

UA  
23.3  
.A2322

**REPORT  
TO THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
ON THE**

**NATIONAL MILITARY  
COMMAND STRUCTURE**



**JULY 1978**

#04110361

UA  
23.3  
.A2322

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE

Report of a study requested by the President  
and conducted in the Department of Defense

Washington, D.C.

July 1978

## PREFACE

The last major amendment to the National Security Act occurred in 1958. Since then, a pattern of relationships has evolved between the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Joint Staff, and the Unified and Specified Commands. The resulting National Military Command Structure (NMCS) is the subject of this Report. As defined, the NMCS includes all facets of interaction among these groups, including both how the Secretary provides guidance and instructions to the JCS and the field commanders and how they provide planning and military advice to him, the President, and the Congress.

In this study I have examined the elements of the NMCS and have attempted to evaluate various aspects of their performance. I have tried to pay particular attention to ways in which organizational structure as well as personalities and attitudes influence results.

In conducting this study, my staff and I examined the relevant legislation and directives, both Secretarial and those of the JCS, that define the structure. In addition, we reviewed earlier reports on defense organization by various governmental commissions and semi-public groups as well as analyses of the NMCS by both military officers and academic specialists.

Our major source of information and judgment, however, has been the several hundred interviews my staff and I conducted with incumbent and former policymakers, military officers, and non-governmental observers. These included Secretaries, Deputy and Assistant Secretaries, senior officials in the National Security Council-interagency system, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Commanders-in-Chief of Unified and Specified Commands and their respective staffs.

I am deeply grateful to all these individuals who have been so generous with their time and frank and helpful with their observations and judgments. These form the foundation of this study. I am especially indebted to General George S. Brown who, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided full support for this effort from its inception and requested the Joint Staff and the field commands to give it their complete support also.

I, alone, am responsible for the judgments and recommendations contained in this Report. However, I could not have conducted the study without the able assistance of the following superior group of military officers and civil servants so generously detailed to me by the Chiefs of Staff and by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs: Dr. Joseph W. Annunziata; Col John B. Bellinger, Jr., USA; Col Roger C. Hagerty, USMC;

Capt Ronald F. Marryott, USN; Capt Kenneth M. Stewart, USAF; and Col John J. Wolcott, USAF.

Finally, I am gratefully in debt to Admiral John P. Weinel, USN (Ret.) for his extraordinarily able assistance. His keen insight and wise counsel, though not always heeded, importantly improved the final product.

Richard C. Steadman  
Washington, D.C.  
July 1978

## I

INTRODUCTION

In September 1977, President Carter requested that the Secretary of Defense initiate a searching organizational review of the National Military Command Structure (NMCS). He requested an unconstrained examination of alternatives for making it more effective and efficient in carrying out the national security mission. This Report presents and evaluates alternatives responsive to the President's instructions.

What emerged from the discussions and studies was a consensus that, by and large, the system has been generally adequate to meet our national security needs in peacetime, crisis, and wartime. We did find, however, a general perception of some fundamental shortcomings which may make it incapable of dealing adequately with our future needs.

The present National Military Command Structure was created by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. It has evolved, through a series of amendments up to 1958, from a decentralized National Military Establishment of separate Military Departments to today's Department of Defense (DoD) headed by a Secretary of Defense with full authority and responsibility for its operation. This authority has permitted central and coherent management of the Department, and its exercise is a major reason

why DoD, while it has its failings, is among the best managed departments in the Executive Branch.

The Military Departments organize, train, and equip the forces of their Services. They have no role in the operational employment of these forces. Combatant forces which have completed their initial training are assigned to the operational command of Unified and Specified (U & S) Commanders. The 1958 Amendment made these commanders directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

As a matter of policy, the Secretary generally exercises his command authority through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who include the Chairman, the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations. The Commandant of the Marine Corps participates with the JCS on matters of direct concern to the Corps. Their primary statutory function is to be the principal military advisers to the Secretary, the National Security Council (NSC), the President, and also the Congress. They have accordingly been charged by the President with presenting in governmental councils the military viewpoint for the effective formulation and conduct of national security policy. OSD and the JCS both provide staff assistance to the Secretary and, though separately identified and organized, are formally charged to function in full coordination and cooperation. The Joint Staff is the staff of the JCS and is managed for them by the Chairman.

The structure, which emerged in 1958 and which remains essentially the same today, was a compromise between a recognized requirement for unified direction of the armed forces and for military advice rising above individual service interests, on one hand, and the natural desire of our military services organized separately for land, naval, and air warfare to preserve their historic autonomy, on the other. It is not surprising, then, that we find some of the fundamental problems of the NMCS today to be products of the tensions inherent in that basic compromise. The central issue today is whether the NMCS, as presently organized, can work well enough to cope with the national security problems of the future.

The world has become both more complex and more dangerous for the United States than it was in 1958, and the need for sound planning of defense policy and resources and their coordination with foreign and economic policy is even more essential. The period of American pre-eminence following World War II has given way to one of precarious strategic nuclear balance. Other elements of national power are more widely diffused throughout the world, with our preponderance correspondingly reduced. New problems have arisen, such as the proliferation of nuclear capabilities at one end of the spectrum of violence and terrorism at the other, shortages of natural resources, and major changes in the international economic structure.

Moreover, defense budgets are tight, weapon systems are expensive, and technological changes are providing new possibilities which may result in altered roles for various elements of the armed forces.

This Report divides the National Military Command Structure into two broad areas. The first addresses the organization for war-fighting, as well as command and control of forces in the field. The strengths and weaknesses of the Unified and Specified Commands as now established and the experience of recent crisis situations are also examined. The second part of the study covers those aspects which relate to policy, planning, and advice. It discusses the interactions and functions of the Secretary of Defense, OSD, JCS, Joint Staff, and the field commanders in these areas.

Two important areas relating to national security are not addressed in this study. First, the National Military Command Structure, as defined in this Report, is just a part of the broader interaction of offices within the Executive Branch interested in national security and we did not address the interaction of the Secretary, the JCS, and the CJCS with the NSC and its staff, OMB, CIA, and the Department of State. Second, we did not address the command structure for nuclear war or its safeguards.

Some of the recommendations of this Report are self-evident; some are non-specific; some may be controversial.

They are mainly directed at ways to enhance the joint and unified military contribution to the national security decisionmaking process. Hopefully, they will stimulate discussion of the fundamental philosophies underlying our Defense organization.

Whatever recommendations are adopted, it is important that, within the framework of clearly defined authorities and responsibilities, the National Military Command Structure remain flexible enough to respond to different leadership, different circumstances, and different events in an unpredictable future.

## II

COMBAT READINESS, WAR-FIGHTING CAPABILITY, AND  
CRISIS MANAGEMENT

THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

The Unified Command Plan (UCP) defines the organizational structure and responsibilities of the various commands under which the Nation's combatant forces receive direction from the National Command Authorities (NCA). The present Unified Command Plan has its origin in the US command arrangements of World War II and its legal basis in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, which authorizes the President through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish combatant commands. The UCP has evolved through a series of changes to its present structure of five Unified Commands and three Specified Commands.

A Unified Command is a command composed of significant forces from two or more Services, e.g., the Pacific Command or the European Command. A Unified Commander (CINC) usually has reporting to him a component commander for each assigned Service element. Component Commanders report to the CINC on operational matters but directly to their military departments on matters of personnel and materiel support. A Specified Command is one which has a broad continuing functional mission and is usually

composed of forces from one Service, e.g., the Strategic Air Command or the Military Airlift Command.

By law, the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Unified and Specified Commanders, who exercise operational command over all forces assigned to them. The Joint Chiefs of Staff act as the military staff to the Secretary for operational direction of those forces. The Military Departments are not in the chain of command. They are responsible for the administration, training, and supply of the forces assigned to the Unified and Specified Commanders.

The Unified Command Plan is designed to reflect perceived military and political "realities" at a particular moment in time and has thus undergone numerous reviews and considerable change since 1947. Moreover, changes to the UCP are usually controversial, producing split opinions among the JCS. There are many reasons for this, such as pride of Service and allocation of four-star billets. However, debate over the UCP is intense in part because it is not possible to devise a perfect plan. It is possible to draw up four or five alternative UCPs, each one about as good as the other. For this reason, the Report contains no ultimate solutions, but rather suggests some alternatives that could be adopted in the interests of a more effective Unified Command Plan.

Several generalized recommendations have evolved from our review of the UCP. First, given the evolutionary

nature of the underlying political and military "realities," the UCP should be reviewed by the JCS and the Secretary of Defense at intervals not to exceed two years. Second, Unified Commands are joint commands by definition and as such selection of the CINC should be on the basis of the best available qualified officer with consideration given to mission and forces assigned rather than strictly to Service affiliations. Third, in considering UCP organization and functions, a CINC's "military-diplomacy" role should be an important consideration. For example, CINCs should retain at least an overview responsibility for security assistance to countries in their area; in this way they can play a useful role as spokesmen for US military interests with those countries. Finally, there is no need for Unified Commands to cover all areas of the world.

While we examined the component commands as to their operational responsibilities under the Unified Commanders and determined that the present organization can be responsive, we did not study the relationship of the component commander with his Chief of Service on matters such as supply, equipping, maintenance, administration, and discipline. Thus, we have not studied possible redundancies in functions and personnel in the Unified and component command headquarters. A special study should examine the component commands with a view

toward identifying redundancies in functions and personnel and recommending which of these redundancies are necessary and which should be eliminated. In particular, the feasibility of consolidating the components' logistic functions should be closely examined.

### US European Command

The United States European Command (EUCOM) established in 1952 is a Unified Command with three component commands: US Army, Europe; US Naval Forces, Europe; and US Air Forces, Europe. EUCOM's present area of responsibility covers all of Western Europe, including the United Kingdom and Ireland, the Mediterranean Sea and its littoral countries, and the Middle East land mass to the eastern border of Iran, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea.

EUCOM is unique in that in a NATO war it will function primarily as a support command while the NATO command structure will exercise operational command. The US Commander-in-Chief, Europe (CINCEUR) is dual-hatted as the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), while his Army and Air Force component commanders are dual-hatted as NATO Commander, Central Army Group, and NATO Commander, Allied Air Forces, Central Europe. In peacetime, EUCOM responsibilities are much the same as for all Unified Commands.

EUCOM's geographical area of responsibility is an issue of widespread concern. There are convincing arguments for limiting EUCOM's area to NATO Europe. There are also convincing arguments for maintaining its present area of responsibility, particularly the Middle East. In the case of the former, it is argued that EUCOM should be totally absorbed in its NATO mission. EUCOM should not be distracted in war or peace outside the NATO area, which in security matters is second in importance only to the United States itself. Further, advocates of this approach point to lack of European support for US efforts during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and allege that in future possible US involvements in the Middle East, EUCOM most likely will be by-passed. They would make EUCOM's area of responsibility identical with that of NATO Europe. This should lead to a smaller EUCOM staff devoted almost exclusively to NATO-related matters, which could in turn reduce political problems inherent in relocating EUCOM headquarters near the SACEUR headquarters, another worthy objective.

On the other hand, there are equally strong advocates for leaving the Middle East in EUCOM's area of responsibility. They argue that EUCOM exercises operational command over those forces, particularly naval and air forces and the communication facilities, that would most likely first be used in contingencies in the Middle East.

They also argue that the Middle East is contiguous with NATO Europe. Finally, there is the fact that the survival of NATO is as likely to be decided in the Middle East/Persian Gulf as on the plains of Central Europe. There is, therefore, a mutuality of NATO interests in the Middle East and a need for concerted, not conflicting, allied policy toward it. A USCINCEUR/SACEUR responsibility for the area will assist in furthering this goal.

A practical difficulty of removing the Middle East from EUCOM's responsibility is the problem of to whom it would be given? REDCOM is too far removed. The US Pacific Command already has an enormous area of responsibility, and its headquarters is too far away even though its area is in some cases contiguous with the Middle East. The US Atlantic Command would be a candidate if it were responsible for the Mediterranean Sea and thus had the forces in an area contiguous to the Middle East area. The Middle East could be made the responsibility of a sub-unified command reporting to EUCOM. This would enable EUCOM to concentrate on NATO-related problems and still assure senior level attention to Middle East contingency planning. It would also provide flexibility in the command structure since the sub-unified command could operate either under EUCOM or, if the situation warranted, directly under the JCS. On the other hand, a sub-unified command may involve setting up

another layer and another headquarters at some expense in manpower and infrastructure. The location of such a headquarters might also be a problem. Finally, the Middle East could be assigned to a joint task force reporting directly to the JCS, although many feel that a Unified Commander is best equipped and motivated to handle area responsibilities.

A related EUCOM issue is the assignment of responsibility for Africa south of the Sahara. Some argue that, given its political importance and level of military activity, this area should be assigned to a Unified Commander. EUCOM is already involved in security assistance and intelligence matters in this area and it clearly is an area with historic as well as present ties to Europe. Nevertheless, while present arrangements may be untidy, assigning the area to any CINC now would send signals and perhaps create expectations of involvement beyond the present intent of policymakers.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- o The Middle East should remain a EUCOM area of responsibility.
- o EUCOM should continue to plan for, and execute when directed, all contingency operations in the Middle East.
- o There should be sufficient flexibility in the Middle East planning to permit a contingency to be run directly from Washington, with EUCOM in a supporting

role and/or to permit establishment of an on-scene Unified Command reporting either to EUCOM or direct to Washington.

- o The JCS should examine the concept of a sub-unified command for the Middle East, reporting to EUCOM, and then provide their advice on the proposal to the Secretary of Defense.

- o Africa south of the Sahara should not now be assigned to EUCOM.

#### US Atlantic Command

The US Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) is a Unified Command with area responsibility for the Atlantic Ocean (excluding European coastal waters), the Caribbean Sea, the Pacific Ocean on the west coast of South America, and part of the Arctic Ocean. The Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command, is also Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), a NATO Command. In addition, he is the Commander-in-Chief, US Atlantic Fleet, because naval forces and responsibilities dominate this command.

There are no pressing problems or disputes relating to LANTCOM's present areas of responsibility. While it would be desirable to make LANTCOM a more truly unified command this would require additional area responsibility (e.g. Panama, or the Middle East) which would not be appropriate at this time.

There is some ongoing discussion of command arrangements for US and NATO maritime assets in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean and alternatives to present arrangements would have important implications for LANTCOM if adopted. Under one concept all maritime assets in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean would be under a single NATO commander, who would report to a Supreme Allied Commander, NATO. Other concepts would have CINCLANT/SACLANT having either operational or allocating authority over maritime forces in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Each of these concepts has the objective of greater flexibility in the use of naval assets in support of NATO.

While these concepts are NATO-oriented, they primarily involve US forces and implementation if any would require changes in the UCP.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- o LANTCOM should retain its presently assigned areas and responsibilities.
- o The JCS should review the command arrangements for US maritime assets in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean and determine whether these achieve optimum effectiveness for US and NATO defense postures.

#### US Pacific Command

The US Pacific Command (PACOM) is a Unified Command with area responsibility for the Pacific Ocean west of

the coast of South America, the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Bering Sea, part of the Arctic Ocean, and the Indian Ocean.

While there are currently no particular problems requiring changes in the PACOM area of responsibilities, there are two issues which will require consideration and decision sometime in the near future.

The first, and the most important, concerns the command of forces in Korea. Currently the Commander, US Forces, Korea, is under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. In recommending the establishment of a Combined Forces Command in Korea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not change the concept of CINCPAC exercising operational command of US forces in Korea. Some argue that we should now create a new Unified Command in Northeast Asia or at the very least, have a system whereby the Commander, US Forces, Korea, remains under PACOM in peacetime but in times of crises or war reports directly to Washington. Others believe we should maintain the present arrangements and the integrity of the Pacific command. Recognizing that each alternative has its advantages and disadvantages, our judgment is that if we fight again in Korea, we will establish an area command reporting directly to Washington.

What is often overlooked is that we do not know precisely how or where the next crisis, the next short war, or the next long war will eventuate in the Pacific area, including Korea. Further, we have no way of knowing the personalities of the key players, each of whom will have his own perceptions, inclinations and preferences. The key, therefore, is flexibility. Our UCP and our attitudes must be flexible enough to handle future crises/conflicts from Washington through PACOM to the Korean Command; from Washington direct to the Korean Command with PACOM on line in a support role, ready to step in and take over from Washington on short notice; or, the Korean Command acting as a Unified Command with all the responsibilities and authorities that pertain.

The other PACOM issue concerns the US Army command arrangements in the PACOM area. Currently, there is no Army component commander in the PACOM organization. There is, instead, a CINCPAC Support Group (CSG) headed by a major general that provides some of the functions of a component commander such as liaison, advice and assistance to Headquarters, PACOM and the Navy and Air Force component commanders. However, PACOM exercises operational command over Army units through subordinate Unified Commanders in Korea and Japan and through the US Army Support Command in Hawaii.

Some believe that the Army component, US Army Pacific, should be reestablished. Among the reasons cited is the need for more senior advice to CINCPAC

on regional Army matters and for more senior Army representation in military-diplomatic activities in this large area where ground forces play important roles in many countries. Others believe that a component command is not needed since support of Army forces in the Pacific is handled directly between Washington and the sub-unified commands. Therefore, they argue that if CINCPAC needs more senior Army representation, a three-star Army officer on CINCPAC's staff would be sufficient since there is no need to build a larger headquarters for this purpose. Others argue that the current CSG organization should be maintained as a test bed for future, more streamlined component command structures.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- o PACOM should retain its presently assigned areas and responsibilities.
- o Planning, practices, and attitudes regarding crisis/wartime command arrangements for US Forces, Korea should retain maximum flexibility to permit alternative arrangements to include the present command organization, direct command by Washington of US Forces, Korea or a combination of the two. Where organizational decisions cannot be made to accommodate these alternatives, they should be made in favor of an assumption that there will be a Unified Command reporting directly to Washington.
- o The Army Component Command should not be reinstated unless a convincing argument is made that this

would be demonstrably more effective than present arrangements.

### US Readiness Command

The United States Readiness Command (REDCOM) is a Unified Command exercising operational command over all US Army and US Air Force combatant forces in the United States not assigned to other Unified or Specified Commands. REDCOM's primary responsibility is to provide a general reserve of combat-ready forces to reinforce other Unified or Specified Commands. REDCOM is charged with the planning for overseas deployment of Army and Air Force units to support the contingency plans of the overseas commander. REDCOM is also responsible for joint training and joint exercises as well as for the development of joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint employment of forces.

Navy and Marine Corps general purpose forces are not assigned to REDCOM. They are assigned to PACOM, LANTCOM, and EUCOM. There are, however, Navy and Marine Corps officers assigned to REDCOM headquarters to help assure compatibility of joint force employment and deployment planning.

There is a vocal body of opinion which favors disestablishing REDCOM and assigning its functions elsewhere: joint training and doctrinal developments on a rotating basis between Training and Doctrine Command

(Army) and the Tactical Air Command (Air Force), and deployment planning to a unit attached to the JCS. This leaves unanswered the question of where to assign operational command of those forces without violating the principle of command of combatant forces by Unified and Specified Commanders, through the JCS to the Secretary of Defense. (More Army divisions and Air Force tactical aircraft are assigned to REDCOM than any other Unified Command.) As importantly, it would diffuse the emphasis on joint training when the emphasis should be to expand these efforts. Finally, in the area of deployment planning, REDCOM has developed expertise and capability far beyond any other command or organization which might assume this function if REDCOM were disestablished.

REDCOM should be considered for an increased role as the focal point of the day-to-day aspects of the mobilization/deployment planning of all the CINCs, particularly as they pertain to coordination of lift requirements for all Services and the detailed management of the movement of men and materiel during a major reinforcement of a CINC or CINCs. REDCOM would not have authority to allocate lift between CINCs. This would remain with the JCS/Joint Transportation Board (JTB). REDCOM would coordinate the requirements of all CINCs as articulated in the Time Phased Force Deployment Lists. Because of its computer capability and staff expertise, REDCOM appears to be ideally suited to assume

the additional responsibilities as the CINCs' point of contact for coordination of lift requirements for all Services, thus relieving the CINCs of tedious detailed management of force movements within CONUS.

Coordination of common user lift assets of the three Transportation Operating Agencies (TOAs) is a function of the JCS/JTB as defined in the JCS Pub 4. However, it is envisioned that during a major reinforcement of a CINC or CINCs, the JCS/JTB will be deeply involved in the adjudication of major airlift/sealift allocation issues and will not be able to address detailed wartime transportation movement problems. REDCOM thus becomes an ideal candidate to relieve the JCS/JTB of the detailed management of transportation problems/issues.

Increased participation of Naval and Marine forces in REDCOM joint exercises should be directed by the JCS. Finally, REDCOM should play a more active role in developing joint tactics/doctrines for all forces, including identifying deficiencies in materiel or Service training programs and procedures whose correction would enhance joint operations.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

o REDCOM should be designated as the focal point for the coordination of the day-to-day aspects of mobilization/deployment planning of all CINCs, particularly as they pertain to lift requirements and detailed

follow-through during major reinforcements.

- o REDCOM should have greater Naval and Marine forces participation in its joint training exercises.

- o REDCOM should be given a broader, more active role in developing joint doctrine for all forces.

- o Navy and Marine participation on the REDCOM staff should be increased to achieve these objectives.

#### US Southern Command

The US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is a Unified Command with area responsibility, except for air defense and protection of sea communications, for Central and South America (excluding Mexico). Except for the defense of the Panama Canal and Canal Zone, contingency planning is oriented primarily toward evacuation of US nationals and disaster relief. SOUTHCOM's other responsibilities include security assistance activities and Service training missions.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously recommended disestablishment of SOUTHCOM as a Unified Command. This recommendation was made at a time when there were great pressures to reduce headquarters and staffs. Since that time SOUTHCOM has reduced its staff by almost 50 percent. It has reduced its flag officers from six to three and dual-hatted two of the three.

As a result of the new treaty with Panama, there will be an initial transition period of some 3-5 years

for turnover of Canal responsibilities and facilities. Unquestionably, it serves the best interests of everyone concerned not to disestablish SOUTHCOM during this transition period.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- o Retain SOUTHCOM as presently constituted for at least the period of negotiation and transfer of responsibilities and facilities resulting from the Panama Canal treaties.

- o When this transition period is over, review the future of SOUTHCOM in light of the then-prevailing military/political environment.

#### Strategic Air Command

The Strategic Air Command (SAC) is a Specified Command composed of US Air Force forces whose primary responsibility is the strategic retaliation mission.

Because of the assignment of ballistic missile submarines to PACOM, LANTCOM, and EUCOM, these commands also share a responsibility for the strategic retaliation mission. The establishment of a Unified Strategic Command to control all strategic forces has previously been recommended, although not within DoD. At present, target selection and integration of assigned delivery vehicles are done by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), a combined effort of the Air Force and Navy. We could find no serious complaint with the

"joint nature" of its work.

In addition, a Unified Strategic Command would not eliminate the requirement for naval control of all sub-surface and surface vessels to prevent mutual interference. Thus, positioning of ballistic missile submarines would in any event be delegated to subordinate commands.

A Strategic Command, while looking neat on a wiring diagram, would be an unnecessary layer between the NCA and the fighting forces.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- o None.

#### Military Airlift Command

The Military Airlift Command (MAC) was designated a Specified Command in 1977. MAC's primary mission is providing airlift support to the Unified and Specified Commands.

Examination of MAC raised the related issue of establishment of a Unified Transportation Command composed of the Military Airlift Command, Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). A Transportation Command is an attractive concept, but on examination it is difficult to find any clearly demonstrable benefits. What is clear is that it would require the establishment of a major headquarters,

expensive in money and manpower, which would, in fact, be a presently unjustifiable layer in the total command structure.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- o None.

#### Aerospace Defense Command

Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM)--a Specified Command--is the single manager of US forces for the surveillance, warning, and defense of the United States against aerospace attack. ADCOM's Commander-in-Chief is dual-hatted as the commander of NORAD, a bi-national United States and Canadian command.

The Air Force has conducted a study of alternatives for changing the management of assets currently assigned to ADCOM without changing its basic missions. This classified study is currently being reviewed by appropriate authority for possible implementation. Therefore, it is not discussed in further detail in this Report.

#### WARTIME/CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Vietnam is the only war we have fought since the major reorganization of 1958 and it was thus a test of the NMCS under wartime conditions. We did not undertake a detailed analysis of the DoD management of the war in Vietnam, as this would have been far beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, some general observations

about the management of this war can be made.

First, and most importantly, however imperfect our command arrangements may have been, few would make the case that the nature of the command system had any appreciably negative effect on the conduct of the war. Good people, operating under the pressure of war, made the command structure work despite its shortcomings.

Second, in thinking about the future we should take little comfort in the fact that we were able to work with a jury-rigged command structure in Vietnam. In that war, we had lots of time and a relatively low level of direct military threat under which to make adjustments. Planning today must assume a requirement to adjust to war overnight.

Third, Washington certainly was too deeply involved in the details of actually running the war, particularly the air war in the north. On the other hand, we believe that Washington failed to use the analytical tools available to evaluate both overall policy and operational performance. Neither the reasonableness of stated objectives and the strategy for obtaining them, nor the cost-benefit analysis of various tactical options was subjected to rigorous scrutiny. Moreover, Washington did not always exercise independent judgment when evaluating requests from commanders in the field. There was a tendency to give the commander what he wanted.

If the US ever again is involved in a protracted

war, its basic premises, its strategy, and its tactics should be subjected to rigorous analysis in Washington.

Much as Vietnam provided a test under wartime conditions, a crisis involving the use of military force is also a key test of how well the National Military Command Structure performs under pressure. A crisis tests not only the war-fighting and readiness capability of the forces; it also tests the ability of the system to produce advice that is usable to key decisionmakers and the ability of the system to relay their orders.

The following crises were examined: Middle East War (1967); Sinking of the USS Liberty (1967); Capture of the USS Pueblo (1968); Middle East War (1973); Cyprus War (1974); Evacuation from Cambodia (1975); Evacuation from Saigon (1975); Seizure of the SS Mayaguez (1975); Beirut Evacuations (1976); and the Korea "Tree Cutting" Incident (1976).

Each of these crises was unique: some were large and some were small (in terms of forces required); some were fast-breaking and some slow: some had tight, centralized control and some were decentralized; some could be foreseen and pre-planned in detail and some could not. In other words, these ten crises provided a broad spectrum for analysis and an indicator of the range of situations to be expected in the future.

By and large, the command structure performed well

in these crises. Put another way, the overall structure itself was seldom a factor in any of the shortcomings observed. One reason is that the system has been self-correcting. Deficiencies noted in one crisis were generally corrected before the next.

Information is a key ingredient in any crisis. The information gathering and reporting system has changed dramatically over the past 20 years. Rapidly developing technologies have improved the speed, quality, and quantity of the information flow through communications and data processing systems. Major organizational improvements in the flow of information have come with the gradual improvement of the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). Since the early 1970s communications failures have increasingly become a rarity. Policymakers can now reasonably expect to obtain timely information from the field (although early reports probably will be confused or inaccurate) and to have their instructions quickly and accurately relayed to the appropriate military forces. At the same time, the virtual revolution in information system capability presents the NMCS with a new set of challenges.

One of the major issues in crisis management is the extent to which the established chain of command is actually used during crises. The military command structure has changed little since it was established in

1958. Yet, communications capabilities have improved to a point where it now is possible for a remote decision-maker to talk directly to an on-scene commander. Thus, it is relatively easy to by-pass the military chain of command.

Some believe that the very existence of this capability impels decisionmakers to become overly involved in the details of crisis management. Crises are important events and the speed and extent of the flow of information to the public makes every crisis an event with political implications. Thus, key decision-makers get involved in what may seem to some to be minute details because they want personally to insure a successful outcome. In addition, there is a natural tendency for a key decisionmaker to want to speak with someone at the scene of the crisis--to add a flavor that is unobtainable in Washington or to verify a key piece of information upon which to base a subsequent decision.

On the other hand, the professional military tend to believe that the chain of command should generally be followed as closely as possible. They believe that the principle of "unity of command" is important and that the commander on the scene is best qualified to exercise it. They feel that by-passing levels of command increases the risk of failure and the risk to the forces involved. Further, the professional military

believe that commanders should be told "what" to accomplish--and not "how" to do it.

Many military officers are concerned also with the possibility that lower echelons/commanders will "pass the buck" and not take effective action in a crisis situation if they know that their every move is subject to immediate scrutiny from a very high level. They may lose their initiative, a quality which can be decisive in a fast-moving situation.

In sum, military commanders must be aware that any use of military forces will be of interest to the National Command Authorities and that employment of these forces may be closely directed from Washington. The civilian leadership, on the other hand, should be aware that by-passing the established chain of command does cause problems and may add some risks.

A related issue concerns the need for close coordination between the President and the Secretary of Defense during a crisis. Although in a crisis the President has a number of advisers in addition to the Secretary of Defense, orders to the field commands should be clearly identified as emanating from the Secretary as well as from the President--and not be transmitted separately by Presidential advisers acting in his name. By-passing the Secretary undermines his authority over the combatant forces.

A further issue is the possible misinterpretation

of decisions made by the National Command Authorities. In some crises directives were not written and verified; they were issued orally. At times, different receivers interpreted the guidance differently, and a degree of confusion resulted.

In addition, there has not always been a "feedback" channel to the decisionmakers to inform them whether or not their decisions have been implemented. For example, in June 1967, a message was directed to the Liberty to move away from a combat area well before the attack on the ship occurred. Although there was plenty of time, the message did not arrive before the attack which disabled the ship and killed/wounded members of her crew. However, there was no feedback to key decisionmakers that the message had not been received.

Another facet of crisis management is the adequacy of the system in providing key decisionmakers with military options, and risk assessments, in a timely manner. In general, we found that during crises the system has provided a range of military options sufficiently broad to satisfy the decisionmakers.

Risk assessments, however, are only as good as the information on which they are based. In some crises, such as the recapture of the Mayaguez and the landing on nearby Koh Tang Island, the intelligence information available to military commanders in the field did not

accurately reflect the actual size of the hostile forces to be encountered. Thus, these risk assessments tended to be inaccurate and unexpected losses were taken.

Those crises that were built around a CINC's plan seemed to run more smoothly than those that were predominantly conducted ad hoc. This was in part because events for which there are plans are, by definition, to some degree foreseeable. The value of a contingency plan is not so much in the completed product, but in requiring staffs at all levels to pre-plan their arrangements for meeting various possible crisis situations. Contingency plans were used in part or in toto in most of the ten crises.

Finally, there is some question as to whether the NMCS adequately utilizes data-processing capabilities that are now economically feasible and available in preparation for its support of the NCA at a time of crisis. In particular, the system may need to improve its capability quickly to generate adequate responses to "what is" and "what if" questions asked by decision-makers. There is no such thing as enough information in a crisis. Somebody will always want more. Nevertheless, the state of the art in data management has changed radically in the last few years and the system may not have evolved to take full advantage of these changes. The way to find out is to exercise the system on a real-time basis against realistic hypothetical crises.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

o The chain of command to be used in any particular crisis should be clearly enunciated at the outset. If any element is to be by-passed, it should remain fully informed of developments. There should be no confusion as to the proper flow of communications and the locus of responsibility.

o NCA decisions during crises should be written and verified whenever possible. Even oral decisions required during emergencies should be followed up immediately in writing. In addition, feedback mechanisms should be established to insure that decision-makers know the status of implementation.

o A variety of NMCC-centered command post exercises responding to realistic hypothetical crises should be undertaken to test the ability of the NMCS to support the NCA. Senior level policymaking personnel should be encouraged to participate.

## MANAGEMENT OF THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

### The Role of the CINCs

The CINCs command all forces assigned to them and are responsible to the President and the Secretary for the operation of these forces. At times in the past there have been questions regarding the control a CINC has over forces assigned to him. However, we found that each CINC believes he has full operational command over his forces, as provided for by the 1958 amendment

to the National Security Act.

The CINCs are key figures in the NMCS. They are responsible for assuring that the forces under them are capable of protecting US interests, in a combat situation if required, on a moment's notice. CINCs are given large geographic and/or functional responsibilities for which they are held fully accountable.

On the other hand, most CINCs have limited power to influence the capability of the forces assigned them. Although they provide inputs to the JCS on force structures and readiness, their views have no formal articulation in the budgetary decisions at either the Service or the Secretarial level. Secretary Brown has taken steps to overcome this shortcoming; he now receives a quarterly report direct from each CINC. These reports establish a useful dialogue in areas of research and development, force balance, resource allocation, and readiness. They provide the CINCs' personal judgments on areas which impact on his mission.

This mechanism, however, does not address the fundamental difficulty inherent in the organizational structure. The CINCs' forces are trained and equipped by their parent Services, who control the flow of men, money, and materiel to the CINC's components. The Services (and the components) thus have the major influence on both the structure and the readiness of the forces for which the CINC is responsible. Later

in the report we will suggest ways for the CINCs to participate in the resource allocation decision process (PPBS), as it relates both to capabilities of forces in being (O&M funds) and to the composition of future forces.

#### Role of the Chairman, JCS

The Chairman is key to the superior functioning of the command system. He is, in practice, the link between the operational commands and the NCA. As such he passes NCA directives in the field and is the CINCs' primary point of contact in Washington.

Nevertheless, DoD directives now in force do not provide the CINCs with a single military superior in Washington. This has two negative aspects. First, the CINCs do not have a formal spokesman in the Washington arena to assure that their viewpoints are part of the decisionmaking process. Second, there is no single military officer responsible for overseeing and directing the activities of the CINCs: they have no military boss per se. These are both functions which the Chairman now informally, and in part, fulfills, but he is naturally inhibited by not having a clear formal mandate. We believe the Chairman should now be given authority to play a more active role with the CINCs, and that this authority should be formally delegated to the Chairman by the Secretary. **The CINCs**

would continue to be directly responsible to the Secretary, as required by law, but the Chairman would become both their spokesman in Washington and the Secretary's agent in managing the CINCs.

It is important that the JCS as a body continue to act as the immediate military staff to the Secretary. This insures that he will be directly exposed to differing judgments and advice where they exist. However, a committee structure is not effective for the exercise of military command or management authority. Such authority could be more effectively exercised by the Chairman, who in being so empowered, should also be directed to act in consultation with the other JCS members when time permits.

An expanded and formalized role for the Chairman in managing the Unified and Specified Commands would include a responsibility for advising the Secretary on the war-fighting capabilities (readiness) of the forces and for assuring that the CINCs' views on resources required to correct identified deficiencies are adequately addressed in the allocation process.

There are now many detailed reports on the operational readiness and war-fighting capability of the combatant forces. However, these reports are focused on unit, not joint combatant force, capabilities; they use differing standards among Services; they are not designed to tie into the resource allocation process;

and they do not focus on alternative corrective action possibilities.

Reports to senior levels should concentrate on joint combatant forces, not unit capabilities. However, the JCS definition of operational readiness is narrow:

The capability of a unit, ship, weapon system, or equipment to perform the missions or functions for which it is organized or designed. May be used in a general sense or to express a level or degree of readiness.

This definition describes a mere aggregation of uni-Service units and systems. The reports, therefore, do not describe the capability of a joint combatant force "to perform the mission or function for which it is organized or designed." Existing reports do not address the full spectrum of choices for improving joint war-fighting capabilities, which include modernization, force structure changes, and even roles and mission changes. Standardized reports probably are not suitable for the address of such a broad spectrum of alternatives, but reporting from the CINCs themselves should address these possibilities. Finally, there is no direct linkage between the readiness reporting systems and the JCS role in the budget process; thus, there is no joint military advice to the NCA for the correction of identified capability deficiencies.

The recommendations of the CINCs and the Services on improving the joint war-fighting capabilities of the

combatant forces are provided in a very general way in JSOP Volume II. However, this document is not designed for the assessment of readiness, and its inadequacies for NCA decisionmaking on resource allocation will be noted later in the Report. Further, since many "readiness" deficiencies fall into the Operations and Maintenance portion of the budget, they do not appear in the JSOP.

Constrained resource recommendations combining the various aspects of war-fighting capability, such as readiness, modernization, and force structure, are provided only in the Service Program Objectives Memoranda (POM) submitted annually to the Secretary. There are, however, no constrained joint recommendations on the Service POMs. The continuing refinement of the DoD program and budget subsequently involves the joint process only on selected major issues, rather than on alternatives, trade-offs, or a total program approach. Thus, the CINCs have no direct input into the budget process and no joint spokesman in the PPBS to represent their views on improvements to the capabilities of their forces. Moreover, the Secretary lacks joint military advice on resource allocation issues regarding readiness, except to the extent that it is provided informally by the CJCS. These gaps represent serious limitations in the NMCS in the planning and management procedures for maximizing the war-fighting capability of the combatant forces within the limitations of fiscal realities.

Because the CINCs and the JCS now have a minimal role in the corrective decisions, the initiation of corrective action is left largely to the Services. Because such actions relate mostly to expenditures on forces in being they are particularly important to the CINCs. The process should be changed to provide a formal input from the CINCs to the Chairman regarding the CINC's assessment of deficiencies of forces assigned to him and resource actions required to correct these deficiencies. With appropriate staff support, the Chairman could analyze inputs from the CINCs and then assure that these assessments of priority actions are considered by the Services and the Secretary of Defense in the budget decision process. Some of this now goes on in a continuing and generally informal manner. But the role of the CINCs and the Chairman in the resource allocation process should be expanded and formalized.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- o That the role of the CINCs be expanded to include a participating voice in determining requirements of the forces under his command.

- o That the Secretary designate the Chairman as his agent for supervising the activities of the CINCs and that to facilitate this, he amend present directives to indicate that he will normally transmit his orders to the CINCs through the Chairman who will act in

consultation with the JCS when time permits. The JCS would remain as the immediate military staff to the Secretary.

- o That the Services/JCS/OSD conduct an in-depth review of readiness/capabilities reporting with a view toward developing a system which will provide the Secretary with detailed, thorough, and well articulated information on readiness and force capabilities including limitations, and recommendations for deficiency correction.

- o That the Chairman, supported by the CINCs, be given a formal role in resource allocation planning and decisions.

## III

POLICY, PLANS, AND ADVICE

Clear and responsive professional military advice to the NCA is a prerequisite to successful defense planning. Equally, the articulation of clear national security policy is a prerequisite to sound military planning and advice. This section deals with these three important functions of the NMCS--policy, planning, and advice--and its effectiveness in producing them.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND OSDCivilian Control

Civilian control over the military has been a basic tenet of our Nation since its founding, and the effectiveness of this control has been a basic question in the evolving legislation on DoD organization. We find that the concept of civilian control over the military is unquestioned throughout the Department. It is a non-issue. Our military forces are fully responsive to the command and control of the duly constituted civilian authorities; the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Secretary.

Problems do exist in the relationship between other OSD officials and the military. There is a perception among many military officers that OSD officials below the Secretary and Deputy Secretary sometimes improperly attempt to direct the Joint Chiefs, the Joint Staff,

or the field commands. The military feel this is an extension of the concept of civilian control beyond the intent of the law. A different and more important problem is the manner in which civilian control is sometimes exercised. Many military officers believe that OSD's increasing involvement over the last thirty years in details of implementation--the "how"--as well as the establishment of the policies--the "what"--represents an intrusion into details beyond that needed for the legitimate exercise of policy direction. Moreover, they contend that detailed "how" directions from OSD authorities tend to stifle military initiative which will, over the long run, result in degraded performance.

Organizational adjustments cannot deal with these issues. It is a matter of attitudes, management styles, and perceptions of the proper role and level of OSD direction. Officials in OSD should be sensitive to these issues and careful to exercise only such authority as has been clearly delegated to them by the Secretary.

On the operational side OSD should limit its "how" directives and encourage military initiatives to the extent compatible with reasonable exercise of OSD policy direction. Field commanders are responsible for the security of their forces and are sensitive to the possibility that detailed "how to" orders may so limit their flexibility as to jeopardize their discharge of this responsibility. On the other hand, military

actions have political implications, and the Secretary of Defense thus must be able to monitor JCS messages which provide operational instructions that derive from mission-type orders.

#### Policy Direction

Policy direction is the primary responsibility of OSD. Such direction naturally encompasses all areas of DoD activities. That which relates to the NMCS includes guidance for strategic planning, both in the near term, to include the preparation of contingency plans, and future force plans.

In the area of force planning, effective policy direction requires the statement of policy and objectives which can form the basis for military planning and from which derive the DoD program and budget. Most military officers believe that more clear and definitive national security policy guidance is needed for strategic planning. If adequate policy guidance is not given to military planners, they must prepare their own, as a necessary starting point. Some argue that previous national security policy guidance was too general to be useful, and it certainly is true that vague or all-encompassing statements of defense policy objectives are of little help in detailed force planning. On the other hand, programs constructed without clear policy directives can only be prepared on the basis of policy goals determined by the programmer himself, but often

not made explicit for senior decisionmakers to accept or reject. Policy goals and alternatives should be made as explicit as feasible and subjected to the test of scrutiny and debate. This procedure would insure rigor in their formulation, consistency with the goals of the NCA, and better understanding of the policy by those who are charged with its execution. We believe, therefore, that a serious effort must be made to provide policy guidance which defines the national security objectives we expect our military forces to be able to attain.

In the area of policy guidance for operational plans there is a need for at least an annual review by the Secretary and selected key assistants of the principal military plans to assure that their political assumptions are consistent with national security policy. Such briefings also would broaden the understanding of key policymakers of military capabilities and options in the event of crisis or conflict.

The JCS are sensitive to the fact that only the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary are in the operational chain of command and, thus, strictly interpreted, only they have a "need to know" regarding operational plans. While security of operational plans is critical, present arrangements place too great a burden on the Secretary and Deputy Secretary for assuring that there is sufficient continuing policy guidance in these areas. This responsibility

should be delegated to the Under Secretary for Policy.  
Studies, Analysis, and Gaming

The OSD, the JCS, and the Services all have in-house and contract capabilities for studies, analysis, and gaming which form the basis for recommendations in key areas of policy, strategy, and force planning. These studies often have differing results due to wide divergence in models, assumptions, approaches, and computer applications.

Few argue that all defense studies, analysis, and gaming should be centrally controlled. To do so would severely restrict each agency in developing its positions. On the other hand, centralized coordination and dissemination of results would reduce some overlaps and insure wider benefits for the work done.

Secretary Brown has already taken action to improve the management of DoD studies performed by OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services, particularly in support of the PPBS. These studies would be more useful to the Secretary of Defense and the JCS if some proceeded from a common focus, while insuring that dissenting views are expressed. The issues for such analyses include those identified areas of uncertainty or disagreement in the preceding year's PPBS cycle and should be promulgated as early as possible in the next cycle. Each agency has a particular set of responsibilities unique to it, and study assignments in these programs should be related to those responsibilities. The terms

of reference for the work in each analysis should be coordinated among interested staff agencies by the study originator. When disagreements arise on assumptions or data, they should be identified and the rationales for the opposing views made explicit. Decision authority on which assumptions or data to utilize should rest with the program originator with the dissenting views recorded. Closer adherence to schedules, wide dissemination of study results among all interested staff agencies, and avoidance of duplication are necessary. These management functions are inappropriate burdens for the Secretary of Defense/Deputy Secretary of Defense to assume and should be done by the Under Secretary for Policy. Similar improvement by the JCS in the management of the study program to support JSOP or its successor is also needed and will be discussed later.

#### The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

We believe that the Under Secretary for Policy can play an important role in the NMCS. He should be the focal point for policy coordination between the OSD and JCS, as well as between DoD and the rest of the national security bureaucracy. He should act for the Secretary in monitoring JCS plans for conventional, limited nuclear, and strategic nuclear war to assure that they reflect Presidential and Secretarial guidance and should bring to the attention of the Secretary and/or the JCS issues in these areas which merit fresh consideration in DoD

or elsewhere. This office should work with the Joint Staff and appropriate elements in OSD and other government agencies in developing long-range plans on national security policy matters. Defense planning is now largely limited to the five-year length of the Defense Program and such coordinated long-range planning should prove useful to the Secretary and Joint Chiefs in their consideration of future force structures or other policy issues and as guidance for military planning. This office should be responsible for assuring that the annual Consolidated Guidance and documents based upon it clearly define the security objectives, and their order of priority, our forces are designed to attain. It should also manage the OSD program of studies, analysis, and gaming in the areas of policy, strategy, force planning, and resource allocation. Finally, the Under Secretary for Policy should coordinate the DoD input to the implementation of national intelligence matters.

The offices of the Assistant Secretaries (ISA) and (PA&E), the Director of Net Assessment, and the DoD intelligence agencies should be integrated under the Under Secretary for Policy. This integration would enhance coordination between OSD offices dealing with policy issues, insure that all studies and analyses are in the context of national security policy, and relieve the Secretary of the burden of arbitrating the details of dissenting views. It would also clarify and sharpen

debate surrounding program issues. The various proponents often proceed from different and unidentified policy premises, making it virtually impossible to rationalize differences in program terms. On the other hand, on many key issues the Secretary will need the unfiltered judgments of these offices. There should be no compromise to this principle.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- o Specific national security policy guidance, which sets objectives our forces should be capable of attaining, should be provided to the JCS but without undue detail about how they are to be attained.

- o The Secretary of Defense, his Deputy, and selected key assistants should regularly review current military operational planning.

- o The role of the Under Secretary for Policy should include:

- oo Assuring that national security policy and objectives are provided to and reflected in JCS/JS plans for contingencies/crises, conventional wars, and tactical and strategic nuclear wars.

- oo Developing long-range national security policy plans for consideration by the NCA.

- oo Assuring that national security objectives are reflected in the Consolidated Guidance and other PPBS documents.

- oo Coordinating DoD input to national intelligence matters.

oo Coordinating the annual study, analysis, and gaming program conducted by DoD and outside agencies to resolve major issues in policy, strategy, force planning, or resource allocation.

o The Assistant Secretaries for ISA and PA&E, the Director for Net Assessment, and the DoD intelligence elements should report to the Secretary through the Under Secretary for Policy, who would have tasking and coordinating responsibility for these offices, while they would retain responsibility and control over the substantive judgments and evaluations of their offices.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE JOINT STAFF  
Organization, Functions, and Procedures

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were formed during World War II for combined strategic planning with their British counterparts. Their legal status and functions were formalized by the National Security Act of 1947 and have remained essentially the same since.

An underlying principle of the 1958 amendment to the Act, as proposed by President Eisenhower, was that:

"...separate ground, sea, and air warfare are gone forever...our country's security requirements must not be subordinated to outmoded or single-service concepts of war."

To this end, a Service Chief's duties as a member of the JCS take precedence over all his other duties. However, problems inherent in the dual roles of the

Chiefs as both the military leaders of their Services and members of the JCS charged with providing military advice that transcends Service positions have been recognized by every major study of DoD organization as well as in the Congressional debates on the various amendments since the 1947 law. Thus, in 1958 a Vice Chief of Staff was established for each Service, and the Chiefs were directed to delegate Service-related duties to their Vice Chiefs, so as to insure the Chiefs adequate time to devote to their Joint duties.

The Chairman of the JCS is the highest ranking officer of the military Services; however, he holds no command authority. He has the unique functions of representing the JCS in the deliberations of the National Security Council and of acting for the JCS in time-sensitive operational matters. Normally, he becomes a close personal adviser to the Secretary and the President.

The JCS are supported by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) manned by some 1300 people, of whom some 700 are military officers or their civilian equivalents. OJCS includes the statutorily limited Joint Staff, the Office of the Chairman, and JCS agencies. The Joint Staff is headed by a Director, who is selected by the Chairman in consultation with the other Chiefs and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

Each Chief is responsible to the Secretary of his Department for the management and military leadership of

his individual Service in its mission of organizing, training, and equipping its forces. This responsibility for administering an organization and budget larger than that of any American commercial enterprise can consume as much time and energy as any person can devote to it. Since 1958, the advent of the PPBS has imposed new and greater demands on a Chief's time in the management of his Service. Each Chief, therefore, has a Service Staff of over a thousand officers to assist him in this role. This staff also supports him in his role as a member of the JCS.

No law or Secretarial directive dictates how the JCS should conduct their business, nor what the relationship should be between the Joint and Service Staffs. The Chiefs themselves determine how their staffs will interact and to this end have issued a series of procedural directives covering the processing of JCS actions.

These procedures are designed, in general, to assure as extensive consultation between the Joint Staff and the four Service Staffs as the urgency of the action permits. Consultation and coordination can occur in committees at one to five levels, from the action officers (Major/Lieutenant Colonel level) to the Chiefs themselves, depending on the difficulty of the issue, the amount of time available, and the degree of contention involved. If an expedited action is necessary, the paper can be

addressed immediately by the JCS or by their principal representatives in the joint arena, the Operations Deputies, who are also dual-hatted as Deputy Chiefs of Staff for operations and plans in the respective Services. The time of the Chiefs and Operations Deputies is conserved by procedures permitting papers to be approved at levels as low as Service planners (Colonels and Navy Captains) when appropriate. These flexibilities in the system notwithstanding, it is the norm for each level to be involved in the preparation and/or review of a significant joint paper and, as well, for coordination among the various elements of each of the five involved staffs, which may be extensive on major plans or policy papers.

It is difficult for the Joint Staff to perform creditably under these procedures. The problem has been compounded by the historic unwillingness of the Services to heed the pleas of various Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the JCS to assign their most highly qualified officers to the Joint Staff. The Services have not perceived such duty as being of the highest priority and have made their personnel assignments accordingly. Many of the best officers have noted this fact and thus avoid a Joint Staff assignment if at all possible. In consequence, while the Joint Staff officers are generally capable, the very top officers of the Services more frequently are on the Service staffs.

### Military Advice

We found a generally high degree of satisfaction with the military advice which the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff personally provide the Secretary and which the Joint Staff officers provide their counterparts in the National Security Council interagency system. On the other hand, the formal position papers of the JCS, the institutional product, are almost uniformly given low marks by their consumers--the policy-makers in OSD, State, and the NSC Staff--and by many senior military officers as well. In formal papers argumentation and recommendations usually have had such extensive negotiation that they have been reduced to the lowest common level of assent. Consumers often criticize formal JCS positions as being ponderous in presentation and predictably wedded to the status quo. Thus, the joint military voice does not play the role it might on many important issues.

The joint decisionmaking system is able to deal with some issues better than others. In general, it has handled operational and most planning matters quite well. On the other hand, the nature of the organization virtually precludes effective addressal of those issues involving allocation of resources among the Services, such as budget levels, force structures, and procurement of new weapons systems--except to agree that they should be increased without consideration of resource constraints.

A Chief's responsibility to manage and lead his Service conflicts directly with his agreement in the joint forum to recommendations which are inconsistent with programs desired by his own Service. A Chief cannot, for example, be expected to argue for additional carriers, divisions, or air wings when constructing a Service budget and then agree in a joint forum that they should be deleted in favor of programs of other Services. In doing so he would not only be unreasonably inconsistent, but would risk losing leadership of his Service as well.

Accordingly, in the resource allocation area, trade-offs and alternatives are developed through dialogue and debate between OSD and the Services. The joint system plays virtually no role in this allocation process. The JCS do attempt to assess the military risk involved at various program levels and force compositions. While this is a necessary function, it is not a substitute for joint military advice on the preparation of constrained force structure options.

While the JCS are essentially reactive on arms control matters, this is an area in which their judgment of what proposals are acceptable for national security has weighed heavily in the formulation of national policy. Some feel the JCS have been essentially a negative factor, resisting change, and are too reluctant to participate in developing arms control proposals. Others believe their advice is useful in defining

the outer limits of the acceptability of arms control proposals from the standpoint of minimum risk. This is not unnatural or improper, since the primary responsibility of the JCS is to insure national security. On the other hand, some consider that JCS/Joint Staff participation in the development of innovative arms control measures which would improve security could lead to improved arms control policies. Others contend that there are sufficient arms control advocates in other Government agencies charged with that responsibility. Thus, judgments differ as to the value of the JCS advice as well as their approach to the problem.

There are also differing views as to the effectiveness of the annual JCS plan (formerly called the JSOP) which provides their recommendations for future military strategy and forces necessary to carry out national security policy and objectives at what they consider to be a prudent level of risk. This document has been criticized by many as too remote from fiscal reality ("a wish list") and too voluminous to be useful to the Secretary and the President. In consequence, the critics say, it is not read by the audience for whom it is primarily intended. On the other hand, this plan has been described by others, principally in the military, as stimulating interaction among the military staffs to develop joint military strategy and force recommendations. While its force proposals may be

considered high by some, they represent a considerable scaling back of the total requests of the CINCs. Finally, its advocates note, the JSOP establishes a benchmark which the JCS can use as a reference point in assessing the risks of various program/budget alternatives and as a goal to plan toward, even though it may be less useful to its consumers in reaching program decisions regarding forces for the near term. On balance, the JSOP is of more value to the JCS than its intended consumers.

Other contentious issues in which important Service interests or prerogatives are at stake tend to be resolved only slowly, if at all. These include basic approaches to strategy, roles and missions of the Services, the organization of Unified Commands, joint doctrine, and JCS decisionmaking procedures and documents. Thus, addressal in the system of such contentious issues as control of close air support of ground forces is initiated only when the pace of technological change or Secretarial directives force it. Changes in these contentious areas are approached reluctantly and deferred to the extent possible. This difficulty is basically systemic, although it is also related to inherent military conservatism. There is a natural tendency to be comfortable with what one understands and knows will operate and a natural skepticism to accept theoretical assertions of improvement. This tendency (pejoratively

labeled by some "fighting the last war over again") needs to be challenged more often, but challenges are difficult within the existing system which provides many avenues for delay.

Other aspects of JCS papers, more procedural than substantive, tend to reduce their acceptance among civilian consumers. The military style of writing papers is often foreign to those unfamiliar with it. Also, the extensive line-by-line negotiation by layers of multiple authors tends to reduce the continuity and incisiveness of the papers.

Furthermore in the JCS approach to problems there is a tendency to provide only what is specifically requested. Some believe this too often leads to "single solution" papers which may not be compatible with fiscal or political constraints. Others feel that this problem is a two-way street, in which the civilian leadership should formulate more precisely the questions on which they desire advice--as well as stating political, economic, or other limits on responses to the question posed. There is also a tendency to be reactive, rather than innovative or participative. There has been a trend in recent years toward fewer "split" JCS papers being forwarded to the Secretary for decision. Pressures have thus built toward developing positions on which all Services can agree, and "coordination" among the

staffs is often interpreted as a requirement for concurrence. Since the number of people who must agree on the details of a paper is large, the process tends to inhibit initiative.

Some military officers argue that the reason formal JCS advice is not found more useful by the civilian consumers is that the JCS tell them what they do not want to hear. While there may be some element of truth to this view, it implies that senior civilian leaders are not concerned about our national security and do not really want military advice. We believe rather that they are as concerned as our military leaders, but that they necessarily view the problems from a different and somewhat broader perspective which includes fiscal, political, and other imperatives besides military ones. In fact, the pleas of the decisionmakers for more forthcoming military advice seem to belie this argument.

In sum, the present system makes it difficult for the Joint Staff to produce persuasively argued joint papers which transcend Service positions and difficult for the JCS to arrive at joint decisions in many important areas. These limitations are related in part to JCS/Joint Staff procedures and style of presentation as well as to inherent tension between Service interests and a joint perspective. The style is marked by lack of crispness and incisiveness, and the approach to problems by reactivity, general conservatism,

and single solutions. Substantive content, while varying in quality depending on the subject, is either not provided, ambiguous, or of low utility in many areas of great importance. The examples described are only a selected cross-section; however, many of the issues on which effective joint advice is not being provided by the JCS are of fundamental importance to the ability of the United States to deter war and to fight one successfully, if necessary. The development of force structures and weapons systems within feasible budgets and the resolution of contentious joint military issues are the very decisions most difficult for the Secretary, the President, and the Congress to make. Thus, the joint military voice does not carry the weight it could in the decision process, especially in areas where it could be most useful and influential.

#### Alternatives For Improving Military Advice to the NCA

##### Enhancing the Role of the Joint Staff

Several adjustments to current JCS procedures, which could be made within existing legislative statutes, would, we believe, lead to improving the effectiveness and impact of the joint institutional product. One is to enhance the role of the Joint Staff and to reinforce its capability to provide the kind of integrated national planning and advice envisioned by President Eisenhower in submitting the 1958 legislation:

Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of Service.

Adjustments to JCS procedures which have most promise in this connection are: more guidance from senior levels prior to formal staffing; reduced requirement for the Joint Staff to "coordinate" with the Service staffs, substituting a requirement merely to include differing views in the body of its paper; increased use of analysis of pros and cons of alternative courses of action in JCS papers; and Service assignment of their most qualified officers to Joint Staff duty.

Unproductive conflict, particularly at lower staff levels, could be reduced if the Chairman or the JCS provided the Joint Staff with general guidance, when appropriate, on difficult and important issues prior to the initiation of staff action. In addition to reducing lower-level conflict, early guidance could also result in a final product more closely reflecting the position(s) of the senior officers. Another advantage would be that, because the principals would address the issues without responsibility to support previously prepared staff efforts, they would be better able to agree on a genuine national approach. A disadvantage is that the complexity and multiplicity of modern military problems preclude principals from being expert on all simultaneously, and

that therefore, such initial high-level guidance may not lead in all cases to more thorough or less negotiated solutions and/or may preclude innovative initiatives by the staff experts.

Another path to a more focused product would be for the Joint Staff to be relieved of any requirement for Service coordination and for it to present its product directly to the Operations Deputies. Under this procedure Joint Staff officers would solicit Service inputs, while informing them of the development of the paper. This procedure would sharpen the presentation of JCS views and place greater emphasis on a joint military perspective. Since it would eliminate the lower committees, time spent on minor issues of an editorial or non-substantive nature would diminish. Disadvantages of this procedure include an increased number of issues faced by the Operations Deputies. Moreover, their negotiations might not improve the final product. However, reducing the number of lesser issues and limiting the Operations Deputies' deliberations to major issues might overcome these disadvantages.

A variation on the above, which preserves the principle of editorial integrity for Joint Staff/JCS papers, would be for the Services and the Joint Staff to recognize that there are legitimate, different points of view and that it is the function of the Joint Staff to delineate and analyze alternative choices, with its preferred course

of action noted. The Joint Staff would articulate the positions of the Service staffs as accurately as possible and present them among other alternatives to the Operations Deputies and the JCS. This would remove the present de facto burden of obtaining Service concurrence. Service staff views would be included in the body of the paper when fundamental substantive differences exist--not as dissenting footnotes. The Operations Deputies and the JCS would then be responsible for deciding which position(s) to adopt. This procedure would provide the Chiefs with analysis of differing courses of action. Further, this format could be carried forward in papers sent to the Secretary by the JCS.

Proponents of this latter procedure maintain that it would improve presentation by recognizing legitimate differences of views, and presenting them clearly; that the quality of the argumentation would improve through successive stages of the paper; and that many divergent views would be withdrawn as the strongest argumentation became evident. Those who favor this procedure also believe that by providing the Secretary more complete military staff work for consideration of complex problems, the JCS paper would be used as the basic framework for decisionmaking and thus enhance the status of both the JCS and the Joint Staff.

On the other hand, this procedure might entail an increased workload for the JCS and/or the Operations Deputies, though all papers would not require or lend

themselves to the alternatives analysis approach. Some oppose this procedure on the grounds that the JCS view is more powerful if a single, united position is presented and/or that alternatives provide an opportunity to select choices the JCS do not favor. This view does not recognize, however, that in many situations the JCS do agree on a recommended alternative; that in many cases the Chiefs advocate differing alternatives through Departmental channels; and finally that not providing alternatives leaves their development and analysis to the staff of the Secretary. Indeed, the view that single solution positions enhance the weight of the JCS seems to overlook the fact that because the JCS advise and do not decide they may have the greatest influence by presenting the policymakers with good analyses of the pros and cons of alternative courses of action. By this procedure, the Secretary would at least have the benefit of being formally exposed to JCS analysis of possible alternatives and would thus have a better understanding of the rationale for the JCS recommendations.

If the Joint Staff is to perform the staff leadership role envisioned by the adjustments suggested in this paper, it must be staffed with the best qualified officers available. Historically, the Services have most often assigned such officers to the Service staffs and not to the Joint Staff, although recently the Services have, on their own, taken commendable actions to attempt to upgrade the quality of officers assigned to the Joint

Staff. Over the long run, however, until the Service Chiefs are committed to putting a share of their very best officers on Joint Staff duty, the situation probably will not undergo fundamental change. This will come about only when the Services believe that the Joint Staff is playing a central role in helping to decide issues of critical importance to the Service--in short, when it is addressing resource allocation, constrained force structure, roles and missions, and other contentious issues and when the recommendations of the joint process in these areas weigh heavily in the final decisions.

Secretary Brown already is taking steps to reissue and strengthen the "Gates Memorandum," which requires Joint duty as a prerequisite for selection to flag rank, in an effort to have the Services assign their best officers to Joint Staff or other Joint duty. However, the Gates Memorandum of 1959 did not succeed in this goal because the positions defined as joint duty were defined too broadly and because frequent exceptions were allowed by the Services. To make a revised directive truly effective requires that the exceptions be determined by someone with a joint perspective. Therefore, the exception authority should be delegated by the Secretary of Defense to the CJCS.

Emphasizing joint duty as a promotion criterion is important but will not in itself develop a Joint

Staff with the standard of excellence it would require if it is to provide the best possible support for the JCS and the Secretary in the national security decisionmaking process. To assemble the best officers from each Service on the Joint Staff on a continuing basis will require extraordinary measures. We suggest the Chairman be empowered to obtain assignment to Joint Staff duty of any requested officer, with due consideration for rotation requirements and the officer's career development. The criteria for such selection should be excellence in performance of staff duty as well as capacity for approaching problems from a national outlook. Exceptions would naturally have to be made, but these should be granted by the Chairman, for the Secretary, and not by the Services. Such exceptions should be recorded by the CJCS to insure that these officers are requested at a later date when they become available. By so empowering the CJCS, the Secretary would assure an upgrading of the Joint Staff.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- o The JCS should revise their procedures to:
  - oo Make the Joint Staff alone responsible for authorship of JCS papers.
  - oo Present comprehensive analysis of alternatives whenever appropriate, encouraging expression of differing views.

- oo Provide initial high-level guidance to the Joint Staff when appropriate.

- o The Secretary of Defense should reissue the Gates Memorandum with a narrower definition of joint assignments and delegate authority to determine exceptions only to the Chairman, JCS.

- o The Service Chiefs should commit their most outstanding and highly qualified officers for assignment to the Joint Staff.

- o The Secretary should empower the CJCS to obtain assignment to the Joint Staff of any requested officer, with temporary exceptions determined by the CJCS.

#### Increasing the Responsibilities of the CJCS

Adoption of the foregoing procedural and personnel assignment suggestions should result in significant improvements to the formal product of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and thus increase the weight of their advice in the national security decisionmaking process. They would not, however, correct a central limitation in the present system, namely, its inability to address effectively resource allocation and constrained force structure issues because of the Service Chief's dual role as a Joint Chief and as the military leader of his Service.

There are several possible adjustments to the present structure which would address this basic problem. One would be to formalize and expand the Chairman's present

role as an adviser to the Secretary on those issues the JCS as a body are unable to address effectively. Another alternative would be to create a body of National Military Advisers, whose responsibilities would be limited to the Joint arena, and concentrate the Service Chief's duties on the leadership and administration of his Service.

The Nation has been well served by a series of Chairmen able to rise above Service interests in advising the President and the Secretary and in reporting to the Congress. The CJCS is the only officer with no present or future Service responsibilities, and thus he is in a unique position to provide national military advice.

The Chairman already acts as an adviser to the Secretary of Defense on budget and constrained force structure issues, but he now does so on an informal and personal basis, generally by being a participant at many of the decision meetings. He does not have adequate staff support on these issues, nor does he have a regular and formal input into the system. The Secretary could ask the Chairman to develop expertise in the Joint Staff to support him and establish a mechanism for the Chairman to have a formal input into the program and budget cycles.

If the Chairman were to be designated as the joint military adviser to the NCA on resource allocation, the views of the CINCs on major program and budgetary issues could be better articulated in the PPBS. At present, while

the CINC to some extent provides resource requirements to the JCS - the EUCOM Master Priority List being the most detailed submission - it is left to individual Service Chiefs to consider that portion of the CINC's recommendation which directly pertains to their particular Services. Under this revised system, the CINCs would provide the Chairman with a list of their resource priorities, and he and his staff could then compile the CINC inputs and attempt to adjudicate differences when required. Thus, the Chairman would end up with a priority list of those items deemed most important by the CINCs and would see that these views are considered in the decisionmaking process. Such a list quite naturally might differ from a Service-prepared set of priorities, which is why it is important that the operators have a spokesman in Washington.

If the CJCS is given increased responsibilities in the budget and resource allocation process, he will need additional staff support in the studies, analysis, and gaming area, particularly in the areas of strategy, force plans, gross costing, and analysis of risk and trade-offs. The JCS analytical capability was greatly reduced when SAGA was reduced in strength and WSEG was dis-established. The need for improved management of the annual DoD studies, analysis, and gaming programs was described earlier. The same improvements should be incorporated

into the JCS program of studies in support of JSOP. The program should be retitled to support the broader PPBS, although its scope would probably not differ greatly. Authority for the management of the program should be delegated to the CJCS. He should undertake this responsibility in consultation with the JCS and the Under Secretary for Policy, as appropriate.

As an additional action formalizing the Chairman's role as a joint adviser on resource issues, he could be made a voting member of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC), the committee which makes decisions on the development of new systems.

The major advantage of this approach would be that it would provide the NCA with a national military judgment on contentious issues without substantially changing the JCS structure which has been in existence for more than thirty years. It also would provide a mechanism to insure that the views of the CINCs are represented in the resource allocation process. A possible disadvantage of this adjustment is that it could have some adverse impact on the Chairman's role vis-a-vis the other Chiefs. The Chairman leads but does not command the JCS. To do this effectively, he must have the trust and confidence of the other Chiefs. While the Chairman's work in the resource and constrained force structure decision process would proceed in consultation with the JCS, he clearly would act from his own national perspective and not on

behalf of the individual Services or the other Chiefs. Nevertheless, the judgments he gave the Secretary would be known throughout DoD and it is not difficult to imagine how these judgments could cause friction with the Service Chiefs. On the other hand, this system would provide each Service Chief an incentive to work cooperatively with the Chairman. Our judgment is that this possible disadvantage would be manageable if the Secretary made clear to the other Chiefs his desire for a national military viewpoint on these issues and his belief that this can come only from the Chairman.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- o That the Secretary of Defense designate the Chairman, JCS as responsible for providing military advice from a national viewpoint on program and budget issues.
- o That the CJCS be established as a voting member of the DSARC.
- o That the CJCS, in consultation with the JCS and the Under Secretary for Policy, as appropriate, manage an annual study, analysis, and gaming program conducted by the Joint Staff, SAGA, contract agencies, and the Services as appropriate. It should be designed to clarify or resolve major issues in the areas of joint military strategy, force planning, or resource allocation.
- o That the Chairman be given appropriate Joint Staff support to make broad program and budget judgments.

### National Military Advisers

If the Joint Staff were strengthened through the procedures outlined and the Chairman were given these new responsibilities and the means to carry them out, it is possible that much of the dissatisfaction with the joint formal military advice would disappear. If this proves not to be the case, then solutions of a more fundamental nature directed at resolving the inherent tensions in the current organization, such as separating the joint advice and command functions from those of Service administration, would become necessary. This might be accomplished by establishing a body of National Military Advisers entirely independent of Service responsibilities, although this would be a drastic and controversial change.

The National Military Advisers (NMA) would be comprised of a senior officer from each Service, one of whom would be the Chairman. Members might previously have served as Service Chiefs or CINCs. They would be the ranking officers of the military and would be the principal military advisers to the Secretary of Defense, the NSC, the President, and the Congress. Their functions would be similar to those of the JCS today, but they would not be dual-hatted as Chiefs of their Services. Adoption of this structure would clearly separate joint planning, operations, and advice from Service administration. The NMA would be responsible for all joint functions;

the Chiefs of Staff of the Services would be responsible for organizing, equipping, and training the forces assigned to the field commands. The NMA should not return to their Service for further assignment, but could be eligible for assignment as Unified Commanders.

The NMA would be supported by the Joint Staff. In practice, both the NMA and the Joint Staff would consult frequently with, and rely importantly on, the specialized expertise of the Service Staffs, but the Joint Staff would be independent from the Service Staffs to an extent not now possible.

A National Military Adviser system would enable the joint process to regain or undertake various functions not now done or done elsewhere, either because of lack of management time or because policymakers judge the present system unduly influenced by Service interests. The NMA would have the time to reassume administrative responsibility for various Defense Agencies such as the Defense Communications Agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency, and the Defense Mapping Agency, which now report to OSD offices. Further, it could assume a broader and more direct role in the joint testing of weapon systems and in the review of joint research and development projects. On the analytical side, the NMA could undertake expanded joint war gaming and force capability analyses directed towards assisting budget and constrained force structure decisionmaking.

The NMA concept has some important advantages as well as some major disadvantages and risks. The major advantage of the NMA concept is that it would create a joint body of senior military advisers with the time and sole responsibility to provide the best joint military advice possible, uninhibited by Service responsibilities. We have noted the inability of the present JCS structure to play a major role in budget and constrained force structure decisionmaking. The separation of the NMA from Service responsibilities would permit them to address and provide advice in these areas. As importantly, in other areas of joint military advice the NMA would be able to address each issue from a national perspective, free of any Service pressure. They would not be dependent for support on separate Service Staffs, who bring Service perspectives to the addressal of the issues. Their support would come from the Joint Staff.

Another advantage in separating the joint planning, operations, and advice from Service administration functions is that it would create two positions requiring quite different abilities and would thus facilitate the assignment of senior officers with the unique talents necessary for each. The present JCS-Service Chief position requires a combination of administrator, leader, and national strategist. This is a rare combination and officers who are well-qualified in all

these areas are not always available.

We believe that establishing National Military Advisers supported by a Joint Staff independent from the Services could result in better and more influential military advice in national security matters. Others, and this category includes many and perhaps most senior military officers, believe that separating joint advice from the Service responsibility would result in reducing the weight of influence of the professional military and could also result in less meaningful military advice.

Many senior officers feel that there has been a clear trend towards centralizing decisions at the OSD level and that a major point of balance to this centralization is the weight of the dual role of the Service Chiefs as members of the JCS and military heads of their Services. In this dual role the JCS have a voice in Congress and in NSC affairs, which provides some political offset to OSD decisions. Creating an NMA, it is argued, would result in there being two sources of power (NMA and the Service Chiefs) where there now is one, neither as powerful as the present dual-hatted Service Chief of Staff. There is validity to both the thesis and the argument. The counter-argument is that an NMA system would produce advice--particularly on budget and constrained force structure issues--which would weigh more importantly in Secretarial decisions than

that produced by the present system. A better articulation of professional military views would have greater impact in offsetting OSD views. Moreover, the weight of the advice would be enhanced by its being truly joint and national in outlook.

It is also argued that an NMA-Service organization would risk fractionating present Service cooperation and reverse the present movement towards a more joint approach to operations and advice. Those who hold this view see a possible return to the pre-eminence of overriding Service interests, less consideration of cross-Service trade-offs, and a polarization of differing and conflicting Service doctrinal positions. They fear that much of the progress towards unity of action accomplished since 1947 would be risked by creation of an NMA-Service organization. No clear evidence supports or refutes these honestly-held judgments, but the possible damage seen by those who hold these views is clearly a risk.

Establishing an NMA would increase the number of power centers within DoD and might make more difficult both internal management and external presentation of DoD views. The Congress, for example, is not likely to refrain from asking a Service Chief his views on a national security policy issue, and absent his present bond to the JCS corporate positions, a Chief would be free to express views contrary to those of the NMA or the Secretary.

Separating Service responsibility from joint advice has been criticized on the ground that it might create an "ivory tower" mentality among the joint advisers. This is summarized by statements such as: "Separating advice from responsibility to carry it out will produce unsound advice." Or, "If advisers are not responsible for the day-to-day functioning of their Service, they will lose touch with what's going on." These arguments can be considered broadly under operational and planning advice.

Operations are now conducted by forces under the command of the Unified and Specified Commanders. They are responsible for fighting the combatant forces under their command and it is to them that Washington should go for information on the status of forces and judgments on the feasibility of operational proposals. We recognize that the Service Chief has proximity to the Secretary and that his opinions will be solicited. In particular, since the Services are charged with the support of the forces their judgment on the feasibility of such support would be a necessary ingredient to decisionmaking. Nevertheless, the responsibility for operations rests now, as well as under an NMA structure, with the U & S Commanders.

The planning functions of a joint body, either the present JCS or an NMA, clearly require Service-unique special inputs. However, the very nature of such

planning--either operations plans which originate with the CINCs or force structure plans--usually allows adequate time for the Joint Staff to solicit and consider such input and would permit the National Military Advisers to consult with the Service Chiefs as appropriate.

Creating National Military Advisers and limiting the Service Chief function to the military leadership and administration of his Service would require revision of the National Security Act. While we recognize many advantages that may be attributed to these more drastic alternatives, we would also urge that careful consideration be given to the strengths of the current system and to the checks and balances implicit in its design. We would argue that searching and detailed study should be given to such proposals prior to their implementation.

For the present, we recommend taking now the steps previously outlined to enhance the role of the Joint Staff, while changing the format and approach in presenting JCS advice to the Secretary of Defense, and to increase the responsibility of the Chairman, particularly in providing national advice on program/budget and constrained force structure issues. In the event that these measures are not implemented, or if they should not prove effective in resolving the basic problems of improving the professional

military advice to the NCA and insuring that their voice is more adequately heard in decisions on important national security issues, the President should consider the formation of a group of National Military Advisers.

## GLOSSARY

ADCOM	Aerospace Defense Command
ASD/ISA	Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
ASD/PA&E	Assistant Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CINCEUR	Commander-in-Chief, Europe
CINCLANT	Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CONUS	Continental United States
CSG	CINCPAC Support Group
DOD	Department of Defense
DSARC	Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
EUCOM	European Command
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JS	Joint Staff
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
JSTPS	Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
JTB	Joint Transportation Board
LANTCOM	Atlantic Command
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authorities
NMA	National Military Advisers
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NMCS	National Military Command Structure
NORAD	North American Air Defense Command
NSC	National Security Council
OJCS	Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PACOM	Pacific Command
PPBS	Planning, Programming, Budgeting System
POM	Program Objectives Memorandum

REDCOM	Readiness Command
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (NATO)
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (NATO)
SAGA	Studies, Analysis and Gaming Agency
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command
TOA	Transportation Operating Agencies
UCP	Unified Command Plan
U&S Commands	Unified and Specified Commands
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System