is almost 30 percent, 29.67.

Mr. DAVIS. Yes.

Mr. LOVELAND. Okay. Now this applies to a 300 million IAU program. In addition, the Europeans have supplied 150 million IAU's to which we do not contribute at all. The two parts of the program are considered a single whole. Thus by contributing 30 percent to two-thirds of the program we are really contributing 20 percent to the whole program. We consider that our de facto percentage now \_\_\_\_\_.

Mr. DAVIS. Is the European community providing similar facilities to that included in the NATO infrastructure?

Mr. LOVELAND. No, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. I am trying to get—what is that 150 million you spoke of? What is that going into?

Mr. LOVELAND. They simply supplied 150 million IAU's, that is an additional 50 percent of the current program in order to allow NATO to build more of its urgent projects. So they simply furnished money which is being handled exactly as the commonly funded moneys and therefore it is a single program of 450 million IAU's.

Mr. DAVIS. We do participate in the decisions as to where that money is to be spent.

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir, and particularly that is some of the \$42 million of recoupment on aircraft shelters.

Mr. PATTEN. At last we found out.

Mr. DAVIS. So that there is a basic formula for the cost sharing?

Mr. LOVELAND. Of each set of slices, yes.

Mr. DAVIS. The basic formula does not necessarily change, but insofar as other factors might change, such as the gross national product of the country, for instance, if there is a substantial change in the relationship, that would then lead to a renegotiation.

Mr. LOVELAND. No, sir. This is all just hardheaded negotiations and you shut them in a room and when they come out they are supposed to have the numbers.

And it is done at a very high level, our ambassador is appointed plenipotentiary, and it gets pretty nasty.

Mr. DAVIS. All right.

Then once those figures have been agreed upon, on a hardheaded basis, that then is simply a joint idea of what the nations ought to contribute.

Have they uniformly made those contributions on the basis of that?

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir.

The only one that was ever not forthcoming was the French one which they cut off in 1966, and they have continued in some programs, those to which they were committed already in 1966, but the others they have defected on. But that is the only case on record.

#### PREFINANCING

Mr. DAVIS. I would like to have you clarify this for me a little bit: We have NATO infrastructure, then we have unilateral U.S. construction in a number of NATO countries.

Now tell us to what extent U.S. construction then might possibly be recognized by NATO if it meets the NATO requirements, as applied against the agreed-upon contribution by the United States?

Mr. LOVELAND. We do not do it that way, sir.

If we do any unilateral construction that falls within the NATO criteria, we "prefinance" the project.

Then when NATO has programed and recognized the project, we submit a fund request and we are reimbursed the funds.

Now those funds that are reimbursed go back into my line item and substitute for appropriations. So the answer to your question is yes, but not that way.

Mr. DAVIS. So that—

Mr. LOVELAND. Well, we built the shelters. NATO had not recognized shelters when we built them. Since then they have recognized them, they have programed them for everyone. We have submitted the fund request for those of ours which have been programed and we have recouped the money.

Mr. DAVIS. That might also apply in the case, we will say, of a U.S.-built military installation, we will say, in Greece, Turkey, or wherever it might be. There might be two ways of doing it.

One, we might say: We think this is important for NATO, we expect to use it, therefore we would get approval from NATO later, but go ahead and build it now in order to get the job done; is that one way it might happen?

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir.

If we had U.S. funds available and we had, for some reason or other, not been able to inform our NATO allies early enough in order to program it, then we would go ahead with the project after having notified them that we were prefinancing the project.

Mr. PATTEN. May I inject this point with my colleague?

I think this committee pushed for the air shelters—

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. PATTEN [continuing]. Over the years.

The chairman and others felt that was very vital. Is it a fair statement to say that some of the pressure initially came from this committee to provide the air shelters?

Mr. LOVELAND. I think that is a fair statement, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. Basically, reimbursement might come into play in two ways: One, with prior notification to NATO and their at least tacit agreement that because the facilities were needed that we could go ahead and spend our money and later it would become a reimbursable item.

The other might be where we have already gone ahead and established the facility which NATO would subsequently recognize as being of benefit to NATO as a whole and then might agree, even though they had not previously pre-approved it, to recognize it for purposes of reimbursement.

Mr. LOVELAND. Again, no, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. That would not happen?

Mr. LOVELAND. That will never happen. We have an agreement against the reimbursement of what we call existing facilities. Part of the reason for making the prefinancing statement is to avoid having a facility which is going to be built considered as an existing facility at the time you ask for it to be programed and paid for.

The idea here, and the United States was a supporter of that idea, was that we did not want to be paying for some facilities built by Napoleon and turned over to NATO.

## RESIDUAL VALUE OF INFRASTRUCTURE FACILITIES

Mr. DAVIS. At the beginning was there general agreement as to the disposal of NATO facilities or was it more like our situation in Morocco, and some of these other areas, which were conceived at about the same time, where once NATO walked out, they reverted to the host country?

Mr. LOVELAND. There is an agreement, it is reasonably loose; it is not as loose as the one you are talking about.

To start with, NATO owns nothing. The title to land and facilities rests within the host nation. When we walk away, we have an agreement that we will negotiate the residual value of the facility and the host nation will reimburse us. However, as I know, that is not awfully easy.

Mr. DAVIS. It has never happened to date, has it?

Mr. LOVELAND. It has happened, particularly where there was an obvious use for a facility.

In one case, the Dutch, for instance, claimed negative residual value. They wanted us to put an airfield back into corn and we told them no.

## PIPELINES

Mr. DAVIS. I am thinking particularly of that tremendous POL line that we put in in France.

Mr. LOVELAND. We are using that every day, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. We are using that?

Mr. LOVELAND. We are involved with the French in using that line. It is being used somewhat for military use and somewhat for civil use, which provides revenue which helps finance our deficit in the operation of the pipeline.

But in POL and communications, the French have continued to cooperate with NATO.

Mr. LONG. Would the gentleman yield?

Where is that pipeline?

Mr. LOVELAND. We have two NATO pipelines.

Mr. LONG. I mean the one that runs through France.

Mr. LOVELAND. Two through France. One is from Marseilles to Strasbourg; another one is from Le Havre to Valenciennes, which is just below the Belgian border.

Then we have a U.S. pipeline which goes from Donges to Metz and roughly parallels one of the NATO lines. All three are in use.

Mr. PATTEN. How big are they?

Mr. LOVELAND. They are little fellows. They are built for military use. They go from 8 inch to 12 inch.

Mr. DAVIS. Now, where does that put us with respect to the so-called alternate POL line up to the north-central Europe?

Mr. LOVELAND. Sir, the Department of Defense did not support that 14-inch pipeline from Antwerp down past Liege in the southern part of Germany. We recognized that there may be a military requirement which is not being met right now, but there is some possibility that it can be met from civilian resources, either currently existing or to be built.

Mr. DAVIS. Is that projected now, then?

Mr. LOVELAND. It is not dead, but it is awfully sick.

It has been deleted from the program. It will have to be reprogrammed if it is ever to get well again.

Mr. DAVIS. In the meantime, the French have been cooperative with respect to the use of the ones that are in place, is that right?

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, indeed.

#### SLICE XXIV PROGRAM

Mr. DAVIS. Now in this Slice XXIV listing, you have projects referred to as deferred and excluded. Now what is the significance of those two lists talking about this slice?

Mr. LOVELAND. Excluded projects are those which the NATO military does not believe they can support as a NATO minimum military requirement.

Mr. DAVIS. They were submitted by various countries, but have not been approved by NATO as such?

Mr. LOVELAND. That is right. They did not make it through the NATO military.

Mr. DAVIS. All right.

Mr. LOVELAND. Deferred projects are projects which the NATO military recognizes as requirements and has obviously in that case slipped them into that big \$3 billion requirement for the next 5 years, but do not believe that they have sufficient priority to compete for the very short funds in the current program; not very much different from our own U.S. way of handling things.

Mr. DAVIS. So we would consider those as being part of a backlog from which future projects might be selected; is that how you would describe that?

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. Then in this document which is classified, you have set forth the projects that are to be funded in Slice XXIV and they appear in a number of different host countries who are members of NATO?

Mr. LOVELAND. That is correct.

Mr. DAVIS. What is splinter protection?

Mr. LOVELAND. In the case of POL pipeline pump stations, it is an armored door. It is a rather larger than usual masonry building, thicker, and an armored door to protect your POL pumps from near misses by a bomb.

Mr. DAVIS. Off the record a minute.

[Discussion off the record.]

#### FACILITIES IN SUPPORT OF HOMEPORTING

Mr. DAVIS. What about our home porting programs, is NATO giving any recognition to that from the standpoint of financing?

Mr. LOVELAND. Generally not, in that it is principally personnel facilities. Is that not correct?

Commander QUINN. Yes. So far we have received very little from NATO to support homeporting, but we are planning to seek some additional NATO support in the near future.

Mr. LOVELAND. For piers and that kind of thing.

Commander QUINN. Operational support facilities which we have not yet put in.

Mr. DAVIS. Is that generally true, that NATO will support only operational facilities?

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. So that any personnel embellishments are strictly at the expense of the user country, is that correct?

Mr. LOVELAND. That is correct, and that is the meaning of Mr. Laird's category of "stationed forces."

#### DISPERSAL AIRFIELDS

Mr. DAVIS. You talked about satellites in a different connection, but it did bring to mind the question of satellite fields for the dispersal of planes. Are we doing anything of that kind?

Mr. LOVELAND. Satellite fields for what?

Mr. DAVIS. For the dispersal of planes.

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir, satellite fields. We have a number of what we call DOB's, dispersed operating bases. We keep these maintained at a minimum standard. We have not been able to disperse to the squadron level because the Air Force does not have that kind of maintenance money. But indeed, it is a constant preoccupation in the NATO and U.S. Air Forces.

Mr. DAVIS. But there is no program, a general overall program as such?

Mr. LOVELAND. Well, we built the bases, we have the bases. There are plans to disperse in times of tension. Therefore, I think you can say that there is a program but not a very costly or active one; simply planning.

Mr. DAVIS. That is all, Mr. Chairman; thank you.

Mr. PATTEN. Professor Long?

Mr. LONG. I have never known whether that was intended to be a compliment or not.

Mr. PATTEN. Do not be so touchy.

#### COSTS OF OVERSEAS CONSTRUCTION

Mr. LONG. The question of construction costs of these things intrigues me because our costs are going up so fast in this country. I understand that the rate of inflation in most of those other countries is moving up faster than ours.

General COOPER. That is true in Japan, also.

Mr. LONG. Right. That has been true in the last couple of years.

Mr. LOVELAND. We get less construction for the real amount of money that we have committed.

Mr. LONG. Both because of the devaluation and because of their rise in inflation.

Mr. LOVELAND. Because we have to put more money into it.

Mr. LONG. What about their absolute construction costs?

We have a lot of things in this country, like Davis-Bacon, Walsh-Healey, and plenty of other things which make our construction costs unnaturally high, particularly for the military. We see it again and again, though we cannot do much about it politically.

Do they have the same thing in those countries?

Mr. LOVELAND. Presumably you mean laws which have to be followed for environmental protection, that kind of thing?

Mr. PATTEN. More for pay benefits for labor.

England has the labor government. I can tell you they have provisions we never dreamed of.

Mr. LOVELAND. But they do not pay labor like we do.

Mr. PATTEN. That is different.

Mr. LONG. We are talking about relatively.

General COOPER. We consider in Germany the geographical cost index is 1.2, which means it costs us 20 percent more to build in Germany than it does in Washington, D.C.

Mr. PATTEN. Do they have it so that the labor unions can control how a job can be operated, or is the contractor freer? Does he have less inhibitions?

Mr. LONG. I am intrigued by your statement, that their costs are 20 percent higher than what those in Washington are.

My original question was how much more is the cost of building a military house, let's say, in Germany, than to build a domestic house in Germany? What is their inflation factor?

Mr. LOVELAND. I do not believe there is any difference. The contractor's price is the contractor's price.

General COOPER. There is no difference between building military and civilian. It is very expensive.

Mr. LONG. In the United States, costs are much higher for a military house than for a civilian house.

Mr. PATTEN. I thought you were talking about something else.

For instance, in one of the African countries, if you are running a hotel, you have to take local labor, a certain percentage, 85 percent has to be local, whether it is capable or not. Now that is the type of rule, the imposition, that stops the freedom of a builder.

I thought your question, when you mentioned Walsh-Healey and the like, that you were directing it to political rules or laws or customs which are man-made that prevent a contractor from freely doing what he otherwise would do.

Mr. LONG. Therefore, it costs much more for military construction in those countries than for their domestic civilian construction.

Mr. LOVELAND. Under NATO rules this could not be true, in that the host nation, while sovereign, has given up a certain amount of that sovereignty to fair competitive practices.

Mr. LONG. That is very interesting.

Then tell me why is it that their construction costs, in Germany, are greater than ours by 20 percent.

Mr. LOVELAND. Their inflation has been going up so much faster.

In Germany, for instance, the mark has revalued—

Mr. LONG. I realize that. Of course, not everything is much more expensive in Germany. In general, many things are cheaper there.

Mr. LOVELAND. You have not been there recently?

Mr. LONG. No; I have not. I hear the cost of living is going up rapidly. I hear it is no longer considered plush duty.

Mr. LOVELAND. That is right.

Mr. PATTEN. There is an article in one of the current magazines, Doctor, which states that the cost of living in Paris is so high now that it is one of the most expensive capitals in the world in which to live, and that a lot of our crew who found it a good thing in the last 20 years, find out now it costs more even to get dinner, to go to a res-

taurant, than it would, say, in the United States, and they are leaving Paris.

Mr. LONG. You mentioned that these countries want these projects.

Mr. LOVELAND. They want them.

Mr. LONG. Yes. Did you not say that before, that we had increased bargaining power recently because they wanted these projects now?

Mr. LOVELAND. No. What I meant to say is, our increased bargaining power came from the increased rhetoric here on burden sharing and such things.

Mr. LONG. Exactly. Since these nations knew we might withdraw our troops, that meant we are in a little better bargaining position. They want the projects; I wonder why.

Mr. LOVELAND. They want the troops.

Mr. LONG. Do they want the troops?

I have heard Germany is getting very uptight about this.

Mr. LOVELAND. Some of the people are getting uptight. As always, you find signs of "United States go home," anywhere we are; but generally, the governments want the troops. This program is considered to be one of the more cohesive programs in NATO.

Mr. PATTEN. Mr. McEwen.

Mr. McEWEN. Just one question I would like to ask anyone here to enlighten me on.

#### GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT OF NATO COUNTRIES

I take it that gross national product is a significant figure in negotiating the contributions of the NATO nations; is that correct?

Mr. LOVELAND. No, sir.

Mr. McEWEN. It is not?

Mr. LOVELAND. No, sir.

The theory is—gross national product—how many facilities will be built in the country, what are the economic advantages, how many forces does that country have to support. It is a beautiful theory; it does not work.

You go around the table and you hammer out these percentages and that is the way it has always been done. Every time we have wanted to reduce our percentage, that is the way it has happened.

Mr. McEWEN. You refer, Mr. Loveland, to GNP in here; do you not?

Mr. LOVELAND. I do not think so.

Mr. McEWEN. I know in another of our subcommittees, in Foreign Operations—Dr. Long who is also on that subcommittee has left—we were always treated to the GNP figures. We do have GNP figures for all these countries?

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir; we do.

Mr. McEWEN. The question I never asked there and I do want the answer here: Who determines those? What is the authority for those GNP estimates?

Mr. LOVELAND. Normally they come from OECD figures in Paris.

Mr. McEWEN. From who?

Mr. PATTEN. Wait a minute.

For the United States, I can answer how we get our figures for gross national product. We have our Division of Labor Statistics. We press

them to give us weekly reports on some things. We hear that in our Labor-HEW subcommittee. Industry and business do not want to wait to get some reports on a yearly basis, they do not want to wait for them even on a monthly basis.

They asked for additional money to give a better service on our production rate, on the other labor statistics. I believe you will find that our statistics are based on figures gathered and filed by industry and others around the country, periodically.

The Labor Statistics Division is what we rely upon for the figures quoted by Treasury and others.

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, but we would normally know our own much better than we knew those of our allies. But the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris does indeed gather these statistics, not only those on inflation but also those on GNP.

Mr. McEWEN. Do they prepare it on all of these countries?

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. McEWEN. That is an international organization.

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes; it is.

Mr. McEWEN. Do they set what ours is or do they take the figure that Mr. Patten refers to?

Mr. LOVELAND. Sir, I do not know. I imagine they take ours and check it as much as possible and then either confirm it or put out their own figure.

Mr. McEWEN. How would they determine GNP of any country without information furnished by that country?

They would have to have information from that particular country, would they not?

Mr. LOVELAND. Certainly, and all countries are members of the organization and have ambassadors representing them.

General KJELLSTROM. Sir, if I may, there is a great deal of information on economic activity of the various countries. In most cases, the countries are very happy to share it with others to achieve a common base for computing such things as GNP. I have been through it on a research project from time to time.

Mr. McEWEN. General, are the methods, the standards, the procedures employed in the various countries quite similar? Do you think they form a valid basis for comparison?

General KJELLSTROM. This is one of the problems. You have to examine them very carefully to insure that the bases for computation are comparable. One of the problems is that a country might change its basis for computation of the GNP from one year to another without indicating the resulting distortion.

Mr. McEWEN. I believe we have done that. Maybe Mr. Patten knows, but I have often wondered and I wondered here today, because there was some indication that this is one of the factors you consider, what the GNP of the country is.

Mr. LOVELAND. It is certainly one of the factors which we consider in what we should be contributing.

Mr. McEWEN. It is supposed to be referred to when you are negotiating how to arrive at the contributions of the various countries?

Mr. LOVELAND. Anything that wins the argument is a useful thing.

Mr. McEWEN. That is all I have.

General KJELLSTROM. Could I go off the record?

Mr. PATTEN. Yes.

[Discussion off the record.]

#### REPROGRAMING REQUEST

Mr. PATTEN. Turning to the reprograming request, we will now discuss your reprograming request.

Provide for the record the May 7, 1973, letter from Mr. Brazier, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller.

[The letter follows:]

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,  
*Washington, D.C., May 7, 1973.*

HON. ROBERT L. F. SIKES,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Construction, Committee on Appropriations,  
House of Representatives.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The February 12, 1973, devaluation of the dollar has significantly increased the fiscal year 1973 cost of the U.S. share of the NATO infrastructure program over the \$76.2 million currently available. The Department of the Army, in conjunction with Office of the Secretary of Defense, estimates that the total increased cost for fiscal year 1973 will be \$23 million. This covers the devaluation impact on unliquidated obligations as well as the impact on fiscal year 1973 program obligations incurred subsequent to the dollar devaluation and is in addition to increased program costs of \$20 million stemming from the December 18, 1971, dollar devaluation.

We have determined that the requirement for additional authorization can be substantially met utilizing the provisions of section 703, Public Law 92-545 (and similar sections of earlier Military Construction Authorization Acts). A total of \$20.65 million available authorization has been identified under this provision and the chairmen, House and Senate Armed Services Committees have been apprised.

The Department of the Army has requested approval to reprogram funds in the amount of \$20.65 million within the military construction, Army program to finance the unbudgeted requirement outlined above. The remaining dollar devaluation costs will be financed through deferral of a like amount of fiscal year 1973 projects to fiscal year 1974, over and above projects previously deferred to finance the December 18, 1971, devaluation.

Early approval by your committee of the proposed reprograming action is requested in order that funds will be available at such time as the NATO International Accounting Unit (IAU) is revaluated to reflect that February 12, 1973, dollar devaluation. This will occur immediately upon approval of the dollar devaluation by the Congress and by the International Monetary Fund. Details of the proposal, including the source of funds, are contained in the enclosure.

Representatives of my office and the Department of the Army are available to furnish additional information, if you so desire.

Sincerely,

DON R. BRAZIER,  
*Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense.*

Enclosure.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, ARMY REPROGRAMING  
REQUEST, MARCH 30, 1973

Installation : NATO infrastructure.

Project : NATO infrastructure.

Authorization : 10-percent increases in NATO infrastructure title I authority, authorized by : Section 803, Public Law 90-110, \$6 million (10 percent of \$60 million) ; section 803, Public Law 90-408, \$5,500,000 (10 percent of \$55 million) ; section 703, Public Law 91-142, \$5 million (10 percent of \$50 million) ; section 603, Public Law 91-511, \$4,150,000 (10 percent of \$41,500,000).

These increases in NATO authority will not cause the totals authorized by title I of the respective acts to be exceeded.

Estimated cost : \$20,650,000.

Description : Increased cost of U.S. share of essential facilities in established categories for the operational effectiveness of NATO forces—fiscal year 1973 and prior years.

Justification : The February 12, 1973, revaluation of currencies resulted in increased dollar requirements to cover the U.S. share of costs of multinational NATO common funded infrastructure programs for fiscal year 1973 and prior years ; \$20,650,000 is required to cover the upward adjustment of unliquidated obligations of \$150.9 million that existed at the end of January 1973 and the impact on the U.S. share of new NATO obligations planned for the balance of fiscal year 1973. The increases are computed at 11.11 percent based on the increase in the official price of gold from \$38 to \$42.22 per ounce.

Source of funds : Funds to finance this increased cost will be provided by reprogramming Safeguard appropriations as follows :

Project and appropriation	Budget estimate (revised)	Revised cost	Amount of reduction
Planning, 92-160.....	\$10,300,000	\$2,300,000	\$8,000,000
Construction, 92-204.....	44,300,000	31,650,000	12,650,000
Total.....	54,600,000	33,950,000	20,650,000

This reprogramming reduces the \$50 million reserve that was retained for the dismantling of the Malmstrom site under terms of the SALT agreement. The Budget estimates reflected above give effect to the reductions imposed on prior Safeguard appropriations by Congressional actions on the fiscal year 1973 MCA appropriation which reduced prior safeguard appropriations by \$159 million.



## EFFECT OF DOLLAR DEVALUATIONS ON INFRASTRUCTURE OBLIGATION RATE

Mr. PATTEN. What has been the effect of the two dollar devaluations on the amount the United States owes the NATO infrastructure account and our rate of obligation in this account?

Explain to us how you arrive at these.

Mr. LOVELAND. That is quite a mouthful of questions.

The two devaluations to date have cost \$42 million.

Mr. PATTEN. How does this affect your rate of obligation?

Mr. LOVELAND. The rate of obligation in the weekly meetings of the Payments in Progress Committee is not affected whatsoever by any unilateral decisions by one country.

Now anybody can put on a veto and hold things up, but it is not politically sound as a practice in a 15-nation alliance.

Mr. PATTEN. What has been the effect upon the pound?

Mr. LOVELAND. The pound, the British have had the same problem we have, so have the Greeks, so have the Italians.

Mr. PATTEN. Relatively it could be more of a burden in their country if their rate of inflation is higher?

Mr. LOVELAND. Indeed it could.

## AUTHORIZATION

Mr. PATTEN. Would you explain as clearly as possible, and also provide a statement for the record, how you propose to derive the authorization required in order to spend the funds which you are requesting to be reprogrammed?

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, sir.

As stated in Mr. Brazier's letter, we have determined that the requirement for additional authorization can be substantially met utilizing the provisions of section 703, Public Law 92-545, and similar sections of earlier Military Construction Authorization Acts.

A total of \$20.65 million available authorization has been identified under this provision and the chairmen, House and Senate Armed Services Committees, have been apprised.

That \$20.65 million will not quite do the trick for this most recent devaluation. Presumably we are going to have to eat the rest of it.

General KJELLSTROM. The source of the funding is excess funds in the Safeguard program.

Mr. LOVELAND. That is the source of the funds, but here I am talking about authorization.

Mr. PATTEN. That was authorized in a separate bill?

General KJELLSTROM. That is right.

Mr. PATTEN. The source of the authorization is unused authorization in prior year Army—

Mr. LOVELAND. That is correct, since fiscal year 1968.

## FINANCIAL STATUS, FISCAL YEARS 1968-74

Mr. PATTEN. Could you supply us a table showing the complete picture on authorization and funding for fiscal years 1967 through 1974?

Mr. LOVELAND. Could I start with 1968, please?

Mr. PATTEN. For the record.

[The information follows:]

NATO INFRASTRUCTURE—FINANCIAL STATUS

[In millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year—						
	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
<b>Authorizations:</b>							
Carryover.....		29.4	40.1	61.9	47.3	18.2	80.0
Authorized.....	60.0	55.0	50.0	41.5	15.0	58.0	80.0
Reprogramming.....						20.6	
Available authorization.....	60.0	84.4	90.1	103.4	62.3	96.8	80.0
Obligated.....	30.6	44.3	28.2	56.1	44.1	96.8	80.0
Balance.....	29.4	40.1	61.9	47.3	18.2	0	0
<b>Funds:</b>							
Carryover.....		6.9	14.6	35.8	33.4	14.2	40.0
Appropriation (NOA).....	37.5	47.0	34.0	33.5	14.0	38.0	26.0
Recoupments.....		5.0	15.4	20.2	10.9	24.0	20.6
Reprogramming.....						20.6	
Total available.....	37.5	58.9	64.0	89.5	58.3	96.8	66.0
Obligated.....	30.6	44.3	28.2	56.1	44.1	96.8	80.0
Unobligated balance.....	6.9	14.6	35.8	33.4	14.2	0	-14.0

Mr. LOVELAND. 1967 is a problem because that is MAP. We started in MCA in 1968.

Mr. PATTEN. How will you meet the remaining requirement for authorization and funding to meet the total devaluation cost to date?

Mr. LOVELAND. You mean after getting \$20.65 million here?

Mr. PATTEN. Yes.

Mr. LOVELAND. Here again, fortuitously, and maybe because we had been somewhat foresighted, we had been scrubbing our unliquidated obligations in a search for water, meaning authorizations that were higher than they needed to be to do the job that was required.

By pure luck, probably, our efforts in this field have furnished us some \$18 million or \$19 million right at the time when we needed them for the first devaluation, so again with that \$19 million and this \$20.65 million we are almost up to the \$43 million and consequently eating the rest is possible though not very comfortable.

Mr. PATTEN. How will this added cost affect fiscal year 1974 and subsequent programs?

Mr. LOVELAND. We are going to run up against the end of fiscal 1973 with no money in either authorization or appropriation. If we had authorization I would have a little money from these recoupments, my excess recoupments from 1973, but we are going to need some kind of an act to provide authorization to continue the program in fiscal year 1974 pending the passage of the eventual authorization bill.

Mr. PATTEN. Would one possibility be the continuing resolution, authorizing language in the continuing resolution?

Mr. LOVELAND. If the continuing resolution contains language which also continues Infrastructure Authorization, yes. I understand this to be highly unusual and to be maybe the first time we have asked for it.

Mr. PATTEN. I think you can see what we are driving at as we go on the floor.

Mr. LOVELAND. Yes, indeed.

## URGENCY

Mr. PATTEN. What is the urgency of this reprogramming, and what is its status with the other committees?

Mr. NEUENDORF. I will respond to that.

The urgency of the requirement is that it is required that our records reflect the true indebtedness, the true obligations, of the United States. As soon as the dollar devaluation is approved by Congress and the International Monetary Fund is notified we must by law adjust our obligations to reflect the additional cost.

Our unliquidated obligations at all times, plus or minus a few million, are approximately \$150 million. So when the devaluation is approved, we will have to increase our recorded obligations by 11.11 percent, which reflects the increase in the price of gold, from \$38 to \$42.22.

The additional requirement of \$23 million reflects the additional cost of obligations incurred subsequent to February 12, 1973, when the President first announced the devaluation.

Mr. PATTEN. Should this committee give its consent subject to the approval of reprogramming of authorization?

Mr. NEUENDORF. Yes, sir. That is the request of the Secretary of Defense. I checked just this morning as best I could as to the status of the devaluation bill in the House and with the Treasury people who have been following this. Of course, they have primary interest. Their estimate is that the bill will probably come to the floor of the House sometime next week, go to conference, be resolved, and it will be somewhere between 2 weeks and possibly 3 before it goes the full cycle, House passage, conferees, President's signature, and immediate notification by the Treasury to IMF.

Mr. PATTEN. We were talking about this yesterday so I think your answer is realistic.

Mr. LOVELAND. An illustration, please. If this bill is passed and IMF is notified that the dollar has been devalued, immediately we would have to commit \$23 million of funds. I have \$5 million or \$7 million available, in that range. Therefore, there would be a technical violation right then because if the appropriation and the reprogramming actions haven't gone through by that time I have no way of complying with the law and you might have to hold next year's hearings in Leavenworth.

Mr. PATTEN. I think you ought to try to avoid that because of the debate last Thursday. We might have some people who may make a serious point of any illegal spending in this area, although I see that the leader in the Senate has agreed to postpone any action until at least June 1, until after Decoration Day.

Mr. NEUENDORF. I could add, sir, within the Department of Defense, so there wouldn't be any time lost in paperwork, the Secretary of Defense has requested OMB to apportion the money and OMB had apportioned the reprogrammed money to the Department of Defense subject to approval by the House and Senate Appropriations Committee, so we can't touch it but we don't have a 10-day delay after the Congress passes it. We can make the money immediately available for obligation.

Mr. PATTEN. Mr. Davis.

## STATUS OF APPROVAL BY OTHER COMMITTEES

Mr. DAVIS. This reprogramming has to be approved by the Armed Services Committee of both Houses, does it not?

General KJELLSTROM. Notification only, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. I didn't think the chairman got an answer to his question as to what the status of the matter is in the Armed Services Committees.

General KJELLSTROM. The hearings in the Senate which will be joint MILCON appropriation and authorization hearings won't be held for at least another month according to the best information we have from the staff.

Mr. DAVIS. What about the House Armed Services Committee?

General KJELLSTROM. Did you appear before them yet?

Mr. NEUENDORF. The House Armed Services Committee as well as the Senate Armed Services Committee received a letter from the Secretary of Defense—

General KJELLSTROM. When are they going to hold this hearing?

Mr. NEUENDORF. In terms of the hearing, sir, it is not necessary, in that the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee has acknowledged receipt without protesting the action. The Armed Services Committee needs to be apprised. If they don't protest then we may proceed.

In the case of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Symington responded and asked for additional information which we have just provided. If that is acceptable to him, then the authorization would be available to us, but not the appropriation, so we couldn't spend a penny until we got both the reprogramming approved dollarwise as well as the silent blessing on the authorization.

Mr. DAVIS. And your best information is it will be another month before the Senate Appropriations Committee is going to take this up?

General KJELLSTROM. That is my information, yes, sir.

## SAFEGUARD FUNDS

Mr. DAVIS. One further question.

This money is coming out of Safeguard and, as I understand it, it is actually coming out of the money which had been set aside for the purpose of dismantling up at Malmstrom.

General KJELLSTROM. That is correct, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. I assume that the \$50 million referred to is the best estimate available of what it is going to cost us to do that, is that correct?

General KJELLSTROM. No, sir. You recall General Leber was here a few days ago and he testified that this \$50 million was retained as reserve but the \$20.6 million being reprogrammed would not have an adverse impact, in his estimation, when a final determination is made of the funds required for dismantling.

General COOPER. That is because some of those funds are specifically to knock out the reinforced concrete which everybody agrees would be a waste of money, so as long as he is not required to do that, which he thinks he shouldn't do, he is perfectly willing to give these up.

Mr. PATTEN. I don't want to inconvenience anybody but while we are in closed session I would like to cleanup these little items.

General COOPER. Can we excuse the NATO witnesses?

Mr. PATTEN. They can be excused.

I want to compliment you. I think you have done a good job.  
Mr. LOVELAND. Thank you.

### ARMY CLASSIFIED ITEMS

Mr. PATTEN. We will now take up the Army classified items.

Please insert the justification material in the record at this point.

[The justification material for the following projects was classified and has been retained in the committee files:]

[Dollar amounts in thousands]

Installation project	Priority	Cost
Fort Sherman, C.Z.: Upgrade airfield.....	1	\$275
Korea:		
ALOC Airfield (vicinity of Andong).....	1	675
POL mooring system, Pohang.....	1	893
Classified project.....	1	3,000

### FORT SHERMAN—AIRFIELD UPGRADE

Mr. PATTEN. What is the requirement for an airfield at Fort Sherman?

General COOPER. The requirement for the airfield at Fort Sherman is to have a field on the Atlantic side of the Canal Zone where \_\_\_\_\_. Otherwise, the only airfields that we have are those on the Pacific side, leaving a long highway of about 50 miles that would have to be traversed to reach the Atlantic side.

There is an existing field at Fort Sherman, but we need to upgrade it \_\_\_\_\_ in C-130 aircraft.

Mr. PATTEN. Will the project you are requesting complete the requirements?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

### ALOC AIRFIELDS—KOREA

Mr. PATTEN. Discuss the Army's ALOC airfield program in Korea and provide for the record the previous projects and the methods of funding them.

General COOPER. This project we are asking for is in the vicinity of Andong. This is the last in a series of these ALOC airfields. All are required in connection with being able to bring in supplies by air.

Mr. PATTEN. How are you going to fund them?

General COOPER. If you want all of the details for the record we have those details and can provide them for the record.

[The information follows:]

The construction of an ALOC field near Uijonbu was approved and funded in the fiscal year 1968's MCA program.

ALOC projects at the following locations were approved and funded as part of the fiscal year 1970 MCA program:

Chungchon  
Chinhae  
Hoengsong  
Pyongtaek  
Susaek  
Yong-Gu  
Pochon

The following three ALOC projects were funded by reprogramming funds originally approved in Public Law 91-170 for construction of POL facilities in Germany. The action was approved by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense on March 27, 1973, after notification of the appropriate Senate and House committees:

Kangnung  
Sokcho-Ri  
Chechon

Mr. PATTEN. And the methods of funding them.

General COOPER. Yes, sir. We funded two in fiscal year 1968, and quite a few in 1970. We also reprogrammed fiscal year 1970 funds for three of them. There is only the one in the fiscal year 1974 program.

Mr. PATTEN. Would this item ———?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

POL MOORING—POHANG, KOREA

Mr. PATTEN. What capacity will the POL mooring system at Pohang provide, and how large tankers will this accommodate?

General COOPER. This will provide a tanker unloading facility which can take a T-5 tanker. Actually the depth where they will build this facility will have a draft of 60 or 70 feet and could take much bigger tankers but the 250,000-barrel tanker T-5 ———.

Mr. PATTEN. Are you building it of sufficient size in view of the trend toward ever-larger tankers?

General COOPER. Yes, sir. That is what I answered. The T-5 tanker is a 40,000-ton deadweight-ton ship and with the 60 or 70 feet draft we could probably moor upwards of 150,000-deadweight-ton tankers.

CLASSIFIED PROJECT

Mr. PATTEN. Are the uses of the \$3 million you are requesting audited to insure that they represent valid military requirements?

General COOPER. Is this in the last classified project?

We can set up a separate briefing on this particular project, sir.

General KJELLSTROM. Yes, these funds are audited. We understand arrangements have been made for an up-date audit.

Mr. PATTEN. Any further questions?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes.

On that Andong airfield, as I take it, what we are talking about really is a runway. There is no base or field in the usual connotation?

General COOPER. That is right. It is a 4,000-foot runway for the C-130 to operate on.

Mr. DAVIS. We have to discuss at a separate time then the classified project.

General KJELLSTROM. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. PATTEN. We stand adjourned.

MONDAY, MAY 21, 1973.

Mr. LONG. The committee will come to order.

FIFTH ARMY—continued

FORT POLK, LA.

Turn to Fort Polk, La.

Insert page 103 in the record.

[The page follows:]

1. DATE 9 July 1973		2. DEPARTMENT ARMY		3. INSTALLATION Fort Polk							
4. COMMAND OR MANAGEMENT BUREAU Fifth United States Army			5. INSTALLATION CONTROL NUMBER Louisiana 725		6. STATE/COUNTRY Louisiana						
7. STATUS Active			8. YEAR OF INITIAL OCCUPANCY 1941		9. COUNTY (U.S.) Vernon Sabine & Natchitoches						
10. NEAREST CITY Leesville, 7 miles North											
11. MISSION OR MAJOR FUNCTIONS Provide administrative and logistical support for a US Army Training Center, (Infantry), USA Reception Station, USA Hospital, USA Dental Detachment, USA Garrison and subordinate elements.			12. PERSONNEL STRENGTH		13. INVENTORY						
			PERMANENT		STUDENTS		SUPPORTED		TOTAL		
			OFFICER (1)	ENLISTED (2)	CIVILIAN (3)	OFFICER (4)	ENLISTED (5)	OFFICER (6)	ENLISTED (7)	CIVILIAN (8)	(9)
a. AS OF <u>31 DEC 1972</u>			949	22,043	2,256	0	15,838	0	2	0	25,248
b. PLANNED (End FY 75)			835	4,943	2,327						23,945
			LAND		ACRES (1)		LAND COST (\$000) (2)		IMPROVEMENT (\$000) (3)		TOTAL (\$000) (4)
			a. OWNED		196,998		611		76,202		76,813
			b. LEASES AND EASEMENTS		2,034		0		0		0
			c. INVENTORY TOTAL (Except land rent) AS OF 30 JUNE 19 <u>72</u>								76,813
			d. AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY (Exclusive of family housing - \$6,252)								8,349
			e. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM (Exclusive of family housing - \$14,486)								29,276
			f. ESTIMATED AUTHORIZATION - NEXT 4 YEARS (Exclusive of family housing - \$29,000)								129,343
			g. GRAND TOTAL (c + d + e + f)								243,781
* Includes trainees, transients and students.											
SUMMARY OF INSTALLATION PROJECTS											
PROJECT DESIGNATION											
CATEGORY CODE NO.	PROJECT TITLE	Page No	TENANT COMMAND	UNIT OF MEASURE	AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM			FUNDING PROGRAM			
					SCOPE	ESTIMATED COST (\$000)	SCOPE	ESTIMATED COST (\$000)			
		<b>PRIORITY</b>									
721	105 - EM/EW Barracks Complex	1	104	MN	2,550	26,016	2,550	26,016			
740	94 - EM Service Club	1	106	SF	27,800	1,283	27,800	1,283			
740	110 - Commissary	19	107	SF	51,000	1,977	51,000	1,977			
	Total					29,276		29,276			

## FORT POLK, LA., \$29,276,000

Fort Polk is located 7 miles south of Leesville, La. The mission of this installation is to operate an infantry training center consisting of five training brigades and supporting units, operate a reception station, and provide administrative and logistical support for all units assigned to the installation. The program provides a barracks complex for enlisted men and women, a service club, and a commissary.

<i>Status of funds</i>	<i>Dollars in thousands</i>
Funded program not in inventory.....	8,349
Unobligated projects, Mar. 31, 1973 (actual).....	180
Unobligated projects, June 30, 1973 (estimated).....	0

## DESIGN INFORMATION

Project	Design cost (thousands)	Percent complete Apr. 30, 1973
EM EW barracks complex.....	1,400	25
EM service club.....	72	10
Commissary.....	87	5

*Enlisted barracks summary, Fort Polk, La.*

	<i>Men/Women</i> <sup>1</sup>
Total requirement.....	22,525
Existing substandard.....	28,652
Existing adequate.....	0
Funded, not in inventory.....	750
Adequate assets.....	750
Deficiency.....	21,775
Fiscal year 1974 program.....	2,550
Barracks spaces occupied, May 15, 1973.....	15,004

<sup>1</sup> 90 square feet per man—permanent party personnel; 72 square feet per man—trainees.

## SUITABILITY FOR BASIC TRAINING

Mr. LONG. What advantages and disadvantages does Fort Polk have as a training installation?

General COOPER. Fort Polk, as a training installation, has lots of space as its greatest advantage. It is something like close to 200,000 acres. Environmentally it is excellent. Its biggest disadvantages are that it doesn't have much in the way of permanent facilities and, because it is relatively isolated, it doesn't have much in the way of housing and community support.

It is very good in terms of the weather. There are more training days available at Polk than at most places.

In summary, it is a good place to train, but it doesn't have many permanent facilities either for the trainees or for the permanent party.

Mr. LONG. I am a little bit at a loss as to why, being in Louisiana, it has been shortchanged in the way of facilities over the years.

General COOPER. There are many earlier attempts to close Fort Polk which were unsuccessful.

Mr. LONG. I can believe they were unsuccessful.

## LONG-RANGE PROGRAM

Provide for the record the long-range construction program by category, and indicate what the deficit will be at the end of this period.

[The information follows:]

*Fort Polk, La.—Long-range program (fiscal year 1975-78)*

Facility class :	<i>Dollars in thousands</i>
Operational -----	4, 859
Training -----	
Maintenance and production -----	
R.D.T. & E. -----	
Supply -----	
Hospital and medical -----	30, 795
Administrative -----	
Troop housing -----	93, 381
Community support -----	
Utilities -----	308
<b>Total -----</b>	<b>129, 343</b>

The remaining facility deficit (in dollars) beyond fiscal year 1978 tentatively forecasted by Fort Polk is approximately \$12,400,000.

BARRACKS COMPLEX

Mr. LONG. Who will utilize the barracks complex you are requesting ?

General COOPER. The barracks complex we are requesting in fiscal year 1974 is for the permanent party.

Mr. LONG. Is there any significant off-post support ?

General COOPER. You mean in family housing ? There is very little off-post support because of the past indefinite status of Fort Polk. Although many local people were understandably reluctant to spend money in building houses or other accommodations, some did take a chance and have been extremely helpful to the troops at Fort Polk.

Mr. LONG. How far is it from New Orleans ?

General COOPER. I don't know exactly.

Mr. LONG. One hundred miles ? A long way off ?

General COOPER. It is a long way off, yes, sir—approximately 200 miles.

COMMISSARY

Mr. LONG. Provide the details on the commissary workload, past and projected, for the record.

[The information follows:]

Following are the annual commissary store sales, past and projected, for Fort Polk for fiscal years 1970 through 1976. The figures for fiscal years 1970 through 1972 are actual sales. Fiscal year 1973 includes actual sales for the first ten months and projected sales for the last 2 months. Fiscal Years 1974 through 1976 are projected based on past experience and anticipated increased patronage of the store when additional on-post housing is available.

Fiscal year :	<i>Annual sales</i>
1970 -----	\$4, 054, 177
1971 -----	4, 402, 800
1972 -----	5, 021, 963
1973 -----	5, 600, 000
1974 -----	6, 100, 000
1975 -----	6, 600, 000
1976 -----	7, 100, 000

Mr. LONG. What type of facilities are you using now ?

General COOPER. Now we are using temporary facilities, sir.

## ACREAGE UNDER ARMY CONTROL

Mr. LONG. When you spoke a few minutes ago about 200,000 acres, I was staggered by that amount of real estate at one of these bases. We have that much at base after base.

Do you have a statement—I suppose there is one and it has been offered many times—of the total amount of acreage that your Army bases occupy?

General COOPER. Yes, sir, we have the total.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Sir, worldwide we have about 12 million acres of land under Army control.

Mr. LONG. How much of that is in the United States?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. It would be over 10 million, I would say, in the United States.

Mr. LONG. Thank you.

Do you have any questions?

## COMMISSARY

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, on Fort Polk. I hope we are not getting carried away in these commissary projects here. I notice that you are contemplating 51,000 square feet to replace under 30,000. Is there adequate basis for expanding the facilities to that extent?

I am wondering if we aren't getting a little ambitious in this as well as some of the other commissaries that we have talked about.

General COOPER. No, sir. Based on the strength at Fort Polk, and we definitely plan to continue the existence of Fort Polk, 51,000 square feet is what is called for.

The existing facilities are less than that but they are also very crowded. We are also looking forward to the fact that there will be more family housing, and many of the officers and enlisted men who now are involuntarily separated from their families will be moving in there as part of the family housing program and the expected community buildup.

We have 500 family houses in the 1974 program. We have over 1,000 in the out years.

Mr. DAVIS. Is this in a rather isolated location?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you.

## AUTOMATED FOOD MARKET

Mr. McKAY. In conjunction with commissaries, at least a year ago as I recall, there were some proposals—I don't know whether we talked about them with the Army or not, but we did with the Air Force—concerning automated commissaries to protect from theft, reduce cost, and improve space utilization.

Has there or is there any of that going on in Army commissaries? Where you have certain sample areas, you take computer cards for the items you want, and the order is delivered to a loading point, that type of thing?

There have been some?

General KJELLSTROM. You are talking about the automated super-market-type operation?

Mr. MCKAY. Yes.

General KJELLSTROM. Sir, I would suggest that the services as a whole will hold back until industry develops a system that is workable. They still haven't developed an automated supermarket that really fits the bill from a commercial standpoint. I personally, from my staff standpoint, would resist a recommendation for the Army to take the lead in automating a supermarket, a commercial-type facility.

We take advantage of new developments in industry and in the merchandizing area in both the exchange service and the commissaries, but to take the lead in an automated supermarket-type facility would not be appropriate.

Mr. MCKAY. This was put forth as an idea because there was an awful lot of loss. There was theft and there were other problems which they felt they could reduce or cope with. The cost would be offset by the space saved and a number of other things.

I just wondered if you had been considering it in any way.

General KJELLSTROM. I know the Army is not seriously considering this as a technique.

General COOPER. We have done some automation in terms of warehousing which will also tend to reduce theft because we will have fewer people working there. I think that is not nearly as automated as what you are talking about.

Mr. MCKAY. You would have samples on the floor for people to examine but then they would just pick up a computer card and take it to the cashier's desk. At that point their order would be filled and assembled to be picked up at the door or out back. They wouldn't pick up anything inside, so there would be nothing they could walk out with, for instance.

I have no further questions.

Mr. LONG. You sound like a real expert.

Mr. MCKAY. It sounded pretty good to me. I don't know whether it is practical. They had some examples; I think one had been operated in Canada. They were looking into it.

Mr. LONG. Mr. Davis.

#### COMMISSARY SURCHARGE

Mr. DAVIS. How far off the beam would the suggestion be that you increase the small markup you have on the products at the commissary so as to help support the cost of commissary development?

General COOPER. We do build some commissaries using surcharge funds, but the basic policy on surcharge is set by DOD and pertains to all of the services.

Were we to add to the surcharge so we could, in essence, build all the commissaries out of surcharge funds, we would be taking away part of the soldier's income. We really ought to consider this as part of his overall pay rather than as a separate issue just on the commissaries.

Mr. DAVIS. Perhaps that is a little academic with respect to an isolated post such as this, but I can't help but question, in the Washington metropolitan area, for instance, the small markup that is a uniform thing servicewide and permits charges that are not at all competitive with the price that everyone else must pay for these goods.

I know this probably is a decision that will be made at a level higher than yours, but the thought just occurs to me that a little more substantial charge would help to cover the cost of these new facilities.

However, apparently no nonappropriated funds are used for commissary construction.

General KPPELLSTROM. Sir, if I may provide a review of the surcharge. Within the United States we add 3 percent to the cost of the food as a surcharge and 2.5 percent outside of the United States. This surcharge is for maintenance of operating equipment and supplies, utilities, shrinkage, spoilage, and pilferage for the commissary operations. All of the surcharge money collected in fiscal year 1972 and fiscal year 1973, except for a very small portion, goes for these operating costs.

The pay of personnel for the operations of the commissary, some \$72 million in fiscal year 1972, comes from appropriated funds. This is permitted by law and also based on an agreement with the Congress that this is a fringe benefit available to the military and their dependents.

In fiscal year 1972 we used \$1.6 million of the surcharge money for improvement of store buildings. If we were to change the policy and require the commissary surcharge to pay the cost of the construction of new commissaries, there would have to be another look taken at the pay side of the equation relating to military compensation, because in determining compensation the fringe benefits are a part of the equation. I agree with you, and we have taken a look at this. We should speed up our commissary construction program. We have many, many stores that are totally inadequate and we are not requesting very many in the military construction program each year because congressional and local community interest makes this a sensitive area. The locations of these commissaries are very carefully evaluated within the Department of the Army prior to requesting approval from Defense and the Congress.

Mr. DAVIS. Retired personnel in the United States are permitted full commissary privileges, are they not, no matter where they may be?

General KJELLSTROM. That is correct.

Mr. DAVIS. That is all.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

#### CONSTRUCTION FOR RETIRED PERSONNEL

Mr. LONG. What bothers me a little about this is that which bothers me about the hospital at West Point. Knowing, of course, that you can't build a new facility for retired people, the basis for it in terms of the number of people there who use it legitimately and for whom you can build a new facility is inflated in order to justify building space to meet the retired workload.

I would like to be reassured on this. To what extent—and I am going to be asking these questions about every single unit you come up with from now on—does the justification for commissaries—and service clubs, too—stand on its own and to what extent is the justification being stretched in order to expand the facility for retired people for whom you can't build under the law?

General KJELLSTROM. If I may, sir, we will provide the details on the Fort Polk commissary and service club for the record, but I believe the retired population in the vicinity of Fort Polk is rather minimum.

It is not necessarily the most ideal retirement community.

Mr. LONG. I can understand that. Perhaps you can tell us what it is because I am going to be asking these questions now on all these things.

General KJELLSTROM. We will provide it for the record, sir.

[The information follows:]

The justification for new commissary construction is based primarily on active duty military personnel who will use it. However, inasmuch as retired military personnel are authorized commissary privileges, they will use the facility and this factor must be considered in determining the size of a new facility. Based on a survey made at Fort Polk, there are approximately 1,797 retired families in the vicinity of Fort Polk who use the commissary.

#### TRAINING CENTER CRITERIA

Mr. LONG. I also looked at one of our briefing notes here with the statement that Fort Polk has not had any cuts or base realignments affecting it. Right?

General COOPER. That is correct.

There have been some general cuts as part of the drawing down of the whole basic training load so we reduced the number of basic training companies at Fort Polk. It was not part of the realignment or reorganization.

Mr. LONG. In a year in which we are supposed to have base closings to save money—base closings and base realignments—when the whole country is hungering for some reduction in military expenditures as a result of the supposed termination of the war in Vietnam, why do you keep coming forth with new construction requirements, and why are base realignments not made in such a way as to minimize new construction requirements?

General COOPER. The availability of permanent construction or the lack of permanent construction is one of the criteria which we use in coming up with the final decision. It is not always the overriding criterion, and we considered that in the case of Polk. It is a serious disadvantage at Polk.

On the other hand, Polk has almost 200,000 acres of land so it is not only a very good training center but, if in pulling divisions back from overseas we have to establish a division area, it has very great advantages in available land. The deficit in terms of permanent facilities is offset by its ideal location as a training area, including the amount of land that is available.

Mr. LONG. Well, I understand that any base is ideal until such day as you suddenly decide that it is not, whereupon the next location will be ideal. I do think we are entitled to something that we can get our teeth into, rather than just a general statement that we have to have this, and this a necessary place, and, therefore, we couldn't make our cuts here.

You understand what I am talking about.

General COOPER. Yes, sir, and we have provided a comparison of the training centers for the record already, including the advantages and disadvantages, and the criteria that we went through. However, it ultimately ends up as a question of judgment after all these things are added up.

Mr. LONG. I think we are entitled to the information on which the judgment is based. I hope you will give that.

[See page 221.]

Mr. Patten?

Mr. PATTEN. No questions.

FORT RILEY, KANS.

Mr. LONG. Fort Riley, Kans.  
Insert in the record page 108.  
[The page follows:]

1. DATE July 1973		2. DEPARTMENT ARMY		3. INSTALLATION Fort Riley									
4. COMMAND OR MANAGEMENT BUREAU Fifth United States Army			5. INSTALLATION CONTROL NUMBER Kansas 605		6. STATE/COUNTRY Kansas								
7. STATUS Active		8. YEAR OF INITIAL OCCUPANCY 1855		9. COUNTY (U.S.) Riley & Geary	10. NEAREST CITY Junction City, 4 miles Southwest								
11. MISSION OR MAJOR FUNCTIONS Training and logistical support of an Infantry Division and non-divisional support units, Reserve Component Summer Training and Correctional Training Facilities.				12. PERSONNEL STRENGTH		PERMANENT		STUDENTS		SUPPORTED		TOTAL	
				OFFICER (1)	ENLISTED (2)	CIVILIAN (3)	OFFICER (4)	ENLISTED (5)	OFFICER (6)	ENLISTED (7)	CIVILIAN (8)		
				a. AS OF <u>31 Dec 72</u>	1,919	15,817	2,389	0	0	13	32	0	20,125
				b. PLANNED (End FY75)	1,723	16,803	2,331	0	0	13	32	0	20,902
13. INVENTORY													
LAND		ACRES (1)		LAND COST (\$000) (2)		IMPROVEMENT (\$000) (3)		TOTAL (\$000) (4)					
a. OWNED		101,056		11,425		140,473		151,898					
b. LEASES AND EASEMENTS		13		0		0		0					
c. INVENTORY TOTAL (Except land rent) AS OF 30 JUNE 19 <u>72</u>								151,898					
d. AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY						(Exclusive of family housing = \$ 2,842)		15,105					
e. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM						(Exclusive of family housing - \$26,759)		34,918					
f. ESTIMATED AUTHORIZATION - NEXT 4 YEARS						(Exclusive of family housing - \$52,550)		65,149					
g. GRAND TOTAL (c + d + e + f)								267,070					
SUMMARY OF INSTALLATION PROJECTS													
PROJECT DESIGNATION													
CATEGORY CODE NO.	PROJECT TITLE				Page No	TENANT COMMAND	UNIT OF MEASURE	AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM		FUNDING PROGRAM			
					Priority			SCOPE	ESTIMATED COST (\$000)	SCOPE	ESTIMATED COST (\$000)		
721	229 - EM Barracks Complex				1	109	MN	1,650	22,547	1,650	22,547		
721	231 - Barracks Modernization				1	111	MN	2,351	8,396	2,351	8,396		
723	228 - Support Facilities for EM Barracks Complexes				52	112			2,635		2,635		
750	224 - Outdoor Athletic Facilities, Custer Hill				54	114			1,340		1,340		
	Total								34,918		34,918		

## FORT RILEY, KANS., \$34,918,000

Fort Riley is located 4 miles northeast of Junction City, Kans. The mission of the installation is to command, train, and support an infantry division and other combat and combat support units and to support Reserve components summer training. The program provides a barracks complex, barracks modernization, support facilities for a barracks complex, and an outdoor athletic facility at Custer Hill.

*Status of funds*

Funded program not in inventory-----	\$15,105,000
Unobligated projects, Mar. 31, 1973 (actual)-----	5,835,000
Unobligated projects, June 30, 1973 (estimated)-----	205,000

## DESIGN INFORMATION

Project	Design cost (thousands)	Percent complete Apr. 30, 1973
EM barracks complex-----	700	25
Barracks modernization-----	400	20
Support facilities barracks complex-----	100	0
Outdoor athletic facility Custer Hill-----	60	0

*Enlisted barracks summary, Fort Riley, Kans.*

	Men <sup>1</sup>
Total requirement-----	9,571
Existing substandard-----	<sup>2</sup> 18,365
Existing adequate-----	<sup>3</sup> 1
Funded, not in inventory-----	1,728
Adequate assets-----	1,729
Deficiency-----	7,842
Fiscal year 1974 program-----	4,001
Barracks spaces occupied, Mar. 15, 1973-----	10,243

<sup>1</sup> 90 square feet per man—permanent party personnel; 72 square feet per man—trainees.

<sup>2</sup> Includes 5,206 spaces that can be made adequate.

<sup>3</sup> Private housing.

## TROOP STRENGTH

Mr. LONG. Are the long-range personnel strengths shown here and the barracks requirements indicated in the justification sheets based upon a force level of two-thirds of a division at Fort Riley?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. That would be how many men? That would be 10,000?

General COOPER. By the time you add the supporting troops—

Mr. LONG. How many troops are in a division?

General COOPER. A division is about 15,000 to 17,000.

Mr. LONG. So that would be 10,000 or more?

General COOPER. The division troops themselves, plus you have part of what they call the support troops—combat battalions—that are not organizational to the division.

Did anyone ever describe to you the division slice concept? For each division we have what is called an ISI, the initial support increment. And then we have what is called the sustaining support increment (SSI). These three (division, ISI and SSI) are roughly equal in size. Normally in peacetime we keep the sustaining support increment in the reserves which we can call up when there is a national emergency.

Mr. LONG. When you have two-thirds of a division, which is 10,000, what does that mean?

General COOPER. In our planning we will have close to 20,000 overall troop strength at Fort Riley.

Mr. LONG. In other words, 10,000 plus 10,000 support; right.

General COOPER. That is about right.

General KJELLSTROM. But not necessarily at each installation, sir. Part of the additional personnel you see at Fort Riley includes the correctional training facility population and nondivisional units. I don't have the detailed troop list for Fort Riley here but we can provide it for the record, sir.

[The information follows:]

FORT RILEY, KAN.—TROOP LIST

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Mechanized Division  
 1st Military Police Company  
 1st Aviation Company  
 121st Signal Battalion (minus one detachment)  
 1st Engineer Battalion (minus one company)  
 Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade, 1st Mechanized Division  
 Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Brigade, 1st Mechanized Division  
 4th Armored Cavalry Squadron (minus one troop)  
 Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 1st Division Artillery  
 1/7 Artillery Battalion  
 1/5 Artillery Battalion  
 3/6 Artillery Battalion  
 Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Division Support Command  
 1st Administrative Company  
 1st Finance Company  
 1st Medical Battalion (minus one company)  
 1st Supply and Transportation Battalion  
 701st Maintenance Battalion (minus one company)  
 1/63 Tank Battalion  
 4/63 Tank Battalion  
 2/63 Tank Battalion  
 1/18 Infantry Battalion (mechanized)  
 2/16 Infantry Battalion (mechanized)  
 1/2 Infantry Battalion (mechanized)  
 1/28 Infantry Battalion (mechanized)  
 335th Assault Helicopter Company  
 337th Support Company  
 Headquarters and Headquarters Company 541st Supply-Service Battalion  
 1st Light Maintenance Company (direct support)  
 556 Maintenance Support Company  
 Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 138th Engineer Group  
 34th Engineer Battalion (construction)  
 55th Engineer Company (panel bridge)  
 82d Engineer Detachment (water purification)  
 67th Disbursing Section  
 16th Combat Support Hospital  
 82d Helicopter Ambulance Detachment  
 1st Division Military Intelligence Company  
 Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 716th Military Police Battalion  
 978th Military Police Company  
 977th Military Police Company  
 890th Military Police Company  
 49th Ammunition Company  
 74th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment  
 172d Rocket and Missile Support Detachment  
 24th Medium Truck Company  
 207th Military Police Company  
 U.S. Army Medical Activity  
 Headquarters Garrison  
 U.S. Army Retraining Brigade  
 5th Army Marksmanship Unit

General COOPER. The 20,000 strength in this case includes the hospital as well as the correctional facility, but basically the ISI is normally about the same size as a division.

Mr. LONG. Well, you just added something to my knowledge. Is it likely that the other third of this division would return to here if it were returned from Europe?

General COOPER. Would return to Fort Riley if it were returned from Europe?

Mr. LONG. Yes.

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. And that would be in the same proportion? It would be 15,000 plus another 5,000 support?

General COOPER. A third of a division would mean 5,000 troops plus another 5,000 support.

General KJELLSTROM. Not necessarily, sir. We might take part of the current nondivisional force structure that is at Riley and place it at some other installation.

#### BARRACKS SUPPORT FACILITIES

Mr. LONG. Discuss the requirement for support facilities for the enlisted men's barracks complexes and indicate on a map where these would be located.

Mr. CARTON. The support facilities are located in the Custer Hill area. These are small buildings, primarily administrative and supply facilities, that were not constructed with the main barracks complexes. They are located in the area shown here.

The buildings in black, which are barracks, are existing buildings. This project provides supporting administrative and supply buildings.

Mr. PATTEN. May I ask a question?

Mr. LONG. Yes.

Mr. PATTEN. Do you have the encroachment problem at Riley?

General COOPER. No, sir.

#### FORT SHERIDAN, ILL.

Mr. LONG. Fort Sheridan, Ill.

Insert page 115 in the record.

[The page follows:]

1. DATE 9 July 1973	2. DEPARTMENT ARMY	3. INSTALLATION Port Sheridan								
4. COMMAND OR MANAGEMENT BUREAU Fifth United States Army		5. INSTALLATION CONTROL NUMBER Illinois 805	6. STATE/COUNTRY Illinois							
7. STATUS Active	8. YEAR OF INITIAL OCCUPANCY . 1887	9. COUNTY (U.S.) Lake	10. NEAREST CITY Highland Park							
11. MISSION OR MAJOR FUNCTIONS Provide logistical support for ARADCOM activities, USAR Centers, US Army Support Detachment Selfridge Air Force Base, and family housing. Provide military police services in five states. Provide finance, accounting, medical, dental and personnel service to assigned on and off-post activities. Provide educational development programs for military personnel in the area. Provide support for the proposed veterinary school facility.										
12. PERSONNEL STRENGTH		PERMANENT		STUDENTS		SUPPORTED		TOTAL		
		OFFICER (1)	ENLISTED (2)	CIVILIAN (3)	OFFICER (4)	ENLISTED (5)	OFFICER (6)	ENLISTED (7)	CIVILIAN (8)	TOTAL (9)
a. AS OF 31 Dec 72		146	597	1,143	20	90	128	720	1,365	4,209
b. PLANNED (End FY 75)		417	1,059	1,635	60	200	26	62	48	3,507
13. INVENTORY										
LAND		ACRES (1)		LAND COST (\$000) (2)		IMPROVEMENT (\$000) (3)		TOTAL (\$000) (4)		
a. OWNED		730		286		27,482		27,768		
b. LEASES AND EASEMENTS		0		0		0		0		
c. INVENTORY TOTAL (Except land rent) AS OF 30 JUNE 19 72								27,768		
d. AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY								2,784		
e. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM								762		
f. ESTIMATED AUTHORIZATION - NEXT 4 YEARS								5,584		
g. GRAND TOTAL (c + d + e + f)								36,898		
SUMMARY OF INSTALLATION PROJECTS										
PROJECT DESIGNATION										
CATEGORY CODE NO.	PROJECT TITLE	PRIORITY	Page No	TENANT COMMAND	UNIT OF MEASURE	AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM		FUNDING PROGRAM		
a	b	c	d	e	f	SCOPE	ESTIMATED COST (\$000)	SCOPE	ESTIMATED COST (\$000)	
171	125 - Veterinary School Facility	5	116		SF	30,129	762	30,129	762	

## FORT SHERIDAN, ILL., \$762,000

Fort Sheridan is located at Highland Park, Ill. The mission of the installation is to support ARADCOM activities, USAR centers, U.S. Army Support Detachment, Selfridge Air Force Base, and the U.S. Army Veterinary School. This program provides academic facilities for the U.S. Army Veterinary School at Fort Sheridan.

*Status of funds*

Funded program not in inventory-----	\$2, 784, 000
Unobligated projects, March 31, 1973 (actual)-----	2, 784, 000
Unobligated projects, June 30, 1973 (estimated)-----	2, 784, 000

## DESIGN INFORMATION

Project	Design cost (thousands)	Percent complete Apr. 30, 1973
Veterinary school facility-----	50	75

*Enlisted barracks summary, Fort Sill, Okla.*

Total requirement-----	Men <sup>1</sup> 13, 685
Existing substandard-----	<sup>2</sup> 12, 850
Existing adequate-----	<sup>3</sup> 345
Funded, not in inventory-----	3, 357
Adequate assets-----	3, 702
Deficiency-----	9, 983
Fiscal year 1974 program-----	2, 814
Barracks spaces occupied, Mar. 15, 1973-----	8, 469

<sup>1</sup> 90 square feet per man—permanent party personnel; 72 square feet per man—trainees.

<sup>2</sup> Includes 5,070 spaces that can be made adequate.

<sup>3</sup> Includes 17 in private housing.

## ARMY VETERINARIANS

Mr. LONG. What other Department of Defense installations has the Army surveyed as possible sites for your veterinary school?

General COOPER. We looked at the possibility of moving it to Fort Sam Houston to collocate it with the Health Services Command. We also looked at the possibility of moving back into the facility that they did have in downtown Chicago.

Those were the two primary ones.

Mr. MCKAY. Is this a veterinary school, did you say?

Mr. LONG. Yes.

Mr. MCKAY. Is it dogs nowadays, or do you still have mules?

General COOPER. We don't have any mules. We do have dogs, but the most important mission at the veterinary school is training veterinarians to inspect food, not only for the Army but, I believe, also for other services.

Mr. LONG. For human consumption?

General COOPER. Yes, sir. We have veterinarians, including enlisted men, at all of the plants that provide food in any significant quantity to the Army and to the other armed services.

Mr. TALCOTT. Do they have veterinarian training or do they have dietetic training?

General COOPER. No; this training is for veterinarians. These are people who will insure that the food is clean and safe for human consumption.

Mr. LONG. Has this always been true, or is this a recent use?

General COOPER. I think that it has always been true.

Mr. TALCOTT. This has been true since the Army was organized. That may be one of the problems. They are still operating it as they did originally.

Mr. MCKAY. Since you don't have any vital use for veterinarians, isn't it possible that the Medical Corps could do that same thing?

General COOPER. The Veterinary Corps is one of the six branches of the Medical Department.

Mr. TALCOTT. But are not the veterinarians now performing functions that in ordinary society would be performed by dieticians or food inspectors and this sort of function?

Mr. MCKAY. I wonder if we are not perpetuating something that is not necessary and can be merged with something else.

General COOPER. There have been recent problems with botulism in soup as you probably remember.

Mr. LONG. We are not questioning the need for inspection. The question is, are veterinarians the people to do this? It comes as a little surprise that they are involved. Is this because this is the best use of veterinarians, because veterinarians are the best people to do this, or simply because, with the departure of the mule, you had a lot of veterinarians you didn't know what to do with so you put them into inspecting food for human consumption?

General COOPER. Veterinarians have been inspecting food throughout history. General Pixley can add something to that.

General PIXLEY. If this function wasn't performed right now by the military veterinarians, and the Army veterinarians do the primary food inspection for the three services, then the Department of Agriculture would have to take this over.

Now, there have been some debates, even in Congress, in past years about expanding this whole role of the Department of Agriculture, but I would like to add one other point on the role of the veterinarians.

You may recall that last year in Texas there was a tremendous epidemic of equine encephalitis in horses. The Department of Agriculture could not meet this requirement and all of the veterinary surgeons and enlisted personnel were mobilized and sent to that area; also a recent outbreak of disease in chickens in California.

Now, many of the vaccines, in fact most of the vaccines, to control civilian animal disease outbreaks have been developed by the Army. There is a tremendous requirement for them in research and development.

Mr. MCKAY. Would you say that the veterinarian is better able to determine the safety of animal food products than a medical doctor who spends his time on the anatomy of homo sapiens?

General PIXLEY. Yes, sir. He cannot be equated either to the dietitian who is concerned with whether you are taking the proper number of calories.

Mr. MCKAY. Why don't you explain to the committee the reason why that is so.

General PIXLEY. Well, again, in summary, the veterinarian determines whether the food is safe for consumption. The dietitian is concerned with determining whether the proper caloric consumption for a healthful diet is available to the soldier.

Mr. MCKAY. Is this because the veterinarian's course of study deals not with the human but rather with the animal?

General PIXLEY. Yes, sir; with animals.

Mr. TALCOTT. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MCKAY. Sure.

Mr. TALCOTT. Veterinarians perform this service for the military services?

General PIXLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. TALCOTT. Do you know the counterpart in civilian life who performs that service?

General PIXLEY. The Department of Agriculture.

Mr. TALCOTT. The veterinarians in the Department of Agriculture do the same work?

General PIXLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

Does this include consumption by our forces overseas?

General PIXLEY. Yes, sir; that is one of the most critical areas, especially where food is procured overseas and not shipped from the States for consumption.

Mr. PATTEN. And how about our fellows on leave, say in parts of Africa or parts of even Korea?

General COOPER. I don't want to leave a mistaken impression. We don't inspect overseas local food establishments unless they are providing food directly to the military.

Mr. PATTEN. Oh.

General COOPER. We rely on advice to the individuals not to eat in unauthorized places.

Mr. PATTEN. I suppose if a country had high tuberculosis in cows we would probably be flying in our own butter, milk, and cheese. Right?

General COOPER. That is about what you have to do.

General KJELLSTROM. We use reconstitution plants which we have used in many of the overseas countries where we have a sizable number of troops stationed. Milk is reconstituted from the dried product provided from the United States.

Mr. LONG. It does seem to me that this veterinary school facility deserves a real hard look. It will cost \$762,000.

Mr. PATTEN. I would like to ask one question: Is any of this money to buy land?

General COOPER. No, sir.

#### STUDY OF UTILIZATION OF FORT SHERIDAN

Mr. PATTEN. Is there an encroachment problem at Fort Sheridan?

General COOPER. There is an encroachment problem in that Fort Sheridan is right in a well developed area in Highland Park, Ill. There are people who want it for some specific purpose, but there is no encroachment problem as far as the Governor of Illinois or the governing bodies really wanting part of it.

Mr. LONG. You are not going to come to us in another year or two and say that you are sorry, that you decided this thing ought to be moved and shut down and be located somewhere else?

General COOPER. I hope not, sir.

Mr. LONG. You hope not.

General COOPER. We are looking at Fort Sheridan again, as we are at all of our other posts, particularly posts that are less than 5,000 or 10,000 strength. We would certainly know before we spent any of this money on the veterinary school whether this study is going to show that we will close Fort Sheridan.

Mr. LONG. Before the money is actually spent we are going to get assurance that you don't have any future plans to shut this down or move it away or otherwise—

General COOPER. Absolutely, sir.

Mr. MCKAY. Mr. Chairman, would you yield?

Mr. LONG. Yes.

#### OTHER LOCATIONS FOR VETERINARY SCHOOL

Mr. MCKAY. In line with the impact at Fort Sheridan, wouldn't it be much wiser to put this out in Colorado, for example, where there is a civilian veterinarian school where you could get consultation and assistance and training, rather than at Fort Sheridan? I think you put it here originally because of the Chicago stockyards.

General COOPER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MCKAY. Now those are gone.

General COOPER. As of now. I asked the same question when I reviewed the project. But there are sufficient places in the Chicago area where the students can visit to learn what goes on in civilian establishments that prepare the food. We wouldn't have to put it in Colorado simply because they still have stockyards there.

Mr. LONG. But are there empty facilities or vacant facilities in Colorado where this could be consolidated without having to spend this money?

General COOPER. There are empty facilities at Fort Sheridan where we are putting this school. You notice the project is for alteration and conversion of existing structures. It is not for a new facility.

To answer your question, I don't know of any specific facilities in Colorado that are already suitable for this type of installation.

I think wherever we went we would have to alter some existing buildings.

Mr. LONG. The other day we discovered that you hadn't taken into consideration the proximity of Bainbridge, which is closing and freeing a lot of housing, when looking to the housing justification for Aberdeen. Is it possible you are doing the same thing here?

What other Department of Defense installation has the Army surveyed as possible sites for your veterinary school?

General COOPER. I will have to provide that for the record unless General Pixley knows.

[The information follows:]

Prior to 1971, the U.S. Army Veterinary School was located on Pershing Road in southwest Chicago. The deterioration of the facilities and especially the area surrounding the school made a move essential.

Many formal and informal studies had been made to determine the feasibility of relocating the school. Sites previously studied were Fort Detrick, Md., Fort Lee, Va., Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, Colo., Columbus General Depot, Ohio, and Fort Sam Houston, Tex. None of these locations proved feasible. Other locations were considered but did not warrant study in depth.

During the course of the study it became evident that a move of the school to Fort Sheridan was feasible. It was cost effective, maintained continuity of training, met essential requirements of locating the school near a concentration

of representative plants of the food industry, had proximity to national headquarters of many food industry associations, food industry research and development centers and communications networks of air, rail, road, and water. Suitable buildings were available at Fort Sheridan for renovation into a school facility at minimal cost. All other sites surveyed would have required new construction at prohibitive cost and did not meet other requirements.

General PIXLEY. No, sir. I think, sir, probably one of the primary reasons the Army veterinary school has been traditionally for decades in the Chicago area is because of the large food processing centers in that area.

It is true that, since our Nation has grown, there are other areas that could be considered, but my understanding is that none has facilities that would be as easily adaptable as Sheridan and they would use as they have of course some of the expertise they have had for years in the Chicago area to help instruct in the school.

Mr. LONG. I think the committee should be reassured that you are looking into all possible alternatives and it ought to be done in a very careful way.

Mr. MCKAY. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LONG. Yes.

Mr. MCKAY. Is there a veterinarian school in the Chicago area aside from your own?

General PIXLEY. A service school, no, sir, there is not.

Mr. MCKAY. Not a service school.

General PIXLEY. No, sir. But there is a school in the State of Illinois.

Mr. MCKAY. A school of veterinary medicine?

General PIXLEY. Yes, sir. There are only about 14, I think, in the Nation.

Mr. LONG. Is that one at Chicago?

Mr. PATTEN. We had them before our HEW committee last week. They were pleading for us not to cut out the help for the veterinary schools, and, Doctor, I think you can revise your list upward, as I remember it.

We don't have any school in New Jersey. I well remember that. But when those people who run the veterinary schools appeared before our committee, I was amazed to learn that there were so many schools in the United States. My recollection is it was a little above 14 or 16.

In the budget there is no money for the schools per capita, as they call it, or categorical grants, and the fellows who run the veterinary schools appeared before the committee.

Just as the members here were surprised to learn that the veterinarian inspects our food, I also was surprised at many things they said, because when I grew up I thought a veterinarian was a fellow who treated horses.

Mr. PATTEN. They were bragging about their research.

Mr. LONG. A veterinarian is somebody, I understand, whom you get on the telephone and ask what you can do to help your sick horse. You don't get a visit out of a veterinarian any more than you do out of a doctor anymore.

Mr. MCKAY. They have become more professional.

Mr. PATTEN. How many animals do you think there are in your district?

Mr. LONG. Animals?

Mr. PATTEN. Yes, all types, sheep, pigs, horses, chickens.

Mr. LONG. Tens of thousands. We have a lot of horses.

Mr. PATTEN. How many do you think are in my district? I got the shock of my life. I thought we had all factories until the SPCA fellows started to drop into my office with pictures. They showed me a dead horse, a case where they arrested a constituent of mine; and they showed me a frozen pig, dead, in another place.

After listening to the SPCA fellows, I am under the impression we have a million animals running around all the time in my district. What they show is absolutely abominable, and they are pressing charges.

I went out and made an inspection of one farm; it was filthy.

#### INTERIM FACILITIES

Mr. LONG. What interim facilities are you considering for this school?

General COOPER. We are considering three prefabricated, portable buildings that we would use temporarily, three buildings the size of roughly 20 by 60 feet.

Mr. LONG. It is going to cost money to get them into use as temporary facilities.

General COOPER. Yes, sir. We expect the leasing of these will be about \$70,000 for 18 months.

Mr. LONG. I really think this whole thing ought to be looked into.

#### REAL PROPERTY AND OPERATION COST OF FORT SHERIDAN

Provide for the record the operation and maintenance and military personnel costs of operating Fort Sheridan. Also, show the real property maintenance costs and the replacement value of the inventory.

[The information follows:]

#### REAL PROPERTY, PERSONNEL AND OTHER OPERATING COSTS, FORT SHERIDAN, ILL.

Activity:	Cost
Backlog of essential maintenance and repair.....	\$169,000
Initial cost of improvements.....	27,482,000
Replacement cost (excluding land).....	104,432,000

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year—		
	1972	1973	<sup>1</sup> 1974
Real property maintenance.....	9,600	9,691	7,324
Other operating costs.....	5,368	6,005	3,976
Personnel:			
Military expense.....	5,038	4,274	2,942
Civilian cost.....	8,977	10,447	11,128

<sup>1</sup> Estimated.

#### VETERINARY SCHOOL WORKLOAD

Mr. MCKAY. Mr. Chairman.

How many veterinarians do you turn out a year? What is our population of veterinarians?

General COOPER. The student load varies. It has been as high as about 170. But the load that we project now for the future is about 120.

We have several different courses out there. We have a basic course which is about 8 weeks. Last year the school graduated a total of 618. This is enlisted men as well as officers.

Mr. MCKAY. I assume the enlisted personnel are not full-fledged veterinarians. Is that true?

General COOPER. That is true.

Mr. MCKAY. So of that 618, how many would be full-fledged veterinarians as a result of your school?

General COOPER. Well, officers are full-fledged veterinarians before they go to our school.

Mr. MCKAY. Oh, I see. That is a prerequisite for entrance?

General COOPER. Yes, sir. When they come into the Army they go through a basic officers course at the veterinary school.

Mr. MCKAY. So this is similar to the program for our doctors who have had their training outside and then join the corps?

General COOPER. Yes, sir. There are also other special courses.

#### LONG-TERM USE OF FORT SHERIDAN

Mr. LONG. I note the real property operation and maintenance costs at this post are on the order of \$8 million. Isn't this high for a post of this size?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. Why?

General COOPER. Because it is a large post with relatively few people. Eight million dollars wouldn't be high if there were a lot more people.

Mr. LONG. Then why not cut bait now? You are right on a lake. You are right near the city. I wouldn't think this has a very long-run future. It is the kind of base you are going to be coming back and telling us is too crowded, too valuable as real estate, too much altogether—the same reasons you are using to close down places like Fort Holabird?

General COOPER. One of the reasons we have located in a highly populous area is that we are concerned about our dealings with the Reserves and National Guard.

One of the considerations we have to make is, can we afford the high price of operating a relatively small post in an area like Fort Devens, for example, or Fort Sheridan.

Mr. LONG. What about a place where there already is a veterinary facility? Why not consolidate?

General COOPER. There is no other place where we have a veterinary facility as such.

Mr. LONG. Didn't you mention Colorado?

Mr. MCKAY. Colorado has a private school, a State school. There is no military school there that I know of.

General COOPER. That is a separate issue, sir.

Mr. LONG. You mean there are no possibilities of putting this elsewhere to save money, to save these high operating and maintenance costs?

General COOPER. We would save the operating and maintenance cost if we closed down all of Fort Sheridan. If we moved the school from Fort Sheridan to someplace else, you could expect to spend at least this much for modifying existing facilities.

Mr. LONG. Since this is a very high-cost operation, are we going to be hit with some future base closure? I am very concerned over this.

General KJELLSTROM. Sir, if I may put this school in perspective. Several years ago, as part of the move out of the metropolitan area of Chicago, we moved the veterinary school from 3900 Pershing Road, which is right in the midst of the stockyards in Chicago, out to Fort Sheridan. We recognized at the time we made the move that we did not have fully adequate facilities, but they were better from the standpoint of living conditions for the individual students and their supporting staff than the existing facilities.

#### U.S. ARMY RECRUITING COMMAND

Furthermore, Fort Sheridan is the headquarters of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command and the headquarters of one of the nine Reserve component readiness regions within the Reserve component structure. Fort Sheridan is also a focal point within the communications system and a very fine location for the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, so the veterinary school is one of several activities in being and assigned to Fort Sheridan.

Mr. LONG. Will minor construction at a cost of \$408,000 complete the requirements for the new mission here?

General COOPER. Yes, that and the reprogramming for the Recruiting Command will complete the requirements.

Mr. LONG. For everything? You won't be coming back to us for anything more?

General COOPER. That is correct.

Mr. LONG. Is this one of the posts you are restudying?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONG. I hope you get it restudied in time.

#### NEED FOR MILITARY VETERINARIANS

Mr. DAVIS. Just before we leave that, Doctor, when did we last examine the necessity for direct military support for veterinary training?

General COOPER. You mean as opposed to civilian support?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes.

General COOPER. I will ask General Pixley. I don't know.

General PIXLEY. It is my understanding that this has been examined almost yearly. I think General Kjellstrom has had more experience on Hill legislation than I. But it is my understanding almost every year for years this same subject comes up—should there be a veterinary uniform service?

But then the decision usually reached was, yes, there is such a requirement because of mobilization. And the military veterinarians—I come back to this point—have made some astounding contributions. They have held off crises in civilian life, such as developing a vaccine for the horse encephalitis which can spill off into humans, that chicken disease in California.

They have developed many other vaccines that can be used not only during mobilization, entering foreign countries, and exposure to other diseases, but also to thwart encroachment of disease into domestic livestock in this country.

General COOPER. There is another aspect to this. We could probably get away with using civilians in peacetime, but we could end up with the same problem we did to a lesser extent with supply personnel—that in wartime you wouldn't have trained people you can ship overseas.

Mr. DAVIS. I wasn't thinking about that so much, General, as I was whether it is essential for the military to train veterinarians. Is there an overall shortage of veterinarians that makes this necessary?

General COOPER. These people are trained as veterinarians before they come into the Army. We don't have a separate 4-year veterinary course in the Army.

Now, I don't know under the new system where we are going. It is proposed that we have an Army medical school. I don't think we plan an Army veterinary school. The course we give to the veterinarians when they come in the Army is an 8-week basic course to make them into officers and teach them Army procedure.

General KJELLSTROM. Sir, if I may come back to your basic question, "When was the last time that we reexamined this issue of military versus civilian," I know that it has been reexamined and I would like to include a statement in the record of the experience on this issue because it has been very carefully evaluated several times, but I don't have it at my hand.

[See information, page 584.]

#### TYPE OF TRAINING PROVIDED

Mr. DAVIS. How long a course are we giving these people?

General COOPER. The first course we give them when they enter is an 8-week course. It is a veterinarian officers orientation course.

Mr. DAVIS. Does this operate all year-round then?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. How many are we dealing with at one time here?

General COOPER. The average student load, including officers and enlisted men, will be about 120 at any one time.

Mr. DAVIS. So we are not just training veterinarians then; we are training a lot of enlisted men?

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

General PIXLEY. Technicians.

Mr. DAVIS. How long a course would they take?

General COOPER. They have a basic course of 8 weeks also and they have refresher courses of five segments of 2 weeks each for a total of 10 weeks. There are other courses that we give as the need arises.

But basically it is an enlisted basic course and then these advanced courses. This is their advanced individual training as well as their basic combat training you might say.

Mr. PATTEN. General, didn't you use 618 graduates earlier in your testimony?

General COOPER. That was last year, sir.

General PIXLEY. 618; yes, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. Yes. That gives a different impression than 120.

General COOPER. The 120 is the number of students there at any one time, so 120 times 6 ought to give you about the right number.

Mr. LONG. I am a little puzzled about what kind of school this is. I gather there are veterinarians there. Then you tell me you are not giving them real veterinarian training. Is this just training for people who have undergone some officers' or enlisted men's basic training, people who have had their veterinarian training elsewhere?

General PIXLEY. No, sir.

Mr. LONG. What kind of courses do you give them? Give us an example.

General PIXLEY. These are courses that are concerned with food inspection for safety. Most of the students are enlisted and they are taught by commissioned Veterinary Corps officers. They are taught how to inspect all types of food, including meats, for the presence of disease.

For example, sir, this is probably an item you haven't heard of before. Up until recently some of the ships from the Boston Harbor would go out to sea for as long as 3 or 4 months before they would come back with a load of fish.

We have one veterinary technician on each of those ships. In many of the functions of these enlisted technicians, their inspections also benefit the Department of Agriculture.

The question has come up again and again, yes, the Department of Agriculture could take this over, but they have up to this point said, "We can't handle it."

Mr. DAVIS. Let me ask just one more question.

Isn't there a great deal of commonalty, particularly with respect to your commissioned officers, people who have received their professional training outside of the service, in the training of veterinarians and the training of the medical people down at Sam Houston?

General COOPER. I don't know specifically how much of that 8-week basic veterinarian course consists of nonveterinary subjects.

General PIXLEY. Down at Fort Sam Houston there is no veterinarian food inspection course.

Mr. DAVIS. But there is a medical course, and I was wondering if a lot of the things that you are trying to teach these veterinarians to make them into military officers might not be the same as those you are teaching the medical people down at Sam Houston.

General PIXLEY. No, sir. This is very technical.

General COOPER. The question then, General Pixley, is whether these veterinarians take any nonveterinary related courses in their basic course at Fort Sheridan—and I believe they do—or do they take them at Sam Houston?

General PIXLEY. At the medical training center, Fort Sam Houston, some veterinarian technicians have 8 weeks advanced general medical training. Most, however, go direct to Fort Sheridan upon completing basic combat training.

General COOPER. You are talking about officers?

General PIXLEY. I am talking about enlisted.

General COOPER. We don't have a good answer as to how much nonveterinarian instruction is conducted at Fort Sheridan. I think there are some courses in that area. Veterinarians don't go to Fort Sam Houston for a basic course.

General PIXLEY. They do go to Fort Sam Houston for a basic officer orientation course and then they go to Sheridan.

General COOPER. They do go to Sam Houston?

General PIXLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. PATTEN. In light of all the recent publicity given to sanitation in restaurants. I am wondering whether the service you are rendering is adequate for the 2 or 3 million men that we have to protect.

General COOPER. In terms of ——

Mr. LONG. Epidemics of food poisoning and that sort of thing.

General COOPER. How many times we close down or say we won't buy food from a certain place?

Mr. LONG. Yes.

Mr. MCKAY. Are you skimping on personnel for the inspections you have to do, or do you have an ample supply of help? Do you need more or less employees for what you are doing?

Mr. LONG. I think we ought to get some historical record of food poisoning and that kind of thing for the record.

General COOPER. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

Mission and Functions of the U. S. Army Veterinary Service.

The Navy and Marine Corps have no veterinary service; however, they both have extensive requirements for veterinary services which are fulfilled by the veterinary services of the Army and the Air Force.

The mission of the veterinary service is to protect the health of the troops and to safeguard the financial interest of the Government. The veterinary service accomplishes this mission through the following functional areas:

- a. Food Hygiene and Quality Assurance
- b. Control of Animal Diseases Transmissible to Man
- c. Preventive Medicine and Public Health
- d. Medical Care of Government-Owned Animals
- e. Medical and Subsistence Research and Development

While the stated mission of the veterinary service has remained virtually unchanged since it was established in 1916, the functional emphasis has been increasing at a rapid rate in the area of medical research and development.

Also, while complete care of all Government-owned animals has been provided since the service was established, the primary species of animals owned by the Government have shifted from equines to laboratory animals and military dogs.

The veterinary service consists of 512 officers, all of whom have degrees as Doctors of Veterinary Medicine. The 243 enlisted animal specialists and 1,022 enlisted food inspection specialists also form an integral part of the veterinary service.

In addition to the functions described above, the veterinary service also supports the U. S. Department of Agriculture in the event an animal disease such as equine encephalomyelitis (VEE) should break out in our domestic animal population. During the past two years extensive support was provided the USDA; in 1972 forty veterinary officers assisted Federal and State veterinarians in successfully combatting Newcastle's Disease which threatened to decimate the poultry industry in America.

Veterinary Service Personnel Situation.

Veterinary Corps officer requirements in the past have fluctuated. During World War II there were 2,211 officers on duty. In 1966 there were 629. Today, with an Army decreasing in numbers, 512 are authorized. With the reduction in overseas commitments, this number, together with the excellent enlisted personnel, is sufficient to satisfactorily accomplish the functions of the service if these authorized spaces are filled.

Establishment • Sanitary Inspections.

Foods procured for the Armed Forces with appropriated or nonappropriated funds must come from sanitarly approved establishments. To the maximum possible, inspection and approval of establishments by other Federal agencies is accepted. Wherever this is not possible, sanitary inspection and approval is performed by the military services. These latter establishments are listed in a "Directory of Sanitarly Approved Food Establishments for Armed Forces Procurement" for the benefit of procurement officers.

During CY 1972 a total of 39,553 establishments were inspected by Army veterinary service personnel. These were initial, routine or special sanitary inspections. There were 531 establishments disapproved for sanitary discrepancies.

Food Poisoning Outbreaks.

Historical records indicate that contaminated food caused more casualties during the Spanish-American War than did Spanish bullets. Hurried deliveries and lack of an organized inspection force led to the purchase and issue of improperly processed and stored foods which, in turn, led to thousands of American casualties. It was, in fact, these tragic occurrences which led to the establishment of the Veterinary Corps by Congress in 1916.

These problems are not unique to the American Army. A monument inscription in northeastern France states that during World War I the rapidly advancing German soldiers in the St. Mihiel salient were halted and brought to the ground just as much by contaminated rations of sausage issued before their attack as by American bullets. The German Army today has a large and effective veterinary service.

Fortunately, there have been no significant outbreaks of food poisoning in the Armed Forces since the Spanish-American War. This results from joint efforts by the food industry, Federal agencies and personnel of the military veterinary services.

Food Inspection.

During CY 1972 records of The Surgeon General show that 68,637,619 pounds of food were rejected by the Army veterinary service for all causes. A total of 21,651,298,829 pounds of food were inspected. It is noted that not all the rejected food was unwholesome; some did not meet contract requirements. The total poundage inspected sometimes reflects several inspections of the same food; once at time of purchase, later in storage, and finally at time of issue. Food inspection and hygiene is a continuing and not a one-time function.

Studies on the Army Veterinary Service.

In 1956, Secretary of Defense Wilson directed a review of the veterinary function in the Department of Defense.

This action culminated in recommendations that the mission and functions of the Army Veterinary Corps and the Air Force Veterinary Service continue substantially as at present with no significant transfer of inspection functions to the Department of Agriculture. Further, it was recommended that appropriate Department of Defense directives be revised to clarify the responsibilities of the military veterinary services for subsistence inspection, and to provide for a more uniform utilization of veterinary services throughout the Department of Defense. This was done.

A study of Veterinary Corps officer requirements was conducted by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development during the period 1 February - 29 March 1972. This study was conducted by that office for analysis and evaluation to determine or validate U. S. Army Veterinary Corps officer requirements by functional area and to present a coordinated Army Staff position which outlines the desired officer staffing level by each functional area. The analysis and evaluation concluded that the functions of the Veterinary Corps are properly assigned and required for Army mission accomplishment and that there was a valid requirement, at that time, for 504 Veterinary Corps authorized spaces.

In June 1972, the Secretary of the Army informed the Secretary of Defense that the Army would undertake a thorough analysis of the entire veterinary program. This study was accomplished by the Comptroller of the Army between June and November 1972 and resulted in a study, subject: Program Analysis of the Army Veterinary Service, dated 24 November 1972. This study concluded that the functions of the Army veterinary service are properly assigned and are required for both peacetime and mobilization mission accomplishment of the United States Armed Forces.

Military Education of Officer and Enlisted Men of the Veterinary Service.

Both officers and enlisted men of the veterinary service attend courses at the U. S. Army Medical Department Veterinary School as a part of their overall military education.

The military education received by a typical Army officer during his military career will include attendance at a basic officers course, a branch orientation course, an advanced officers course, periodic branch refresher courses, Command and General Staff College (selected few) and Senior Service College (selected few), and a variety of special short courses.

A degree as a Doctor of Veterinary Medicine is a prerequisite for commissioning in the Veterinary Corps. These officers are already professionally qualified as are physicians, engineers or lawyers who enter the Army. The Army Veterinary School does not teach them to be veterinarians. It does contribute to their education as Army officers and provides them working knowledge in the detailed functions of the Veterinary Corps.

The following are officer courses taught at the Veterinary School:

- a. Army Medical Department Officer Orientation Course (Veterinary Corps)  
Length: 8 weeks  
Scope: To provide commissioned officers a working knowledge in preventive medicine, food hygiene and food technology as they relate to procurement, storage, shipment and issue of food for the Armed Forces both in the United States and overseas.  
Attendees: All officers entering active duty in the Veterinary Corps. Members of the Reserve Component.
- b. Army Medical Department Field Grade Officer Refresher Course (Veterinary Corps)  
Length: 2 weeks  
Scope: Same as Orientation Course; however, this course provides refresher and updating information.  
Attendees: Selected officers in grade or Major or higher who have not attended course within past four years.  
Members of the Reserve Component.
- c. Veterinary Officer Statistics (Veterinary Corps)  
Length: 3 weeks  
Scope: Emphasizes statistical procedures employed in research and development activities, particularly those utilizing animals and those statistical principles involved in health and quality subsistence inspection and veterinary public health. Data distribution, significance tests for comparison of population groups, correlative methods, statistical sampling techniques, comparability procedures, quality control, and experimental design receive particular emphasis. Classroom presentations are supplemented by practical exercises.  
Attendees: Selected officers working in food inspection or research and development functional areas.  
Members of the Reserve Component.

All enlisted men who enter the Army attend a basic training course. Following this, they attend an Advanced Individual Training Course where they are taught a Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) awarding course. Later in their career they will attend an advanced course and various refresher and special courses, as required.

The following are enlisted courses taught at the Veterinary School:

- a. Food Inspection Procedures, Basic  
MOS: 91R10, Course No. 321-91R10  
Length: 8 weeks  
Scope: To provide a working knowledge of the fundamentals of food

inspection, contract administration, field inspection and surveillance inspection.

Attendees: All enlisted food inspection specialists entering active duty.  
Members of the Reserve Component.

b. Food Inspection Procedures, Advanced

MOS: 91R20, Course No. 321-91R20

Length: 10 weeks

Scope: Unit and contract administration; fruit and vegetable inspection; surveillance inspection; food inspection of military installations; combat service support; veterinary aspects of CBR operations; dairy and poultry inspections; basic food sciences; veterinary anatomy and physiology; meat technology.

Attendees: EM who have been qualified as a Food Inspection Specialist (MOS 91R10) for a period of not less than 12 months.

Members of the Reserve Component.

c. Enlisted Refresher Courses (5 in number)

Length: 2 weeks

Scope: Each of the five refresher courses offered provides refresher training in one or two of the subjects listed in the scope of the advance course in subparagraph a above.

Attendees: Enlisted men who have a requirement for refresher training in the listed subjects.

Members of the Reserve Component.

Additionally, special courses are offered as required and programmed to veterinary units, officers and enlisted men of the Reserve Component.

Veterinary service personnel perform their functions on military installations and also on an area basis, in peacetime and in wartime, in the United States and in scattered countries of the world wherever Armed Forces personnel are assigned. Congress assigned the basic missions to the Veterinary Corps. Other functions are delegated by The Surgeon General in order to fulfill the mission of the Army Medical Department. The missions and functions of the Veterinary Service are properly assigned and cannot be performed by other individuals.

FORT SILL, OKLA.

Mr. LONG. Turn to Fort Sill, Okla., and insert pages 117-118 in the record.

[The page follows:]

1 DATE 9 July 1973		2 DEPARTMENT ARMY		3 INSTALLATION Fort Sill								
4. COMMAND OR MANAGEMENT BUREAU Fifth United States Army			5 INSTALLATION CONTROL NUMBER Oklahoma 755		6. STATE/COUNTRY Oklahoma							
7. STATUS Active		8. YEAR OF INITIAL OCCUPANCY 1834		9. COUNTY (U.S.) Comanche	10. NEAREST CITY Lawton, 4 miles South							
11. MISSION OR MAJOR FUNCTIONS Responsible for command, training and logistical support of Artillery and surface-to-surface missile units; activation and training of STRAF Artillery units; maintain and operate the Army Field Artillery School, Artillery Advanced Individual Training Center, and provide support for Reserve Components summer training.				12. PERSONNEL STRENGTH								
				PERMANENT		STUDENTS		SUPPORTED		TOTAL		
				OFFICER (1)	ENLISTED (2)	CIVILIAN (3)	OFFICER (4)	ENLISTED (5)	OFFICER (6)	ENLISTED (7)	CIVILIAN (8)	(9)
				a. AS OF 31 Dec 72	2,283	13,686	3,483	1,141	1,576	33	23	22,225
				b. PLANNED (End FY 75)	1,963	11,656	3,442	1,129	2,956	28	18	21,192
				13. INVENTORY								
				LAND		ACRES (1)	LAND COST (\$000) (2)		IMPROVEMENT (\$000) (3)		TOTAL (\$000) (4)	
				a. OWNED		94,304	2,419		136,200		138,619	
				b. LEASES AND EASEMENTS		34,317	0		22		22	
				c. INVENTORY TOTAL (Except land rent) AS OF 30 JUNE 19 72								138,641
d. AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY								21,798				
e. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM								9,447				
f. ESTIMATED AUTHORIZATION - NEXT 4 YEARS								50,517				
g. GRAND TOTAL (c + d + e + f)								220,403				
SUMMARY OF INSTALLATION PROJECTS												
PROJECT DESIGNATION				TENANT COMMAND	UNIT OF MEASURE	AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM		FUNDING PROGRAM				
CATEGORY CODE NO.	PROJECT TITLE		Page No	c	d	SCOPE	ESTIMATED COST (\$000)	SCOPE	ESTIMATED COST (\$000)			
a	b		PRIORITY	c	d	e	f	g	h			
310	232 - Maintenance Evaluation Facility		7	119	AMC	SF	8,342	235	8,342	235		
721	245 - Barracks Modernization		1	120	MN	2,814	9,212	2,814	9,212			
	Total						9,447		9,447			

590

## FORT SILL, OKLAHOMA, \$9,447,000

Fort Sill is located 4 miles north of Lawton, Okla. The mission of this installation is to command, train, and support artillery and surface-to-surface missile units; to activate and train STRAF artillery units; and to support the Army Artillery and Missile School, Artillery Advanced Individual Training Center, and Reserve components summer training. The program provides a maintenance evaluation facility and barracks modernization.

<i>Status of funds</i>	<i>Dollars in thousands</i>
Funded program not in inventory.....	21, 798
Unobligated projects, 31 March 1973 (actual).....	3, 525
Unobligated projects, 30 June 1973 (estimated).....	0

## DESIGN INFORMATION

Project	Design cost (thousands)	Percent complete Apr. 30, 1973
Maintenance evaluation facilities.....	10	25
Barracks modernization.....	315	25

Mr. LONG. What is the purpose of a maintenance evaluation facility and why do you need one here?

General COOPER. The purpose is to accomplish the mission of testing and evaluating general support maintenance on items of electronics.

The existing facility permits only limited test measurements which result in equipment being sent to the field with undetected deficiencies.

Mr. LONG. When you upgrade barracks and associated dining facilities as you are proposing to in this project, what provision do you make for the later construction of a central food preparation facility?

General COOPER. In this particular case we are not making provision for a central food preparation facility.

Mr. LONG. What does that mean?

General COOPER. That means that we think it will be a long time before we would get one at Fort Sill.

Mr. LONG. Are you buying kitchen equipment which will be unnecessary in a few years?

Mr. CARTON. Sir, in this particular project the work in the mess hall is primarily that of air conditioning, painting, and minor improvements. It does not involve major change to the dining facilities or the kitchen equipment.

Mr. PATTEN. Are there any questions about Fort Sill?

## FORT LEONARD WOOD, MO.

Let us turn to Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.

Please insert page 121 in the record.

[The page follows:]

1. DATE 9 July 1973		2. DEPARTMENT ARMY		3. INSTALLATION Fort Leonard Wood											
4. COMMAND OR MANAGEMENT BUREAU Fifth United States Army			5. INSTALLATION CONTROL NUMBER Missouri 995		6. STATE/COUNTRY Missouri										
7. STATUS Active		8. YEAR OF INITIAL OCCUPANCY 1941		9. COUNTY (U.S.) Pulaski	10. NEAREST CITY Rolla - 29 miles Northeast										
11. MISSION OR MAJOR FUNCTIONS Provides command guidance, administrative and logistical support for the US Army Training Center, Engineer; US Army Reception Station, US Army Hospital and various other assigned or attached TOE and TD units. Also provides support for US Army Reserve, Army National Guard and other satellited activities.				12. PERSONNEL STRENGTH											
				PERMANENT		STUDENTS		SUPPORTED		TOTAL (9)					
				OFFICER (1)	ENLISTED (2)	CIVILIAN (3)	OFFICER (4)	ENLISTED (5)	OFFICER (6)		ENLISTED (7)	CIVILIAN (8)			
				a. AS OF <u>31 Dec 72</u>		1,042	22,116	2,895		6	72	20	26,151		
				b. PLANNED (End FY 78)		951	16,401	2,454			14,211*	0	10	0	24,027
				13. INVENTORY											
				LAND		ACRES (1)		LAND COST (\$000) (2)		IMPROVEMENT (\$000) (3)		TOTAL (\$000) (4)			
a. OWNED		70,963		1,482		181,305		182,787							
b. LEASES AND EASEMENTS		13		4**		0		4							
c. INVENTORY TOTAL (Except land rent) AS OF 30 JUNE 19 <u>72</u>															
d. AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY															
e. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM															
f. ESTIMATED AUTHORIZATION - NEXT 4 YEARS															
g. GRAND TOTAL (c + d + e + f)															
SUMMARY OF INSTALLATION PROJECTS															
PROJECT DESIGNATION					TENANT COMMAND		AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM		FUNDING PROGRAM						
CATEGORY CODE NO. a	PROJECT TITLE b	Page No c	PRIORITY	UNIT OF MEASURE d	SCOPE e	ESTIMATED COST (\$000) f	SCOPE g	ESTIMATED COST (\$000) h							
721	148 - MP Barracks w/Supporting Facilities	122	1	MN	135	1,831	135	1,831							
721	151 - EM Barracks Complex	124	1	MN	2,522	32,247	2,522	32,247							
721	155 - EW Barracks Addition	126	1	EW	122	1,136	122	1,136							
721	156 - Barracks Modernization	127	1	MN	2,830	2,981	2,830	2,981							
730	147 - Confinement Facility - 250 Man	128	6	SF	104,000	6,287	104,000	6,287							
Total						44,482		44,482							

\* Includes trainees, transients and students  
 \*\*3,800 one-time cost for easement.

592

## FORT LEONARD WOOD, MO., \$44,482,000

Fort Leonard Wood is located 29 miles southwest of Rolla, Mo. The mission of this installation is to command and support an Army Training Center—Engineer, and an Army reception station. The installation also trains and supports nondivisional units and supports Reserve components summer training. The program provides barracks with support facilities for military police personnel, a barracks complex, an addition to barracks for enlisted women, barracks modernization, and a confinement facility.

<i>Status of funds</i>	<i>Dollars in thousands</i>
Funded program not in inventory.....	21, 222
Unobligated projects, 31 March 1973 (actual).....	18, 873
Unobligated projects, 30 June 1973 (estimated).....	16, 757

## DESIGN INFORMATION

Project	Design cost (thousands)	Percent complete Apr. 30, 1973
MP barracks with support facilities.....	90	0
EM barracks complex.....	1, 200	25
EW barracks addition.....	60	0
Barracks modernization.....	200	30
Confinement facility, 250 men.....	180	10

*Enlisted barracks summary, Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.*

	<sup>1</sup> Men/women
Total requirement.....	22, 675
Existing substandard.....	<sup>2</sup> 28, 156
Existing adequate.....	<sup>3</sup> 123
Funded, not in inventory.....	102
Adequate assets.....	225
Deficiency.....	22, 450
Fiscal year 1974 program.....	5, 609
Barracks spaces occupied, 15 March 1973.....	12, 962

<sup>1</sup> 90 square feet per man—permanent party personnel; 72 square feet per man—trainees.

<sup>2</sup> Includes 10,568 spaces that can be made adequate.

<sup>3</sup> Includes 20 in private housing.

## SURVEYS AND INVESTIGATIONS STAFF REPORT

Mr. PATTEN. The committee has a surveys and investigations staff report on the facilities requested at Fort Leonard Wood. Unless there is objection, we will include it in the record at this point.

Mr. DAVIS. No objection.

[The report follows:]

MAY 4, 1973.

Memorandum for the chairman.

Re military construction program for fiscal year 1974.

Construction and modernization and facilities, Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.

By directive dated February 22, 1973, the committee requested a study be made of the Army's construction program at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.

The committee directed that the investigation should include, but not be limited to, a study of the adequacy of long-range planning for facilities modernization and utilization at this post; the adequacy of projections of population levels for base missions as part of the Army's overall long-range base utilization plans; and the use of current bachelor housing assets on base and in the community.

The results of this study are incorporated in the attached report.

Respectfully submitted,

C. R. ANDERSON,  
Chief of the Surveys and Investigations Staff,  
House Appropriations Committee.

## I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

## A. INTRODUCTION

The fiscal year 1974 military construction program guidance letter issued by the Army on September 10, 1971, advised that the Army Chief of Staff had initiated a program designed to provide adequate housing for all soldiers and dependents at the earliest practicable date. The Army planned, beginning with fiscal year 1974, to devote about one-half of its military construction program each year to construction or modernization of bachelor housing, primarily barracks. For fiscal year 1974, OSD approved \$411,200,000 for construction of bachelor housing and dining facilities for the Army. The military construction program at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., for fiscal year 1974, totals \$44,482,000 for construction of new facilities and modernization of existing permanent facilities, as follows:

Project title:	<i>Estimated cost (thousands)</i>
Enlisted men's barracks complex.....	\$32, 247
Confinement facility, 250-man capacity.....	6, 287
Military police barracks and supporting facilities.....	1, 831
Enlisted women's barracks addition.....	1, 136
Barracks modernization.....	2, 981
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>44, 482</b>

## B. BACKGROUND

Established as a training center in 1941, Fort Leonard Wood is located 29 miles southwest of Rolla, Mo., and covers about 71,000 contiguous acres in south-central Missouri. The total Government investment in this installation is over \$182 million.

Fort Leonard Wood is charged with the mission to command and support the U.S. Army training center, engineer, Army reception station, Army basic combat training, and various other assigned or attached units. The installation also trains and supports nondivisional units and supports U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard components summer training. In 1956, the installation was made a permanent facility and it is presently part of the 5th Army, Continental Army Command (CONARC). The investigative staff was advised that in the reorganization of Army, this installation will be retained as a permanent facility as a part of the new Training and Doctrine Command.

## II. FISCAL YEAR 1974 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

*Army Stationing and Installation Plan*

The Army stationing and installation plan (ASIP) provides a long-range projection of an average day's strength necessary to accomplish the installation's missions. This is the basic document used to justify the construction of permanent facilities. The ASIP for Fort Leonard Wood shows that it is to have 8,000 men as permanent cadre, 11,000 basic combat trainees, 6,200 advanced trainees, 1,100 receptees, and 1,200 transients for a total strength of 27,500. The construction projects for fiscal year 1974 have been justified by the Army using the above planning strengths. Also, projects proposed have been approved in the master site plan for the installation.

The investigative staff was informed by Army officials that the ASIP had been revised to show the new strengths anticipated in the modern voluntary Army. These officials explained that the plan tries to take into consideration a number of factors: (1) the recruitment of needed soldiers, (2) the reenlistments expected, and (3) the training in occupations that will be required to carry out the Army's mission.

*Unit Cost Limitations*

Based on Public Law 92-545 dated October 25, 1972, the unit cost limitation for construction of permanent Army barracks inside the United States is \$27 per square foot, adjusted by an area construction cost index. The square foot cost at Fort Leonard Wood is \$32.40 (\$27 adjusted by the area construction cost index of 1.2). The DD form 1391's for fiscal year 1974 are based, however, on \$28.50 per square foot, adjusted by the 1.2 area construction cost index (120 percent), or \$34.20 per square foot. The Department of Defense Military Con-

struction Cost Review Guide for fiscal year 1974 specifies that cost limitations, "subject to congressional approval," applicable to barracks construction will be based on \$28.50 per square foot, adjusted by the area construction cost index. An Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) official advised the investigative staff that OSD will seek congressional approval to increase the previously established \$27 per square foot to \$28.50 per square foot for fiscal year 1974.

#### *Waiver of Square Feet Criteria*

In a memorandum dated October 25, 1972, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Logistics) requested that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Housing) continue a waiver of criteria to permit the design of bachelor housing based on the 165-square-foot-per-man criteria, as opposed to the 155 square feet previously utilized. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense previously had granted a waiver for the fiscal year 1973 military construction program based on an established gross area of 165 square feet per man. This memorandum noted that the 165-square-foot criteria represented a 6-percent increase over the maximum allowance, but the Army felt that the design advantages of a new type of barracks construction, including livability, flexibility, and the requirement of the modern volunteer Army, justified this waiver.

On November 9, 1972, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense continued the waiver but not that to utilize the 165 square feet per man, coupled with the 6-percent construction cost growth, would represent an increase in costs for bachelor housing of about 19 percent over the costs presented to the Congress in fiscal year 1973. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense had attached two conditions to the granting of the original waiver at 165 square feet per man, which were, (1) that there be full disclosure by the Army to Congress, and (2) that, for guidance purposes, the total cost of the barracks facilities not exceed \$4,000 per man.

It appears to the investigative staff, from a review of a prior memorandum pertaining to the same subject, that the maximum guidance figure established by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense was intended to maintain comparability of quarters among the services. In continuing the waiver previously granted to the Army in fiscal year 1973, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, while "strongly discouraging" a gross area in smaller projects of 165 square feet per man, extended the same waiver to include the smaller projects for fiscal year 1974. Moreover, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense planned to study the results obtained from granting the waiver for large projects to ascertain whether the waiver should be continued in fiscal year 1975.

#### A. ENLISTED MEN'S BARRACKS COMPLEX—2,522 MEN

##### *1. Present Facilities*

Housing for bachelor enlisted men at Fort Leonard Wood is available in permanent, semipermanent, and temporary buildings. The oldest buildings, temporary mobilization barracks, were constructed in 1941. Beginning in 1958, the Army used military construction, Army (MCA) funds to construct 39 permanent-type barracks to provide an additional 10,773 spaces. Also the Army used fiscal year 1967 Southeast Asia funds to construct 80 metal prefabricated barracks (semipermanent) to provide additional spaces for 1,824 enlisted men. Army records as of February 1, 1973, indicated that Fort Leonard Wood has bachelor housing assets (permanent, semipermanent, and temporary) to provide 28,381 spaces for bachelor enlisted men. The breakdown of these assets is shown below:

	<i>Number of spaces</i>
Adequate on base.....	103
Funded not in inventory.....	102
Substandard:	
Can be made adequate.....	10,568
Cannot be made adequate.....	17,588
	28,156
Private off base.....	20
	-----
Total spaces.....	28,381

Recent changes by OSD to the criteria for new construction and modernization of barracks have had a significant impact on the Army's barrack assets

insofar as their classification into "adequate" and "substandard" are concerned. These policy changes have been made a part of the new Army adequate housing program which has as its principal objective to bring Army housing up to adequate and modern standards. The Army plans to achieve the goals of this program in a 5-year period which started with the fiscal year 1973 military construction program. In selecting the locations for the new construction, the Army emphasized those installations which have shown the largest deficits in permanent construction, and which would also further the Army's overall plan to remove from its inventory all World War II temporary barracks as rapidly as possible.

The investigative staff determined that the Army has expended over \$3.9 million to improve the temporary structures at Fort Leonard Wood. The first improvements were performed with fiscal year 1957 military construction funds, under the Bruckerization program, which provided for extensive modernization, such as new lavatory facilities, new floors, new doors, and insulation. In all, 130 barracks were 'Bruckerized' at a contract cost of \$22,500 each. In addition, 30 messhalls were improved at a contract cost of \$23,000 each. The work on the messhalls included rearrangement of kitchens and installation of new floors, new equipment, and lavatory facilities.

Moreover, further improvements were made on these barracks with fiscal year 1972 operation and maintenance funds at a total cost of \$290,000. The improvements, which included the purchase and installation of portable barracks partitions, were a part of the Army barracks improvement project which was authorized and funded under the fiscal year 1972 program in the amount of \$42.5 million. According to Army testimony the intent of the program was to relieve some of the irritants of barracks living prior to moving into the modern volunteer Army program.

As planned, the proposed fiscal year 1974 new construction program at Fort Leonard Wood would, if approved, result in the demolition of most of the improved temporary World War II barracks at this installation. At the time of this investigation, the temporary barracks were being fully utilized to house permanent party enlisted men and women.

## *2. Proposed Facility*

The \$32,247,000 enlisted men's barracks complex proposed for fiscal year 1974 at Fort Leonard Wood was based on the recently approved new bachelor enlisted housing design. The architectural/engineering firm of Lyles, Bisset, Carlisle, and Wolff (LBC&W) of Columbia, S.C., won the design competition held by the Army in fiscal year 1973. According to an OCE official, some Members of Congress have received a briefing on the new design competition. The OCE official advised that, in deciding not to "put all of its eggs into one basket," the Army modified and also accepted a design concept submitted by the firm of Benham Blair and Affiliates of Oklahoma City, Okla. This official stated that, although the LBC&W concept offers more privacy, the Benham Blair concept is better suited to colder climates. Accordingly, Fort Leonard Wood will use the Benham Blair design concept.

According to the Army justification, (1) the project is required to provide barracks and troop support facilities capable of housing 2,522 personnel; (2) the project is part of the overall program to provide permanent adequate housing facilities to support the long-range strength; (3) the personnel who will occupy the new facilities are now housed in substandard, temporary buildings; (4) the installation has only 47 percent of the permanent barracks spaces required; and (5) if the project is not approved, troops of the regular Army must continue to occupy the old temporary structures which could result in low morale and seriously hamper efforts to obtain the reenlistments needed for an all volunteer Army.

If this project is approved, the Army plans to demolish 109 buildings having a total area of 406,033 square feet.

The DD form 1391 for the enlisted men's barracks complex sets forth a total figure of 461,505 square feet with justification criteria which stated that this square footage was based on maximum utilization of the complex, that is, 2,796 E2-E4 personnel at 165 square feet per person. The investigative staff noted that, if the above figures were used, the total square footage would amount to 461,340 square feet, a discrepancy of 165 square feet. Fort Leonard Wood officials could not explain this discrepancy,

In mid-April 1973 an OCE official provided the investigative staff with an updated DD form 1391 which reflected a corrected total square footage figure of 466,935. He stated this figure was based on a proposed occupancy of the complex by 2,796 E2-E4 personnel with 165 square feet per man, plus 2 square feet per man allowance for mechanical space. This official stated the DD form 1391 reflecting a square footage of 466,935 represents the revised DD form 1391 which will be submitted to Congress. This DD form 1391 shows a total cost figure of \$32,247,000 for the enlisted men's barracks complex.

### 3. Underutilization of Training Facility

According to information furnished by the Department of the Army, Fort Leonard Wood is programed to train 55,000 basic combat trainees (BCT's) per year. Currently BCT's are trained in a 9-week cycle, of which 8 weeks are for actual training and 1 week is for "fill in" (early arrivals) and facilities maintenance. At this level, Fort Leonard Wood officials project that their facility has an optimum capacity to take in 1,100 new BCT's per week. Officials at Fort Leonard Wood advised the investigative staff that Fort Leonard Wood has not actually trained as many BCT's as it has been programed to train in past years. These officials furnished the investigative staff with information, set forth as follows, which shows programed as compared to actual training levels from fiscal year 1970 forward:

Fiscal year	Programed level	Actually trained	Percent deficit
1970.....	55,000	48,000	12.7
1971.....	55,000	50,000	9.0
1972.....	55,000	34,000	38.2
1973.....	55,000	(1)	.....

<sup>1</sup> Not available.

These Fort Leonard Wood officials did not know the number of trainees they would actually train in the future under the modern volunteer Army concept.

The investigative staff was advised by CONARC officials that each Army training base currently being utilized in the United States is programed to train 55,000 BCT's per year. CONARC has the responsibility to insure that trainees are assigned in equal numbers to each training facility. According to CONARC officials, the percent shortfall in the number of actual BCT's at Fort Leonard Wood would be representative of the total Army training percent of shortfall Continental United States (CONUS) wide. In the fiscal year 1973 military construction appropriations hearings, Army officials testified that "as a result of decreased accession in fiscal year 1972, Army training center structure has been underutilized."

With respect to advanced individual trainees (AIT's), the investigative staff noted that during fiscal year 1972, Fort Leonard Wood experienced a 26.1 percent deficit in AIT engineering and a 27.7 percent deficit in AIT combat support.

The investigative staff was advised that, for planning purposes, the Army has projected a troop strength of 804,000 at the end of fiscal year 1978. As a result of anticipated troop reduction from the current approximate 1.2 million level, the cessation of hostilities in Southeast Asia, and the advent of the modern volunteer Army concept, the Army is in the process of a reorganization in order to better respond to its training mission.

At the height of Southeast Asia activities, the Army operated 13 training centers throughout the United States. Currently, the Army is operating six training centers, and there is a possibility that this number will be reduced to five in the near future. These training centers, currently under CONARC, will be placed under the new Training and Doctrine Command. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Individual Training, CONARC, advised the investigative staff that the Army will continue to equally distribute the trainees among the active training centers. However, in line with its reorganization, in order to insure a constant flow in training, the Army proposes to make the following major changes in its training format:

(1) The active training bases will be designated according to their training specialties (i.e., all engineering and mechanical training will be performed at Fort Leonard Wood).

(2) Continuity in training will be achieved by affording both BCT and AIT at the same training facility. According to the Army, this will result in the reduction, and hopefully the elimination, of the expense of transferring a trainee between phases of his training cycle.

(3) The Army will attempt to "level out" its trainee intake to eliminate peaks and valleys in its actual trainee strength. As an example, to supplement the regular training load strength during low recruitment periods, reservists will be brought in for training.

In spite of the reorganization of the Army training format, the investigative staff noted that none of the officials on any level of the Army chain of command could offer any "hard" figures to substantiate the effect of this reorganization on programed training levels. One Army official advised that it would be at least 2 years before the Army would have any figures on the impact of the modern volunteer Army concept on Army troop strength. Another Army official advised that the Army General Staff is anticipating that they can recruit 155,000 to 165,000 trainees in fiscal year 1974. These figures are based on a study conducted by a private research corporation which concluded that the Army can expect 150,000 to 180,000 trainees for fiscal year 1974. This same Army officer advised that the Army feels that they can "get what they need" in trainees over the next few years, though they could not predict past 1976.

A CONARC official advised the investigative staff that although the ASIP is programed to train a total of 273,000 troops during fiscal year 1974, CONARC feels that approximately 200,000 troops will actually be trained in fiscal year 1974. Based on CONARC's estimate, if the Army continues to operate six training centers, Fort Leonard Wood will be overprogramed by 39.4 percent. On the other hand, Fort Leonard Wood will be overprogramed by 27.2 percent if the Army operates five training centers.

#### *Bachelor housing programing deficits*

The determination of bachelor housing requirements report, DD Form 1657, is a document compiled annually by each installation. This report contains programing deficit information which is obtained from annual base surveys of adequate, substandard, and off-base housing available, and programing projections as set forth in the ASIP. The investigative staff reviewed the fiscal year 1974 DD Form 1657 for Fort Leonard Wood which showed that a programing deficit of 2,291 spaces was reported for E2-E4 bachelor enlisted personnel. The following computation shows how this programing deficit was calculated :

	Number	Source
Total E2-E4 personnel.....	2,845	ASIP.
Less: Married E2-E4 personnel.....	1,037	Fort Leonard Wood experience.
Total.....	1,808	
Program level—90 percent.....	1,627	DOD Programing criteria.
Add: Transients.....	964	ASIP and Fort Leonard Wood experience
Gross programing deficit.....	2,591	
Less: Present adequate E2-E4 housing.....	300	Fort Leonard Wood housing survey.
Net programing deficit.....	2,291	

Fort Leonard Wood officials furnished information for calendar years 1971 and 1972 which showed the total transient population, broken down by categories, as follows :

Calendar year:	Holdovers	Public Law 51	Medical holding company	Personnel confinement facility	Replacement company	BCT holdovers	Total
1971.....	1,178	1,676	2,816	6,315	933	492	13,410
1972.....	1,034	2,175	1,554	2,944	1,308	492	9,507

In spite of the fact that the transient population decreased by over 30 percent from 1971 to 1972, CONARC instructed Fort Leonard Wood to program its fiscal year 1974 transient population at 1,264 transients per month, or 15,168 for a 12-month period. It has previously been noted in this report that the Army projects