


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
U. S. ARMY
Lethal, Deployable, Flexible...Ready...



Project VANGUARD Final Report

A blueprint for the future...

General Support Force



15 December 1990
Fort Belvoir, Virginia

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT

- FOREWORD
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- BODY OF REPORT
- APPENDICES

FOREWORD

From the beginning of World War II until the STEADFAST Study in 1972, there had been a pattern of Army reviews involving the missions and organization of the CONUS general support forces and headquarters every five to seven years. Since 1972, reorganizations have mainly been directed at changes in the tactical forces attendant to major doctrinal revisions in 1976 and 1982. Like the STEADFAST Study, Project VANGUARD came at a time of retrenchment after a sustained buildup in military spending. Unlike previous reviews of the general support forces, however, VANGUARD had the primary mission of cost reduction while also rationalizing the force structure to a smaller total Army.

This effort must be put into the context of several sweeping defense establishment reduction initiatives resulting from strategic changes in the international balance of power that emerged in 1989. Congressional cutbacks to the defense budget prompted the Defense Management Review; severe funding reductions caused eleventh hour adjustments to force structure and procurement accounts in the FY92-97 Program Objective Memorandum; the 1989 Base Realignment and Closure Commission directed a series of base realignments, which caused major resource adjustments. These rapid, cumulative program adjustments were confusing to programmers at all levels and caused fluctuations in most decision resource data bases. VANGUARD became the latest entrant in this process as an advocate for further cost reduction.

Despite these distractions, VANGUARD in cooperation with the Army staff and the major commands, undertook a functional review of all headquarters and commands organized under tables of distribution and allowances throughout the entire Army. Soon after work began, Operation Desert Shield started. This had the advantage of providing a test for some of the emerging initiatives, which resulted in modifications. It also had the paradoxical effect of signaling a force expansion just as the full impact of ongoing force reductions was beginning to settle in on commanders.

This report provides a blueprint for the reshaping of the Army's general support forces. The net effect of all known management initiatives, including VANGUARD, will be to reduce manpower levels in TDA organizations by about 23 percent by 1997. The VANGUARD blueprint provides the only means to make those reductions in a coherent way between and among commands. Nearly half of the VANGUARD reductions have substantive concurrence with proponents and will be programmed. The remainder require further reconciliation. It is imperative that the reconciliation be made within the resource constraints recommended by VANGUARD. Because of the inter-relationship of many of the VANGUARD initiatives it is strongly urged that these concepts be developed as the vehicle by which to take the reductions.

VANGUARD has broken new ground in many functional areas. This was accomplished in cooperation with several major commands that led the way in proposing innovative ways to reconfigure and obtain efficiencies. Others sought to preserve traditional methods and were less successful in reducing operating costs. Now is the time to build on what VANGUARD has started. In the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, further resource cutbacks can be expected and it is probable that even greater sacrifices in the general support forces will be needed to preserve a modernized fighting Army.

18 January 1991
Ft. Belvoir, Va

JOHN R. GREENWAY
Major General, USA
Director, Project VANGUARD

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....EX.1

I. STUDY OVERVIEW

CHARTER.....1.1.

MISSION.....1.2.

SCOPE.....1.3.

CONCEPT OF OPERATION.....1.4.

BRAC.....1.5.

DMR I.....1.6.

DMR II.....1.7.

AMR I.....1.8.

AMR II.....1.9.

POM 92-97 FORCE STRUCTURE REVIEWS.....1.10.

II. STUDY EXECUTION

GENERAL.....2.1.

 Strategy.....2.1.a.

 Work Plan.....2.1.b.

**PHASE I: TRENDS, IMPLICATIONS, POLICIES
AND RULES.....2.2.**

 Overview.....2.2.a.

 Trends.....2.2.b.

 Implications, Policies & Rules.....2.2.c.

 Completion of Phase I.....2.2.d.

PHASE II.....2.3.

 Methodology.....2.3.a.

 Phase II Products.....2.3.b.

III. VANGUARD VISION

GENERAL.....3.1.
VISION DEVELOPMENT.....3.2.

IV. REALIGN HQDA STAFF

GENERAL.....4.1.
REALIGN THE HQDA STAFF FUNCTIONS.....4.2.
 Reduce the HQDA Staff.....4.2.a.
 Consolidate Headquarters Functions.....4.2.b.

ELIMINATE AND REALIGN FIELD OPERATING/STAFF SPT AGENCIES UNDER HQDA.....4.3.

 General.....4.3.a
 Realign FOA/SSA.....4.3.b.
 Individual FOA/SSA Evaluations.....4.3.c.
 Office, Secretary of the Army.....4.3.c.(1)
 DOD Explosive Safety Board.....4.3.c.(1)(a)
 DOD NAF Personnel Activity.....4.3.c.(1)(b)
 DOD Wage Fixing Authority.....4.3.c.(1)(c)
 Military Postal Service Agency.....4.3.c.(1)(d)
 National Committee for Employer Spt
 of the Guard and Reserves.....4.3.c.(1)(e)
 Armed Services Bd for Contract Appeals..4.3.c.(1)(f)
 Per Diem, Travel, and Trans Committee...4.3.c.(1)(g)
 Office, Deputy Under Secretary of the
 Army Operations Research.....4.3.c.(2)
 Model Improvement & Studies Mgt Agency..4.3.c.(2)(a)
 Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army
 for Financial Management.....4.3.c.(3)

US Army Finance & Accounting Center.....	4.3.c.(3)(a)
Office, Chief of Legislative Liason.....	4.3.c.(4)
Congressional Inquiry Division.....	4.3.c.(4)(1)
The Auditor General.....	4.3.c.(5)
The Army Audit Agency.....	4.3.c.(a)
The Inspector General.....	4.3.c.(6)
The Inspector General Agency.....	4.3.c.(6)(a)
Office, Chief of Public Affairs.....	4.3.c.(7)
OCA-New York.....	4.3.c.(7)(a)
OCA-Los Angeles.....	4.3.c.(7)(b)
Command Information Unit.....	4.3.c.(7)(c)
Army Broadcast Service.....	4.3.c.(7)(d)
Hometown News Center.....	4.3.c.(7)(e)
Office, Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army.....	4.3.c.(8)
Headquarters Services-Washington.....	4.3.c.(8)(a)
Defense Supply Services-Washington.....	4.3.c.(8)(b)
Space & Building Management-Washington..	4.3.c.(8)(c)
Safety, Security, & Svc Spt-Washington..	4.3.c.(8)(d)
Resource Services-Washington.....	4.3.c.(8)(e)
General Officers Mess.....	4.3.c.(8)(f)
Office, Chief of Staff of the Army.....	4.3.c.(9)
Center for Military History.....	4.3.c.(9)(a)
Army Safety Center.....	4.3.c.(9)(b)
Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans.....	4.3.c.(10)
Military History Institute.....	4.3.c.(10)(a)

Office, The Judge Advocate General.....4.3.c.(11)
 US Army Legal Services Agency.....4.3.c.(11)(a)
 US Army Claims Service.....4.3.c.(11)(b)
 Office, Chief of Chaplains.....4.3.c.(12)
 Chaplaincy Service Support Agency.....4.3.c.(12)(a)
 Chief, National Guard Bureau.....4.3.c.(13)
 NGB Operating Agency Center.....4.3.c.(13)(a)
 NGB Financial Services Center.....4.3.c.(13)(b)

REDUCE DEFENSE AND JOINT ACTIVITIES.....4.4.

VANGUARD INITIATIVES NOT PROVIDED TO THE ARMY LEADERSHIP.....4.5.

General.....4.5.a.
 Consolidate Internal Review Function with the Inspection General Function.....4.5.b.
 Eliminate Directed Military Overstrengths.....4.5.c.

ARMY MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITIES.....4.6.

V. REALIGN CONUS FORCES

GENERAL.....5.1.

REALIGNMENT OF RESERVE COMPONENT ASSETS.....5.2.

Establish USARC as a MSC of FORSCOM.....5.2.a.
 Eliminate CONUSA's.....5.2.b.
 Establish Maneuver Exercise Commands.....5.2.c.
 Reduce AC Support to RC.....5.2.d.

ELIMINATE USARSO AS A MACOM.....5.3.

REALIGN TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT.....5.4.

Eliminate MTMC as a MACOM.....5.4.a.

	Reduce Rail Restoration Program.....	5.4.b.
	Reduce OSA Aircraft Structure.....	5.4.c.
	Eliminate U.S. Army Air Traffic Combat Support Activity.....	5.4.d.
	RESTRUCTURE SECURITY ACTIVITIES.....	5.5.
	Eliminate CIDC as a MACOM.....	5.5.a.
	Eliminate Law Enforcement Functions.....	5.5.b.
	Eliminate Retraining Brigade.....	5.5.c.
	CONSOLIDATION OF SPACE ACTIVITIES.....	5.6.
VI.	RESTRUCTURE AND REALIGN TRAINING, COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS, AND FORCE INTEGRATION	
	GENERAL.....	6.1.
	REALIGN COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS AND FORCE INTEGRATION.....	6.2.
	REALIGN PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT.....	6.3.
	General.....	6.3.a.
	Form a Center for Professional Development.....	6.3.b.
	Consolidate Management Training by Forming the U.S. Army Management College.....	6.3.c.
	Suspend Combined Arms and Services Staff School.....	6.3.d.
	Eliminate the Physical Fitness School.....	6.3.e.
	Suspend the Sergeants Major Academy.....	6.3.f.
	REALIGN TRAINING.....	6.4.
	Reduce the Number of BCT Sites.....	6.4.a.
	Space was not Used for the Final Report.....	6.4.b.
	Use USAR Training Divisions to Conduct IET.....	6.4.c.

Relocate Ordnance AIT from Ft. Belvoir to APG.....	6.4.d.
Suspend CMTC in Europe.....	6.4.e.
Reduce the Army Marksmanship Training Unit.....	6.4.f.
Eliminate the NBPRP.....	6.4.g.
Reduce Staffing at USAR Training Institutions.....	6.4.h.
Eliminate EUSA ITEP Non-Divisional TSO.....	6.4.i.
TRAINING RELATED FIELD OPERATING AGENCIES.....	6.5.
Classify ARRTC as a Training Center Under USAR Command.....	6.5.a.
Retain ATSC as a FOA of TRADOC.....	6.5.b.
Redesignate the CTED Student Detachment.....	6.5.c.
Eliminate the National Science Center.....	6.5.d.
Maintain USASAFA as a FOA under TRADOC.....	6.5.e.
VII. RESTRUCTURE AND REALIGN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS	
GENERAL.....	7.1.
RESTRUCTURE THE PERSONNEL CENTERS AND CMD.....	7.2.
Combine PERSCOM with ARPERCEN.....	7.2.a
Combine PERSCOM with GUARDPERCEN.....	7.2.b.
Realign FOA's and Activities under the Army Personnel Command.....	7.2.c.

Reduce USAPIC and Transfer to PERSCOM.....	7.2.e.
Restructure Medical Activities.....	7.2.f.
REDUCE TDA AUGMENTATION TO OVERSEAS MACOMS.....	7.3.
Reduce TDA Augmentation to 1st PERSCOM (USAREUR).....	7.3.a.
Reduce TDA Augmentation to 8th PERSCOM (EUSA).....	7.3.b.

VIII. RESTRUCTURE INSTALLATIONS AND BASOPS MANAGEMENT

GENERAL.....	8.1.
CONSOLIDATE INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS UNDER ONE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF IN SELECTED MACOM HQS..	8.2.
INSTALLATION AND BASOP MGT FUNCTIONAL INITIATIVES.....	8.3.
Privatize, Make Totally NAF, or Eliminate Mission of Arts & Crafts Entertainment, and Category B Bowling; Reduce APF to Category A Recreation Centers.....	8.3.a.
Consolidate Reenlistment at Installation Level.....	8.3.b.
Standardize Installation TDA.....	8.3.c.
Eliminate Contracts and Civilian KP Services in Enlisted Dining Facilities.....	8.3.d.
Transfer Milk Plant Operations to AAFES.....	8.3.e.
Consolidate DRCS into DPTS.....	8.3.f.
Consolidate All Directorate Budget Offices at Installation Level at the DRN.....	8.3.g.
Transfer Installation Contracting Function for Contracts Requiring Solicitation to the Corps of Engineers.....	8.3.h.
Maximize the Elimination of WWII Wooden Structures.....	8.3.i.
Require Transient Facilities to Reimburse the Repair and Maintenance Account for Utilities.....	8.3.j.

REALIGN INSTALLATION AND BASOPS MANAGEMENT-RELATED STAFF SUPPORT ACTIVITIES AND FIELD OPERATING AGENCIES.....	8.4.
U.S. Army Environmental Office.....	8.4.a.
U.S. Army Chemical Demilitarization Agency	8.4.b.
U.S. Army Commercial Activities Management Agency.....	8.4.c.
U.S. Army Program & Installation Assistance Agency.....	8.4.d.
Base Realignment/Closure Office.....	8.4.e.
U.S. Army Engineer Activity, Capitol Area.....	8.4.f.
U.S. Army Facilities Engineering Activity Korea.....	8.4.g.
U.S. Army Engineering Housing Support Center.....	8.4.h.
U.S. Army Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency.....	8.4.i.
Eighth U.S. Army Recreation Services Operation.....	8.4.j.
U.S. Army Recreation Service Support Center-Europe.....	8.4.k.
U.S. Army Korea Contracting Agency.....	8.4.l.
U.S. Army Humphrey's Engineer Center Support Activity.....	8.4.m.
U.S. Army Pacific Activity.....	8.4.n.
U.S. Army Materiel Command Installation and Services Activity.....	8.4.o.
U.S. Army Rocky Mountain Arsenal.....	8.4.p.
U.S. Army Chemical Activity.....	8.4.q.
U.S. Army Transportation Activity	

(White House), Military District of Washington.....	8.4.r.
U.S. Army Forces Command Central Contracting Office.....	8.4.s.
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Contracting Activity.....	8.4.t.

IX. RESTRUCTURE AND REALIGN LOGISTIC FUNCTIONS

GENERAL	9.1.
RESTRUCTURE THE U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND (AMC).....	9.2.
REALIGN HQDA FIELD OPERATING AGENCIES.....	9.3.
Eliminate the U.S. Army Troop Support Activity (TSA).....	9.3.a.
Eliminate the U.S. Army Security Assistance Agency - Latin America (USASAALA).....	9.3.b.
Reduce the U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency.....	9.3.c.
Eliminate the Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) Experimentation Site.....	9.3.d.
Reduce the U.S. Army Contracting Support Agency.....	9.3.e.
REALIGN AMC FIELD OPERATING ACTIVITIES	9.4.
Eliminate the Materiel Readiness Support Activity (MERSA) (ESM88), the Catalog Data Activity (CDA) (ESM90), and the Logistics Control Activity (LCA).....	9.4.a.
Eliminate the Central System Design Activity (CSDA) (ESM86), the Central System Design Activity - East (CSDA-E) (ESM85) and the Logistics Program Support Activity (LPSA).....	9.4.b.
Eliminate the U.S. Army TMDE Support Group (ESM93), the U.S. Army TMDE Support Activity - CONUS and the Central TMDE Activity, Lexington.....	9.4.c.

Eliminate the U.S. Army Industrial Engineering Activity (IEA).....	9.4.d.
Eliminate the Central Ammunition Management Office - Pacific (CAMO-PAC).....	9.4.e.
Eliminate the U.S. AMC Quality Assurance Activity.....	9.4.f.
Eliminate the U.S. Army Intelligence Materiel Activity (IMA).....	9.4.g.
Eliminate the U.S. AMC Installation Services Activity.....	9.4.h.
Eliminate the U.S. AMC Surety Field Activity (SFA).....	9.4.i.
Reduce the U.S. Army Logistics Assistance Program Activity (LAPA), a HQ AMC FOA, and the Logistics Program Activity (LAP).....	9.4.j.
Eliminate AMC - Europe.....	9.4.k.
Reduce the Office of Project Manager, Nuclear Munitions.....	9.4.l.
Reduce the Defence Ammunition Center and School (DACS).....	9.4.m.
Reduce the U.S. Army Executive Director for Conventional Ammunition (EDCA).....	9.4.n.
Eliminate the U.S. AMC Field Safety Activity.....	9.4.o.
Eliminate the U.S. AMC Inspector General (IG) Activity.....	9.4.p.
OTHER VANGUARD INITIATIVES IMPACTING AMC ...	9.5.
Reduce Army Railroad Rolling Stock Maintenance.....	9.5.a.
Reduce the U.S. AMC Professional Development and AMC Career Intern Register.....	9.5.b.
POLICY INITIATIVE IMPACTING HQDA: PROCEDURAL CHANGES FOR REPLACING MAJOR ITEMS IN INVENTORY.....	9.6.

X. RESTRUCTURE AND REALIGN INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS

- GENERAL.....10.1.**
- CONSOLIDATE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES.....10.2.**
 - Restructure Intel Production Activies.....10.2.a.
 - Restructure Intel Collection Activies.....10.2.b.
- REALIGN MACOM INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.....10.3.**
 - Eliminate Arms Reduction Mgt Activity.....10.3.a.
 - Eliminate Army Intel Center Europe.....10.3.b.
 - Eliminate FORSCOM Automated Intel Spt Activity.....10.3.c.

XI. RESTRUCTURE AND REALIGN INFORMATION MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS

- GENERAL11.1.**
- RESTRUCTURE THE IMA ORGANIZATION.....11.2.**
 - Eliminate Information Systems Command....11.2.a.
 - Restructure ISC.....11.2.b.
- INFORMATION MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION INITIATIVES.....11.3.**
 - Reduce or Eliminate Telecommunications Services - Telecommunications Centers....11.3.a.
 - Reduce or Eliminate Telecommunications Services - Telephone Centers.....11.3.b.
 - Reduce or Eliminate ADP Software Engineering Activities.....11.3.c.
 - Reduce or Eliminate Visual Information Services.....11.3.d.
 - Consolidate Official Mail and Distribution at Installation Level.....11.3.e.
 - Discontinue Hardcopy Printing.....11.3.f.
 - Consolidate Installation and BASOPS Records Management and Publications

into the DOIM.....11.3.g.

REALIGN IMA-RELATED FIELD OPERATING AGENCIES AND STAFF SUPPORT ACTIVITIES.....11.4.

U.S. Army Decision Systems Management Agency.....11.4.a.

U.S. Army Financial Management Systems Integration Agency.....11.4.b.

U.S. Army Management Systems and Support Activity.....11.4.c.

Defense Telecommunications Services - Washington.....11.4.d.

National Guard Bureau Information Management Agency.....11.4.e.

U.S. Army Plans and Operations Information Support Agency.....11.4.f.

U.S. Army Command and Control Support Agency.....11.4.g.

U.S. Army Program Management Systems Development Agency.....11.4.h.

Command Systems Integration Agency.....11.4.i.

U.S. Army Information Systems Selection and Acquisition Agency.....11.4.j.

Information Management Support Agency....11.4.k.

FORSCOM Information Resource Management..11.4.l.

TRADOC Library and Information Network Center.....11.4.m.

U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command Automated Systems Activity.....11.4.n.

U.S. Army Engineer Automation Support Activity.....11.4.o.

Information Systems Command - Pentagon...11.4.p.

World-wide Command and Control Systems Activity.....11.4.q.

U.S. Army Commercial Communications Office.....	11.4.r.
Television and Audio-Visual Support Activity.....	11.4.s.
U.S. Army Institute for Research in Management Information, Communications, and Computer Sciences.....	11.4.t.
U.S. Army Information Systems Command - INSCOM.....	11.4.u.
U.S. Army Publications and Printing Command.....	11.4.v.
Sustaining Base Network Activity.....	11.4.w.
U.S. Army Intell Support Detachment.....	11.4.x.
AMC Augmentation Element to Communications Systems Activity.....	11.4.y.
U.S. Army Research, Development and Acquisition Information System Activity..	11.4.z.
Communications-Electronics Services Office.....	11.4.aa.
Information Systems Management Agency....	11.4.bb.
Reserve Component Automation System Project Management Office.....	11.4.cc.

XII. RESTRUCTURE THE ARMY ANALYSIS FUNCTIONS

GENERAL.....	12.1.
RESTRUCTURE ARMY ANALYSIS ORGS.....	12.2.
Reduce and redesignate CAA.....	12.2.a.
Reduce and redesignate TRADOC Analysis Command.....	12.2.b.
Reduce and redesignate Army Material Systems Analysis Agency.....	12.2.c.
Reduce Cost and Economic Analysis Center.....	12.2.d.
Eliminate Logistics Evaluation Agency....	12.2.e.

Reduce Rand Arroyo Center.....	12.2.f.
Eliminate Engineer Study Center.....	12.2.g.
Reduce and Transfer Strategic Studies Institute..	12.2.h.
XIII. REALIGN THE TEST AND EVALUATION FUNCTIONS	
GENERAL.....	13.1.
RESTRUCTURE T&E ORGS.....	13.2.
Reduce OPTEC.....	13.2.a.
Reduce TEXCOM.....	13.2.b.
Reduce TEMA.....	13.2.c.
Reduce TECOM.....	13.2.d.
Disestablish USAMC Liaison Office, TRADOC TEXCOM.....	13.2.e.
XIV. SPECIAL INTEREST INITIATIVES	
FIELD OPERATING ACTIVITY.....	14.1.
EXECUTIVE AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY.....	14.2.
ZERO BASED ENLISTED STUDY.....	14.3.
XV. AUDIT OF MANPOWER REDUCTIONS	
GENERAL.....	15.1.
DISCUSSIONS.....	15.2.
CONCLUSIONS.....	15.3.
XVI. PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING IN THE VANGUARD STUDY.....	16.1.
XVII. APPENDICES.....	17.0.
CHARTER.....	17-A.
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS.....	17-B.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. STUDY OVERVIEW

a. **Background.** In the fall of 1989, it was clear that the decade of defense growth was over and that the Army would have to find ways to reduce its program substantially. The Army Staff and MACOMs assessed the implications of probable future resource levels and the changing world situation throughout the process of building and submitting the FY92-97 POM. From the warfighting viewpoint, the POM contains a balanced Army able to execute the National Strategy within acceptable risk levels. But there had been no comprehensive review of the Army's general support forces (GSF) which organize, equip, man, train, sustain, mobilize, and deploy the fighting force.

b. **Project VANGUARD.** Therefore, Project VANGUARD was conceived in March, 1990, to assess the missions, functions, and organizations of the GSF and provide a blueprint for transition to support the smaller, more CONUS-based Army of the 1990s and beyond. VANGUARD commenced operations at Ft. Belvoir on 24 April, and was formally chartered by the Secretary and Chief of Staff, Army on 2 May 1990.

VANGUARD CHARTER

PURPOSE...

'To determine the most efficient and effective organization of the General Support Forces as the Army is reshaped in the next decade by strategic evolution and resource austerity.'

Carl E. Vuono
General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

M. P. W. Stone
Secretary of the Army

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

c. Mission and Scope. VANGUARD's mission was in two parts as shown below.

MISSION

- **IDENTIFY THE FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE GENERAL SUPPORT FORCES IN A SMALLER, MORE CONUS-BASED ARMY.**

- **DEVELOP ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS, POLICIES, AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE EFFECTIVE AND PROVIDE ADDITIONAL COST SAVINGS TO PROTECT FURTHER DEGRADATION TO THE FIGHTING FORCE.**

(1) VANGUARD was required to review the entire GSF (primarily TDA units) from installation level to the Headquarters, Department of the Army and determine which missions and functions would be required to support the smaller, more CONUS-based Army of the future. Through development of alternative concepts, policies, and organizations, VANGUARD was to provide a new construct or blueprint to reshape the GSF and rationalize it with the warfighting force of the future.

(2) Unlike past studies which have focused on correcting specific dysfunctions or improving efficiency, VANGUARD's primary focus was on cost reduction in the GSF as a means of protecting the fighting force from further degradation. Thus, maintenance of capability to effectively execute missions at substantially lower cost was the primary focus. Where possible, operational improvements were incorporated and many of the VANGUARD initiatives were able to both reduce costs and attain operational efficiencies.


(3) The FY92-97 POM and associated programs such as Army and Defense Management Reviews and the family of Base Realignment and Closure initiatives were assumed to be executable as planned and included in the VANGUARD base case. Although failure of any of these initiatives to execute as planned would increase the Army's need for

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

bill payers, revisiting of these approved programs was beyond VANGUARD's scope.

(4) Several MACOMs had already begun planning to accommodate the more constrained resource environment of the future. VANGUARD was charged from the outset to incorporate these plans and expand on them whenever possible in the context of the overarching Army direction.

d. Concept of the Operation.



(I) VANGUARD'S concept was composed of four key elements or phases:

- Identification of national and international trends likely to impact the Army of the 1990s and beyond.
- Derivation of implications of this changing environment on the Army and on the GSF in particular.
- Derivation of a vision of the future GSF defined both by an organizational construct and a set of governing policies.
- Derivation and application of study rules which led to a set of implementation initiatives which would move the Army toward a vision of the future GSF.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**


(2) As the study progressed, the policies, rules, and vision were modified as necessary (based on field input and study refinement) and new initiatives emerged. Chapter II (Study Execution) and Chapter III (VANGUARD Vision) discuss this further.

II. STUDY EXECUTION.

a. Strategy.

(1) As a first step toward reshaping the GSF in a coherent fashion, VANGUARD developed an overall vision of the future army which consisted of an organizational construct and a set of alternative policies.

(2) The figure outlines the development of the VANGUARD Vision which served as the framework for integrating emerging initiatives.



**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

b. Derivation of Trends, Implications, Policies, and Rules.

(1) VANGUARD identified four national trends or influences which have direct impact on the GSF. Two of these trends are threat related and the others are related to changing cultural and demographic concerns.

Significant Trends

- The perceived military threat is changing...
 - Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat is declining...
 - Warning times are increasing...
- U. S. interests are changing in a multi polar world...
 - Importance of the Third World increasing...
 - Little change in warning times...
- Domestic issues are getting more attention...
 - Domestic missions for the military are becoming more important...
- Demographics of the Nation are changing...
 - Changing public relationships with the military...

(2) On balance the threat related trends tend to provide some opportunities for GSF savings because of the magnitude of the change in NATO. The cultural and demographic trends generally require more GSF resources for the Army to compete successfully for quality soldiers in a shrinking manpower pool and to provide the living and working environment enjoyed and expected by Americans at large.

(3) From these trends and implications, a set of alternative policies was developed and study rules were derived. A complete display can be found at Chapter XVII, Appendix G.


c. VANGUARD Vision.

(1) To produce a model of the future army, the policies and rules derived from external influences were applied to the Army's traditional roles and missions so that the vision would include and support the essence of the Army.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

(2) Defining the essence of the Army. The preeminent focus on warfighting for the last forty-five years has been an exception but one which can be expected to prevail for the indefinite future. We in the Army tend to think of ourselves almost exclusively as war fighters but the Army, as a national institution, plays a much broader role. For most of the Nation's history, the Army has been substantially involved in humanitarian, nation building, and other general military services. Thus, the vision of the future must also accommodate the non-warfighting missions which tie the Army to the American people.

(3) Under the Goldwater Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, all forces are assigned to CINCs except those devoted to the basic functions required of Service Secretaries to organize, equip, man, train, sustain, mobilize, and deploy forces (10 U.S.C. sections 162(a)(1) 3013). The MTOE Army then is generally assigned to the CINCs and the role of the GSF is to perform the Secretary's statutory functions.



(4) Within the context of the Army's role as a national institution and the GSF contribution to that role, VANGUARD assessed the Army of today and developed several alternative models of the future Army. Assessment of the current force in view of known trends and implications resulted in a set of alternative policies (see Chapter XVII Appendix F) and the VANGUARD direction as depicted on the next page.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990

VANGUARD DIRECTION

- ARMY STAFF REDUCED IN SIZE TO PROVIDE POLICY FORMULATION AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION.
- FIELD OPERATING AGENCIES/ACTIVITIES REDEFINED AND REDUCED.
- MACOM HQ STREAMLINED AND FOCUSED ON MISSION EXECUTION.
- NUMBER OF MACOMS REDUCED THROUGH MISSION REALIGNMENT AND CURTAILMENT.
- INTERMEDIATE HEADQUARTERS ELIMINATED OR REDUCED.
- BASE OPERATIONS ELEVATED INTO THE MAINSTREAM OF VITAL ARMY MISSIONS.
- GREATER RELIANCE PLACED ON RC GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDS TO PERFORM CONUS DEFENSE AND MOBILIZATION.
- WARTIME CHAIN OF COMMAND GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TRAINING AND MOBILIZATION OF RESERVE COMPONENTS.

(5) This direction then led to four models and provided the basis for their evaluation.

ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONS

BASE CASE

Characteristics...

- 18 MACOMs
- Large Staffs
- Many FOAs
- Matrix Mgt
- Ponderous

LIFE CYCLE MODEL A

Concept...

- 11 MACOMs
- Follows Life Cycle Model
- Staff & Operations Separate
- Separates Mission From BASOPS
- AC, RC, Civ Fully Integrated

DUAL-HAT MODEL B

Concept...

- 13 MACOMs
- Follows COE Model
- ARSTAF Principal Dual-Hatted As MACOM CB
- Eliminates Most FOAs
- AC, RC, Civ Fully Integrated


FIGHTING FORCE C

Concept...

- 7 MACOMs
- Follows WWII Model
- Mission Oriented MACOMs (Like USAF/USN)
- Staff & Operations Separate
- AC, RC, Civ Fully Integrated

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

(6) Each of these alternatives had overriding disadvantages which are discussed in Chapter 3. The resulting VANGUARD Vision captures the best characteristics of the four models and incorporates the substance of field and HQDA staff input.



(7) This organizational model, together with the policies summarized below comprise the VANGUARD Vision...the framework for initiatives and recommendations.


d. Methodology.

(1) Primary data source. The Army Authorization Data System (TAADS) was selected as the baseline for VANGUARD analysis since it is the only system where mission, resources and organization come together. It is the authoritative HQDA approved data record of each unit's mission, requirements, and authorizations. The pace of events in 1989-90 prevented reconciliation of decisions within TAADS and between TAADS and other Army systems. Consequently VANGUARD's baseline was updated as information became available and ultimately reconciled with the latest approved TAADS file at the end of the study.

(2) The force was analyzed vertically by function (e.g., information management function from the installation to the DISC4) and horizontally (by command). Missions, functions, policies, concepts, and organizations were examined in this manner

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990

and weighed against costs.



(3) Major initiative thrusts which move the Army toward the vision were then developed and specific implementing initiatives derived. An iterative process was used which incorporated field input through both formal and informal coordination. See Chapter 2 (Study Execution) for additional detail.

(4) Of the over five hundred separate initiatives surfaced in the course of the project, approximately one hundred seventy survived the full review and were incorporated in the major thrusts summarized below. Only the major initiatives are displayed here but all are contained in the main body of this report.

III. REALIGN THE HQDA STAFF. (CHAPTER IV)

a. **General.** The HQDA Staff traces its current organization and functions to the National Security Act of 1947. It has evolved through a series of changes which responded to internal requirements (changing force size, modernization) and external influences (statute, national strategy). Most recently the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 reduced headquarters strength and enhanced civilian authority and the FY91 Defense Authorizations Act further reduced headquarters strengths over the next five years. VANGUARD's assessment of HQDA today (consistent with recent RAND work and supported by field input) is shown below.

ASSESSMENT OF HQDA STAFF TODAY

- OVERHEAD INCONSISTENT WITH SMALLER ARMY
- DISTINCTION BETWEEN DEPARTMENTAL FUNCTIONS (POLICY, PLANNING, PROGRAMING)...& MACOM FUNCTIONS (EXECUTION)... *BLURRED*
- RESPONSE TIMES ARE SLOW RESULTING IN SYSTEM BYPASS AND AD HOC MATRIX MANAGEMENT
- SECRETARIAT & ARSTAF ARE NOT FUNCTIONALLY ALIGNED...
 - DUPLICATION & OVERLAP
 - COMPETITION
- STAFF & PROGRAM INTEGRATION IS UNFOCUSED... VCSA BECOMES THE INTEGRATOR BY DEFAULT

PERCEIVED AS...

PONDEROUS...


b. VANGUARD Concept and Savings.

(1) Reductions. HQDA is reduced by twenty per cent consistent with the programmed reduction of the Army at large and the FY91 Authorization Act. After considering the impacts of mission and function changes caused by OSD direction and VANGUARD recommendations, reduction targets are established on a pro-rata basis. VANGUARD has provided representative examples of how reductions of this size can be spread on a functional basis.

(2) Field Operating Agencies (FOA) & Staff Support Agencies (SSA). Closely associated with the staff reductions are the elimination or restructuring of FOAs and SSAs to reflect projected workloads and reduce overlap and duplication. Where possible, missions that can be performed at lower levels were reassigned to MACOMs. Proper accountability for FOAs and SSAs has been strengthened.

(3) Integration. Ineffective staff and program integration is a dysfunction which has been documented by previous Army studies and by RAND Arroyo. Operational effectiveness and headquarters reductions are facilitated by the addition of a

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 15 December 1990



strong program integrator who responds to the VCSA (Chapter IV). Although there are a variety of options, the authority and responsibility necessary for the Program Integrator to be effective require it to be established as the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Army.

(4) **BASOPS.** As discussed in Chapter IV (Realign HQDA) and Chapter VIII (BASOPS), there is a need for a HQDA focal point for BASOPS and installation management. VANGUARD recommends that an Assistant Chief of Staff, Base Operations Support (ACSBOS) be established from existing resources, principally in the Office of the Director of Management.

(5) Conclusions and recommendations.

<p>III-1. CONCLUSION:</p> <p>RECOMMENDATION:</p>	<p>HQDA, with its associated FOAs and SSAs, must be reduced.</p> <p>Reduce the strength of the HQDA staff by at least twenty percent over no more than five years.</p> <p>Confine HQDA to policy, planning, prioritization, resource allocation.</p> <p>Assign operational functions now performed at HQDA to MACOMs... reduce staff & eliminate FOAs accordingly.</p>
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**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

III-2. CONCLUSION: HQDA lacks integration in building, managing and executing the Army Program.
Lack of a Program integrator at HQDA is a major operational dysfunction.
The Director of the Army Staff (established to be the integrator) has insufficient authority and is fully occupied by other functions.

RECOMMENDATION: Establish a strong Program Integrator to be responsible for development and execution of the army programming and force integration functions.
Designate the Program Integrator the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff to insure requisite authority and latitude.

III-3. CONCLUSION: BASOPS and installation management lack focus at HQDA.

RECOMMENDATION: Using the Director of Management as a nucleus, establish an Assistant Chief of Staff for BASOPS and Installation Management. (See d-2. above)


(6) VANGUARD's recommended savings for this initiative are shown below.

SAVINGS	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97
MIL	140	233	328	432	515	519
CIV	198	357	464	577	659	665
\$(M)	1.9	10.6	16.7	22.0	28.2	32.1

IV. REALIGN CONUS FORCES. (CHAPTER V)

a. **General.** This initiative is primarily focused on reorganization and realignment of U. S. Army Forces Command. It also provides for reductions in resources devoted to transportation management and criminal investigation and the elimination of three MACOM headquarters: Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC); Criminal Investigation Division Command (CIDC); and U.S. Army South (USARSO).

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 15 December 1990



b. VANGUARD Concept and Savings.

(1) FORSCOM. The majority of FORSCOM GSF resources are in the BASOPS/installation management arena (discussed in Chapter III) and in support of the reserve components. This initiative focuses on the RC support and capitalizes on the establishment of the Chief, Army Reserve as commander of an Army Reserve Command (USARC) which will command all USAR forces in CONUS.

(a) Under current plans, the USARC will assume a substantial part of the USAR functions now performed at HQ FORSCOM and five CONUSAs. Further, increased warning times for the NATO scenario and the increased competence of RC general officer headquarters in recent years make it possible for all of the CONUSA missions to be absorbed by the reserve chain of command and the CAPSTONE commanders. Thus CONUSAs can be reduced in size in the near term and ultimately eliminated.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990

(b) VANGUARD's recommended schedule for disestablishing CONUSAs acknowledges the need to maintain continuity through completion of OPERATION DESERT SHIELD.

(c) The current Army program maintains full time support (FTS) resources in USAR and ARNG units at current levels and realigns it to increase support to unit readiness. VANGUARD recommends modest reductions to the AC component of FTS which generate savings without significant readiness impact.

(2) MTMC and CIDC disestablished. MTMC's functions are currently under review by OSD and OJCS. Current missions and functions, or residual Army functions after OJCS decisions, can be accommodated without the need for a separate MACOM (Chapter V and Chapter VII). Likewise, investigative functions can be performed as a function of VANGUARD's Personnel Command (Chapter VII). Two MACOM headquarters and associated administration and overhead are eliminated. Significant savings are also made by operational realignments.

(3) Consistent with the Panama Treaty Implementation Plan, HQ USARSO will be withdrawn from Panama. VANGUARD recommends that it be disestablished on withdrawal (rather than relocated) and that residual missions be reassigned to FORSCOM.

(4) Conclusions and recommendations.

IV-1. CONCLUSION:	Improved operational effectiveness of the USAR and economies and efficiencies can be achieved under different command arrangements.
RECOMMENDATION:	Establish a USAR Command (under the Chief, Army Reserve) to command all USAR Forces.

IV-2. CONCLUSION:	Reserve component general officer commands are capable of assuming more responsibility. Given longer warning times for the NATO scenario, active and reserve CAPSTONE commanders can play a greater role in RC training & mobilization.
RECOMMENDATIONS:	Substantially reduce CONUSAs in the near term and disestablish by end FY95. Assign mobilization planning mission to USARC and RC general officer commands. Assign the training integration mission to Corps and TUSA.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

IV-3. CONCLUSION: The Army can operate effectively with fewer MACOMs.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Disestablish MTMC and assign residual functions to a subordinate command of U.S. Army Logistics Command (formerly AMC).
Disestablish CIDC and assign law enforcement and investigations missions to U.S. Army Personnel Command.
Disestablish USARSO when withdrawn from Panama under the Treaty Implementation Plan. Assign residual missions to FORSCOM.

IV-4. CONCLUSION: Since funds allocated for rail restoration have been consistently diverted by commanders, the program's priority can be reduced.

RECOMMENDATION: Reduce resourcing of the rail restoration by one half.

IV-5 CONCLUSION: The Army's requirement for operational support aircraft is outdated.

RECOMMENDATION: Reduce the operational support aircraft fleet to 105 airframes.


(5) Recommended VANGUARD savings are shown below.

SAVINGS	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97
MIL	226	657	833	985	1594	1594
CIV	82	620	930	1416	3514	3514
\$(M)	31.6	44.0	58.1	71.0	67.5	167.5

V. REALIGN TRAINING AND COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS. (CHAPTER VI)

a. General. This initiative adopts major elements of TRADOC's own plans for the future but recommends adjustments to achieve greater savings and to facilitate operational efficiency in key army functions. The figure below compares the TRADOC Future Plan to the VANGUARD Vision.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 15 December 1990



b. VANGUARD Concept and Savings.

(1) Intermediate HQ. The two Integrating Centers in TRADOC future are eliminated. Schools and Warfighting Centers report directly to HQ TRADOC. Two new functional Centers are established: one to oversee professional development and training; one to execute the Army's force integration process.

(2) A Center for Professional Development is established to oversee the professional development schools above the advanced course level and the Army Training Center. Current TRADOC schools (CGSC, CAS³, the Sergeants Major Academy) are included. The Army War College and the Army Management College are added to form a single center of excellence for Army professional development training. The latter is a combination of all of the disparate management schools now extant consolidated for efficiency and savings. See figure on next page for initiative savings.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

(3) The locus of the force integration process is shifted from HQDA to TRADOC's new Force Integration center. The Department retains proponentcy for policy, priorities, and resource allocation but TRADOC becomes the life cycle manager of the force as DA's executive agent. This allows establishment of a critical mass of expertise to design the force and the units in the force (both TOE and TDA), develop force structure alternatives to meet DA resourcing and mission guidance, and document the force once approved by HQDA. This reduces redundancy, eliminates overlap, facilitates significant reductions at HQDA and MACOM AMHA, and brings focus to the force integration process. It results in substantial savings in the TRADOC schools (combat developments), MACOM HQ (force integration, manpower & equipment requirements, documentation) and HQDA (ODCSOPS).

(4) Warfighting Centers are established to better align institutional training with warfighting doctrine and to reduce redundancy. With some modifications, the TRADOC plan was reflected in VANGUARD's Vision. Changes are based on initiatives to delete integrating centers.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

(8) Conclusions and recommendations.

V-1. CONCLUSION: The "TRADOC Future" plan, with some modifications, should be adopted.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Adopt the "TRADOC Future" concept with the following changes:

- Disestablish the TRADOC Integrating Centers & establish two functional centers described below.
- Adjust the warfighting center concept based on branch elimination VANGUARD recommendations.

V-2. CONCLUSION: The Army's current organization and concept of conducting the force integration process are manpower intensive and inefficient.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Establish a single Force Integration Center as an MSC of TRADOC to design, develop, and document the force as DA executive agent for force integration.
Move the locus of force integration from HQDA to TRADOC. HQDA retains policy, prioritization, resource allocation, and approval authority.
Substantially reduce or eliminate manpower & equipment requirements, combat developments, and documentation staffs and FOAs/SSAs outside of the TRADOC FI Center.

V-3. CONCLUSION: Army professional development should be consolidated under TRADOC.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Create a Center for Professional Development in TRADOC and assign all professional development courses, above the advanced course level.


VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 15 December 1990

(9) VANGUARD recommended savings are shown below.

SAVINGS	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97
MIL	3839	4106	4335	4691	5016	5016
CIV	1692	2002	2524	3110	3677	3677
\$(M)	201.5	273.4	282.4	308.6	335.7	375.5

VI. REALIGN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT. (CHAPTER VII)

a. General. This initiative moves toward true life cycle management of all army personnel (AC/RC/civilian) under a single manager.



**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

b. VANGUARD Concept and Savings.

(1) Consolidation of Personnel Centers. Total Army Personnel Command, GUARDPERCEN and ARPERCEN are combined at a savings. Most ODCSPER FOAs are disestablished and their functions absorbed by PERSCOM. Law enforcement supervision and the investigations function from the disestablished CIDC (Chapter V) are also included. The initial VANGUARD concept combined USAREC and Cadet Command into a single accession organization to recruit all categories of soldiers for all components. HSC was disestablished and the health care mission given to a subordinate command of PERSCOM.

(2) Accessions. A joint USAREC/Cadet Command Study showed that savings to be gained by consolidation were not substantial enough to justify attendant mission turbulence. The proposal was withdrawn.

(3) Disestablishment of HSC was an option which appeared to offer substantial savings and eliminate the overhead of a MACOM HQ. However, there is risk to quality of health care provided to soldiers associated with decentralization. Ultimately the Surgeon General presented a plan which effects equivalent savings while preserving the medical community as an entity. VANGUARD incorporated that plan because congressional restrictions limited further reductions. There remains too much overhead in the Army Medical Department and the Surgeon General has been directed to reduce it by at least twenty-five percent.

(4) While some efficiencies and savings accrue to consolidation of personnel centers immediately, significant gains are dependent on collocation. VANGUARD's review indicates that establishment of the new command in St Louis using ARPERCEN as a nucleus provides the best opportunities for savings.

(5) Conclusions and recommendations.

VI-1. CONCLUSION:	Multiple army personnel centers are duplicative and inefficient.
RECOMMENDATION:	Establish a new Personnel Command as a MACOM with the mission of providing life cycle management and support to all soldiers of all components and all civilian employees. Merge the Total Army Personnel Command, ARPERCEN, & GUARDPERCEN.

VI-2. CONCLUSION:	The current establishment of personnel management and support related FOAs is dysfunctional and wasteful.
RECOMMENDATION:	With the exception of medical organizations and those with legal implications, disestablish all personnel management and support related FOAs and transfer missions to the new Personnel Command.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

VI-3. CONCLUSION: The Army Medical Department consumes an increasingly disproportionate share of manpower resources which are effectively fenced in statute.
A "stovepipe" medical structure best serves the needs of soldier support but currently contains too much overhead.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Approve the Surgeon General's concept for reorganizing the Medical Department.
Consolidate the Office of the Surgeon General and the Medical Command Staffs and obtain substantial savings.
Consolidate medical FOAs and eliminate a minimum of twenty five percent overhead.

- Return non medical personnel to other Army missions (within statutory limits).
- Return medical personnel to direct patient care.

(6) VANGUARD recommended Savings are shown below.

SAVINGS	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97
MIL	30	221	231	241	248	254
CTV	58	307	329	387	392	411
\$(M)	1.4	7.2	13.8	18.0	18.2	20.8

VII. RESTRUCTURE INSTALLATIONS & BASOPS MANAGEMENT. (CHAPTER VIII)


a. General

(1) This concept would have established an Army Services Command to operate all Army installations world-wide. Additionally, this Command would have absorbed many of the functions now done by the small "stovepipe" MACOMs; thus making it feasible to eliminate ISC, HSC, CIDC, MTMC, and MDW. Importantly, this command would have brought BASOPS and installation management the status accorded other missions with potential for improved economies, efficiencies and standardization in the Army's plant management and services to the Army family. Substantial manpower savings accrued to this option.

(2) Field comments indicated an almost universal concern that establishment of a

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990

Services Command would sever the traditional and necessary linkage commanders now enjoy between mission and support resources. Given such field consensus, VANGUARD's Vision was modified to reflect the concept outlined below.



b. VANGUARD Concept and Savings.

(1) A Deputy Chief of Staff for Base Operations Support is established at MACOM and HQDA to provide a champion and a focus for these important functions. Building on a staff model developed and implemented by TRADOC, substantial savings are made by bringing all installations management functions under a single DCS. Further savings are made and efficiencies achieved by limiting CONUS MACOMs commanding installations to only four (FORSCOM, TRADOC, AMC, & MDW).

(2) Also included are a series of diverse initiatives detailed in Chapter VIII which centralize installation contracting, reduce non-essential services, and realign and reduce engineer services and FOAs.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

(3) Conclusions and recommendations.

VII-1. CONCLUSION:	<p>Installation and BASOPS management do not compete well for resources at HQDA or in field prioritization because:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - They are not perceived as equally important with primary missions of commands. - There is no single focal point at HQDA or MACOM (except TRADOC recently). - It is not viewed as a career enhancing field.
VII-2. RECOMMENDATIONS:	<p>Establish an Assistant Chief of Staff for BASOPS and Installation Management on the Army Staff. Establish a Deputy Chief of Staff for BASOPS and Installation Management in MACOMs that command installations. Limit CONUS MACOMs commanding installations to FORSCOM, TRADOC, AMC and MDW. Realign contracting and other services for economies.</p>


(4) VANGUARD recommended savings are shown below.

SAVINGS	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97
MIL	98	106	120	120	126	126
CIV	1743	2862	4081	4151	4161	4161
\$(M)	31.9	115.7	150.1	197.2	217.1	222.6

VIII. RESTRUCTURE & REALIGN LOGISTICS FUNCTIONS. (CHAPTER IX)

a. General. This initiative embraces the AMC2000 plan which consists of six phases. Based on executability, VANGUARD proposes only the first three phases of the plan for submission to the 1991 BRAC Commission while endorsing the whole when resources can be identified and further detailed planning can be accomplished. VANGUARD's concept reduces AMC to seven MSCs but retains the ability of the organization to equip and sustain a trained and ready army. It also retains AMC's capability to develop and acquire non-major systems and equipment. The future AMC 2000 is displayed in the upper left while the VANGUARD proposal is shown below:

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**



b. VANGUARD Concept and Savings.

(1) Industrial Operations are centralized under a single command (IOC). This command is responsible for the operation of the arsenals, ammo plants, and depots.

(2) The commodity commands will begin to be consolidated at a single location. All but CECOM and TACOM would be moved to this central complex initially. BRAC considerations preclude their move until a later date. VANGUARD's review indicates that Huntsville, AL, is a candidate for location of this Complex but the Army must first comply with provisions of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 prior to selection.

(3) The MTMC vision which was the starting point for the VANGUARD analysis downsized the command approximately 40 percent. VANGUARD proposes to disestablish MTMC as an Army MACOM and transfer traffic management, residual terminal operations, and transportation engineering functions to restructured Army Logistics Command.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

(4) Conclusions and recommendations.

VIII-1. CONCLUSION:	The AMC 2000 Plan provides a sound start point for restructuring Army logistics functions.
RECOMMENDATIONS:	That AMC 2000 be adopted in concept and implemented subject to BRAC and fiscal constraints. That AMC be redesignated Army Logistics Command, reflecting a broadened mission. That MTMC's residual missions be absorbed by Logistics Command.


(5) The savings associated with these initiatives are shown below:

SAVINGS	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97
MIL	36	91	173	232	283	283
CIV	214	1454	2766	4010	5231	5232
\$(M)	3.5	9.4	98.9	299.8	348.3	358.9

IX. RESTRUCTURE & REALIGN INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS. (CHAPTER X)

a. **General.** Congress had already directed the intelligence community to review their organizations for layering and redundancy. Thus VANGUARD and the Army intelligence community worked closely together to achieve efficiencies that closed several field stations and consolidated other units and FOAs. These moves created a more streamlined organization that leverages advanced technology to achieve economy of force and which acknowledges the changing strategic environment. This new organization is shown below.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**



b. VANGUARD Concept and Savings.

(1) Six FOAs are streamlined and consolidated into the Intelligence Support Command, a MSC of INSCOM, located at Ft Belvoir.

(2) In Europe, Field Stations Berlin and Augsburg will close while participation at Menwith Hill Station, England, will increase. Additionally, the 66th MI BDE will undergo reorganization, relocation, and reduction.

(3) In the Pacific the two multi-discipline theater intelligence brigades, the 501st in Korea and the 500th in Japan will merge on Oahu, HI. Field Station Kumia (703rd MI BDE) will remain a separate entity.

(4) In the Americas, the two multi-discipline theater intelligence brigades, the 470th in Panama and the 513th, at Ft Monmouth will merge becoming the 470th MI BDE (Contingency) at a location to be determined.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

(5) The Army Intelligence Agency, presently a DCSINT FOA, will be transferred to INSCOM as a Major Subordinate Command.

(6) Conclusions and recommendations.

IX-1.	CONCLUSION:	<p>A MACOM level headquarters is needed to centrally manage the Army's intelligence missions and resources. Current intelligence organizations are inconsistent with the Army's needs in the emerging geo-political environment.</p>
	RECOMMENDATIONS:	<p>Retain INSCOM as a MACOM. Restructure and realign the intelligence community consistent with the DCSINT's plan.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Eliminate FOA missions by realigning missions and resources under INSCOM. - Close field stations in Augsburg & Berlin. - Consolidate operational units consistent with mission and threat.

(7) There are large manpower savings associated with the initiative. Most of these organizations are funded by the National Foreign Intelligence Program and dollar savings therefore do not accrue to the Army. The savings are shown below:


SAVINGS	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97
MIL	1272	2450	2747	3213	3346	3614
CIV	176	501	630	786	886	920
\$(M)	0	1.9	7.1	7.2	7.4	8.3

X. REALIGN INFORMATION MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS. (CHAPTER)

a. **General.** This initiative centers around Information Systems Command (ISC). In the original VANGUARD vision ISC was eliminated as a separate command with its functions being split to a number of the commands. Services Command would have been given most of the information management area functions which require a single manager. The most critical of these is management of strategic communications. With the withdrawal of the Services Command concept, this mission could not be absorbed readily by any of the other organizations. As a result VANGUARD revised its vision to include a reduced ISC which becomes an area oriented rather

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

than a command oriented organization as it is today. This new organization, shown below, was developed by ISC as an alternative to the original VANGUARD proposal.



b. VANGUARD Concept and Savings.

(1) In CONUS information management activities (IMA) services will be provided on an area basis. Five area IMA brigades will be established to service their assigned geographic area. They will provide command and support functions for each of the service organizations located at the installations. The service organizations have been reduced since many of the current missions will be transferred to the brigade. The installation information management officer will again be assigned to the installation staff and not be dual hatted as the service organization head.

(2) In Europe, the IMA support is done similarly but because of the garrison dispersion a support activity is inserted between the brigade and the service unit.

(3) All three theaters retain a tactical Theater Signal Command.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

(4) Conclusions and recommendations.

X-1. CONCLUSION: Given current missions and Army command arrangements, a single command is required to oversee critical communications functions.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Retain ISC as a MACOM.
Restructure and substantially reduce ISC using IMA Future as a start point.

- Provide IMA services on an area basis.
- Place the DCSIM & IMO in supported organization vice ISC.
- Align IMA funding with responsibilities.
- Eliminate or substantially reduce IMA FOAs by realigning missions.

X-2. CONCLUSION: A number of IMA management practices and policies (ranging from systems engineering to blank forms stockage) are inefficient and wasteful.

RECOMMENDATION: Implement a variety of policy and management changes as described in Chapter XI.

(4) The proposed Vanguard savings for this topic are shown below:


SAVINGS	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97
MIL	71	162	371	375	380	380
CIV	56	409	1150	1159	1169	1169
\$ OMA (M)	0.9	7.8	29.6	53.7	55.6	58.0

XI. RESTRUCTURE & REALIGN ARMY ANALYSIS FUNCTIONS. (CHAPTER XII)

a. General. The goal of VANGUARD's review was to identify alternative analytical organizations that meet the future needs of the core processes at reduced resource levels with high

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

quality products using the best analytical tools. An ARSTAF study of analytical organizations, sponsored by the DUSA(OR), served as the starting point for the VANGUARD review. In some cases, the findings of that study were adopted while in others they were expanded. The review resulted in the development of a concept which establishes three (CEAC, SFEC, RAND/Arroyo) Centers for Army analysis and two functionally oriented analytical organizations.



b. VANGUARD Concept and Savings.

(1) Rand Arroyo Center conducts analysis that supports assessment of policy and broad strategic issues only. This allows reduction of professional workyears by about fifty percent from the current program.

(2) A Strategic Force Evaluation Center is created at the Army Staff Level. Conducts analysis that supports force planning and assessments of strategic concepts and broad military options. It will be capable of supporting the analysis requirements of all functional proponents on the Army Staff, thereby allowing separate functional analysis agencies to be disestablished.

(3) The Force Integration Analysis Center subordinate to TRADOC conducts analysis that supports the Concept Based Requirements System, conducts force design studies that support force development and provides training studies to support the force integration process.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

(4) The Systems Analysis Center in Logistics Command conducts system analysis support, assists with COEA's, provides independent material evaluations, and an authoritative source for system performance data.

(5) The Cost and Economic Analysis Center develops independent cost estimates for major systems, force cost estimates, Operational & Support cost factors and supports resource allocation.

(6) Conclusions and recommendations.

XI-1. **CONCLUSION:** The Army has too many analytical organizations which leads to duplication of effort and dysfunctional competition.

RECOMMENDATION: Consolidate nine analytical organizations and establish five centers of excellence.

XI-2. **CONCLUSION:** The unique capabilities of Rand-Arroyo are valuable but should be limited to areas of broad policy analysis.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Refocus Rand entirely on broad strategic issues for which credible functional capability is not available.
Reduce the Rand-Arroyo budget by fifty percent.

(6) The proposed Vanguard savings for this topic are shown below:


SAVINGS	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97
MIL	106	106	106	106	106	106
CIV	258	258	258	258	258	258
\$ OMA (M)	3.2	11.6	12.3	13.6	14.7	16.1
\$ RDTE (M)	7.9	8.2	8.5	8.7	9.0	9.3

XII. REALIGN TEST AND EVALUATION FUNCTIONS. (CHAPTER XIII)

a. **General.** Until recently, virtually all Army testing and evaluation were accomplished by Army Material Command (AMC), Strategic Defense Command (SDC), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and the US Army Operational and Evaluation Agency (OTEA). As part of

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

the DMRD 936 objective to improve the effectiveness of acquisition management and reduce costs, the Army reviewed the management, organization, and responsibilities. Changes were recommended in the technical and operational test and evaluation organizations. These changes are shown below:



b. Concept and Savings.

(1) Two major test and evaluation agencies, OTEA and Test and Experimentation Command (TEXCOM) are merged into a single command, the Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC).

(2) Conclusions and recommendations.

XII-1	Conclusions:	<p>Army Test and Evaluation community should be reorganized to implement the LAB 21 study.</p> <p>There is potential for additional resource savings particularly in TECOM BASOPS.</p>
	Recommendations.	<p>Implement the LAB 21 study but revalidate resource requirements after approximately one year of operation in the new configuration.</p> <p>Reduce TECOM BASOPS resources after further evaluation and validation.</p>

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

(3) The Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM), within AMC, is responsible for technical testing, material assessment, safety verifications etc. themselves and the PEO structure.

SAVINGS	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97
MIL	87	87	87	87	87	87
CIV	64	64	64	64	64	64
\$(M)	0.9	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.3

XIII. SPECIAL INTEREST INITIATIVES.

a. ZERO BASED ENLISTED STUDY. (CHAPTER XIV)

(1) **General.** This initiative is based on the premise that enlisted soldiers belong primarily in the war fighting force and should be allocated to the GSF by exception. To the degree that reductions can be made, the Army can reapply soldiers to fighting force or use resulting manpower spaces to pay additional end strength bills, thereby protecting the fighting force from erosion.

(2) VANGUARD Concept and Savings.

(a) Previous attempts to reduce TDA resources have almost always started by accepting current resource levels and seeking functions or work centers which could be reduced based on work load or mission change, etc. This concept seldom produces significant savings and usually leads to a marginal reductions.

(b) The Zero Based Enlisted Study started by removing all enlisted soldiers from the TDAs and adding back only those where requirements for enlisted soldiers were clear.

(c) Recommended reductions include only those positions which could be eliminated without backfill by other manpower. Military savings could be substantially increased if sufficient funds were available to replace soldiers with civilians. For example, most military clerks in TDA positions could be replaced by civilians, particularly in CONUS. Given the current fiscal environment, however, extensive civilianization is not an option.

(d) VANGUARD was aggressive in an attempt to return as many soldiers as possible to the fighting force. There may be a small number of deleted positions which the local

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

commander will consider to be essential. If this is the case, those requirements will rise high enough on local priority lists to be supported ahead of less critical requirements under the flexibility of managing civilians to budget.

(e) A summary of the types of positions eliminated is shown below.

ENLISTED TDA RULES	
PROTECTED:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FIN & ACT PERSONNEL • ICB & DRILL SETS • INSTRUCTORS • OPNS & RANGE NCO's • RIGGERS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ENL MOBS & GO DRIVERS • FIREFIGHTERS (SFM) • PRIME POWER PERSONNEL (S&E) • CONFINEMENT PERSONNEL (S&C) • CRIMINAL INVESTIGATORS (S&C) • DOB HANDLERS
LIMIT:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 OSM PER GARRISON TDA • 3 REUP NCO's PER INSTL • UP TO 4 MAO NCO's PER INSTL 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 IG NCO's PER INSTL • PROTOCOL NCO's IN SELECTED SWCC's • 75% OF MILPO PERSONNEL
ELIMINATE:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SO/ESO ENL • MUSEUM & HISTORY ENL • VISUAL INFO & DATA PROCESS. • TRNG EVALUATORS • ASSISTANTS • TASKING & TEST NCO's • DUTY SOLDIERS • SCTY NCO's - NOT MP's 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CONUS GEN ENL • CONUS CHEM ENL • CONUS PNY SCTY ENL • CONUS ANGL APPREHEND ENL • CONUS CRIME PREVENT ENL • CONUS GAME WARDEN • CBT ARMS NCO's (NOT PROTECTED) • MP's ON INSTL WHERE TOS MP's EXIST (NOT PROTECTED)
CIVILIANIZE:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ALL POSITIONS THAT DO NOT REQUIRE SOLDIERS (AR 670-4) 	

(f) Savings resulting from this initiative were deconflicted from other VANGUARD initiatives which were given priority in cases of duplication. Thus, savings projected below are very conservative.

(g) Given the limited scope of analysis, it is possible that actual reductions would not be precisely the same positions identified by VANGUARD. This initiative is the basis however to reduce commands in the order of magnitude shown in addition to all other initiatives.

(h) Conclusions and recommendations.

XIII-1 Conclusions:	The Army has approximately 9,000 enlisted spaces allocated to the TDA which could be eliminated (independent of the other VANGUARD initiatives) without substantial mission impact.
Recommendations:	The MACOM's be tasked to eliminate 9000 enlisted soldiers from the TDA by end FY97 in addition to other VANGUARD reductions.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

(b) VANGUARD recommended savings are shown below.

ZERO BASED ENLISTED							
CONCEPT							
- <u>PREMISE</u> Enlisted soldiers belong primarily in TOE units							
- Commanders will civilianize essential positions using MCB							
COMMAND RESULTS							
CMD	NET AUTH	O ENL	% REDUCED	CMD	NET AUTH	O ENL	% REDUCED
HQDA	67	-11	16	INSCOM	1721	-167	10
DA FOA'S	917	-103	11	SPC OPS	1392	-125	9
JOINT/DEF	4436	-27	0.6	TRADOC	39422	-3100	8
FORSCOM	7361	-1552	21	ISC	11108	-934	8
COE	185	-38	20	KOREA	1854	-103	6
AMC	3718	-698	19	USMA	354	-21	6
USAREUR	7937	-1384	17	USAREC	7843	-235	3
MEPCOM	694	-112	16	MDW	918	-10	1
USARPAC	2494	-284	11	HSC	16662	-58	0.3

a. FIELD OPERATING AND STAFF SUPPORT AGENCIES. (CHAPTER XIV)

(1) **General.** There is a widespread perception within the Army and in OSD and the Congress that FOAs and SSAs are too numerous; consume too many resources; and add little value. Therefore, VANGUARD gave review of these organizations special attention.

(2) VANGUARD Concept and Findings.

(a) An inventory of all organizations classified as FOAs or SSAs was

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

conducted. A total of 239 units with about 60,000 manpower spaces were identified. After backing out those which were impacted by other actions (e.g., commissaries transferred to DOD), 218 organizations were analyzed.

(b) After the functional analysis of each unit, emerging findings and recommendations were integrated into major VANGUARD initiatives. For example, the personnel related FOAs are reported in Chapter VII (Restructure and Realign Personnel Management Functions).

(c) Principal findings are shown below.

FINDINGS

- The system of designating and missioning FOAs and SSAs in undisciplined...
 - There is no HQDA proponent
 - Regulations are outdated, vague, and ignored
- Many FOAs & SSAs at HQDA and MACOMs should be reclassified and realigned.
- FOAs & SSAs are performing missions that should be done either on Staffs or by subordinate units.
- There is much duplication & overlap


(d) Detailed discussion of the FOA review is in Chapter XIV.

(e) FOA and SSA savings are reflected in the appropriate major initiatives.

c. DOD EXECUTIVE AGENT RESPONSIBILITIES. (CHAPTER XIV)

(1) **General.** In response to a specific task issued by the Secretary of the Army, VANGUARD conducted a review of the missions and functions for which the Army has been designated DOD Executive Agent. Details of that review are in Chapter XIV.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990



(2) Concept and Findings.

(a) One hundred thirty-eight Army Executive Agencies were identified with assistance from the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary. The Air Force is executive agent for two hundred eleven missions/functions. Navy and total DOD statistics were not available.

(b) It is difficult to determine the level of effort or resource requirements of many of these missions since few are performed by discrete agencies or activities or highlighted as separate program entries. Through coordination with the units performing these missions and research of program and budget data, VANGUARD captured estimated historical resource use, currently allocated resources, and estimated future requirements.

(c) Each executive Agency was evaluated within its functional context with

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990**

an objective of determining which could be eliminated, reassigned to another service, or reassigned to a DOD agency.

(d) The 138 responsibilities were divided into three categories:

- Those consistent with the Army's traditional roles and missions which should be retained.
- Those not tightly linked to the Army's traditional roles and missions but...
 - Benefit to Army exceeds cost
 - or
 - Cost is minimal
- Those which should be eliminated or transferred.

(e) VANGUARD found thirty-four missions that could be transferred or eliminated. There are nearly 7,000 man-years and 107 million dollars required to support these functions annually.

(f) VANGUARD recommends that the Army seek relief from these thirty-four missions.


XIV. SUMMARY OF REDUCTIONS AND SAVINGS.

a. Manpower.

(1) Even though the relationship between the size of the GSF and the fighting force is not linear, it is useful to compare the Army's overall programmed reduction to GSF reductions.

(2) The figure below assumes that the GSF reduction should be consistent with the total program at about twenty-five percent.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 15 December 1990



	FY92			FY97		
	Mil	Civ	AGG	Mil	Civ	AGG
AMC	-1000	-11282	-12241 (11%)	-2005	-24544	-26549 (24%)
CIDC	-222	-118	-327 (10%)	-605	-208	-708 (6%)
COE	-24	-882	-1010 (7%)	-81	-828	-909 (6%)
EUSA	-841	-1498	-2488 (18%)	-1172	-2708	-3880 (28%)
FORSCOM	-2781	-5501	-8282 (18%)	-5848	-8253	-14101 (26%)
HSC	-817	-821	-1638 (9%)	-2880	-817	-3697 (8%)
INSCOM	-1310	-22	-1332 (12%)	-3028	-588	-3616 (32%)
ISC	-1780	-3823	-5603 (16%)	-8787	-5488	-14275 (30%)
MDW	-54	-188	-242 (8%)	-228	-248	-476 (14%)
MTMC	-51	-112	-163 (5%)	-317	-1231	-1548 (43%)
TRADOC	-5815	-5102	-11017 (12%)	-15777	-7882	-23659 (26%)
USAREUR	-1864	-20751	-22415 (26%)	-3281	-20198	-23479 (26%)
USARPAC	-288	-1047	-1335 (12%)	-880	-1258	-2138 (17%)
USARSO	-13	-228	-241 (7%)	-825	-1388	-2213 (8%)
USASOC	-24	0	-24 (4%)	-121	0	-121 (2%)
HQDA	-816	-2217	-2702 (5%)	-1772	-2848	-4620 (8%)
JT/DEF	-3882	-88	-3970 (25%)	-2503	-88	-2591 (26%)
TOTAL	-19827	-83818	-73437 (18%)	-47854	-78718	-126572 (28%)

• DMRD, PBD, BRAC, AND POM 92-97 POM ADJUSTMENTS

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15 December 1990

(3) When all auditable reductions programmed for the GSF are added to VANGUARD savings, the total reduction by FY97 is very close to the twenty-five percent notional goal. Given the fixed costs of operation in many TDA activities, this means that additional substantial reductions will require elimination of missions or major changes in the culture of the Army' operations.

(4) The figure below provides a summary of VANGUARD savings. That portion attributable to Army Management Review II (AMR II) has already been accepted by the Army and included in the FY92/93 budget submit. Remaining savings can be applied to the program in POM 94-99 or used, in part, to offset near term costs.

PROJECT VANGUARD		RECOMMENDED VANGUARD SAVINGS					
		FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97
AMR 2 (DMRD 945)	MIL	1383	1527	1613	1640	1648	1648
	CIV	2605	3020	3055	3095	3155	3155
	\$(M)	62	148	168	182	202	220
BAND 1	MIL	1951	3517	4315	4953	5739	6018
	CIV	1478	3710	5940	7497	10718	10772
	\$(M)	40	122	238	341	417	580
BAND 2	MIL	5902	8431	10914	13262	15497	15509
	CIV	3303	4995	7596	8894	9491	9511
	\$(M)	249	423	451	633	697	740
TOTAL SAVINGS		FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97
	MIL	9236	13475	16642	19655	22654	23175
	CIV	7386	11725	16591	19486	23364	23438
	\$(M)	351	693	857	1156	1316	1540



CHAPTER I STUDY OVERVIEW

1.1. CHARTER

a. **Background.** By the fall of 1989, it became clear that the defense budget growth of the eighties was over. From the Army's perspective, the most favorable outcome of the FY90 Budget process was to begin FY90 at the FY89 level, adjusted for inflation. This, together with emerging implications of the Conventional Forces - Europe (CFE) negotiations caused the Army Staff to review programmed Army systems and force structure. In preparation for the upcoming FY 92-97 DOD Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle, a study was initiated to examine trends, available and projected resources, and formulate a strategy to transition the Army into the 1990s at reduced levels. Reductions in resources, active component force structure, and a high potential for drastic reductions in Europe as a result of CFE was assumed. The challenge was to develop the required program reductions while maintaining an effective force to meet the potential range of world-wide commitments. This initial effort ultimately expanded to include participation by MACOMs and resulted in significant changes to the Army Program which was published in POM 92-97. The characteristics of the future fighting forces identified are shown below:





Figure I-1
STRUCTURE REVIEW FINDINGS

Completion of POM 92-97 and its supporting studies and analyses provided a blueprint for the structure manning, and equipping of the Army's tactical forces of the future and identified a need for a similar major review of the General Support Forces (GSF).

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER I
STUDY OVERVIEW
15 December 1990**


b. **VANGUARD Charter.** Project VANGUARD was approved jointly by the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff, Army on 2 May 1990. The project began in April and continued through December 1990. A brief summary of the purpose is shown in figure I-2.



**Figure I-2
VANGUARD Charter**

The mission and scope of the project are described below. A complete copy of the Charter is included at Chapter XVII, Appendix A.

1.2. MISSION. VANGUARD's two-fold mission statement is listed below in figure I-3.



**Figure I-3
VANGUARD Mission**


**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER I
STUDY OVERVIEW
15 December 1990**

VANGUARD's mission was unique in two particulars.

a. **Effort Based on Trend Toward Smaller Overall Force.** All GSF were considered, and missions and functions were inventoried and evaluated in light of future requirements. The Army at large was projected to change radically; and the entire support infrastructure was to be reviewed with missions and functions to be validated, eliminated, or changed. Previous studies had been more restricted and focused on specific missions and functions, or discrete parts of the GSF (both to achieve current efficiencies and to accommodate projected changes to narrow Army missions, functions, or organizations). In VANGUARD's case, however, there were few constants.

b. **Protect Against Further Degradation of Warfighting Forces.** The goal was to attain substantial cost savings, so approaches required detailed understandings of missions and functions. Where possible, functions were consolidated and economies of scale were achieved. Previous studies to reduce GSF had been driven by the need to fix major dysfunctions or to improve efficiency. Vanguard had to maintain a capability in an already reduced Army while achieving the required cost savings. The protection of the fighting force was the aim that would guide the VANGUARD effort and resulting recommendations.

1.3. **SCOPE.** VANGUARD's scope is show in figure I-4.



**Figure I-4
VANGUARD Scope**

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER I
STUDY OVERVIEW
15 December 1990

a. VANGUARD's review included all Army TDA and selected MTOE organizations from detachment/installation level to the Office of the Secretary of the Army. Active, reserve component and Army elements of Joint and Defense Agencies and Army support to other Agencies (e.g., executive agency responsibilities) were included. Since there are some MTOE organizations which are in fact performing GSF missions, VANGUARD was not restricted to the TDA Army and MTOE units were included as appropriate.

b. Classified programs and missions were not addressed in detail as a general rule but, when reviews of specific resources and functions led to opportunities for savings, recommended changes were coordinated with the program proponents and will not be addressed further in this report.

c. Streamlining and reducing the GSF to complement a smaller total Army means that VANGUARD's emphasis was on reductions and savings while continuing to maintain the capability for the Army accomplish required missions and functions. VANGUARD's test was cost savings balanced against the capability to effectively execute missions and functions. Wherever possible, operational improvements were sought and many of the VANGUARD initiatives were built around the need for such improvements.

d. A number of major programs and initiatives concerned with base closings, management initiatives, and force structure changes (discussed in paragraphs 1-5 through 1-10) were already approved for execution when VANGUARD commenced operations. Although it was generally acknowledged that not all of these initiatives would prove to be fully executable, VANGUARD's charter did not include revisiting them. In fact a special Army ad hoc group (Task Force 2000) was formed on the Army Staff to monitor and coordinate execution of these disparate programs. Thus, VANGUARD assumed throughout that approved initiatives would execute and included them in the baseline data of the study.

e. Several of the MACOMs and staff agencies had already recognized the probable future resource posture and responded by developing plans to reduce costs, reconfigure organizations and change methods of operation. VANGUARD was charged with capturing these emerging plans, capitalizing on the work done in the field, and rationalizing the various local initiatives to build a coherent Army program. Changes to these emerging plans would be recommended only where local efforts were inconsistent with the thrust of the emerging umbrella plan for the Army.

f. Although VANGUARD was not conceived as a manpower survey nor as a base closure and realignment effort, the study scope clearly envisioned substantial savings being

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER I
STUDY OVERVIEW
15 December 1990**

generated by reductions in manpower and the realignment and closure of additional installations. Indeed, the main avenue to cost savings in the GSF is to reduce the operations and maintenance, Army (OMA) account. Given reductions already sustained in other accounts, really substantial savings are only available through massive reductions in civilian personnel, closure of installations, elimination of missions or functions, and changes in policies and concepts that alter the culture of the Army as it has developed over the past fifty years.

g. To be of value, VANGUARD deliverables had to be keyed to the Army's schedule for participation in the program and budget development process. Of immediate concern was the FY92-93 budget being finalized and submitted to OSD in August of 1990 and, later, the extensive changes to the Army's programs occasioned by the concurrent shortfall of \$2.7 billion in the FY91 Authorizations Act and conduct of Operation Desert Shield.

1.4. CONCEPT OF OPERATION.

a. **General Concept.** To develop initiatives to reshape the GSF, VANGUARD adopted a four phased concept. Continuous coordination with MACOMs and HQDA Staff proponents was a key element of the concept. Phases were:


(1) Identification of the national and international trends likely to impact the Army of the 1990s and beyond.

(2) Derivation of implications of this changing environment on the Army and the GSF in particular.

(3) Derivation of a vision of the future GSF defined by both an organizational construct and a set of governing policies.

(4) Derivation and application of study rules which led to a set of implementation initiatives which would move the Army toward the vision of the future GSF.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER I
STUDY OVERVIEW
15 December 1990**



**FIGURE I-5
VANGUARD Concept**

This figure displays the conceptual continuum that VANGUARD used. Development of new policies for operating and managing the Army, an emerging vision of the Army of the twenty-first century, and study rules derived therefrom led to implementation initiatives which would move the general support force toward the Vision. As the study progressed; policies, rules and vision were modified as necessary and additional initiatives were developed. Further discussion of this process is found in Chapter II (Study Execution) and Chapter III (VANGUARD Vision).

b. VANGUARD Organization.

(1) Figure I-6, on the following page, depicts the organization of Project VANGUARD.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER I
 STUDY OVERVIEW
 15 December 1990




FIGURE I-6
 VANGUARD Organization

(2) **Discussion.** Project VANGUARD was manned by a combination of officer and civilian subject matter experts provided on temporary detail by HQDA Staff Agencies, MACOMs, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. A small group of officers enroute to command or other key jobs were detailed enroute to meet selected requirements. A copy of the correspondence requesting manning support is at Chapter XVII, Appendix D.

(a) The Office of the Director included the Director, Deputy Director, Executive Officer and a small administrative staff provided by the Director of the Army Staff. A legal advisor from OTJAG and a historian from the Center for Military History were also attached.

(b) The Concepts and Integration Team functioned as the "G3" of the project. Initially it focused on developing study concepts, methodology, and schedule. Although that process continued throughout the project, emphasis shifted to integration of the functional study team efforts and routine project management functions. This team

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER I
STUDY OVERVIEW
15 December 1990**

was manned with a combination of officers and civilians with strong backgrounds in conceptual work, the force integration process and the operation and use of the HQDA decision support systems.

(c) The Cost and Economic Analysis Team was composed of cost, manpower, and equipment analysts from the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Financial Management and the U. S. Army Force Integration Support Agency. It developed a standard costing methodology (Chapter XVII, Appendix M) and served as the focal point for computation and validation of costs and savings associated with VANGUARD initiatives.

(d) Study Teams. The actual research, analysis and initiative development was done by two teams that were organizationally focused and six teams that were functionally oriented. Teams were composed of five to seven analysts. Project work was assigned to the functional teams by grouping similar functions from the Army Functional Dictionary into logical packages. For example, the Managing Information Team was responsible for evaluating all policies, procedures, organizations, missions associated with Information management. The HQDA and MACOM teams complemented this vertical review of the Army's functions with a horizontal evaluation of the command functions and interactions between the various levels of command.

(3) Steering Groups.

(a) The VANGUARD Charter required the Director to report to the VCSA and Under Secretary through the HQDA Select Committee (SELCOM). Therefore the Program and Budget Committee (the major general level working committee which supports the SELCOM) became the VANGUARD General Officer Steering Committee. Interim reports were presented to the PBC and concurrence and direction sought prior to each SELCOM briefing and certain other key events (eg: Army Commanders Conference briefings).

(b) Early in the process, VANGUARD sought the advice of a small group of retirees (two generals, one lieutenant general, one member of the senior executive service). The perspective of these senior leaders validated VANGUARD's direction and helped set the stage for the first meetings with senior MACOM representatives.

(c) The most active steering group was a General Officer Working Group (GOWG) chaired by the VCSA. The membership of this group was somewhat flexible and dependent on the subject matter at hand but it always included senior representatives from the Army Secretariat and Army Staff as well as the large MACOMs. This group met formally on four occasions; twice at Fort Belvoir, and twice via televideo

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER I
STUDY OVERVIEW
15 December 1990**

conference. The direction resulting from these four meetings and follow on visits, messages and correspondence insured that the user and field perspective was a clear and integral part of the project.

1.5. Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC).

a. The Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988 (Public Law No. 100-256) established the authority for the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to charter an independent commission to examine ways for the Defense Department to eliminate installation infrastructure. The recommendations of the commission required the closing of 76 installations (including 53 stand-alone housing sites) and realignment of activities and units at approximately 57 other Army installations. These recommendations are called "BRAC I" within the Army.

b. The Army identified 26 additional base realignments and closures in conjunction with the FY91 Budget as a result of assessments of the future threat environment and the requirement to reduce the defense budget. These recommendations are called "BRAC II" within the Army and are associated with the force structure reductions discussed in para 2.11.

c. The Army has also proposed closure or reduced operations at 113 installations and sites overseas. These recommendations are called "BRAC III" and are the direct result of force structure reductions programmed overseas. There are 101 sites in Europe and 12 sites in Korea impacted by BRAC III.

d. The FY91 National Defense Authorization Act included legislation known as the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law No. 101-510, sections 2901-2911). This law radically amended laws governing base closures and realignments by sharply curtailing the discretionary authority of the Secretary of Defense and service secretaries to close or realign military installations in the United States. It did not apply to closures or realignments overseas. The FY91 Act created a Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission with members appointed biennially by the President with advice and consent of the Senate.

e. The Secretary of Defense must recommend base closure and realignments to the Commission in FY91, FY93, and FY95. The Commission reviews the recommendations against the criteria set forth in the Act and sends its own proposals to the President. The President submits the final recommendations to Congress for approval. If an Army Base

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER I
STUDY OVERVIEW
15 December 1990**

Closure or realignment initiative that falls within the Act misses a two-year cycle (e.g., FY91), it must await the next cycle (e.g., FY93) before it can be resubmitted. The legislation prohibited DOD from using any funds to close or realign any CONUS military installations except in accordance with the FY91 Act. The Secretary of Defense must resubmit the realignments and closures announced with the FY 91 budget (commonly referred to as BRAC II) through the new legislatively prescribed procedures if they exceed the thresholds of 10 USC 2687. BRAC I and BRAC III remained valid.

1.6. Defense Management Review I (DMR I).

a. In 1985, the President established the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission) to study various DOD management policies and procedures, and to recommend improvements. The budget process, legislative oversight and the defense acquisition system formed the primary focus of the commission's work.

b. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 reorganized DOD to strengthen civilian authority in DOD; give more responsibility and authority to unified and specified commanders; enhance the efficiency of military operations; and improve the management and administration of DOD.

c. In 1989, the Secretary of Defense conducted a Defense Management Review (DMR) of the Department with the objectives of:

- (1) implementing completely the Packard Commission's recommendation
- (2) improving substantially the performance of the DOD acquisition system
- (3) managing DOD resources more effectively

The first DMR, Fiscal Year 1989, identified \$39 billion dollars in savings for DOD for Fiscal Years 1991-1995. The estimated dollar savings for the Army was \$12 billion over five years. A manpower savings of 10,000 civilian and 1,000 military spaces was also generated.

d. The majority of the management initiatives pertaining to the Army were logistics systems improvements and streamlining the Army Material Command (AMC) Headquarters elements. Additionally, implementation plans were under development to streamline the Army Information Systems Command (ISC). Other administrative improvements included better management of civilian personnel, civilianization of military spaces, reduction of CHAMPUS costs for outpatient care, reduction of utility costs and development of standard

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER I
STUDY OVERVIEW
15 December 1990**

ADP systems. When the FY91 President's Budget was submitted to the Congress a number of consolidation studies were ongoing (e.g., Supply Depots, Air Maintenance Depots, other Maintenance Depots, Financial Operations, Laboratories and Test and Evaluation, ADP and Inventory Control Points). Additionally, a variety of specific changes in legislation that would allow dramatic improvements of management of the acquisition system and other functional areas were identified to the Congress.

e. Midway through the VANGUARD Study, OSD decided to transfer all services Supply Depots to the Defense Logistics Agency and to transfer service Finance and Accounting Centers and finance and accounting operations to a new Defense Finance Center.

1.7. Defense Management Review II (DMR II).

a. In March 1990, DOD asked the Secretaries of the Military Departments to develop candidates for future management improvements based on the assumption that financial resources committed to Defense would continue to decline. The eventual list of 36 FY92 DOD-wide initiatives included a number of consolidations or transfers of entire Army missions and commands to OSD or other services.

b. Consolidations of functions (e.g., DOD and Section six Schools, undergraduate pilot training, base civil engineering services, foreign military sales management, funding of JCS exercises, veterinary laboratories, military construction, military claims headquarters offices, investigations, and DOD printing)....

c. Transfers included commands and functions (e.g., transfer of health care and establishment of a DOD Health Care Agency, disestablishment of Military Traffic Management Command and transfer of its functions to U.S. Transportation Command, and transfer of the investigative organizations to the DOD Inspector General).

d. The ongoing, but undecided, DMR II initiatives complicated the work of Project VANGUARD, since each VANGUARD proposal had to include a consideration of the DMR II initiative being implemented.

1.8. Army Management Review I (AMR I). The Defense Management Review I directed the Services to examine four crucial areas: personnel and organizations; defense planning; acquisition practices; and acquisition process improvements. The Army concentrated on the acquisition organizations and processes and the logistics processes. The initiatives streamlined the acquisition process, reduced layering, and improved the logistics systems. Some initiatives were implemented within the Army's authority, while regulatory and legislative relief were requested for others.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER I
STUDY OVERVIEW
15 December 1990**

1.9. Army Management Review II (AMR II).

a. OSD required the Army to program additional management initiatives in the FY92-97 POM. The Army responded with POM wedge of \$150M in FY92 which grew to \$300M in FY97. The Army Staff submitted twenty-five AMR II initiatives to the Director of the Army Budget for consideration as billpayers towards the AMR II POM wedge. VANGUARD was assigned 15 of the initiatives to work. The majority of the initiatives were in the resource management, logistics, installation management, personnel, and training functional areas. None of the twenty-five initiatives survived the staffing process and VANGUARD had to identify other initiatives to pay the POM wedge. PBD 945, 6 Jun 91 restored OMA dollars associated with proposed printing savings.

b. On 16 October 1990, the Under Secretary of the Army provided the DOD Comptroller 23 AMR II initiatives developed by VANGUARD, which saved \$106.8M (under the \$150M FY92 target), but with a cumulative savings of \$1.3B over the program years. Civilian savings amounted to 3,241 spaces. The Army submission to OSD did not include associated military spaces as savings since the Army intended to reapply the military spaces to reduce undermanning in other units. DOD required the Army to provide the military spaces contained in the 23 initiatives and then DOD included 1,648 military space savings and \$244.8M in Program Budget Decision 945 for a cumulative dollar savings of \$1.2B over the program years. A summary of AMR PBD 945 is at Chapter XVII, Appendix H.

1.10. POM 92-97 FORCE STRUCTURE REVIEWS.

a. POM 92-97 FORCE STRUCTURE REVIEW I.

(1) In preparation for the FY 92-97 POM cycle, a small ad hoc Army Staff task force was charged to develop alternatives to downsize the Army and ensure that near term budget decisions were in consonance with the long term strategic outlook. The reduced threat of a war in Europe and longer warning times, as well as declining resources, were the impetus for a revised vision of the Army's program in the 90's. This group developed a force structure ramp for the Army to transition to a smaller, more CONUS-Based contingency force. The steady state Army was viewed to be versatile, deployable and lethal consisting of a mix of light forces, heavy forces, and special operations forces spread between active and reserve components.

(2) Military end-strength reductions of 135,000 active spaces and 131,000 reserve component spaces were planned over the FY90-FY95 period. An accompanying reduction of 33,600 civilians during FY90-FY94 was also programmed. The force structure adjustments proposed that facilities to be closed or realigned and those impacts are

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER I
STUDY OVERVIEW
15 December 1990**

reduction of 33,600 civilians during FY90-FY94 was also programmed. The force structure adjustments proposed that facilities to be closed or realigned and those impacts are commonly referred to as Base Realignments and Closures II (BRAC II). Proposed inactivations included 2nd Armored Division, HQ 4th U.S. Army, Troop Support Command, and 1st CIDC Region Headquarters. The 194th Armored Brigade and the 9th Infantry Division were downsized; the 7th Infantry Division was relocated and Fort Ord closed; and Health Services Command was converted to a Medical Command under the Office of the Surgeon General. Two tank production facilities were terminated. Six ammunition plants were laid away and one ceased production and was leased. Red River Army Depot was realigned. Sacramento Army Depot and Fort McClellan were closed and Fort Gillem was warmbased. All of the above were proposed to the Congress with the submission of the Defense Department Budget in February 1990.

b. **POM 92-97 FORCE STRUCTURE REVIEW II.** As the POM cycle progressed, results of the initial force structure review were refined and expanded to include additional reductions. Manpower reductions were largely non-specific TDA reductions passed to the Major Army Commands. Specific reductions were defined for Field Operating Agencies, Army Management Headquarters, and Joint and Defense units. Dollar reductions were made to JCS Exercise funds, RDA modernization, flight training, Reserve Officer Training Corps, information management support, second destination transportation costs; central supply, O&MA civilians, and minor construction Army.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER I
STUDY OVERVIEW
15 December 1990

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CHAPTER II STUDY EXECUTION

2.1. GENERAL

a. **Strategy.** VANGUARD's strategy was underpinned by the following:

- An early and comprehensive evaluation of the environment and its implications for the Army of the future.
- Development of a VANGUARD Vision of the future Army.
 - Incorporate changed missions, policies, concepts, organizations.
 - Provide a framework on which to build major initiatives.
- Incorporate emerging MACOM plans where possible.
- Conduct all work in the open and in cooperation with MACOMs and HQDA Staff Agencies.

b. **Work Plan.** VANGUARD was conceived as a two phased study. Phase II, however, was further subdivided as shown in figure II-1 below.




Figure II-1
VANGUARD Work Plan

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER II
STUDY EXECUTION
15 December 1990

(1) PHASE I commenced on 24 April 1990 with the arrival of a small group that would become the nucleus of the VANGUARD team, augmented with selected subject matter experts from MACOMs, the retired community, and the analytical community. The primary focus was on preparing the groundwork for the actual study effort. This included three distinct tasks:

(a) Administrative arrangements for study support including building space, budget, transportation, information management plans, and personnel assignments were developed and coordinated. Highlights are discussed in CHAPTER XVII, Appendices 17K and L.

(b) Development of a study methodology and work plan (including necessary training for analysts).

(c) Definition of the environment in which the Army will operate in the 1990s and the implications of that environment for the organization, missions, and functions of the general support forces (GSF) of the Army.

(d) Development of alternative policies and an initial set of rules to facilitate consistency of approach among study teams.

(2) PHASE II (conduct of the study and development of recommendations) commenced on 15 May 1990 with the arrival of the main body of Project VANGUARD. Major elements of Phase II are summarized below.

(a) Concept Review.

1 Work done in Phase I was reviewed and the principles, concepts, methodology and study rules were refined and validated. The product of this effort was briefed to a General Officer Working Group (GOWG) chaired by the VCSA on 22 Jun 1990 at Fort Belvoir. A summary of that meeting is at Chapter XVII, Appendix E. The primary result of the 22 June GOWG, was ratification of VANGUARD's work plan and the conceptual underpinnings of the study.

2 Orientation and Training.

a Concurrent with the concept review, the initial two weeks of Phase II included a round of orientation and update briefings by key members of the Army Staff and selected MACOMs. With the exception of the Director, Deputy, and members of the Concepts and Integration Team, few of those detailed to Project VANGUARD arrived with the broad working knowledge of the Army's total program (POM 92-97, BRAC, etc) needed

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER II
STUDY EXECUTION
15 December 1990

to conduct the project. In addition, although team members proved to be subject matter experts, few had the experience in force integration and manpower and fiscal management needed to understand and interpret the available Army data bases and decision support systems. Therefore, a training program was included in the Concept Review Phase. An aggressive reading program was also required to familiarize project members with the evolution of the Army's organization and the methodology and findings of past significant studies. See Appendix 17C for a bibliography. Additional training was conducted in use of the ADP systems available.

b Preliminary Assessment. Between 20 Jun and 13 Aug 90. An initial review of missions, functions, and organizations was conducted; primary study directions were determined; and broad POM alternatives emerged. At the end of this sub phase, VANGUARD delivered its first product - a set of management initiatives which could be used to offset the 150 million dollar management initiative wedge in the FY 92-93 budget. Alternative totaling 228 million FY92 and 608 million dollars in FY93 were presented. During this phase, VANGUARD developed a "vision" of the future Army and presented it to the GOWG on 27 July. This VANGUARD Vision (Chapter 3) became the backdrop against which all emerging initiatives were measured.

c Between mid August and the end of October, the broad initiative thrusts developed in the preliminary assessment were reconciled with MACOM plans, developed into a set of alternative concepts, policies, and organizations which were consistent with the established VANGUARD Vision. Implementing initiatives were developed and coordinated with the HQDA Staff and MACOMs. The GOWG met twice during this period to review emerging initiatives. (See Chapter XVII, Appendix E). This phase ended with ratification of the VANGUARD direction by the Senior Leadership at the October Army Commanders' Conference.

d The month of November and early December were programmed for final coordination of VANGUARD's recommendations and preparation of the final report which was to be submitted on 14 December. Two major events disrupted this part of the schedule. First, OPERATION DESERT SHIELD became the Army's top priority and diffused the focus of senior commanders and staff principals that VANGUARD had previously enjoyed. Second, The FY91 Defense Authorizations Act (Public Law No. 101-510) gave the Army \$2.7 billion dollars less than requested by the President. The implications of this shortfall projected into FY92 and beyond caused VANGUARD to be temporarily diverted to assist the Army Staff with finding additional near term savings. Although the report was rendered in briefings for both the Chief of Staff and Secretary on schedule, submission of this written study report was delayed by about thirty days.

e On completion of the report to the Senior Leadership in December,

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER II
STUDY EXECUTION
15 December 1990

VANGUARD began the process of passing its recommendations to the Army Staff for action and incorporation in the program. The Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE) will orchestrate this effort and will receive a small residual cell from VANGUARD to provide required continuity during the transition from study to execution.

2.2. PHASE I: TRENDS, IMPLICATIONS, POLICIES, AND RULES.

a. **Overview.** To arrive at a useful and coherent set of initiatives for reconfiguring the GSF, it was first necessary to determine the implications of a changing world environment. From them, VANGUARD derived new policies for operating and managing the GSF. Study rules, based on these policies were then applied to build a model for the GSF that accounts for missions, resources, concepts and policies in a realistic way. Figure II-2 outlines the relationships of these elements.




Figure II-2
Derivation of the GSF-Future

The initial conceptual work was done by the VANGUARD Concepts and Integration Team augmented by a retired general officer with broad study experience, force integration and resource management experts from USAREUR and WESTCOM (now USARPAC), and a senior combat developer from TRADOC. Assistance was also provided by a team by RAND Arroyo and information was provided from various Army Staff Agencies and the Army War College. Methodology and findings were reviewed by the Army Concepts Analysis Agency.

b. **Trends.** National and international trends documented in various military and

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER II
STUDY EXECUTION
15 December 1990

civilian sources were reviewed for potential impact on the U.S. Defense establishment in general and the Army in particular. This was a particularly difficult task because the world situation was in a state of almost unprecedented turbulence at the time. The Berlin Wall was down; Eastern Europe was in turmoil; the Germanies would soon be reunited; the Soviet Union was undergoing massive political change and, within ninety days, the U.S. military would have begun its largest deployment of forces since World War II (OPERATION DESERT SHIELD) in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In that environment, VANGUARD distilled a large number of apparently significant trends to four which seemed to capture the essence of the environment of the future for the Army.

(1) Threat associated trends.

a Two major trends linked to the changing threat environment were identified. From these trends, multiple implications for the Army were derived and each of these implications led to several implications for the future TDA Army.

- The perceived military threat is changing...
 - Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat is declining ..
 - Warning times are increasing...
 - U. S. interests are changing in a multi polar world...
 - Importance of Third World increasing..
 - Little change in warning time...

Figure II-3

b In general the implications for the TDA Army focus on consolidation, economy and the need for greater efficiency. Opportunities for cost savings are clearly evident (because of the drastically changed NATO situation) if the Army can rationalize its cultural approach to concepts, policies, organization and management with changing environment.

(2) Threat independent trends.

a Two major trends were identified which are independent of the threat and are related to changing demographics of the U.S. and the changing attitudes and expectations of the American people.

- Domestic issues are getting more attention
- Domestic missions for the military are becoming more important...
- Demographics of the Nation are changing
- Changing public relationships with the military...

Figure II-4

b Again, each of these trends drives a group of implications for the Army at large which, in turn, results in several identifiable implications for the TDA Army. In general, TDA implications acknowledge that the Army's increasing competition for a decreasing manpower pool and will tend to increase resource requirements.

c. Implications, Policies, and Rules.

(1) Figure II-5 is an example of the relationship between changing national influences (trends), which cause changing defense priorities, Army implications of those changes, and resulting implications for the TDA Army of the future. A complete display of VANGUARD developed trends and implications is at Chapter XVII, Appendix E.




Figure II-5
 TDA Implications

(2) Two sets of policies and policy changes flow from the implications of the future environment. One set can be viewed in an operational construct while the second

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER II
STUDY EXECUTION
15 December 1990

set is more closely tied to management of the Army and its resources. These VANGUARD policy recommendations are shown in figures II-6 and II-7.




Figure II-6
VANGUARD Operational/Mission
Policies





Figure II-7
VANGUARD Management Policies

(3) From these policies, a set of rules was developed to guide the study in

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER II
STUDY EXECUTION
15 December 1990**

each functional area (e.g., training, manning, equipping, etc). A complete list of these rules in at Chapter XVII, Appendix G. Figure II-8 provides a representative example of the derivation of rules.



**Figure II-8
Rules Derivation**

d. Completion of Phase I.

(1) At the end of Phase I (15 May), trends and implications had been finalized and validated in discussions with several senior active and retired general officers and civilians. An initial set of policies and rules had also been derived. Refinement and validation of these policies and rules was the transition to Phase II.

(2) Ratification. On 22 June the entire methodology described above and the resulting trends, implications and rules were presented to the GOWG. The process and product were ratified with minor adjustments which have been incorporated.

2.3 PHASE II.

a. Methodology.

(1) Establishing an accurate baseline for analysis proved to be a significant challenge. The breadth of VANGUARD's charter (which included missions, functions, concepts and organizations) dictated the use of The Army Authorization Data System

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER II
STUDY EXECUTION
15 December 1990**

(TAADS) as the primary data source. TAADS is the Army's single authorization data base for units and reflects the HQDA approved structure with manpower and equipment authorizations portrayed at a very fine grained level of detail (e.g., by function, cost account, grade, MOS, etc). It is the only HQDA data base that translates the unit's mission, resources, and methods of operation into an organizational construct.

(a) In general TAADS only reflects the current unit structure with a limited view of the future at best. Thus, it was necessary to continually relate the TAADS start point to programmed future resources reflected in other systems to understand the organization and resourcing of units over time.

(b) Additionally, the pace of events during the 1989 AND 1990 had simply outstripped the Army's capability to document decisions and reconcile its multiple data bases. There were significant disconnects between the Force Accounting System (official record of the force as it is and as it is reflected in approved Army plans), TAADS, and the Program and Budget Guidance. These disconnects continued through out VANGUARD's life and required a continuous reconciliation process.

(c) Near the conclusion of the study VANGUARD obtained access to an updated TAADS file in which MACOMs had captured (and ODCSOPS had approved) previously undocumented program changes. All VANGUARD initiatives were compared to this new baseline and conflicts resolved. A detailed description of this process is at Chapter XVII.

(2) Initial Assessment. The GSF was inventoried by Army Management Structure Code (AMSCO) and by standard work center code (SWCC). This approach provided two overlapping views of GSF structure. The first defined the GSF by cost codes (the basis for the way the Army request resources and reports their use to OSD and the Congress) while the second depicts the way that resources have been allocated to perform functions of the TDA Army as described in the Army Functional Dictionary (DA PAM 570-5). Based on this inventory, the force was assigned to the functional study teams for analysis.

(a) Each Team then assessed its assigned study area and overlaps and omissions were rectified. Points of contact on the HQDA Staff and in field commands were established the base case was validated or corrected where errors were discovered. Key to this process was the presence (as members of the VANGUARD team) of representatives from virtually all HQDA Staff Agencies and MACOMs with significant TDA proponencies. This facilitated open and continuous exchange of information.

(b) Figure II-9 shows the distribution of manpower resources to

CHAPTER III VANGUARD VISION

3.1. GENERAL

a. Background.

(1) VANGUARD's vision of the general support force required to support the smaller, more CONUS based Army of the future was derived through an iterative process that began with an assessment of the VANGUARD mission statement and definition of the scope of the effort.

(2) As discussed in Chapter I, unlike past studies such as STEADFAST and, more recently, ROBUST, VANGUARD's mission was not driven by the need to fix a major dysfunction or design a more efficient system. VANGUARD was chartered to find ways to reduce costs and to do that by examining missions and functions performed by the general support force and validating, eliminating, or modifying them. The scope of the effort was uniquely broad. VANGUARD examined the entire general support force: from detachment level through HQDA and joint/defense agencies.

b. Process.

(1) As discussed in detail in Chapter II, National and international influences and trends were reviewed for impact on defense priorities, implications for the army as a whole, and implications for the TDA army in particular. This review produced a set of "doctrinal" guidelines for TDA organization and operation, identified management principles, and defined a set of study rules to guide examination of both organizations and functions.





Figure III-1
Evolution of the Vision

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER III
VANGUARD VISION
15 December 1990**

(2) Throughout the process, the Army's six imperatives and three vectors were used as standard against which results were to be measured.



**Figure III-2
Army Imperatives**

c. The Product.

(1) The product of this process was an emerging vision of the future general support force which has two components, new policies and an organizational model. First, a set of new policies and policy changes were developed which could generate direct savings and which drove the construct of the organizational component of the vision. These policies emerged in two sets. One set was primarily mission oriented and the second set was focused on management. Although these policies were refined as the study progressed, the basic thrust survived intact.

(2) Study rules were established in each functional area to support the specific VANGUARD initiatives that would be used to reshape all elements of the General Support Forces. These study rules are at Chapter 17, Appendix G.

(3) Establishment of the alternative policies led to development of an organizational model. This model was developed to describe what the general support forces of the future would be if redesigned and reconfigured based on missions, functions, and forces supported in a relatively unconstrained environment. These products were not developed for actual programming of resources or forces. It was a conceptual framework

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER III
VANGUARD VISION
15 December 1990**

for discussion with senior army leaders. But, once agreed to by the Army Senior Leadership, this "vision" was to become the yardstick for measuring the utility of VANGUARD initiatives, as well as existing organization, missions, functions, policies, and procedures.

(4) This blueprint was developed and presented at the 27 July 90 General Officer Working Group meeting. The resulting VANGUARD Vision provided the framework. Emerging initiatives were arrayed within this vision and evaluated for consistency, logic, and applicability.

3.2. DEVELOPING THE VISION.

a. Defining the Heart of the Army.

(1) The Army as a national institution. A prerequisite for developing a vision of the future TDA Army was gaining consensus on a working definition of the "essence of the Army" and accompanying relationships between the warfighting and general support forces. Although we tend to think of the Army almost exclusively as a warfighting force, a review of history indicates that the U.S. Army has been substantially involved in nation building, humanitarian, and other general military services (e.g., engineering, medical, security, etc.) throughout its history. In fact the preeminent focus on readiness and warfighting of the last forty-five years has almost been unique. Figure III-3 illustrates the components of the Army's role and the nature of its relationship with the American people.

(2) The Essence of the General Support Force TDA. The Essence of the TDA Army was then conceptualized. The conceptual roles of the general support forces are consistent with the statutorily based functions of the Secretary of the Army to organize, man, equip, train, sustain, mobilize and deploy the force (10 U.S.C., Section 3013). Under Goldwater-Nichols (DOD Reorganization Act of 1986), the only forces left under Service control and not assigned to Commanders-in-Chief are those forces required to discharge secretarial functions...in the Army, the general support forces. Thus VANGUARD's concept is reinforced by Goldwater-Nichols. Figure III-4 displays the Essence of the TDA Army.




Figure III-3
 Essence of the Army
 III-4

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER III
VANGUARD VISION
15 December 1990




Figure III-4
Essence of the TDA Army

b. General Support Forces in the Future.

(1) Role of the General Support Forces. The requirements of TDA Army of the future can be defined by two components. First, the traditional roles of the army as a whole indicate that the need to support both rapid deployments in contingencies and provision of general military services in the U.S. and overseas will increase. Second the specific role of the general support force as executor of the Secretary's responsibilities provides the definition of the TDA Army's primary functions. As the VANGUARD Vision emerged, it was compared to historical snapshots of the Army as it existed at various authorized strength levels and different geo-political situations. Additionally, the current Army organization was compared to the Navy and Air Force to determine similarities and differences in the way the Services have organized to accomplish similar missions and functions. Below the Departmental level, there is a high correlation between the Services' assignment of missions to combatant commands and to functional major commands (see figure III-5).

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER III
 VANGUARD VISION
 15 December 1990


BASECASE MODEL COMPARISON

 AIR FORCE	 ARMY	 NAVY
SYSTEMS COMMAND LES COMMAND	ASC	NAV SUPPLY SYS COM STRATEGIC SYSTEMS COMMAND SPACE AND NAV WARFARE SYSTEMS COMMAND NAV AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND NAV SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND
MAC	SPMC	MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND
TRAINING COMMAND AIR UNIVERSITY	TRADC	CHIEF OF NAVAL RESERVE TRAINING
	CHIEF OF RESERVE	NAV FACILITIES AND ENGINEERING COMMAND
AIR RESERVE	(VBA)	NAV RESERVE FORCES COMMAND
SPACE COMMAND	ARMY SPACE COMMAND	NAV SPACE COMMAND
ELECTRONIC SECURITY COMMAND	NSASMA	NAV SIGINT COMMAND NAV SIG GROUP COMMAND
COMMUNICATIONS COMMAND	NSC	NAV COMMUNICATIONS TELEVISION COMMAND
(Contract Operating Agency)	NSC	NAV WREST SERVICE COMMAND
(Contract Operating Agency)	NSC	(Contracting & Support)

Figure III-5
 Service Comparison

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER III
VANGUARD VISION
15 December 1990**

(2) Establishing a Base Case. The current organization of the Army evolved to accommodate both internal and external changes. Establishment of U.S. Forces Command (as a Specified Command superimposed on U.S. Army FORSCOM, the (MACOMs), activation of U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the planned activation of U.S. Army Reserve Command are three recent examples of the evolutionary process which were driven either directly or indirectly by statute. Each of these examples carries significant implications for the way the Army will do business in the future. When Project VANGUARD began, the Army had sixteen MACOMs. Seven were Component Commands of Unified or Specified Commands and nine were functional MACOMs which support the Army. During the course of the study, USA WESTCOM and USARJ were combined into USARPAC which reduced the Army to fifteen MACOMs. Current organization and characteristics are shown at Figure III-6. This was the base case against which alternative "visions" were compared.



**Figure III-6
Current Organization**

(3) Assessment of the current force. This force is the product of evolution which resulted in the emergence of large staffs at multiple levels and the proliferation of field operating agencies and activities to deal with the implications of an all volunteer army undergoing the most intensive modernization since World War II. Reaction to increased oversight by OSD and the Congress (including its various investigative and auditing

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER III
VANGUARD VISION
15 December 1990**

agencies) led to still more Headquarters growth.

(a) Ultimately, both HQDA and MACOM staffs became so ponderous in their operations that matrix management became the rule for high priority initiatives and the formal staff process was largely relegated to routine, bureaucratic actions. The activation of new functional MACOMs (ISC, CIDC, INSCOM, HSC) over the last 18 years, increased the Army's ability to focus and control critical missions and functions but served to further increase overhead. In addition to fifteen MACOMs, there are over two hundred field operating agencies (HQDA) and activities (MACOM) which participate in the formulation and promulgation of policy or execute programs.

(b) Installation management and BASOPS lacks a clear champion at HQDA and MACOM levels. This has resulted in consistent underfunding, a deteriorating physical plant with an increasingly serious backlog of maintenance and repair, and wide variations in the level of support provided to the Army family among installations and commands.

(c) Both active and reserve component soldiers continue to perceive inequities in AC/RC management and resourcing. While great strides have been made in improving RC training, equipment, facilities and benefits, the reserve components are still not perceived as equal partners. This has led to dysfunctional competition for resources and Congressional action (specific guidance in authorization and appropriations bills concerning structure, resourcing, and command and control).

(d) The proliferation of information management systems has not led to the expected reductions in staff. Rather, introduction of these systems has led to increased demands for detailed decision support information and this new appetite offset anticipated savings.

(4) **VANGUARD Direction.** Assessment of the current organization and review of evolving VANGUARD policy recommendations reaffirmed the direction in figure III-7.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER III
VANGUARD VISION
15 December 1990




Figure III-7
VANGUARD Direction

This conceptual framework became the basis for developing alternative organizational models.

c. **Alternative Visions.** Several alternative organizational models were developed and tested against the conceptual framework previously described and are shown in figure III-8.

(1) **The LIFE CYCLE MODEL.** The first alternative considered was the "Life Cycle Model" (figure III-9). This approach is based on the assessment that the general support force is primarily concerned with the life cycle management of people, places, and things. In concept the Army Staff could be reduced to a DCSOPS and DCSINT (primarily concerned with the component commands) and Deputy Chiefs of Staff for People, Places, and Things who would provide the HQDA oversight for three corresponding functional MACOMs. Each of these MACOMs would then be responsible for cradle to grave management of its function. For example, People Command would access soldiers, provide all training, personnel management, health care, legal support, etc. through the soldier's accession, career and transition to retirement. Army support to retirees and dependents would also be a function of People Command. Under this concept, USMA would be part

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER III
VANGUARD VISION
15 December 1990




Figure III-8
Alternate Visions

of the Command's accession organization; Cadet Command and USAREC would be disestablished and their functions of accessioning officers and enlisted soldiers would be accomplished in a new streamlined organization. TRADOC and HSC would be disestablished and their programs restructured under People Command. Similar logic would apply to the management of Installations under Places Command and Equipment under Things Command.




Figure III-9
Option A - Life Cycle

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER III
 VANGUARD VISION
 15 December 1990

(2) Assessment of the Life Cycle Model. Although this alternative could reduce the Army to seven MACOMs and functionally align the general support force and HQDA, it proved to be limited in the transition from broad concept to practical implementation. For example, disestablishment of TRADOC would leave the combat developments process without a logical home since it crosses all functional lines and something very close to the current training infrastructure would have to be created under the People Command. VANGUARD's assessment was that the combination of turbulence required to execute and the overly broad resulting spans of control would be dysfunctional. It was also difficult to visualize the execution of certain specialized functions such as intelligence under this concept.

(3) The DUAL HAT MODEL. The second concept considered is the Dual Hat Model which features a straight line relationship between the Army Staff principal and the functional MACOMS. The Army Staff principal is dual hatted as the commander of the functional MACOM to which he is aligned. Although the MACOMS were initially life cycle based, consideration was given to the continued need for a training organization. Thus TRADOC was kept. Additionally, the national intelligence mission necessitated retaining an intelligence command to ensure that the Army could accomplish its obligations in this sensitive area. By dual hatting the commander as the principal staff officer, the Army Staff could be reduced as the MACOM staffs could do some of the mission. In assessing this approach it was obvious that the clean functional lines would eliminate much of the cross staff turf fights which occur today.




Figure III-10
 Option B-Dual Hat

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER III
VANGUARD VISION
15 December 1990

Additionally, since the staff principal and the commander was one and the same, clear and timely guidance to both the Army Staff and the MACOM would be assured. However, three shortcomings were identified. First, the Army leadership would lose the independent assessment provided by the staff principal. Second, the span of control would be too large for one person. Finally, the Chief of Staff of the Army would have to deal with the deputies much of the time since the commanders by the nature of their job would be out of town frequently visiting their elements.

(4). The FIGHTING FORCE MODEL. The Fighting Force model is most closely aligned with the World War II Army. It organizes the force along maneuver force type (for example, heavy, light special operations) with a resulting seven MACOMS. Each of the commands would be responsible for the training, maintaining, doctrine and design of their organizations. A very large Services Command would be responsible for normal support missions of people, places and things.




Figure III-11
Option C - Fighting Force

This model was rejected because it would undermine the combined arms culture of the Army and detract from transition to war and conduct of operations.

d. The VANGUARD Vision. The resulting organizational vision (figure III-12) is a modification of the life cycle model described above which includes nine MACOMs, retains

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER III
 VANGUARD VISION
 15 December 1990

the functional focus of the life cycle model, and retains TRADOC and INSCOM in their current roles. Like the life cycle model, the VANGUARD vision makes BASOPS and installation management a primary mission which can compete with other missions on a level playing field for resources and priorities. It also envisions more fully integrating the operation and support of the three components (e.g., merger of PERSCOM, ARPERCEN, GUARDPERCEN).




Figure III-12
 VANGUARD Vision

The VANGUARD Vision incorporates the policies and direction discussed above with an organizational model that negates the disadvantages of the pure life cycle model.

(1) FORSCOM, USAREUR, USARPAC, AND USASOC remain as component commands. USARJ, EUSA and WESTCOM are absorbed by USARPAC, the single MACOM remaining in the Pacific basin. USARSO is disestablished on withdrawal from Panama under the Treaty Implementation Plan.

(2) The Army Staff is functionally aligned with five MACOMs which support the warfighting Army and execute the Secretary's missions of organizing, manning, equipping, training, sustaining, mobilizing and deploying the force.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER III
VANGUARD VISION
15 December 1990

(3) TRADOC retains its current missions and functions but is reduced significantly and both organizations and missions are realigned internally.

(4) A new Personnel Command is created which absorbs the three existing personnel centers, USAREC, Cadet Command, most of HSC and the majority of the personnel related field operating agencies. This command becomes the life cycle manager for soldiers and civilians of all components with the exception of the training function retained in TRADOC.

(5) A Services Command is established to own and operate the Army's installation world-wide. This establishes BASOPS as a priority mission and provides for improved resourcing, and operation and maintenance of Army facilities. To bring the necessary focus at the Departmental level, a Deputy Chief of Staff, BASOPS is established on the Army Staff. Establishment of Services Command provides major savings in manpower and economies of scale in BASOPS accounts. In addition, Services Command absorbs a variety common user functions which facilitate the disestablishment of HSC, ISC and CIDC.

(6) Logistics Command is a downsized and reorganized AMC in recognition of OSD directed mission changes and AMC's plans for consolidation. MTMC is eliminated and its residual army functions are realigned to the Logistics Command.

(7) The nature of Army and National intelligence operations continues to require a MACOM HQ. INSCOM is substantially downsized and its operations streamlined. All ODCSINT field operating agencies are absorbed within INSCOM and missions are realigned at a significant reduction in resources.

(8) Headquarters layers such as CONUSAs and TRADOC Integrating Centers are eliminated for efficiency and resource savings. The relationship between AC and RC components of the warfighting force is substantially strengthened and RC general officer commands are heavily relied on to perform additional missions consistent with the future posture of the Army and anticipated world situation.


(9) The proper distinction between Departmental functions of establishing policy, prioritization, and resource allocation and the MACOM functions of mission and program execution are sharply defined. This allows efficiencies and reduction of overhead at both levels.

c. Assessment of the VANGUARD Vision.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER III
VANGUARD VISION
15 December 1990**

(1) VANGUARD's Vision was first presented to the VCSA and the General Officer Working Group on 27 July 1990. It received considerable attention in the field and within HQDA as well as continuing analysis within VANGUARD between late July and mid-October. During this same period, Operation Desert Shield, the largest U.S. military deployment in peacetime, commenced and some emerging lessons learned were almost immediately extrapolated to field assessments of the VANGUARD Vision. Although the long term applicability of these early assessments remains to be seen, without question Desert Shield quickly became a significant measure of effectiveness of the VANGUARD Vision and provided easy rationale for the status quo rather than substantial changes in the Army's culture.

(2) An amalgamation of field input and VANGUARD's continuing analysis and research led to this assessment:



**Figure III-13
VANGUARD Vision Assessment**

(3) The Army was not prepared to accept the implications of a Services Command in view of the impact on flexibility needed by installation commanders to

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER III
VANGUARD VISION
15 December 1990

accomplish their missions. Given the need to remove this single manager of installations from the concept, it became increasingly difficult to rationalize the disestablishment of the functional MACOMs eliminated in the Vision. Absent a Services Command to absorb many of the common user functions left uncovered. Information management functions, most importantly - strategic communications have to be accomplished by a central authority or command. Therefore ISC was restored to the Vision. Likewise, MDW was added to continue its missions in support of the National Capitol Region which would have passed to Services Command.

(4) Subordination of the medical community to PERSCOM proved unwise. There were no substantial savings to be gained beyond the Surgeon General's commitment to reductions and realignment of both OTSG and HSC in a planned merger of the two organizations. Further, fragmenting the medical community or adding a command layer for the sole purpose of eliminating a MACOM headquarters appeared to introduce a risk to the operational medical capabilities. The revised Vision includes a Medical Command under direction of a dual-hatted surgeon general.

(5) Relatively minor adjustments were made in PERSCOM. USMA remains a separate organization. Cadet Command was originally viewed as an officer accession organization which conducted training as a secondary function in direct support of its primary mission - officer accession. Thus, the Vision combined USAREC and Cadet Command under PERSCOM. Field review established the primacy of Cadet Command's training mission and it therefore remains in TRADOC in the revised Vision.




Figure III-14
Revised Vanguard Vision

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER III
VANGUARD VISION
15 December 1990**

f. Summary.

(1) The revised Vision (FIGURE III-14) is consistent with all of the trends, implications, principles and policies which led to the VANGUARD Direction and the original VANGUARD Vision but it acknowledges important field considerations which became visible during the staffing process.

(2) Consensus of the Army's Senior Leadership on the thrust of this revised Vision was obtained at the 1990 Fall Commanders' Conference. Thereafter, all VANGUARD initiatives were arrayed against the backdrop of the Vision and it was used as the first discriminator in evaluating possible recommendations.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER III
VANGUARD VISION
15 December 1990

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CHAPTER IV REALIGN THE HQDA STAFF

4.1. GENERAL.

a. BACKGROUND.

(1) Evolution of Headquarters, Department of Army.

(a) The current headquarters organization traces its general construct to the National Security Act of 1947 which established the Department of Defense and the Services in their current relationship. HQDA evolved through a series of changes to meet statutory guidance and requirements caused by changing force sizes, varying rates of modernization, and the demands of a changing strategic environment.

(b) Most recently, HQDA organization and functions were significantly changed by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law No. 99-433) which is commonly referred to as "Goldwater-Nichols". The FY91 National Defense Authorization Act also mandated a twenty percent reduction in manning levels in the Defense Department's management headquarters and support activities which include HQDA staff, as well as MACOMs and selected other Army headquarters.

(2) Impact of Goldwater-Nichols

(a) Headquarters, Department of the Army. Goldwater-Nichols reduced the HQDA Staff from 3653 military and civilian authorizations to a statutory ceiling of 3105. It specified that not more than 1,865 officers of the Army may be assigned or detailed to permanent duty in the Department Headquarters (Office of the Secretary of the Army and the Army Staff). Currently, there are 1240 officers, 86 enlisted and 1779 civilians authorized in HQDA. Figure IV-1 depicts the current HQDA organization which was the start point for the Vanguard analysis.




Figure IV-1
HQ, Department of Army Today

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

(b) Field Operating and Staff Support Agencies (FOA and SSA). Field operating Agencies (FOA) are established primarily to execute policy. The requirement for FOAs is independent of the parent headquarters. Staff support Agencies (SSA) exist primarily to support and assist HQDA or MACOM HQ. Chapter XIV contains an indepth review of FOAs and SSAs. As a result of increased management requirements associated with the unprecedented modernization of the volunteer army during the last decade and the need to provide increasingly detailed information to OSD and to Congress, the FOAs and SSAs have grown steadily. Additionally, the Army's implementation of Goldwater-Nichols included the transfer of some personnel, missions, and functions from the HQDA Staff to FOAs and SSAs. Notwithstanding the valid need for these organizations, general perceptions prevail in the Army that there are duplication of functions between FOAs and the HQDA staff; duplication of functions between different FOAs; and FOAs which perform functions more appropriately done by the HQDA Staff. The common perception is that FOA growth is out of control and that they consume too many of the Army's resources. Currently, there are more than one hundred HQDA Field Operating and Staff Support Agencies accounting for over 50,000 manpower spaces. These FOA and SSA vary in size from a strength of five people to a strength of nearly ten thousand. Realignment and restructuring of the HQDA Staff's organization, missions, or functions must include consideration of FOAs and SSAs. See Section 4.2 for VANGUARD initiatives concerning restructure of HQDA Field Operating and Staff Support Agencies.

4.2. REALIGN THE HQDA STAFF FUNCTIONS.

a. REALIGN THE HQDA STAFF (HDA01).

(1) Description. VANGUARD Initiative HDAO1 reduces the HQDA staff by twenty percent consistent with Congressional guidance and programmed reductions for the Army at large. Certain missions and functions are also realigned for economy and operational efficiency.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Mission/Functions/Background.

1 Title 10, U.S.C., as amended by Goldwater-Nichols establishes the organizational template for HQDA. This legislation provides the framework within which VANGUARD examined the Departmental Headquarters. The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 also reiterates the functions for which the Secretary of the Army is responsible. These functions are shown below.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

Service Secretary Functions

- Organizing, recruiting, training, administering (including morale and welfare personnel).
- Supplying, equipping (including research and development), maintaining, servicing.
- Constructing, outfitting and repair of equipment. Constructing, maintaining and repairing of facilities to include acquisition and interest in real property.
- Mobilizing and demobilizing.

2 These functions are captured and assigned to staff principals in AR 10-5. In addition specific Assistant Secretaries are charged with certain of these functions by law. VANGUARD grouped these functions under the general headings of organizing, manning, equipping, training, sustaining, mobilizing (including demobilizing) and deploying for the purpose of functional analysis.

(b) Analysis.

1 The VANGUARD review focused on reducing the size of HQDA and correcting major dysfunctions in staff and program integration. This review included the following:

a Missions and functions of each staff element as specified in Draft AR 10-5, June 1989.

b Tables of Distribution and Allowances for each staff element and associated Field Operating and Staff Support Agencies.

c Overlap in missions and functions and organizational structure between elements of the staff .

d Overlap in missions and functions between the HQDA staff and Field Operating or Staff Support Agencies.

e The degree to which the Field Operating Agencies are performing missions and functions which should be done by the HQDA Staff.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

2 There is a set of strongly held perceptions in the field, in OSD, and in the Congress which VANGUARD found to be valid in varying degrees; and which helped define the VANGUARD approach.

PERCEPTIONS....

- Overhead is inconsistent with a smaller Army.
- The distinction between Departmental functions (policy, planning, programming) and Major Command functions (execution) is blurred.
- Staff reaction time is slow which results in system failure and ad hoc matrix management.
- Base Operations/Installation management is unfocused.
- Staff and program integration is unfocused. The Vice Chief of Staff becomes the integrator by default.
- The Secretariat and Army Staff are not functionally aligned. There is duplication, overlap, and unproductive competition between staff agencies.

3 Based on the fact that the Army is becoming smaller VANGUARD proposes that the HQDA Staff be reduced a minimum of twenty percent. A reduction of this size will force the Department to retain only essential missions and functions, to find real operational efficiencies, and to eliminate duplication. However, the Headquarters will still be sufficiently robust to manage the changing Army of the next decade. The twenty percent target was coincidentally strengthened by the FY91 Defense Authorization Act in which Congress directed a twenty percent reduction in the defense management headquarters and support activities.

4 VANGUARD developed two basic options for realigning and reducing the HQDA Staff. Option A, proposes a pro-rata reduction. Several Defense Management Initiatives which could effect HQDA organization and functions were under review during VANGUARD'S study. Final decisions on these initiatives must be accounted for in execution of HQDA reductions. Option B also proposes a pro-rata reduction but it includes reductions in the current overlap and duplication of organization, missions, and functions between the Secretariat and the Army Staff. These options are discussed below. During this process, a near term staff reduction action was initiated under the joint direction of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary and the Director of the Army

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
 REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
 15 December 1990

Staff. The substance of option A and B with supporting rational was provided to support that effort.

a. Option A - Pro-rata Reduction.

1. The concept for this pro-rata reduction builds down from the current structure without directing realignment of missions and functions between agencies. The actual reductions will be identified and nominated by proponent staff principals and with consideration given to emerging DOD management initiatives. This approach will minimize turbulence, and cause the staff to prioritize functions and to resource only those functions which are essential for the HQDA Staff to accomplish. Chapter 17, Appendix O provides examples of ways that these reductions could be absorbed by the Major staff organization (ODCSOPS, ODCSPER, ODCSLOG and ODCSINT) based on VANGUARD's examination during this process.

2. Figure IV-2 shows a notional pro-rata reduction to HQDA by staff elements. Figure IV-3 provides an assessment of the pro-rata reduction option. The actual reduction will be based on a more detailed functional analysis by the staff proponents.





Figure IV-2
 Pro-Rata Reduction

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**



**Figure IV-3
Assessment of Pro-Rata Reduction**

b Goldwater-Nichols implications.

1 Goldwater-Nichols mandated that certain functions be placed under civilian control within DOD. Financial management, procurement, and research and development are primary examples.

2 When HQDA reorganized to implement Goldwater-Nichols, the Comptroller of the Army and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition were removed from the Army Staff. Their missions functions and resources were merged with the Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management and Research, Development & Acquisition respectively. This consolidation resulted in a manpower savings of about ten percent.

3 Senior military influence was maintained by appointing a LTG as a deputy to each of these Assistant Secretaries.

4 While these were significant improvements, the headquarters is still partially layered and the staff is not functionally aligned.

5 Figure IV-4 depicts HQDA today and highlights the layering and functional misalignment between the Secretariat and the Army Staff.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
 REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
 15 December 1990




Figure IV-4
 Layering and Functional Misalignment

c. Option B - Pro-rata Reduction with Functional Realignments.

1. Using the successfully implemented consolidation described above as a model, VANGUARD broadened the application in Option B to minimize layering and improve functional alignment within the headquarters.

2. This option proposes a pro-rata reduction accompanied by dual hatting the DCSPER and DCSLOG and Deputy Assistant Secretaries.


3. The DCSOPS and DCSINT were not combined with the Secretariat because of their unique focus on military operations particularly in joint arena.

4. The smaller staff would be limited to policy making, planning and resource issues, and would place greater emphasis on priority issues and increased staff responsiveness.

5. There is potential for additional efficiencies and economies through realignment in the functions of Assistant Secretaries. This is not recommended or addressed further because of the practical difficulties of legislative changes which would be required and associated potential impact on other services.


**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

6. Figure IV-5 shows the staff elements which would be collapsed to reduce layering.



**Figure IV-5
Pro-Rata Reduction & Reduced Layering**

Figure IV-6 provides an evaluation of this option.



**Figure IV-6
Assessment of Pro-Rata Reduction & Reduced Layering**

d. Dysfunctions in the Headquarters. Both alternatives effectively reduce HQDA and have the potential for increased operational efficiency. Neither however

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

addresses the primary dysfunctions which detract from efficient operation of the Headquarters and effective management of the Army. There are two distinct, but related, issues.

1 Integration. HQDA lacks an effective staff and program integrator. Absent a strong focus of integration on the Staff, the VCSA fills that void by default and as an undocumented additional duty.

2 BASOPS and Installation Management (CHAPTER VIII). There is no focus at HQDA for BASOPS or installation management. This results in uncoordinated (sometimes mutually exclusive) policies and guidance from multiple sources. Services provided to soldiers are inconsistent between installations and commands. With no MACOM commander or DA Staff principal as its dedicated "champion", BASOPS is undisciplined; resourcing is inconsistent; and the Army's infrastructure is rapidly deteriorating.

e Program Integrator.

1 The current system and organization produce inconsistent proponent developed alternatives which lead to decisions that are continuously being reviewed and challenged.

2 The Army Program is developed by committee with both supply (eg; logistics, personnel) and demand (eg; operations) staff proponents operating as integrator. This leads to incompatible solutions and unexecutable options.

3 No one below the level of the VSCA has visibility across the process.

4 The solution to the integration problems is to institute a Program Integrator (PI) who coordinates the development & execution of the Army program. The Program Integrator concept is consistent with a Rand-Arroyo study which was completed and briefed to the Army Leadership in May 1990.

f Authority of the Program Integrator. The degree of responsibility and authority given to the Program Integrator (PI) is directly related to the size of the Army Staff. Figure IV-8 displays the range of authority and responsibility which could be assigned to the PI and a notional relationship to the size of the Army staff. A strong PI would facilitate additional reductions in the Headquarters.




Figure IV-7
 Program Integrator

Minimum Change - Alternative 1 Program Integrator...	Moderate Change - Alternative 2 Program Integrator...	Major Change - Alternative 3 Program Integrator...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Integrates major staff actions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Integrates major staff actions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Integrates major staff actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Owens only aggregate data base/models Depends on HQDA staff proponent data/models 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Owens data base/models 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Owens Data Base/models
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Integrates iterative HQDA staff & MACOM options to build POM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develops POM based on HQDA staff /MACOM options Interacts w/MACOMs thru HQDA staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develops POM from DG & fiscal guidance MACOMs interact with PL (HQDA staff reviews info)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reconciles Program & submits to OSD.. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reconciles program w/resources Submits POM to OSD & defends Presents program to MACOMs & monitors execution. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reconciles program w/resources Submits POM to OSD & defends Directs & monitors execution by MACOMs


ANY PROGRAM INTEGRATOR ALTERNATIVE CAN APPLY TO EITHER

Figure IV-8
 Program Integrator Scope of Responsibility

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

1 On the low end of the spectrum, change could be accomplished by moving the Director of the Army Staff's administrative and support functions (protocol, communications control, etc.) to a separate Secretary to the General Staff and consolidating the functions and resources at a manpower savings.


2 On the opposite end of the spectrum the Program Integrator's authority is substantially increased. The Army's approach to program development and management changes dramatically and additional staff reductions are possible as missions and functions are consolidated. Although this option could be built around the DAS, the authority implied is not consistent with either internal or external expectations of the DAS. To properly empower the PI, this function should be vested in an Assistant Vice Chief of Staff. Figure IV-9 reiterates the integration problem as well as the solution offered by the Program Integrator.




**Figure IV-9
Solution to Integrator Problem**

g Option A with Program Integrator. Figure IV-10 shows the PI overlaid on Option A. This would significantly improve functioning of the Army Staff but it does not facilitate integration of the entire Headquarters (Secretariat and Army Staff). Figure IV-11 provides an assessment of this option.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**



**Figure IV-10
Program Integrator Below VCSA**



**Figure IV-11
Program Integrator Below VCSA**

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

i Although this appears to be a logical extension of the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization, research shows that it is counter to the legislative intent as reflected in committee reports. The Goldwater-Nichols Joint Conference Report specifies the need to maintain a strong military perspective on the Army Staff and clearly states the congressional intent to maintain service staffs separate from the Secretariats.

i Assistant Chief of Staff for Base Operations and Support (ACSBOS) and Installation Management. During VANGUARD's review of the Army Staff it became clear that the installation management function should be strengthened within HQDA. Neither Option A nor B accomplished this. Although a separate Deputy Chief of Staff is neither required nor affordable, it is important to establish an authoritative focal point to champion and discipline these functions on the HQDA staff. This can best be done through the establishment of an Assistant Chief of Staff for Base Operations and Installation Management on the HQDA Staff. There are several options for establishing such an office. The function could logically be assigned to the Director of Management, the DCSLOG or the Chief of Engineers. The recommendations establish an Assistant Chief of Staff for Base Operations and Installation Management by realigning the Director of Management's admin and protocol functions to an SGS, moving selected functions with resources from other staff agencies, and redesignating the DM as the ACSBOS. A more detailed discussion of installations and BASOPS management is at Chapter VIII.

(3) Conclusions.

(a) Option B with the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army as Program Integrator is the most efficient and least costly but could weaken the channel for independent military advice to the Secretary of the Army. It also appears inconsistent with congressional intent as expressed in committee reports.

(b) Option A with the Program Integrator below the VCSA level offers less opportunities for savings and operational efficiency. These shortcomings are overcome by the preservation of strong channels for both military and civilian leadership to advise the Secretary. Further, a degree of inherent competition between the Secretariat and the Army Staff insures that both the Secretary and the Chief of Staff have access to a variety of options and perspectives throughout the decision process.

(4) Recommendations. (See Figure IV-14 below.)

(a) That HQDA implement a twenty percent reduction over a five year period beginning in FY91.

(b) That HQDA institute the Program Integrator concept by establishing an Assistant Vice Chief of Staff as described above.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
 REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
 15 December 1990

(c) That HQDA establish the Assistant Chief of Staff for Base Operations Support and Installation Management (ACSBOS) using the Director of Management as a nucleus.




Figure IV-14
 VANGUARD Positions

b. CONSOLIDATE HEADQUARTERS FUNCTIONS

(1) REDUCE AND CONSOLIDATE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY (EEO) OFFICES (HDA06) (DMR 945M).

(a) Description. This initiative is the residual portion of VANGUARD initiative FAC1 and would accomplish savings by further reducing the overhead associated with separate EEO offices and consolidating action officers into the personnel staff within the organization to which assigned. The initial increment was approved by the Program Budget Committee (PBC) and Select Committee (SELCOM) as VANGUARD Initiative FAC1 and directed by DOD in DMR 945M.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

(b) Evaluation.

1 Mission/Functions/Background. The EEO program is a command support function and is mandated by law. Several Army organizations provide oversight to the EEO program; The Civilian Personnel Evaluation Agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity Agency, and the EEO Compliance and Complaint Review Agency. Additionally, there are organizations external to the Army which provide federal oversight (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission). This initiative would consolidate multiple installation EEO activities into a single activity to serve the entire installation population. The EEO initiative was originally presented to the PBC and SELCOM as FAC1, but was further reviewed by the Under Secretary of the Army, who made the decision to reduce the program by only 100 spaces.

2 Assumption(s). None.

3 Analysis. EEO is one of several Army programs which is a stand-alone function and offers potential savings by reducing unnecessary overhead. EEO personnel are found at all levels of command throughout the Army. The number assigned to a location is dependent upon the number of civilian personnel employed at that location. Often the installation contains more than one command or organization which has an EEO office; there is duplication of effort in these instances. Analysis indicates that savings can be achieved while retaining the EEO capabilities necessary to adequately serve the Army civilian employees and to meet the legal requirements of the program. This can be done by reducing overhead, eliminating duplicate oversight programs, and eliminating duplicate EEO organizational elements at single locations. The current initiative proposes putting the EEO function, not in the CPO, but into an organization's personnel staff at all levels; e.g. the DCSPAL, DCSPER, etc.

(c) Conclusion(s).

1 Equal Employment Opportunity is a very sensitive program which is important to the Army. Almost any reduction in the program carries with it a danger of sending a signal to civilian employees and external oversight agencies that EEO is no longer important of the Army. The Army has done extremely well in preserving employee rights and serves as a model for other government agencies. It is important to preserve these gains.

2 No further reductions should be taken at current end-strength levels.

(d) Recommendation. This function should not be reduced further.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

(2) REDUCE AND CONSOLIDATE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (EO) OFFICES (FAC1A & HDA06A).

(a) Description. This initiative would reduce the military EO program and give the responsibility for EO complaints to the Inspector General. The administrative responsibilities of the EO function would be done as a collateral duty within the staff element of the organization. At HQDA, the EO proponenty personnel would be retained in order to sustain the policy and programmatic requirements of the program.

(b) Evaluation.

1 Mission/Functions/Background. The Equal Opportunity program is to ensure equal opportunity for soldiers and soldier's family members on and off post. Administrative support for the program is provided by the organization's command or administrative element. Military equal opportunity is a responsibility of leadership and a function of command. Equal Opportunity advisors are soldiers who provide commanders with information and advice on critical leadership issues which impact directly on unit readiness. DoD Directive 1350.2 specifies that the military departments must maintain EO and affirmative action programs including fulltime staff to conduct the program. The directive does not specify separate offices for the personnel or the function. This initiative was initially presented to the PBC as VANGUARD initiative FAC1A. The PBC and SELCOM approved the initiative, however, on further review, the Under Secretary of the Army made the decision to reduce the program by only 110 spaces. This is the remaining increment of the original initiative.

2 Assumption(s). None.

3 Analysis. Analysis included a review of the missions and functions of the various equal opportunity programs, channels for handling complaints and various Army programs for evaluating the morale and welfare of its members. The IG already has the procedures and the manpower in place to handle the normal IG complaints. The general perception is that the majority of EO complaints are handled by the IG anyway. It would take minimal resources for the IG to accept this mission. However, there are certain administrative and regulatory requirements for which it would be inappropriate to give the IG because of the IG responsibility to inspect all Army functional programs. The administrative requirements can be accomplished by command administrative personnel. Additionally, several of the EO ethnic programs are being duplicated by the EEO personnel for the civilian employee community; i.e., Spanish-American Week, Asian Week, etc.

(c) Conclusion(s).

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

1 The Inspector General has the capability to manage the complaints portion of the EO program without additional resources, but should not become proponent for the a functional program.

2 The administrative and regulatory requirements can be done on a collateral basis by personnel within the organization.

3 The administrative and regulatory requirement for the EO program should not be separated.

(d) Recommendation. That the EO program not be reduced further than the reduction identified in DMRD 945.

4.3 ELIMINATE AND REALIGN FIELD OPERATING AGENCIES/STAFF SUPPORT AGENCIES UNDER HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF ARMY.

a. General.

(1) Description. As a part of realigning HQDA, an assessment was made of all Field Operating and Staff Support Agencies which support the headquarters. Those FOA and SSA which are related to other VANGUARD functional initiatives have been incorporated into those initiatives. Those which are not incorporated into other functional initiatives are addressed under the HQDA umbrella. This section provides a summary of VANGUARD analysis and recommendations for several disparate Field Operating Agencies or Staff Support Agencies which support the HQDA Staff. Individual VANGUARD Initiatives for these FOA and SSA are provided at Section 17-N1.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Mission/Function/Background. Field Operating Agencies and Staff Support Agencies have been a component of the General Support Force for many years. However, due to increased availability of resources, increased mission and fragmented responsibilities, FOA have proliferated. As a result of the 1986 reorganization of Department of the Army, spaces and missions were transferred from the HQDA Staff into newly established Field Operating and Staff Support Agencies (FOA/SSA), already established FOA and SSA or to Army major commands (MACOMS). Along with the transfer of spaces, missions and functions were transferred to these organizations. Consequently, over time the distinction between the HQDA function and FOA and SSA functions has blurred. As a result of the initial briefings to the Army leadership, VANGUARD received a tasker from the VCSA to develop a "laydown" of the entire FOA and SSA structure. In developing this laydown, VANGUARD reviewed the structure of both the HQDA Staff and the FOA and SSA to;

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

1 achieve a reduction on the total number of Field Operating and Staff Support Agencies,

2 functionally align the HQDA Staff and proponent FOA and SSA.

3 identify resource savings for the Army.

4 achieve a coherent structure and relationship between the staff and proponent FOA and SSA which could accomplish the missions and functions of the Army.

(b) Assumption(s). None.

(c) Analysis. Analysis of the FOA and SSA included a review of the organization's Table of Distribution and Allowances, its missions and functions, plus in most instances a briefing or face-to-face discussion with personnel from the organization. The leadership for all FOA and SSA identified for a reduction, consolidation, or transfer were given the opportunity to provide input to VANGUARD's review. This review validated that certain FOA are charged with missions and functions which are duplicative of other organizations, certain FOA could and should be consolidated or transferred to other DOD, and others were no longer affordable to the Army given the current environment of constrained resources and pending reduction in the end-strength of the Army.

(3) Conclusion(s).

(a) Many FOA and SSA have missions and functions that are duplicative in whole or in of certain staff functions, duplicate other FOA and SSA, in whole or in part, have missions that are not critical to the Army, or should more appropriately be done by the Army Staff.

(b) Selected FOA and SSA should be eliminated or reduced.

(4) Recommendation. That the following FOA and SSA be reduced or eliminated as discussed in the individual VANGUARD initiatives provided at Section 17-N1. A summary of these FOA and SSA is provided below.

b. Realign FOA and SSA

c. Individual FOA and SSA Evaluations.

(1) Office, Secretary of the Army (Oversight by Administrative Assistant).

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

(a) DOD Explosives Safety Board (DODESB) (HDA27).

1 Description. This initiative would reduce DOD Explosive Safety Board by twenty percent.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. DDESB is responsible for developing and maintaining ammunition and explosives safety standards for Department of Defense. They are assigned to the Department of the Army for administrative support. The Chairmanship of this agency is rotated between the Army, the Air Force and the Navy.

b Assumption. The Army element of this agency should be reduced commensurate with the rest of the Army.

c Analysis. A review of this agency revealed that the DODESB monitors ammunition storage designs and construction to ensure explosives related military construction projects meet applicable safety criteria; it surveys installations to ensure compliance with DOD explosives safety standards; and conduct cooperative efforts with national and international governments and organizations on technical matters effecting explosives safety. The portion of the ESB mission related to military construction is related to budget authority. With the DOD construction budget being reduced the workload of ESB is reduced. No other agency performs this mission, however, ESB can be reduced and continue to accomplish its mission.

3 Conclusion(s).

a DODESB has a critical, unique mission which cannot be performed by another organization.

b DODESB can sustain a reduction without impairing its primary mission.

4 Recommendation. The agency should sustain a twenty percent reduction. DOD must approve such a reduction.

(b) DOD NAF Personnel Activity (DODNAFPA) (HDA12).

1 Description. This initiative would transfer DOD NAF Personnel Activity to DOD.

2 Evaluation.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

a Mission/Function/Background. The NAF Personnel Policy office is responsible for establishing uniform policies which govern the administration and management of Non-Appropriated Fund Instrumentalities employees whose compensation is derived from non-appropriated funds.

b Assumption. The activity should be reduced commensurate with the Army at large.

c Analysis. The DOD NAF Personnel Activity is a four person DOD Activity. The NAF Personnel Chain of Command has always been directly to the ASA(FM&P), not through Army. Army is not executive agent; but only provides administrative support (pays rent, salaries, supplies, etc.). An OSD staff reduction resulted in NAF Personnel being moved to ASA(M&RA) in 1980. OSA staff reduction in 1986 resulted in NAF Personnel being moved to a separate Army TDA. The activity is assigned to Army as a convenience to DOD.

3 Conclusion. A reduction would severely limit the organizations ability to accomplish its mission.

4 Recommendation(s).

a This organization should not sustain a reduction.

b It should be transferred to DOD and should not be part of the army end-strength.

(c) DOD Wage Fixing Authority Technical Staff (DODWFATS) (HDA24).

1 Description. This initiative would reduce the DOD Wage Fixing Authority Technical Staff by twenty percent.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. The DODWFATS was established to administer the policies under DOD Directive 5120.39 and direct the activities of the Local Wage Survey Committee. DODWFATS determines and recommends to the Department of Defense wage schedules for employees based on local wage surveys conducted by the agency and local organizations. DOD Wage Fixing Authority Technical Staff is a DOD Activity. The Office, Secretary of the Army is assigned the administrative support responsibility.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

b Assumption. DODWFATS should be reduced commensurate with Army at large.

c Analysis. A review of the mission and functions revealed that the Department of Defense has been designated by OPM as the lead agency in approximately 112 wage areas. DODWFATS conducts regional wage surveys to determine the appropriate salaries, wages, fringe benefits, and pay policies for DOD employees. These surveys are scheduled every two years and are done in conjunction with local union and business personnel. These surveys are important in keeping local wages for DOD personnel competitive with local wages. A reduction in the organization would mean extending the time between wage surveys in any given area. Regional offices are located at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio and Travis AFB, California. The Secretary of the Army provides administrative support to the DOD Wage Fixing Authority Staff.

3 Conclusion(s).

a DODWFATS performs a function which is not duplicated within any other service or activity and is essential for the Services.

b DODWFATS can sustain a reduction and still satisfactorily perform its primary mission.

4 Recommendation. Reduce DODWFATS by twenty percent. Changes in resources for the DODWFATS can be made only with the concurrence of the ASD(FM&P).

(d) Military Postal Service Agency (MPSA) (HDA25).

1 Description. This initiative would retain Military Postal Service Agency as currently staffed.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. MPSA mission is to achieve the efficient and economical transportation of official and personal mail throughout the DOD, effective operation of the Military Post Offices (MPOs) overseas, management of the DOD Official Mail Program, and to maintain operational command of the subordinate Joint Military Postal Activities (JMPAs). Secretary of the Army has been designated for administrative support.

b Assumption. MPSA should be reduced commensurate with Army at large.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

c Analysis. Review of the mission and functions revealed that MPSA functionally manages the MPS, including the integration of postal transportation, mail routing and the implementation of uniform military postal practices and procedures throughout the DOD worldwide. The Adjutant General Directorate of PERSCOM is dual-hatted as the Executive Director. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps share proportionately in the manning of MPSA. This mission is vital for the morale of the services members and should be left as is. The Agency has already taken cuts from the other services and Army's Quicksilver reduction.

3 Conclusion. MPSA provides a critical, unique function for the Services which no other organization can perform.

4 Recommendation. MPSA should not take a reduction beyond the Quicksilver reduction.

(e) National Committee for Employer Support of Guard and Reserves (NCESGAR) (HDA26).

1 Description. This initiative would retain National Committee for Employer Support of Guard and Reserves at the current level.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. DOD Directive 1250.1 states that the NCESGR shall promote both public and private understanding of the National Guard and Reserve to gain US employer and community support through programs, personnel policies and practices that will encourage employee and citizen participation in National Guard and Reserve programs. Secretary of the Army is designated for administrative support.

b Assumption. NCESGR should be reduced commensurate with the Army at large.

c Analysis. NCESGR is responsible for promotion and development of the volunteer leadership at the national, state and local levels to encourage the development of employer personnel policies and practices that endorse and facilitate employee participation in the National Guard and Reserve activities. It promotes and develops civilian and military management attitudes that will not inhibit initial or continued membership in the Guard or reserve. NCESGR is required to have a full-time staff composed of selected officials from the Military Services and their reserve components. Each Military Service provides military personnel for NCESGR's support staff in ratio determined by the OSD(RA). NCESGR is the only link for goodwill and

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

understanding between the employer and the Guard and Reserve. The increased role that the National Guard and Army Reserve have in the Total Force increase the need for NCESGR.

3 Conclusion. NCESGR provides a critical service which becomes ever more important in view of the increasing role that USAR and NGB play in manning the Army force structure.

4 Recommendation. NCESGR should not be reduced.

(f) Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) (HDA28).

1 Description. This initiative would reduce Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals by twenty percent.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. ASBCA is designated as the authorized representative of the Secretaries of Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force in hearing, considering and determining appeals by contractors or their representatives or authorities on disputed contractual questions. The Secretary of the Army is designated as Executive Agent for the ASBCA.

b Assumption. ASBCA Workload is related to Army end strength and budget authority.

c Analysis. The Board determines with administrative finality appeals from final decisions of contracting officers on disputes relating to contracts. Proceedings of the Board are quasi-judicial and are subject only to judicial review. Budget reductions in the outyears for acquisition contracts will mean less contracting actions and fewer appeals for which ASBCA must get involved. Workload will more than likely increase in the near future with budget cuts resulting in contracts being terminated. However, reductions in workload will occur in the out years. Any reduction should be phased to accomodate this transition.

3 Conclusion(s).

a The ASBCA performs a critical legal function which must be done by some organization.

b ASBCA can sustain a twenty percent reduction and remain a viable, fully capable organization.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

4 Recommendation. Reduce ASBCA by twenty percent. DOD must approve such a reduction.

(g) Per Diem Travel & Transportation Allowance Committee (PDTTAC)
(HDA29).

1 Description. This initiative would reduce Per Diem Travel & Transportation Allowance Committee by twenty percent.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. PDTTAC's primary purpose is to ensure the uniform travel and transportation regulations are issued pursuant to Title 37, United States Code, other applicable laws, and decisions of the Comptroller General of the United States, for members of the seven uniformed services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and Public Health Service). Secretary of the Army has been designated for administrative support.

b Assumption. PDTTAC should be reduced commensurate with the Army at large.

c Analysis. A review of the missions and functions of the PDTTAC revealed that the activity issues uniform regulations implementing the Federal Travel Regulations (FTR), Statutory requirements, Executive Orders, and decisions of the Comptroller General of the United States. PDTTAC attempts to ensure equivalent entitlement to civilian and Uniformed Services personnel when requirements of travel and temporary duty are substantially the same for both. Day-to-day operations of the Committee are conducted by the Committee staff under the direction of a Director, who is a Colonel or Captain (Navy). The position is rotated triennially among the Army, Navy, and Air Force. A reduction of this mission would cause minor delays in adjusting and documenting changes in entitlement for travel, transportation of goods and PCS moves, but would not cause hardships for military and civilians. It simply means that the regulations are updated less frequently.

3 Conclusion(s).

a PDTTAC is a joint activity (multiple service) with a necessary function.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

b This activity can sustain a twenty percent reduction without endangering its capability to perform its primary mission.

4 Recommendation. Reduce PDTTAC by twenty percent. Any decisions concerning resources consolidation must have the concurrence of ASD(FM&P).

(2) Deputy Under Secretary of Army for Operations Research (DUSA)(OR).

(a) USA Model Improvement & Study Management Agency (MISMA) HDA
32)

1 Description. This initiative would eliminate USA Model Improvement & Study Management Agency.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. The Model Improvement and Studies Management Agency (MISMA) manages Model Improvement, Study, & Manage Support Services Programs under broad guidance of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Operations Research {DUSA(OR)}; establishes Army-wide policy guidance for CAAS (Contracted Advisory and Assistance Services); develops and directs Army Issue Assessment Process; establishes and manages Army analysis quality assessment and improvement actions in support of the DUSA(OR).

b Assumption. MISMA should be reduced commensurate with the Army at large.

c Analysis. This agency manages and establishes the Army analysis quality assessment and improvements for the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Operations Research and is in direct support of that office. It provides analysis, development, presentation and defense of the Army Model Improvement and the Study Program. It develops the budget exhibit (PB 27) for Contract Advisory and Assistance Services (CAAS) and is executive agent for CAAS policies. No other organization performs these functions. Transfer of this organizations into the DUSA(OR) would allow reductions of overhead and some action officers.

3 Conclusion(s).

a The agency is essentially a staff support agency for DUSA(OR). It provides a critical function but one which should be accomplished by the Office, DUSA(OR).

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

b MISMA can be reduced and continue to perform its primary mission.

4 Recommendation. Eliminate MISMA as an FOA; transfer missions and functions to the Office, Deputy Secretary of the Army for Operations Research with 5 spaces.

(3) Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management.

(a) U.S. Army Finance and Accounting Center (USAFAC)(HDA09)(DMRD/PBD 912).

1 Description. This initiative would reduce USAFAC by fifteen percent and consolidate with DOD per DMRD 912.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. USAFAC is responsible for payment of all Army employees, accounting for Army appropriated funds, and establishing various fiscal management plans, policies and systems. No other organization performs this mission for the Army.

b Assumption. That USAFAC should be reduced commensurate with Army at large.

c Analysis. DMRD 912 proposes the establishment of a new combined organization under the direction of the OSD Comptroller to oversee and manage DOD-wide accounting and related operation. Review revealed that USAFAC has its own base operations support built into the TDA structure, which should be provided by Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. Additionally, there appeared to be an excessive overhead structure. Significant savings are possible by reducing overhead to minimum requirements and establishing a base operations support agreement with Fort Benjamin Harrison.

3 Conclusion(s).

a USAFAC performs a critical mission for the Army.

b A fifteen percent reduction can be taken and still retain USAFAC's core missions and functions.

c Currently, the Army is prohibited from reducing the resources of the finance and accounting function.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

4 Recommendation. That USAFAC not be reduced.

(4) Office of Chief Congressional Liaison

(a) Congressional Inquiry Division (CID) (HDA20)

1 Description. This initiative would reduce Congressional Inquiry Division by 26 percent and reclassify it as a Staff Support Agency (SSA).

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. This agency prepares coordinated, timely and factual replies to Congressional inquiries regarding Army policy or personal issues. CID was originally established as Congressional Correspondence Agency under the 1977 ARSTAF twenty-five percent AMHA reduction. At this time certain functions and spaces (approx 20) transferred from OCLL.

b Assumption. CID, a Division of OCLL, should be reduced commensurate with the Army at large.

c Analysis. CID advises Chief, OCLL and Army Staff of trends concerning Congressional inquiries; additionally it receives, controls, records and dispatches written replies to these inquiries. A review of the agency's functions revealed closely related, overlapping functions with the Office of Congressional Legislative Liaison. Additionally, the overhead within CID is to a certain extent duplicative with OCLL. This overlap of functions coupled with its excessive overhead enables the agency to sustain a reduction.

3 Conclusion. CID can sustain a reduction and remain fully capable of performing its primary mission.

4 Recommendation. Congressional Inquiry Division should be reduced by 26 percent and reclassified as a staff support agency.

(5) The Auditor General

(a) Army Audit Agency (AAA) (HDA33)

1 Description. This initiative would reduce Army Audit Agency (AAA) by 100 spaces.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. AAA is responsible for the independent and objective internal audit service for the Army as prescribed by AR 10-2. No other agency provides these functions at the Secretariat level. Internal Review personnel performs this function at ARSTAF and within the Major Command.

b Assumption(s).

- 1** That AAA performs a vital mission for the Department of the Army.
- 2** That AAA should be reduced commensurate with the Army at large.

c Analysis. A thorough review of AAA mission and functions was conducted to include a review of future personnel needs within AAA as a result of the downsizing of the Army. The review reaffirmed the vital mission AAA performs for the Army, however, much of the AAA missions and functions are based on the size of the Army; a smaller Army equals less audit requirements. Additionally, AAA is currently organized in regions. Consolidation of regional headquarters plus reduction of single location audits will enable AAA to take this reduction without impairing its primary mission. AAA has already sustained a reduction of 100 spaces due to Quicksilver. Total reduction if sustained would be 200 spaces.

3 Conclusion. AAA, although performing a vital mission, can be reduced and continue to accomplish its primary mission.

4 Recommendation. Reduce AAA by 100 personnel spaces. The organization should remain as a Field Operating Agency.

(6) Inspector General

(a) Inspector General Agency (HDA34)

1 Description. This initiative would reduce the Inspector General Agency (IGA) by twenty-five percent and reclassify it as a Staff Support Agency (SSA).

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. The IGA is responsible for determining the economy, efficiency, discipline, morale, esprit de corps, and readiness throughout the Army.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

b Assumption(s).

1 The IGA functions are important enough to the Army that they will continue to be done at same level.

2 The IGA should be reduced commensurate with the Army at large.

c Analysis. The size of the Army in terms units and number of soldiers directly impacts IGA workload. As the Army reduces, the number and size of inspections required will decline. This will decrease the need for people assigned to the IG function. IG personnel reductions will result in reduced IG training and travel requirements, thus further savings. The IG Agency should be reduced as the remainder of the Army is reduced. It is anticipated that Inspector General organizations across the Army will experience an increase in workload in the near term but the workload will drop as the force is reduced. Consequently, reductions should begin in FY94.

3 Conclusion. The IG Agency can sustain a twenty-five percent reduction and continue to perform its primary mission.

4 Recommendation. Reduce the IGA twenty-five percent consistent with Army wide reduction. Redesignate IGA as a SSA since it is totally dedicated to support TIG mission.

(7) Office of Chief of Public Affairs.

(a) Office, Chief of Public Affairs, New York Branch (OCPA-NY)(HDA35)

1 Description. This initiative would eliminate the OCPA-NY.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. OCPA-NY represents the Secretary of the Army in the New York media market. It targets national and regional publishers, free-lance writers, and senior editors by attracting their attention to the Army or responding to their questions and needs concerning the Army.

b Assumption(s). Access to the New York print media market is not critical to the Army.

c Analysis. OCPA-NY is not critical to the Army. It was established in 1956, and since then has been effective in reaching national printed media publishers. Elimination of OCPA-NY will mean the printed media industry will not have local

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

contacts but can contact OCPA at HQDA directly. This contact can reasonably be accomplished due to improved communications networks. This will mean fewer contacts with the New York printed media if OCPA-NY is eliminated. However, OCPA at HQDA can adequately serve as point-of-contact for the New York media industry. Many of the NY based media have Washington, DC offices already.

3 Conclusion. That the Army public affairs function will not suffer by eliminating OCPA-NY.

4 Recommendation. Eliminate OCPA-NY.

(b) Office, Chief of Public Affairs, Los Angeles Branch (OCA-LA)
(HDA07).

1 Description. This initiative would retain OCPA-LA as is.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. OCPA-LA is the liaison to the TV and motion picture industry, assist productions on technical questions and support to insure accuracy, and is the sole Army focus for media and community relations in Los Angeles.

b Assumption(s).

1 The TV and motion picture industry will continue to have significant impact on the general population in the United States.

2 That OCPA-LA should be reduced commensurate with the Army at large.

c Analysis. Active Army presence in the Los Angeles area is limited to recruiters, ROTC cadres, readiness groups, and Corps of Engineers. OCPA-LA is the focal point for media queries and Army support to the film industry. It is the contact point for the TV and film entertainment industry. Elimination would cause the Army to lose this contact with the film industry, thus the Army would have no input to mass media products concerning the Army. OCPA-LA helps the TV and film industry keep the Army in the proper perspective and to realistically portray the Army in TV, films, etc.

3 Conclusion. OCPA-LA provides a valuable, critical contact point for all aspects of public affairs in Los Angeles.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

4 Recommendation. Leave OCPA-LA as currently staffed.

(c) Command Information Unit (CIU) (HDA36)

1 Description. This initiative would reduce CIU by thirty percent.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. CIU supports the overall Army mission by providing accurate and truthful information about the Army to the Army. It conveys Army policies, messages, and news. It uses print, film, and electronic media, and has responsibility for planning and producing various programs.

b Assumption(s).

1 There will be a continuing requirement for accurate and truthful information within the Army.

2 CIU should be reduced commensurate with the Army at large.

c Analysis. Some CIU print products are useful tools for commanders in the field. Soldiers' Magazine, a quality product, should remain. Soldiers' Radio and Television products are extremely useful to soldiers and commanders. They are presented in a professional and timely manner, are praised by the commanders and soldiers, and thus, should remain. Analysis of other products indicate that the information is often not timely, plus there is redundancy and duplication in some of its printed literature. Additionally, some of the information is superfluous to the needs of the non-commissioned and officer leaders and is more appropriately transmitted through functional channels. A reduction can be accommodated by eliminating the branches within CIU which have no CIU function. This will leave CIU with the majority of its CI functions intact.

3 Conclusion. CIU can sustain a reduction and adequately perform its primary mission.

4 Recommendation. Reduce CIU by 7 military and 11 civilians.

(d) Army Broadcasting Service (ABS) (HDA11)

1 Description. This initiative would reduce ABS by twenty percent and transfer to DOD.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. ABS is responsible for operating and maintaining Armed Forces Radio and Television Service outlets worldwide. It provides policy guidance regarding CONUS Command Information radio and television facilities. ABS is responsible all aspects of radio and television broadcasting-programing, technical issues, equipment issues, and ABS personnel matters.

b Assumption. Some level of radio and television service will be retained for the American soldier.

c Analysis. All DOD benefit from ABS. ABS manages and controls resources and develops the policies necessary to maintain outlets worldwide. Service levels are established by the CINCs in the theater. The CINCs drive the mission. Consequently overseas strengths are related to the needs of the particular theater or command. Reduction in theater manning will reduce the level of service required. Army reduction in end strengths should allow for overall reduction. Quicksilver reduced 17 civilian spaces. ABS can be reduced and yet retained as appropriate level of support to CINC.

3 Conclusion(s).

a Radio and television is an important informational and recreational tool for the soldiers.

b ABS can sustain a reduction and continue to perform its primary mission.

4 Recommendation. Reduce by twenty percent over a three year period beginning in FY93 as CFE and Army reductions occur.

(e) Army/Air Force Hometown News Center (HNC) (HDA10)

1 Description. This initiative would reduce the Hometown News Center by thirty percent of its personnel spaces.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. The Hometown News Center supplements the Army and Air Force public affairs offices worldwide by producing and distributing print and electronic news releases to the commercial media.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

b Assumption(s).

1 That the mission and functions of the agency are necessary, but workload will decrease as the Army reduces in size.

2 HNC should sustain a reduction commensurate with the Army at large.

c Analysis. The Hometown News Center's primary function is to inform the public of an individual soldier's accomplishments, thus enhancing the Army image, and supporting recruitment and retention for the Army. Workload is dependent on Army end strength. With reduced Army end strengths, the workload will decrease significantly. Hometown News Center works through local public affairs offices who can adequately accomplish the majority of the workload associated with PA releases on the individual soldier. Due to the reduced size of the Army; HNC's role is aiding the Army's public image and a high level of recruitment are not essential. Additionally, constrained resources dictate a reduce level of resourcing.

3 Conclusion. This program can be curtailed with minimum negative impact on the Army.

4 Recommendation. Reduce the AAFHNC by thirty percent.

(8) Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army.

(a) Headquarters Services - Washington (HOSVCS-W) (HDA38)

1 Description. This initiative would reduce HQSVCS-Washington by thirty percent.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. This agency effects coordination between the Office, Secretary of the Army and other Army activities which provide administrative support to HQDA. It provides the command and control element for administrative and base operations support to HQDA and selected DOD activities.

b Assumption(s).

1 Certain administrative and BASOPS support functions must be provided for HQDA.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

2 HQSVC-W should sustain a reduction commensurate with the Army at large.

c Analysis. This agency directly supports the Administrative Assistant, Secretary of the Army. It provides all base operations type support to HQDA and other DOD activities in the National Capital Region which are traditionally done by the installation commander. It provides coordination directly with the Defense Headquarters Services organizations providing equivalent services to DOD. However, the organization has more personnel assigned than is necessary to provide the command and control and coordination function.

3 Conclusion. HQSVCS-W can sustain a reduction and continue to perform its primary mission.

4 Recommendation. Reduce HQSVCS-W by thirty percent.

(b) Defense Supply Service - Washington (DSS-W) (HDA37)

1 Description. This initiative would reduce DSS-W by twenty percent.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. DSS-W provides central administrative, acquisition, supply, contractual, and related services for HQDA and other DOD components in the National Capital Region. It acquires, stores, distributes, disposes, and salvages supplies, materials, equipment, and furniture.

b Assumption(s).

1 The organization's workload is sensitive to the population supported, as well as acquisition and supply actions processed by the organization.

2 DSS-W should sustain a reduction commensurate to HQDA and other DOD elements in the NCR.

c Analysis. DSS-W has 335 accounts, \$1.5B in contracts, requisitions and other acquisitions. The workload for DSS-W is directly related to the number of supply and administrative acquisitions actions which in turn is related to the availability of funds and population serviced. The reduced budget and Army end-strength level beginning in FY92 will require fewer acquisition actions, fewer consumer supplies needed, and reduced requirements for self service supply/warehouse storage facilities. This reduced workload translates to a need for few personnel. In addition, the recent

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

automation of the DSS-W supply management elements and their procedures will result in less personnel required to perform this function.

3 Conclusion(s).

a DSS-W performs a critical function that must be done by some organization.

b DSS-W can be reduced and still perform its primary mission satisfactorily.

4 Recommendation. Reduce DSS-W by twenty percent.

**(c) Space and Building Management Service - Washington (SBMS-W)
(HDA21)**

1 Description. This initiative would leave the Space and Building Management Service-Washington (SBMS-W) as is.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. SBMS-W assesses administrative space requirements, develops long-range plans for management, and administers over 6.1 million square feet of administrative floor space for over 45,000 people. It handles all financial operations for administrative space in the National Capital Region not located on military installations.

b Assumption(s).

1 Administrative work space will continue to be a requirement.

2 SBMS-W should be reduced commensurate with the Army at large.

c Analysis. SBMS-W manages planning, administration and funding for office space for personnel in the NCR not located on Army installations. The workload is accomplished by a relatively small staff of 16 people. The budget for reimbursement to GSA and DOD for leased and government owned buildings for FY90 was approximately \$75M. These funds are managed by SDMS-W. The SDMS-W mission is critical but could be done by HQ, MDW.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

3 Conclusion. This mission is critical and must be accomplished by some organization. Given SBMS-W's current relationship with HQDA, it should not be reduced.

4 Recommendation. Retain SBMS-W at current strength.

(d) Safety, Security, and Services Support - Washington (SSSS-W
(HDA22)

1 Description. This initiative would reduce SSSS-W by fifteen percent.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. SSSS-W provides a variety of services including motor transport, travel, administrative support, research and library, fitness, family support, and property accountability. It also provides safety, occupational health (Agent orange), personnel, and physical and computer security programs.

b Assumption(s).

1 DOD headquarters elements in the NCR will be reduced commensurate with overall DOD reductions.

2 SSSS-W should be reduced commensurate with the Army at large and the population it serves.

c Analysis. SSSS-W is a very diverse, complex operation which supports all of DOD in the NCR for the services it does provide. Its workload is dependent upon the population it serves. This workload will decrease with a reduction of HQDA and other DOD headquarters elements in the NCR. The element of SSSS-W which supports Agent Orange research can be eliminated because Agent Orange research is completed. The size of reduction to the organizations supported by SSSS-W is expected to be between fifteen to twenty percent. This will enable SSSS-W to be reduced accordingly.

3 Conclusion(s).

a SSSS-W provides a critical service for HQDA which must be provided by some organization.

b SSSS-W can sustain a reduction and accomplish its primary mission.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

4 Recommendation. Reduce SSSS-W by fifteen percent.

(e) Resource Services - Washington (RS-W) (HDA19).

1 Description. This initiative would reduce RS-W by twenty percent over three years beginning in FY92.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. RS-W provides general administrative and management support to HQDA, FOA, and DOD activities. Also, it provides analysis, management studies of organizations, programming, budget, financial management, accounting, and payroll support for HQDA and HQDA FOA and SSA. Finally, it provides proponency oversight for Program 95 (OMA).

b Assumption(s).

1 Workload is sensitive to number of organizations serviced and their population.

2 RS-W should be reduced commensurate with the organization it supports.

c Analysis. RS-W supports activities at HQDA as well worldwide. The budget encompasses 13 appropriations, exceeds \$2 Billion, supports 160 separate organizations, and services approximately 18,000 people through twenty finance and accounting offices. This organization has 140 of its personnel in St. Louis, Missouri, performing finance and accounting support for HQDA. The remainder are located in the Pentagon and provide dollar and manpower resource management services to HQDA. The workload of certain facets of the organization is driven by the number of organizations serviced. The accounting portion of RS-W's mission is sensitive to population serviced. With the reduction and elimination of certain HQDA FOA and SSA; RS-W can sustain a reduction and still accomplish it's primary mission.

3 Conclusions.

a RS-W provides a critical support for HQDA plus many FOA and SSA.

b RS-W can sustain a reduction and still accomplish its primary missions.

4 Recommendation. Reduce RS-W by twenty percent over a three year period.

(f) General Officers Mess No. 1 (GO MESS) (HDA15).

1 Description. This initiative would reduce the GO MESS by 10 percent.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/ Background. This agency prepares meals and food services for the Secretary of the Army, Senior Army Leadership and certain guests.

b Assumption(s).

1 Some level of this service will continue to be provided to the Army leadership.

2 HQDA will be reduced commensurate with the Army at large.

3 Analysis. The GO MESS provides a necessary service for HQDA by making available a secure environment necessary for conducting governmental business. The workload is dependent on the population serviced. As the number of GOs and SES at HQDA is reduced, the GO MESS can be reduced.

3 Conclusion(s).

a The GO MESS serves a necessary function.

b The GO MESS can sustain a reduction and still perform its mission.

4 Recommendation. Reduce the GO MESS by 10 percent.

(9) Office, Chief of Staff of the Army.

(a) Center of Military History (CMH) (HDA30).

1 Description. This initiative would reduce the Center of Military History by twenty-five percent including Quicksilver.

2 Evaluation.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

a Mission/Function/Background. The CMH coordinates the US Army history program, prepares Army histories, furnishes assistance to Army, DOD, Congress, and the public. It also provides quick reaction research capability and input on current Army issues.

b Assumption(s).

1 It is important that CMH as proponent for Army history continue to capture and provide lessons learned and input to leadership development.

2 CMH should be reduced commensurate with the Army at large.

c Analysis. CMH is the only Army organization whose mission is documenting and transmitting national and military values. It provides a vital service for documenting change to the Army. Without CMH, the Army would lose this capability. Often the CMH is called upon to develop historical research and analysis to serve as a backdrop for current Army problems or issues. This is a critical function; however, a review of its organization, missions and functions indicate that there is potential for savings of at least twenty-five percent. Quicksilver reduced CMH by 23 spaces.

3 Conclusion(s).

a CMH provides a unique, important service which should continue.

b CMH can sustain a reduction and still perform its primary mission.

4 Recommendation. Reduce CMH by twenty-five percent including the 23 space Quicksilver reduction.

(b) U. S. Army Safety Center (USASC) (HDA40).

1 Description. This initiative would reduce the U.S. Army Safety Center by fifteen percent.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. The USASC develops policy and manages the Army safety program Army-wide. It manages and conducts research, analysis and investigation of air and ground accidents; develops safety doctrine, policy, procedures, standards, practices and plans. It also manages specific functions including OSHA, ammunition and explosives safety; and develops safety training programs.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

b Assumption(s).

- 1 Safety issues will remain a high priority for the Army.
- 2 The Safety Center should sustain a reduction commensurate with the Army at large.

c Analysis. The scope of the Safety Center is multi-faceted. It has received expanded missions involving all areas of safety CONUS AND OCONUS. The workload at the Safety Center is dependent on the personnel strength of the Army, equipment density, and operational tempo. The impending reductions in equipment density and operational tempo (OPTEMPO) due to budget constraints indicate that there will be fewer accidents to investigate and less training requirements. Additionally, a review of the Safety Center TDA indicates that there are personnel excess to the needs of the organization due to improvements in automation technology. The bottom line is that reductions will be possible due to improved automation technology, reduced Army size resulting in reduced density of equipment and operational tempo, and the CFE drawdown in Europe. Quicksilver cuts deleted 17 spaces.

3 Conclusion.

- a The Safety Center provides a vital function for the Army.
- b The Safety Center can sustain a reduction and still continue to perform its primary mission.
- c Recommendation. Reduce the U.S. Army Safety Center by fifteen percent.

(10) Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans.

(a) Military History Institute (MHI) (HDA31).

1 Description. This initiative would reduce the Military History Institute by twenty percent and consolidate it with Center of Military History.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. MHI facilitates and encourages the unofficial use and study of military history through the acquisition, concentration, preservation, organization and disposition of materials relating to all military aspects of history. MHI was formally part of CMH.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

b Assumption. That MHI should sustain a reduction commensurate with the Army at large.

c Analysis. The functions performed by MHI are important to the Army War College and the Army as a whole. MHI focuses 5 percent of its support to the Army War College, and 95 percent support to Army-wide issues. These missions could be shifted to the Center of Military History (CMH) by eliminating MHI but not without deterioration of mission accomplishment by CMH. Currently, MHI operates under the DCSOPS but separately from CMH. This situation creates a situation where the Army's Senior Historian is not in charge of all historical functions. Consolidation of the two agencies would alleviate this situation plus aid MHI on taking a reduction. Additionally, review of the organization indicates an overlap of certain support type functions between MHI and the War College. A support agreement with the War College will assist MHI in taking a reduction.

3 Conclusion(s).

a MHI provides a unique, important mission for the Army.

b It can sustain a reduction and continue to perform its primary mission.

c The Army should have a single spokesman who is responsible for the history function throughout the Army.

4 Recommendation(s). Eliminate MHI as a Field Operating Agency; consolidate with CMH and reduce by twenty percent.

(11) Office, The Judge Advocate General.

(a) U. S. Army Legal Services Agency (USALSA) (HDA18).

1 Description. This initiative would reduce USALSA by twenty percent beginning in FY93.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. USALSA provides legal support of the Army including appellate court representation in all forms of litigation. It guarantees independent trial defense counsel and judiciary personnel throughout the Army. Also, it is responsible for professional recruiting for Army legal personnel.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

b Assumption(s).

1 Commanders will continue to require legal support.

2 USALSA should sustain a reduction commensurate with the Army at large.

c Analysis. USALSA provides a critical, world-wide function. Its workload correlates to the size of the Army. Impending Army reductions will result in increased near term workload due to contracting and environmental issues. Ultimately, a smaller Army will require less legal support. Analysis anticipated this increase in workload in the near term due to legal problems associated with down sizing the Army. However, workload should fall as the Army end strength and procurement actions are reduced. This reduction in workload will enable USALSA to take the recommended personnel reduction. The CFE reduction in Europe will also have an impact and aid USALSA in reducing personnel requirements.

3 Conclusion(s).

a Army reductions will decrease the need for legal support.

b Legal functions must be retained at some level.

c USALSA can sustain a reduction and still perform its primary mission.

4 Recommendation. Reduce USALSA by twenty percent beginning in FY93.

(b) U. S. Army Claims Service (USACS) (HDA14).

1 Description. This initiative would reduce the Claims Service by fifteen percent beginning in FY94.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. USACSA investigates, processes, and settles non-contractual claims either for or against the Army. It implements, executes, and administers the comprehensive claims program for the Army. Additionally, it provides claims doctrine and training.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

b Assumption. USACSA should be reduced commensurate with the Army at large.

c Analysis. This is a critical function for the Army. No other organization does it. It has been successful in returning funds to the Army; approximately \$14 million in FY91. USACSA workload is directly affected by the size of the Army and the movement of equipment and personnel. Claims workload is expected to increase in the near years due to demobilizing personnel, however, they should lessen as the Army reduces in size; especially in maneuver damage claims. The situation in Europe associated with Desert Shield and CFE will enable USACSA to take reduction as these forces are reduced and transferred.

3 Conclusions.

a The Army must accomplish the claims function.

b USACSA can sustain a reduction and perform its primary mission.

4 Recommendation. Reduce the USACSA by fifteen percent with reductions beginning in FY94.

(12) Office, Chief of Chaplains.

(a) Chaplaincy Services Support Agency (CSSA) (HDA23).

1 Description. This initiative would reduce the Chaplaincy Services Support Agency by fifteen percent.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. USACSSA executes approved Chief of Chaplain policies and integrates guidance for Army-wide mission in support of soldiers and soldier family religious support needs.

b Assumption(s).

1 Spiritual and religious issues will remain important for soldiers/family members.

2 CSSA should sustain a reduction commensurate with the Army at large.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

c Analysis. Initial analysis was based on a review of missions and functions and the TDA. CSSA performs research and analysis in support of overall Chief of Chaplain missions and responsibilities including proponent functions. Analysis indicated that there is certain duplication of mission and function between the Chaplain agency and the office, Chief of Chaplains. Additionally, portions of USACSSA missions and functions were ill-defined. OCCH and USACSSA are clarifying and reorganizing missions and functions.

3 Conclusion(s).

a USACSSA must continue to perform functions directly related to soldier and family member support.

b CCSA can sustain a reduction and continue to perform its primary mission.

4 Recommendation. Reduce USACSSA by fifteen percent.

(13) Chief, National Guard Bureau.

(a) National Guard Operating Agency Center (NGOAC) (HDA42).

1 Description. This initiative reduces the National Guard Operating Agency Center by twenty percent and reclassifies it as a Staff Support Agency.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. NGOAC is responsible for complete internal administration, planning, direction, and execution of the OAC; develops policies, procedures, and directives for the operation; manages the position management and financial programs of OAC; manages procurements, installation and maintenance of equipment; provides office and storage space; provides assistance in various CONUS locations.

b Assumption(s).

1 The National Guard will have increased responsibilities under the Total Army concept.

2 NGBOAC should be reduced commensurate with the Army at large.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

c Analysis. OAC is in direct support to Chief, National Guard Bureau. Stated missions and functions appear to address only OAC operations and do not define OAC support which is provided to Chief, NGB. Functions are fragmented between divisions on the NGB TDA and supporting personnel on the OAC TDA. Additionally, there are duplication of functions, excess overhead and functions which should be done by the Active Army Component, i.e., the NGB Surgeon General. Sixteen personnel on OAC TDA have the Pentagon as duty station in violation of DODI 5100.73 and AMHA policy. 228 AGR personnel are assigned which should ease the workload of the AC and civilian personnel and allow a reduction in OAC personnel.

3 Conclusion. NGOAC can sustain a reduction through consolidation of NGB and OAC staff and elimination of duplicate missions and functions and excess overhead.

4 Recommendation. Reduce NGOAC by twenty percent; reclassify as SSA.

(b) National Guard Financial Service Center (NGFSC) (HDA39).

1 Description. This initiative would retain the National Guard Financial Service Center as currently staffed.

2 Evaluation.

a Mission/Function/Background. NGFSC manages JUMPS (RC) and pay procedures for ARNG military personnel at USAFAC.

b Assumption(s).

1 NGB pay functions will continue.

2 NGFSC should sustain a reduction commensurate with the Army at large.

c Analysis. NGB provides resources at USAFAC to monitor JUMPS(RC). It maintains liaison with USAFAC on financial management matters, performs assistance visits to States, and handles all NGB travel and commercial accounts. It provides a unique NGB forces for finance and accounting procedures impacting the NG personnel. This function must be provided to NGB by some organization. The manpower at USAFAC associated with this function includes 10 AGRs and 6 civilians which is about right for the functions performed.

3 Conclusion(s).

a NGBFSC provides a critical service for NGB and the total Army.

b A reduction to NGB FSC would seriously harm the capability to perform its primary mission.

4 Recommendation. Retain National Guard Financial Center as it is.

4.4 REDUCE DEFENSE AND JOINT ACTIVITIES (HDA43).

a. Description. This initiative would further reduce the Defense and Joint Agencies an additional 7 percent above the 18 percent which is already targeted against these activities.

b. Evaluation.

(1) Mission/Functions/Background. A review of the SEP 90 Force Accounting System (FAS) identified 76 Defense Agencies, 162 Joint Activities, and 7 Joint International Commands for a total of 245 organizations. Army action associated with the Quicksilver reductions has programed a 701 spaces reduction against Defense and Joint Agencies. Another 1,162 spaces are targeted for selected Defense and Joint Agencies making a total of 1863 spaces or approximately 18 percent. These reductions were not unit specific nor command specific.

(2) Assumption. That the Army accounts in Defense and Joint Agencies would sustain a reduction commensurate with the Army-at-large.

(3) Analysis. In an effort to identify an additional 7 percent reduction to the Defense and Joint Agencies, a review was conducted of the Defense and Joint Agencies enlisted population. This review identified approximately 5000 enlisted spaces in the Defense and Joint TDA structure of which approximately thirty percent of these enlisted spaces were in the "soft" skill areas of administration, logistics, supply, and personnel. These skills lend themselves to civilianization. Additionally, these organizations appear to have excessive enlisted personnel in the "soft skills" relative to the size and composition of the organization. A significant portion of these "soft" skills can be eliminated without impairing the primary mission of the organization.

c. Conclusion. That Defense and Joint accounts can sustain a 7 percent reduction beyond the approximately 18 percent targeted against those agencies.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

d. Recommendation. That Defense and Joint Accounts be reduced 7 percent in addition to the approximately 18 percent reduction already programmed for a total reduction of twenty-five percent.

4.5 VANGUARD INITIATIVES NOT PROVIDED TO ARMY LEADERSHIP.

a. GENERAL

(1) The following VANGUARD initiatives are provided as a matter of record. These initiatives were formulated and pursued because of the belief that they had the potential for achieving savings while either improving the way the Army does business or would not necessarily impact critical missions and functions. In the instances included, the initiatives either required such an organizational change so as to meet general resistance or else they were perceived as being harmful to the Army. Consequently, the VANGUARD leadership decided not to pursue them further.

(2) These initiatives should not be pursued under the current situation and resource constraints. They should be reviewed if Army resources are reduced further (manpower or dollars).

b. CONSOLIDATE THE INTERNAL REVIEW (IR) FUNCTION WITH THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (IG) FUNCTION (HDA04).

(1) Description. This initiative would consolidate the internal review function with the inspection function accomplished by the Inspector General of the Army.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Mission/Functions/Background. Currently, the internal review function is conducted from HQDA to the installation level and by regulation is located in the command element of the organization. Internal review personnel serve the commander primarily in reviewing/evaluating functions or areas which the commander designates and which normally have a high probability for problems. Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 requires separation of the function at HQDA. Moreover, GAO audit standards, DOD Directive 7600.2 and Army Regulation mandate the autonomy of the IR offices. These documents derive in part, from Congressional concern over consolidation of the functions in the mid-1970's. The concept of this initiative was to consolidate the internal review personnel with the Inspector General office within the same organization. At the installation and MACOM, IR would be consolidated with the installation IG. Overhead would be reduced. The professional auditors would be retained within the IG to perform needed audits for the commander.

(b) Assumption(s).

1. That there is no legal constraint to consolidating the internal review and the inspection function.

2. Low priority tasks will not be accomplished.

(c) Analysis.

1. In developing this initiative, a thorough review was conducted of IR spaces on organizational TDA throughout the Army. Analysis determined that a reduction could be accomplished without "breaking" the function and that consolidation with the IG function could best accomplish savings and still ensure that both functions remained viable. A review of responsibilities in the IR and IG functions clearly indicated that it was appropriate to consolidate in order to eliminate duplicate efforts and support the commander through unity of effort. Current levels of staffing ranged from one (1) to 14 auditors. The analysis recognized up front that the IR tasks would have to be put into priority and certain low priority tasks would not be accomplished.

2. A review of legislation by the VANGUARD legal counsel and the Army General Counsel indicate that statutory constraints prohibit the consolidation of Internal Review and the Inspector General function.

(3) Conclusion(s).

(a) Organizationally, it is logical to consolidate the two functions.

(b) Statutory restrictions prohibit consolidating at any level.

(4) Recommendation. That under the current end-strength levels this initiative be removed from further consideration. If end-strength is further reduced, efforts should be made to lift statutory prohibitions on merging these programs.

c. **ELIMINATE DIRECTED MILITARY OVERSTRENGTH (DMO) (HDA05).**

(1) Description. This initiative would eliminate the 1000 Directed Military Overstrength (DMO) personnel carried as part of the force structure in UIC MPW4ZZAA.

(2) Evaluation.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

(a) Mission/Functions/Background. In 1988, the Army leadership approved a procedure whereby 1000 military spaces were placed on a separate UIC and into the force structure. These spaces are used to fill short notice manpower needs when the requirement is for short duration and in most instances are skill or name specific. Under the guidelines of the regulation governing DMO, the assignment can not be longer than one year. In reality, the assignments to many of these DMO positions are on a continuing basis and for terms longer than a year.

(b) Assumption. The DMO authorizations should be reduced commensurate with the remainder of the Army.

(c) Analysis. There are 1000 spaces in the DMO program; 550 enlisted, 150 Warrant Officers, and 300 Officers. The 1000 spaces in DMO provide a viable means to manage short term, quick reaction requirements for HQDA and the Major Commands. Analysis indicated that less than 800 of the 1000 spaces are filled at any given time. Recent discussion with the manager on the HQDA staff indicates that 250 of these spaces will be reallocated to other force structure requirements.

(3) Conclusion. That this program provides a viable, necessary service to the HQDA and MACOM.

(4) Recommendation. That the DMO program remain as is. A further reduction in end-strength would justify a reduction to this program.

4.6 ARMY MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITIES (AMHA) ACCOUNT

a. General. Department of Defense Instruction 5100.73 defines AMHA and provides guidance on management of the account. The AMHA account consists of HQDA and selected HQDA field operating and staff support agencies; Major Commands and selected staff support activities; and certain Joint and Defense agencies. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA(M&RA)) is responsible for managing the AMHA account less the Army elements of the Joint and Defense agencies. The ASA(M&RA) must submit a budget exhibit (Exhibit PB 22 - AMHA) as part of the annual budget submission to Congress. Figure IV-15 depicts the command locations of AMHA accounts.




Figure IV-15
Location of AMHA Accounts

b. Discussion.

(1) The AMHA account is a very sensitive issue primarily due to continuing Congressional and OSD perceptions associated with the size of the departmental headquarters and the Field Operating and Staff Support Agencies supporting it and their interest in minimizing headquarters overhead. As shown in Figure IV-16, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Public Law 101-510) mandates a twenty percent reduction in the DoD AMHA account over a five period beginning in FY91.

(2) Throughout its tenure, VANGUARD has been cognizant of the impact of initiatives on the AMHA accounts and has sought to capture these recommended changes. Since any VANGUARD recommended reductions in the AMHA account can be applied to the Congressionally mandated reduction, it is particularly important that

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

changes in AMHA be documented. Figure IV-16 shows the notional reduction associated with each AMHA command account category. These reductions assume that departmental and Joint and Defense accounts will take a pro-rata share.




Figure IV-16
Prorata AMHA Reductions

(3) Additionally, since any reduction to AMHA, regardless of source, can be applied to the twenty percent mandated reduction, it became necessary for VANGUARD to keep track of other actions which impacted the AMHA accounts. Figure IV-17 provides a summary of AMHA manpower reductions as recommended by VANGUARD initiatives plus those identified in the FY92 Budget Estimate Submission position. These numbers use the FY90 column of the FY92 Budget Estimate Submission as a baseline.




Figure IV-17
AMHA Summary

(4) Figure IV-18 provides a summary of only the VANGUARD impact on the AMHA accounts by Major Command or command grouping (HQDA, JT/DEF). The activation of PERSCOM per the VANGUARD vision is identified separately so as to show a more accurate picture of the HQDA command AMHA account.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

VANGUARD AMHA REDUCTION SUMMARY

COMMAND	FY82			FY87		
	MIL	CIV	AGG	MIL	CIV	AGG
AMC	- 4	- 235	- 239	- 89	- 489	- 578
INSCOM	- 5	- 8	- 11	- 38	- 12	- 50
HSC	- 7	- 34	- 41	- 13	- 34	- 47
MDW		- 7	- 7	- 13	- 13	- 26
ISC	- 19	- 65	- 84	- 44	- 82	- 126
TRADOC	- 28	- 69	- 92	- 31	- 74	- 105
COE	- 6	- 218	- 223	- 4	- 218	- 222
FORSCOM	- 11	- 85	- 106	- 496	- 740	- 1,226
CIDC	- 8	- 1	- 9	- 82	- 44	- 126
MTMC	- 1	- 28	- 29	- 19	- 181	- 180
USAREUR	- 7	- 43	- 50	- 21	- 172	- 181
EUSA						
USARBO	- 9	- 2	- 11	- 118	- 109	- 227
ASARPAC	- 37	- 20	- 57	- 16	- 20	- 36
HQDA	- 137	- 120	- 257	- 93	- 89	- 182
JT / DEF	- 260	- 43	- 293	- 290	- 37	- 297
ACT PERSCOM				- 131	- 183	- 314
TOTAL	- 425	- 810	- 836	- 1,155	- 1,291	- 2,446

**Figure IV-18
VANGUARD AMHA Changes**

(5) VANGUARD recommended changes to AMHA can be attributed to one of several actions.

(a) At HQDA, it is a function of the reduction of the HQDA Staff or a recommendation to eliminate a FOA or SSA and transfer the missions and functions with some personnel to the HQDA Staff. These numbers assume a twenty percent pro rata reduction of the HQDA Staff.

(b) For HQDA FOA or SSA, changes are a function of transferring missions and functions with personnel to the HQDA Staff or reclassifying certain field operating

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

agencies to a staff support AMHA account. Recommendations to reclassify field operating agencies to staff support were done consistent with the AMHA definition in DoD Instruction 5100.73.

(c) For major commands and their field operating or staff support activities, changes are due to individual functional or organizational initiatives.

1 VANGUARD did not attempt to standardize the size of major commands or Subordinate headquarters due to inherent dissimilarities in the types and magnitude of missions. Consequently, the post-VANGUARD structure is a function of the individual initiatives and not due to efforts to standardize or structure the headquarters based on missions and functions. There is validity to the concept of standardizing major command headquarters, and given the current pressure for further manpower and dollar reductions, a standard approach should be developed which will balance the headquarters AMHA account with the overall major command reduction.

2 Additionally, a mission assessment should be done which would focus on major command missions and functions and the level of resources required to support these. This is a major effort which VANGUARD was unable to accomplish within the time available given the VANGUARD charter. This concept is discussed as option four below.

(d) For Joint and Defense agencies changes are a function of the VANGUARD initiative to reduce the Army elements of these agencies commensurate with the overall Army reduction.

(6) Figure IV-19 provides a summary of the VANGUARD recommended changes plus other changes identified in the AMHA Budget Exhibit (PB 22) for the FY92 Budget Exhibit Submission (BES) as provided by Office, ASA(M&RA). A review of Figure IV-19 shows that the combination of VANGUARD recommendations plus other reductions did not achieve the mandated twenty percent AMHA reduction which must be accomplished by FY95. Thus, it may become necessary to achieve the remainder through other actions. There are several feasible options by which to accomplish this.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

TOTAL AMHA REDUCTION - FY97

COMMAND	20%	VG / BES	CMD SHORTFALL	% ACHIEVED
AMC	- 826	- 1,404		- 34.0
INSCOM	- 110	- 60	- 50	- 36.0
HSC	- 96	- 71	- 56	- 15.1
MDW	- 32	- 41		- 25.8
IBC	- 244	- 282		- 20.8
TRADOC	- 257	- 188	- 69	- 14.8
COE	- 48	* 183	- 45	* 75.9
FORSCOM	- 708	- 1,872		- 53.0
CIDC	- 33	- 188		- 100.0
MTMC	- 57	- 218		- 77.1
USAREUR	- 228	* 148	- 226	* 12.7
EUSA	- 99	- 70	- 29	- 14.1
USARSO	- 50	- 238		- 100.0
USARPAC	- 136	- 25	- 110	- 3.8
HQDA	- 639	* 333	- 639	* 7.9
JT / DEF	- 784	- 520	- 284	- 13.3
ACT PERSCOM		* 314		*
TOTAL	- 4,540	- 4,163	- 1,691	- 16.3
* INCL: USARSO, BRACZ, PEO, OSA & OOSA FOR/BSA		4,540	4,163	

**Figure IV-19
VANGUARD/BES Summary**

(a) Option One - Apply a "tax" the MACOMS which did not achieve a twenty percent reduction through current initiatives. Figure IV-19 provides a listing of these MACOMS which did not achieve the twenty percent reduction resulting from a combination of VANGUARD recommendations, and other reductions captured in the FY92 Budget Estimate Submission (BES). This approach has the advantage of minimizing pro rata reductions yet does not further penalize the commands which did achieve a twenty percent reduction.

(b) Option Two - Redefine the missions and functions of selected FOA.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

1 In critically reviewing the missions and functions of selected FOA and strictly applying the DoD Instruction 5100.73 definition of AMHA, VANGUARD recommended that selected FOA be reclassified as staff support AMHA, e. g.; the Army Safety Center and The Inspector General Agency. In reviewing these organizations, VANGUARD accepted their missions and functions as a given and applied the appropriate definition per DoD Instruction 5100.73. In applying these guidelines to the missions and functions as currently written, VANGUARD believes that these FOA fit the definition for staff support AMHA. As written, they blur the distinction between proponent staff functions (AMHA) and the valid functions of the FOA (non-AMHA). While VANGUARD did not attempt to redefine or refocus missions and functions, it appears that a clarification and redefinition, as appropriate, of selected FOA and proponent staff missions and functions could eliminate the requirement to reclassify certain FOA to staff support AMHA. This redefinition of missions and functions must clearly separate AMHA functions from non-AMHA functions with the FOA clearly focused and performing non-AMHA functions.

2 Additionally, there are staff support organizations currently classified as AMHA which could be potentially be classified as non-AMHA by redefining and refocusing their missions and functions, e.g.; the proposed Strategic Force Evaluation Center per the VANGUARD Vision (vice the Concepts Analysis Agency). The HQDA AMHA proponent (ASA(M&RA)) should be designated to review these revised missions and functions to ensure that they comply with the DoD guidelines.

(c) Option Three - Move operational functions from departmental and major command headquarters to operational organizations.

1 Currently, HQDA and Major Commands perform certain missions and functions which are operational in nature. Transferring operational functions to an operational (non-AMHA), non-staff support organization will allow for a reduction in the AMHA accounts. A determination of operational functions can be done best by the staff elements of the headquarters involved.

2 An example of this concept is movement of the force integration function from HQDA to a TRADOC operational command. These concepts are described at paragraph 4.2 and 6.2 respectively of this report. This retains at HQDA and TRADOC headquarters those functions which are truly AMHA functions and moves operational functions now performed in the headquarters to the appropriate level.

a In this instance, additional savings can be gained at HQDA by instituting the Program Integrator concept. Consistent with the discussion of this concept at paragraph 4.2, the greatest savings can be achieved at HQDA by instituting

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER 1V
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

the Program Integrator. Any savings identified above the VANGUARD twenty percent pro rata reduction to HQDA would further reduce the AMHA account.

b Potentially, there are other operational functions which should be transferred to operational organizations. At HQDA, this endeavor should be part of the review of the Army Staff being done by the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army and the Director of the Army Staff in conjunction with the separate staff elements. At the major commands, this should be accomplished between the commanders and the HQDA proponent staff elements.

(d) **Option Four** - Standardize the methodology for establishing mission statements, then structure the headquarters so as to focus on the MACOM's primary mission. The framework for this concept is provided below.

1 Current Army procedures do not require the review of MACOM mission statements for standard formatting. The result is different degrees of detail among MACOMs regarding how missions are stated; some are very short and concise; others are longer and focus not only on components of the primary mission but sub-elements of the mission. Although not provide, an example of the short, concise mission statement is the Army Materiel Command; an example of the longer, complex mission statement is the Information Systems Command. There is no consistency in the development of mission statements. The following statements describe the concept of standardizing procedures for developing mission statements and structuring headquarters to focus on the mission;

- MACOM headquarters would be built from a zero base.
- Mission statements would be succinct and address only major tasks, i.e.; "provide forces" or "distribute materiel."
- The command group structure would be standard, i.e.; same number of deputy commanders, etc.
- Each headquarters would have the traditional primary staff, however, each primary staff would be internally structured so that it reflected the mission of the staff section as it relates to the MACOM mission statement.
- The types of positions (military/civilians) and respective grades would be standard throughout each headquarters.
- Those elements of each staff which did not closely focus on the MACOM mission would be eliminated.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER IV
REALIGN ARMY STAFF FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

- Special and personal staff would be reduced to the absolute minimum and, in turn, must be focused on the mission of the MACOM..

c. Conclusion(s).

(1) The impact of the VANGUARD initiatives is critical in achieving reductions to the AMHA account and provides a rational approach to these reductions.

(2) A combination of VANGUARD and other reductions did not achieve the mandated twenty percent reduction by FY95.

(3) Additional reductions will be necessary to achieve the twenty percent AMHA reduction.

d. Recommendation(s).

(1) That the VANGUARD recommendations be accepted.

(2) That the MACOMs which did not achieve the twenty percent reduction be "taxed", if it becomes necessary to meet the full twenty percent reduction.

(3) That Army leadership undertake an effort to redefine and refocus the missions and function of selected FOA so as to ensure that they are performing only non-AMHA functions.

(4) That the Army leadership undertake a review of HQDA and MACOM missions and transfer operational missions from the respective staff into operational organizations. At HQDA, this can be done during the pending reduction to the HQDA Staff.

(5) That the Army leadership undertake an effort to standardize methodology for developing MACOM mission statements, to standardize the structure supporting that mission, and eliminate all functions which do not focus on the MACOM mission.

CHAPTER V REALIGN CONUS FORCES

5.1. GENERAL.

a. Over the past decade, Reserve Component readiness has improved substantially. The readiness of the Army's Reserve and National Guard units will remain essential to U.S. security in the future as downsizing plans result in a smaller overall Total Army force structure. But, in reshaping its structure into a smaller, yet capable force the Army will rely increasingly on forces based in the United States to secure U.S. vital interests worldwide. Future contingency operations will require tailored, rapidly deployable force packages with the appropriate mix of armored, light and special operations forces and the requisite airlift and sealift. Enhanced deployability will become a major objective as clearly demonstrated in both operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD. Accordingly, the Army must pursue a wide range of programs and initiatives embracing not only improvements in the long standing national deficiencies in airlift and sealift, but also imaginative total force packaging, basing options, equipment design, rail infrastructure, containerization, and the repositioning of equipment afloat and ashore. Concomitantly, the Army, in posturing its future force, must examine the infrastructure of its CONUS based Army to ascertain the appropriateness of its design, the magnitude of its structure and the affordability of its missions and functions. All of a magnitude that will ensure total support of the warfighting forces.

b. The challenge for VANGUARD was primarily to protect the fighting force by reducing the general support forces of the Army. More specifically the task was to determine how AC and RC MTOE commanders could take an increased responsibility for mobilization and traditional TDA missions; whether reducing or eliminating MACOMs HQs were feasible; how to realign traffic management operations and determine which operations and or security functions could be eliminated or reduced. The initiatives resulting from this task can be divided into five groups: (1) initiatives that address realigning RC assets; (2) initiatives that support eliminating MACOMs; (3) initiatives supporting realignment of transportation management activities; (4) initiatives that restructure security activities and (5) consolidation of space activities. See Appendix 17-N2 for specific manpower and costing information on each initiative.

5.2. REALIGN RESERVE COMPONENT ASSETS.

a. **ESTABLISH THE U.S. ARMY RESERVE COMMAND (USARC) AS A MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMAND (MSC) OF FORCES COMMAND (FORSCOM).**

The Secretary and I have approved your plan to establish a United States Army Reserve Command (USARC). The USARC should become fully operational by 30 September 1992...

CSA Memo to FORSCOM - 1 Oct 90

(1) **Description.** This initiative establishes a separate USARC headquarters as a MSC of FORSCOM to command and control USAR forces assigned in the continental U.S.

(2) **Evaluation.**

(a) **Missions/Functions/Background.** The National Defense Authorization Act for FY91 directed the Secretary of the Army (SA) to establish a USARC, under the command of the Chief, of Army Reserve (CAR) as a major subordinate command of FORSCOM. All forces of the Army Reserve in the continental U.S. are to be assigned to the USARC. If the continental U.S. armies are retained in the command structure, their relationship with Army Reserve units is to be similar to their relationship with Army National Guard units. Administrative and operational control of non-mobilized Army Reserve units is to evolve to be vested in the CAR. The USARC is to be a distinct and separate, subordinate entity of FORSCOM. On 1 Oct 90, the SA and Chief of Staff, (CSA) approved FORSCOM's plan to establish a provisional USARC headquarters (HQ) in the Atlanta area effective 1 Oct 90. This headquarters is to facilitate the establishment of the new USARC as a MSC of FORSCOM and to become fully operational by 30 Sep 92. The CAR will serve as the commander of the new organization and as the principal staff advisor to the CSA on the Army Reserve.

(b) **Assumption.** Command and control functions and corresponding resources will be reallocated from current FORSCOM assets to the USARC.

(c) **Analysis.** FORSCOM and the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR) have jointly developed an organization and functions (OF) manual with 830-870 manpower requirements. Upon review of the OF manual, VANGUARD concluded that it was an evolving requirements based document that had not been evaluated against manpower staffing standards. Subsequent examination by a HQ, Department of the Army planning group, on which VANGUARD was represented, determined that staffing authorizations should be in accordance with levels comparable to those programmed for

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER V
REALIGN CONUS FORCES
15 December 1990

FORSCOM and Continental U.S. Army (CONUSA) HQs (approximately 700 spaces). This analysis was further corroborated by the USARC planning group.

(3) Conclusion. The establishment of the USARC as MSC of FORSCOM is in keeping with the Defense Authorization Act of 1991.

(4) Recommendation. The establishment of the USARC should be resourced from current CONUSA assets not to exceed 700 spaces for USARC HQ.

b. ELIMINATE CONTINENTAL U.S. ARMIES (CONUSA) (MDA01).

(1) Description. Project VANGUARD initiative MDA01 identifies savings made possible by realigning reserve component (RC) readiness assets. Missions and functions currently performed by the CONUSAs are transferred to the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) and the CONUS based corps and Third U.S. Army. U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) personnel, logistics, and other command related functions (including resourcing) are assumed by the USARC. Responsibility for RC readiness and training is given to the CONUS corps and Third U.S. Army. The CONUSAs are reduced in number and subsequently eliminated.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. CONUSAs are non-deployable three-star headquarters that have fixed geographical areas of responsibility in CONUS. Their functions currently include command and control (C2) for the USAR; training and readiness for the USAR; training supervision and evaluation for the Army National Guard; mobilization and deployment; planning and execution land defense of CONUS (LDC) planning, military support to civil authorities (MSCA), and military support to civil defense (MSCD); support for counternarcotics efforts; and C2 of readiness groups. Currently, there are five CONUSAs: First Army (Fort Meade, MD), Second Army (Fort Gillem, GA), Fourth Army (Fort Sheridan, IL), Fifth Army (Fort Sam Houston, TX), and Sixth Army (Presidio, CA). Fourth Army is being disestablished by the end of fiscal year FY92 with its area of responsibility being assumed by First Army.

(b) Assumptions.

1 For the contingency force, CAPSTONE will retain the traditional orientation. The balance of the CAPSTONE alignments will be regionally distributed to the other CONUS corps and Third U.S. Army, who will be responsible for training within their geographic regions. (See matrix at Figure V-2.)

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER V
REALIGN CONUS FORCES
15 December 1990**

2 The USARC will be established as a major subordinate command of Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the role of the CONUSAs will diminish.

3 The Army will have longer warning for partial and full mobilization.

***"...If they are retained in the command structure,
the CONUSAs' relationship with Army Reserve units
should be similar to their relationship
with Army National Guard units..."***

—1991 Defense Authorization Act

(c) Analysis. The VANGUARD methodology specifically assessed the value added by intermediate headquarters levels. In the Army mobilization infrastructure, FORSCOM, the CONUSAs, the evolving USARC, the U.S. Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM), the state adjutants general (TAG), and the state area commands (STARCOM) were among those studied. With its activation, the USARC assumes the primary CONUSA mission, command of USAR units. FORSCOM remains the Army executive agent for mobilization and is centrally responsible for LDC, MSCA, and MSCD. Increasingly capable RC general officer commands (GOCOM) play a greater role in executing what were formerly active component missions. As other RC organizations retain or enhance their roles, the primary missions and functions of the CONUSAs are decreased. From the current CONUSA responsibilities identified previously, future roles, in general terms, should number only three: the role of the three-star commander as both a facilitator and integrator, the institutionalization of training standards exercised through the readiness groups, and the standardization of the application of Army policies and procedures. Consistent with the establishment of the USARC and a diminished CONUSA role, VANGUARD concluded that a reduction in the size of the four CONUSAs by FY92 and in the number of CONUSAs from four to three by FY94 can be achieved. Further, the CONUSAs, the Second U.S. Army, augmented with the readiness group assets, together with the JSARC and the RC GOCOMs, form the framework to receive and execute the remaining functions being transferred from the disestablished CONUSAs. Figure V-1 depicts the realignment of CONUSA functions.

REALIGNMENT OF CONUSA FUNCTIONS		
<u>FUNCTIONS:</u>	<u>PRESENT</u>	<u>FUTURE</u>
o C2 for USAR	CONUSA	USARC
o Training and readiness for USAR	CONUSA	Corps/Army
o Training supervision and evaluation for ARNG	CONUSA	Corps/Army
o Mobilization and deployment	CONUSA	
oo Planning		FORSCOM
oo Execution		RC GOCOMs
o Perform LDC/MSCA/MSCD missions	CONUSA	
oo Planning		FORSCOM
oo Execution		RC GOCOMs
o Support counternarcotics efforts	CONUSA	Corps/Army
o C2 for RGs	CONUSA	Corps/Army

**Figure V-1
 Realignment of CONUSA Functions**

(3) Conclusions. The evolution of USAR C2 has produced a dynamic environment in which to determine the future Army mobilization infrastructure. In the face of expanding roles for other organizations, the value added at the CONUSA level decreases. The vital missions and functions can be performed by the USARC, RC GOCOMs, the CONUS corps, and Third U.S. Army, thereby allowing for the elimination of the CONUSAs. Figure V-2 portrays how VANGUARD envisions the transition from CONUSA to corps and subsequent reorientation of missions.

(4) Recommendations.

(a) Support the FORSCOM plan in the near term, through FY92, and consistent with establishing USARC by downsizing, but retaining the four CONUSAs.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER V
REALIGN CONUS FORCES
15 December 1990**

Corps/Army - CONUSA Orientation		FEMA Regions	ARCOMs	Training Divisions	RGs	MECs	CAPSTONE Orientation
3d Army	1st Army	I, II III, IV	9	6	15	1	Regional
III Corps	5th Army	V, VI VII	8	4	9	1	Regional
I Corps	6th Army	VII IX, X	3	2	6	1	Regional
XVIII Corps	None	None	None	None	None	None	Contingency Forces

**Figure V-2
VANGUARD TRANSITION PLAN**

(b) Reduce the number of CONUSAs from four to three by FY94.

(c) Transfer the remaining CONUSA functions and readiness group assets to the CONUS corps and Third Army and eliminate the CONUSAs by FY95.

c. ESTABLISH MANEUVER EXERCISE COMMANDS (MEC) (MDA02)

(1) **Description.** Project VANGUARD initiative MDA02 identifies efficiencies made possible by realigning reserve component (RC) readiness assets. The two maneuver area commands (MAC) and nine maneuver training commands (MTC) are consolidated into four and, subsequently, three MECs. The new organizations are given the mission of supporting the entire spectrum of RC exercises. While the size and composition is based on the RC client population, the MECs are initially allocated with one dedicated to and under the operational control of each continental U.S. Army (CONUSA). When the CONUSAs are reduced in number and subsequently eliminated, the exercise responsibilities

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER V
REALIGN CONUS FORCES
15 December 1990

and assets are transferred to the CONUS corps and Third U.S. Army.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. With MACs focusing on brigade-level and above and MTCs on battalion level and below, both serve the RC community as exercise organizations. They are responsible from planning through execution. Currently, there are two MACs, the 75th in Houston, TX and the 87th in Birmingham, AL and nine MTCs spread throughout the continental U.S. (CONUS).

(b) Assumption. The U.S. Army Reserve Command will be established as a major subordinate command of U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the CONUSAs will be phased out.

(c) Analysis. Central to this initiative is an approved Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans action memorandum, subject: TAA 96 Issue - Maneuver Exercise Commands (FORSCOM), dated 22 November 1988. Presumably based on research done at FORSCOM that developed both the exercise requirement and the MEC concept, the resourcing decision cites savings through reduced overhead and efficiencies attributable to the establishment of the MECs. However, our analysis concluded that, from conception to the resourcing decision, a net structure increase of 644 authorizations resulted. By linking the distribution of the programmed RC manpower resources to the client population and allocating the organizations on the basis of one per regional area command, the VANGUARD alternative completely embraces the Total Army Analysis (TAA) 96 decision of one MEC per CONUSA. While the assets dedicated to RC exercises remain tied to the composition, strength, and disposition of U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard units, the number of MECs is reduced as the number of CONUSAs falls. The operational control of the MECs is transferred to the three CONUS corps and Third U.S. Army when the CONUSAs are eliminated.

(3) Conclusions. The TAA 96 action memorandum frames the issue and identifies the distribution and allocation criteria. Citing a general interpretation of the intent as well as specific language, VANGUARD concluded:

(a) The MEC structure should be aligned with the active component unit responsible for RC training and evaluation (CONUSA/corps).

(b) The MEC structure should be based on the RC client population served.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER V
REALIGN CONUS FORCES
15 December 1990**

(4) Recommendations.

(a) Establish the MECs, distributing the RC manpower resources on the basis of the client population and allocating the new organizations initially on the basis of one per CONUSA.

(b) As the number of CONUSAs is reduced and their missions and functions are subsequently transferred to the USARC, the CONUS corps and Third U.S. Army, maintain the distribution of assets necessary to meet the requirement and an allocation of one MEC per regional area command.

d. REDUCE FULL TIME SUPPORT (FTS) TO THE RESERVE COMPONENTS (RC) (MDA26).

(1) Description. Project VANGUARD initiative MDA26 identifies savings made possible by realigning RC readiness assets. Full time support (FTS) to the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) is reduced. Specific reductions are targeted for U.S. Army reserve support groups, U.S. Army Reserve commands (ARCOM), training divisions, and advisory staffs to USAR and ARNG commanders.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. FTS is provided by active component, active/guard reserve, military technician (MT), and Department of the Army civilian personnel. They perform administrative, logistical, training, and other command support functions in U.S. Army reserve support groups, ARCOMs, training divisions, other major USAR commands (MUSARC), state adjutants general, and state area commands. In recent years, increases in FTS have resulted in dramatic readiness gains in the RC.

(b) Assumptions.

1 The U.S. Army Reserve Command will be established as a major subordinate command of U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the role of the CONUSAs will be phased out.

2 The reserve component force structure will be reduced over the program objective memorandum (POM) years.

3 The Army will have a longer warning for partial and full mobilization.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER V
REALIGN CONUS FORCES
15 December 1990

(c) Analysis. Over the last decade, enhancements in RC readiness and in the proficiency of RC general officer commands (GOCOM) have been realized. Over a similar term, CAPSTONE and other efforts have produced a more closely integrated Total Army. The VANGUARD methodology was an examination of the functions performed by FTS personnel in U.S. Army reserve support groups, ARCOMs, training divisions, and other MUSARCs. The Army plan holds FTS authorizations constant as RC end strength decreases, thereby increasing the ratio toward the goal of 14 percent. By holding the percentage constant as RC end strength falls (in accordance with the 92-97 POM), savings can be achieved without undue additional risk. In consonance with Congressional intent, Secretary of Defense guidance, and Army policy, priority for FTS is given to units below the RC GOCOM level. Through marginal reductions in higher headquarters support and advisory staffing, savings can be achieved while protecting readiness. Consistent with the elimination of the CONUSAs, discussed earlier in this chapter, further savings could accrue by reducing the active military support to the readiness groups in line with a proposed revised regional CAPSTONE alignment. With programmed RC end strength declining more than 15 percent, this initiative reduced FTS less than one percent. The FY91 Defense Authorization Act reduces the AGR force by 30 percent by 1997 in the anticipation of increased AC support of the full time support program. Reductions must be managed carefully to remain within the intent of Congress. Since a floor is statutorily established, military technicians were exempted from consideration.

(3) Conclusions. Decreasing FTS has its inherent risks; however, in view of programmatic reductions, it may be necessary. As the RC force structure is decreased and as marginal reductions in FTS manpower resources are undertaken, maintenance and even enhancement of the FTS-RC end strength ratio can be achieved. Capitalizing on increased Total Force integration and enhanced RC GOCOM proficiency, reduction of the functions performed by headquarters support and advisory personnel results in savings and, at the same time, protects FTS to units below RC GOCOM level.

(4) Recommendations. Without compromising the attained FTS-RC end strength ratio and, therefore, readiness, marginally decrease FTS manpower resources dedicated to RC readiness in conjunction with force structure reductions established in the POM.

5.3. ELIMINATE U.S. ARMY SOUTH (USARSO) AS A MACOM (MAC 10).

(1) Description. This initiative identifies savings made possible by eliminating both USARSO as a MACOM and TIPA as a DCSOPS FOA. VANGUARD initiative MDA21 complements this initiative by eliminating the Panama Canal Treaty Implementation Plan Agency (TIPA) as a FOA of HQDA DCSOPS.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER V
REALIGN CONUS FORCES
15 December 1990**

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. USARSO was activated in Dec 86 from combining assets of the 193rd Infantry Brigade (Separate) and the U.S. Army Garrison, Panama (USAG-PN). The 193rd was a major subordinate command of U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the garrison was a separate FORSCOM installation. USARSO missions are: serve as the Army component to U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and Command and support assigned and attached active component and reserve component Army units, installations, and activities in Latin America. USARSO also acts as the SOUTHCOM executive agent for the Treaty Implementation Plan (TIP). TIPA serves as DOD executive agent for implementation of the Panama Canal Treaty. The agency is responsible for effecting the release of U.S. Government property under SOUTHCOM control to the Panamanian Government. The agency ensures treaty compliance is consistent with U.S. national policy, treaties, laws, DOD guidance and plans. The Panama Canal Treaty calls for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces by the year 2000. In consonance with this treaty, the U.S. must relocate or disestablish military activities in Panama. TIPA terminates upon treaty implementation in 1999.

(b) Assumptions.

- 1** Regional national strategy and military policy for Latin America, remains the same.
- 2** Panama Canal Treaty will be honored.
- 3** Military presence in Panama will be significantly reduced after 1995.
- 4** Panama has a stable government that guarantees canal access, use and operating condition.

(c) Analysis. According to the Army FY92 POM USARSO TOE manpower decreases by 28 percent between 1989 and 1997. A corresponding decrease in the TDA manpower amounts to about 800 spaces. However, not reflected in this POM are all the TIP manpower decrements. The current JCS TIP proposes an 80 percent reduction to SOUTHCOM Army forces that are actually stationed in Panama after 1995. As proposed, eliminating USARSO HQ (an ongoing JCS issue) and the USAG-PN alone will reduce the USARSO TDA manpower by 75 percent. The 41st ASG could reorganize to subsume the USAG-PN mission and the SOUTHCOM Exercise Support Group could reorganize to coordinate and monitor Army activities in the SOUTHCOM area. FORSCOM

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER V
REALIGN CONUS FORCES
15 December 1990

could pick up MACOM responsibilities for Army forces assigned to the SOUTHCOM area. TIPA has specific objectives with time limits for completion. Treaty compliance will occur by 31 December 1999 and the agency can be terminated. The need for a stand alone activity to accomplish this mission is not required.

(3) Conclusions.

(a) Eliminating USARSO after 1995 is warranted and will generate substantial savings to the Army without causing a major impact on Army mission. DOD and JCS must approve the elimination of USARSO.

(b) Historical Army involvement with construction, management and operation of the Panama Canal makes Army the appropriate agency to effect release of this U.S. property.

(c) TIPA has a narrow finite mission. Upon mission completion, Army infrastructure should absorb personnel.

(4) Recommendations.

(a) Disestablish USAG-PN by 1997. Transfer mission responsibility to 41st ASG AUG.

(b) Disestablish USARSO HQ by 1997. Transfer mission responsibility to FORSCOM.

(c) Maintain executive agency in place until implementation of the Panama Canal Treaty. At the completion of this very specific mission, terminate TIPA and reassign personnel within the Army.

5.4. REALIGN TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT.

a. ELIMINATE MTMC AS A MACOM (MDA07) (Disapproved as DMRD 978).

(1) Description. VANGUARD initiative MDA07 identifies savings made possible by reducing end strength, eliminating Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) as a MACOM and transferring the residual functions to a newly created Logistics Command (See Chapter IX, Figure IX-1).

(2) Evaluation.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER V
REALIGN CONUS FORCES
15 December 1990**

(a) **Mission/Functions/Background.** MTMC is a joint service staffed, industrially funded Major Army command, discharging responsibilities as the DOD single manager for traffic management, common-user ocean terminals, transportation engineering and intermodal containers. MTMC is also the Army component of the U.S. Transportation Command. MTMC has four operational major subordinate commands, employing approximately 3800 personnel and operating 30 ocean terminals worldwide. Two major subordinate traffic management commands, MTMC-Western Area in Oakland, Ca and MTMC-Eastern Area in Bayonne NJ, provide regional service to over 2700 defense shippers in CONUS as well as having responsibility for seventeen CONUS and OCONUS ocean terminals, less Europe. The thirteen European ocean terminals are managed by MTMCs European command located in The Netherlands.

(b) **Assumption.** Single manager transportation functions will be performed without degradation when located within the Army logistics community.

(c) **Analysis.** The MTMC vision was the starting point for the VANGUARD analysis. MTMC developed a future organization that would downsize the command approximately 40 percent. Advances in telecommunications and information processing eliminated the need for CONUS transportation zone management and MTMCs Western Area. VANGUARDs analysis supported a smaller deployable force requirement that will require MTMC's Eastern Area to merge with the Headquarters and assure a major reduction in both CONUS and OCONUS terminal operations. The resultant MTMC structure and residual mission would lend itself being incorporated into the Logistics Command. Specifics of the reduction plan (see figure V-3) are detailed as follows:

1 In Europe reductions are projected for FY95 after the Conventional Forces Europe shipping surge has been accommodated and the forward deployed force structure has stabilized. Two terminals will remain open to support northern Europe (Benelux, BE & Felixstowe, UK) and two terminals (Leghorn, IT & Izmir, TU) will continue to support southern Europe.

2 In the Pacific, the Yokohama terminal would close as a result of a lower presence of U.S. forces in Japan. Changes in Okinawa force structure may produce opportunities for additional reductions.

3 Terminal closings overseas will force reductions in overseas command and control headquarters to a smaller forward support office. Both MTMC Europe and the Transportation Terminal Command Far East (TTCFE) will be scaled down by FY96.




Figure V-3
VANGUARD Reduction Plan for MTMC

4 Corresponding reductions in the CONUS terminal structure will commence in FY93. Retaining the Military Ocean Terminals at Bayonne, NJ and Oakland, CA will allow for the continued military control of two strategically important ports, from which unit deployments can be made without using commercial or public facilities. The Military Ocean Terminal, Sunny Point is retained as the only major ammunition port on the east coast. Charleston, SC, Gulf Outport in New Orleans, LA, and the Pacific North West Terminal in Bremerton, WA, offer marginal use in the future.

5 The single most significant action undertaken within the plan, is the eventual merging of Headquarters MTMC and its remaining single CONUS area command in FY97. The success of this endeavor will hinge on MTMC's ability to capitalize on emerging technologies that will produce significant operational efficiencies and extend

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER V
REALIGN CONUS FORCES
15 December 1990**

their vision to manage cargo movements throughout the Defense Transportation System (DTS).

(d) Alternatives.

1 Downsize MTMC approximately 40 percent based upon the Command Vision but maintain MTMC as a MACOM.

2 Disestablish MTMC and incorporate missions and functions into the U.S. Transportation Command.

(3) Conclusions. In FY93 eliminating MTMCs Western Area (MTMCWA) command, will yield significant manpower space savings. Some residual functions will remain to provide traffic management assistance during fielding of the CONUS Freight Management system and continue the ocean cargo "booking" function. Low workload ports in Europe, Baltimore Outport, Mobile, Al and Beaumont, Tx port detachments will be closed in FY93. By FY94, new advanced information/data systems will be fielded which will reduce manpower requirements and generate savings. Overseas force reductions will lead the way for the closure of MTMC terminals and command and control headquarters beginning in FY95. DOD and JCS must approve the elimination of MTMC.

(4) Recommendation. Disestablish MTMC as an Army MACOM. Transfer traffic management, residual terminal operations, and transportation engineering functions and reduced resources to the new Army Logistics Command.

b. LIMIT RESTORATION OF RAIL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS (MDA08).

(1) Description. VANGUARD initiative MDA08 identifies possible savings by reducing funds programmed for restoring rail mobilization and deployment infrastructure by 50 percent. This initiative applies to FORSCOM designated mobilization stations that have a rail deployment mission.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. Army rail infrastructure for mobilization and deployment has deteriorated, through neglect, over the past forty years. Inability to execute deployments by rail as dictated by OPLANS caused HQDA to develop and implement a program to restore rail infrastructure. FORSCOM acts as the Executive Agent for the mobilization and deployment funding and identifies requirements. Rail

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER V
REALIGN CONUS FORCES
15 December 1990

restoration funds restore and rehabilitate rail right-of-way, build loading yards, procure loading ramps, hardstands and lighting. Over the past few years, funding has been partially or fully reprogrammed into other FORSCOM priorities such as safety and the environment.

(b) Assumptions.

1 Significant reductions will occur in the number of installations used for mobilization and deployment due to increased warning time.

2 Rail deployment to seaports of embarkation will be required for initial deployment and sustainment in any scenario.

3 Army will increase reliance on containerization to move unit equipment and sustainment items and rely on intermodal movement for speed, unit integrity, security and economy.

(c) Analysis. Analysis for MDA08 began with examining the Management Decision Package which identified mission and funding stream. Further analysis indicated that funds were routinely reprogrammed by FORSCOM. Approximately 50 percent of FY89 and 100 percent of FY90 funds were used as bill payers for non-rail related missions. Diversion of funds suggested reprogramming of these funds could be accommodated. However, regular routine maintenance on the rail infrastructure should not be deferred totally.

(d) Alternatives.

1 Fix rail infrastructure for early deployers and delay any rail rehabilitation, other than routine maintenance, for installations that first deploy after D+60.

2 Maintain full funding for all FORSCOM prioritized mobilization station with a rail deployment mission and "fence" funds so they can be applied only to the rail program.

(3) Conclusions.

(a) Regular routine rail maintenance is being neglected on mobilization stations with a rail deployment mission.

(b) FORSCOM annually sets priority to rehabilitate rail infrastructure.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER V
REALIGN CONUS FORCES
15 December 1990**

All installations do not have units that deploy immediately. Cost savings could accrue by identifying the early deploying installations and fixing their infrastructure.

(4) Recommendations.

(a) Reduce programmed funding by 50 percent to maintain rail infrastructure and extend the program completion date from FY97 to FY06.

(b) Fence remaining funds to prevent diversion into other mission areas.

c. REDUCE FIXED-WING (FW) OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AIRCRAFT (OSA) IN CONUS (MDA09) (Approved as DMRD 945F).

(1) Description. VANGUARD Initiative MDA09 identifies possible savings by reducing the number of CONUS based Fixed-Wing (FW) Operational Support Aircraft (OSA).

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. There is no clear cut mission statement for FW-OSA which is governed by a collection of DOD and DA policies. FW-OSA are used extensively for VIP travel and to move small shipments of personnel and equipment to meet contingency and peacetime logistical requirements. OSA equipment consists of an odd assortment, of 266 jet, turboprop, and piston driven aircraft. They are owned and scheduled separately by the active Army (for AC and USAR) and the Army National Guard.

(b) Assumption. The plan for single centralized aircraft scheduling will be executed as scheduled.

(c) Analysis. The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Combined Arms Combat Development Activity (CACDA) conducted the Operational Support Airlift Wartime Requirements Study which was published in March 1990. The Study concluded that 180 versus 255 aircraft were required in the near-term and that a properly configured fleet of 165 aircraft could eventually meet Army long range FW-OSA mission requirements. The Army acquired 11 aircraft from the USAF in FY91 increasing the fleet size to 266 aircraft. VANGUARD challenged the figure of 180 and 165 as being based upon an 1989 sized Army under full mobilization and an outdated OPLAN 4102 type scenario. Subsequent analysis (see table V-I) by VANGUARD demonstrated that a

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER V
REALIGN CONUS FORCES
15 December 1990**

reduction to 104 aircraft (60 percent) would support fixed-wing aviation mission requirements and still allow for eliminating older, less efficient aircraft from the fleet. A total Army centralized scheduling system would also be required.

YEARLY OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AIRCRAFT COSTS (\$000)							
COMPO/ TYPE AC	OMA PER PLANE	x	FY 90 FLEET	=	FY 90 OMA COSTS	-	VANGUARD PROPOSAL FLEET AND COSTS 60% CUT
ACTIVE							
C-23	\$298		11		\$ -		-
C-20	817		3		2,451		3 2,451
C-21	331		-		-		1 331
C-12	239		50		11,950		40 9,560
C-7	127		1		127		-
U-21	180		59		10,620		-
BE-65	194		2		388		-
VC-6A	180		2		360		-
			128		25,886		44 12,342
USAR							
C-12	239		-		-		10 2,390
U-21	180		5		900		-
U-8	194		25		4,838		-
T-42	57		2		114		-
			32		5,854		10 2,390
NGS							
C-12	239		23		5,497		23 5,497
C-26	170		-		-		-
C-7	127		14		1,778		-
C-23	298		-		-		27 8,046
U-8	194		32		6,208		-
U-21	180		15		2,700		-
T-42	57		20		1,144		-
CB-310	57		2		114		-
			106		17,441		50 13,543
TOTAL			266		\$49,202		104 \$28,275

**Table V-1
Annual OCS Costs**

(3) Conclusions.

(a) Cost savings can accrue by using a single centralized OSA scheduling for the Total Army and by reducing the size of the fleet.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER V
REALIGN CONUS FORCES
15 December 1990**

(b) The greatest economies are derived by maintaining a modern cost effective FW-OSA fleet at a minimum number of aircraft bases or hubs.

(4) Recommendations.

(a) Implement VANGUARD initiative and reduce current OSA structure by 60 percent.

(b) Accelerate basing recommendations of CACDA study by consolidating aircraft resources soonest.

d. ELIMINATE U.S. ARMY AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL COMBAT SUPPORT ACTIVITY (MDA19).

(1) Description. VANGUARD Initiative MDA19 eliminated the U.S. Army Air Traffic Control Combat Support Activity as a FOA of Forces Command (FORSCOM).

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Mission/Functions/Background. This activity transferred from 7th Signal Command, Ft Ritchie to FORSCOM in 1986 as a result of the HQDA Air Traffic Control Plan. The mission of the activity was to serve as the FORSCOM operating agency for all actions relating to acquiring, operating and certifying ATC equipment, facilities, systems units and personnel.

(b) Assumptions. Decentralizing Air Traffic Control resources to the MACOMs would enhance air traffic services and compliance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requirements.

(c) Analysis. Initial analysis of the function of this activity revealed a planning and programming function that was inconsistent with the mission statement and functions of a FOA. Further details and questions to FORSCOM revealed a residual policy mission caused by the removal of the FOA resources to support the Joint Deployment System (JDS). A separate FOA for the remaining mission was not warranted.

(3) Conclusions. Removing the JDS mission and personnel from this FOA left a mission better suited for HQ FORSCOM as oppose to a FOA. The remaining functions will require two manyears and are supported by two civilian authorizations.

(4) Recommendations.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER V
REALIGN CONUS FORCES
15 December 1990

(a) Eliminate the U.S. Army Air Traffic Control Support Activity as FOA of HQ FORSCOM.

(b) Transfer functions and two civilian spaces to HQ FORSCOM.

5.5. RESTRUCTURE SECURITY ACTIVITIES.

a. ELIMINATE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND (CIDC) (MDA03).

(1) Description. VANGUARD initiative MDA05 identifies savings made possible by reducing end strength, eliminating Criminal Investigation Command (CIDC) as a MACOM, and retaining the investigative functions in a newly created Personnel Command.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Mission/Function/Background. CIDC was created in 1969 at the direction of the Chief of Staff, Army to provide an investigative arm external to the normal chain of command. The mission has evolved to include Protective Service, and Fraud Investigation. Investigative functions later became a Defense Management Review (DMR) initiative to determine what areas could be consolidated among all services to realize management efficiencies. The idea was to consolidate similar functions from each of the services, creating a Defense organization. DMR 996 was disapproved on 17 November 1990 in favor of status quo.

(b) Assumption. Army command and control could be transferred to another activity to provide unbiased support to the agents in the field without prejudicial influence from the supported commanders.

(c) Analysis. The methodology used to evaluate the positions for reduction or elimination was through briefings provided by CIDC, interviews, and reports (both historical and current). Based on an examination of this information, VANGUARD concluded that multiple layering of HQs existed. Further analysis suggested that both the MACOM HQs and Regional HQs could be eliminated, but retention of the district HQ and the investigative function was necessary. In addition to reviewing the command as a separate entity, the Field Operating Activities (FOA) were also examined. CIDC has three FOAs, Protective Service Activity (PSA), Field Investigative Activity (FIA), and Crime Records Center (CRC). Once CIDC HQ is eliminated, FIA and PSA would transfer to MDW while CRC would merge with PERSCOM.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER V
REALIGN CONUS FORCES
15 December 1990

(d) Alternative. Reduce the overall MACOM end strength in line with other Army programmatic force structure actions.

(3) Conclusion. The cost savings that are realized as a result of realigning the functions of CIDC, approximate the same resources gained by eliminating the Command structure and reapportioning the mission. The principal question is the elimination of the MACOM.

(4) Recommendations.

(a) Eliminate USACIDC Headquarters.

(b) Eliminate CIDC regional Headquarters.

(c) Transfer investigative functions to Personnel Command.

(d) Have CIDC district Headquarters report directly to Personnel Command.

b. **ELIMINATE LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS (MDA05) (Approved as DMRD 945V).**

(1) Description. VANGUARD initiative MDA05 seeks to reduce law enforcement functions and personnel in the TDA Army. The law enforcement functions consist of Physical Security, AWOL Apprehension, Game Wardens, and Crime Prevention. VANGUARD initiative MDA22 complements this initiative by reducing the resources related to these functions at the U.S. Army Military Police Operations Agency (USMPOA), a FOA DCSOPS HQDA.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Mission/Function/Background. The Army TDA Military Police force is Comprised of Garrison MPs that are part of the Provost Marshal's office. They serve essentially a peacetime role in support of the garrison operations. The USMPOA performs a wide range of functions relating to law enforcement and physical security that includes formulating DA policy.

(b) Analysis. MP TDAs were initially reviewed by looking at the Standard Work Center Codes (SWCC), most specifically the SWCC, TGA, for AWOL. As a result of interviews with senior Military Police Officers, additional suggestions on

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER V
REALIGN CONUS FORCES
15 December 1990

functions to be eliminated as a cost savings measure were received. Besides AWOL apprehension other areas considered were, Physical Security, Game Wardens, and Crime Prevention. Further analysis concluded that most of the functions could be absorbed by the local Provost Marshal or performed by MTOE MPs when available or other assets as directed by the local commander. The resulting cuts in the USMPOA were related directly to the reduction of the law enforcement functions. Finally, statute requires military departments to enforce fish and wildlife laws on their installations. Thus, the Army needs congressional approval to cease performing game warden functions.

(3) Conclusions. Savings in resources can be gained by eliminating some Law Enforcement functions. Commanders will continue to emphasize crime prevention and civil authorities will continue to apprehend soldiers that are AWOL. Some traditional TDA missions must be shared by MTOE commanders in a resource constrained Army.

(4) Recommendations.

(a) Reduce Military Police Law Enforcement resources.

(b) Reduce the U.S. Army Military Police Operations Agency resource to correspond with reduction in Law Enforcement Function.

c. **ELIMINATE RETRAINING BRIGADE (MDA04) (Approved as DMRD 954D).**

(1) Description. This VANGUARD initiative eliminated the Retraining Brigade at Fort Riley, Kansas. This correction custody activity was part of an OSD action to consolidate the correctional custody systems.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Mission/Function/Background. The Army was designated the Executive Agent to develop a joint coordinated proposal for a structure and plan for operating a consolidated DOD correctional program. OSD guidance was: review the purpose of military corrections, determine how corrections support the warfighting effort and define the sentence associated with a "long term" prisoner. The option that was finally accepted establishes the Army as the proponent for long-term corrections within DOD and assures continued Service Secretary discretion in discharging moral and fiscal obligations relative to military corrections goals, specifically with regard to rehabilitation and restoration to duty.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER V
REALIGN CONUS FORCES
15 December 1990**

(b) Analysis. The methodology used to review this initiative was through interviews with senior MP officers, discussions with Forces Command, and review of the Joint report to the Secretary of Defense on Consolidation of Corrections under DOD dated May 1990. In all cases the Retraining Brigade was recommended for elimination. This initiative was approved as DMRD 945D on 18 Nov 90 at a lesser resource level than recommended by VANGUARD.

(3) Conclusion. Eliminating the Correctional Facility (Retraining BDE) at Fort Riley should be supported.

(4) Recommendation. Eliminate the Retraining Brigade at Ft Riley, Kansas.

5.6. CONSOLIDATE SPACE ACTIVITIES (MDA-24,25,26).

(1) Description. This VANGUARD initiative, identifies marginal savings made possible by consolidating the Strategic Defense Command (USASDC) and the Army Space Command (USARSPACE) as part of this initiative. USARSPACE ceases to exist as a Field Operating Agency (FOA) of HQDA DCSOPS and its headquarters was reduced by 10 percent. USASDC retains it's FOA status as did the Army Space Program Office (ASPO) as part of this initiative.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Mission/Functions/Background. SDC was activated on 5 January 1985 as FOA of the CSA to oversee the Army portion of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Along with its R&D functions it has the operations and maintenance responsibility for the National Test Range and Kwajalein Atoll. ARSPACE is the Army component to US Space Command and a FOA of HQDA DCSOPS. In addition to its responsibility for planning for ground based Anti Satellite (ASAT) and Ballistic Missile (BMD) deployment, it assumed operational responsibility for the Defense Satellite Communication System Operations Center (DSCSOC) on 1 October 1990. Army Space Program Office (ASPO) is a FOA of HQDA DCSOPS and is responsible for the Army's Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) Program.

(b) Assumption. Consolidating space assets and strategic defense will provide the Army with the strongest organization possible to voice and support Army needs in space and to best leverage technology.

(c) Analysis. Initial analysis consisted of identifying/reviewing all

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER V
 REALIGN CONUS FORCES
 15 December 1990

space organizations and activities (see Figure V-4) and their respective missions and functions as well as authorizations and respective funding appropriations. Further information came from findings of the Redistribution of Basops/Unit Structure within TDA (ROBUST) Report of Dec 1988, conclusions of the Army Management Review Report of Oct 1989, briefings and interviews conducted with SDC, ARSPACE and HQDA DCSOPS personnel. Pivotal to the analysis performed, were the economies to be reached in consolidating all space resources or separating strategic from tactical assets. The vast majority of space related dollars belong to OSD and are for the most part RDT&E appropriations. Consolidating strategic assets eliminates ARSPACE as FOA of DCSOPS, HQ DA.




Figure V-4
 Space Organizations and Activities

(d) Alternatives. Several alternatives exist that range from consolidating all space assets and creating a MACOM, to consolidating SDC, ARSPACE, ASTRO, ASPO, and a Space Command, but none offer any significant resource reductions.

(3) Conclusions.

(a) Consolidating SDC and ARSPACE establishes a single Army

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER V
REALIGN CONUS FORCES
15 December 1990

organization for strategic and space assets. The SDC commander would be dual hatted or CG ARSPACE, thereby ensuring senior Army Representation at the USSPACECOM.

(b) The 10 percent savings in HQ ARSPACE is the result of streamlining minimum essential functions.

(c) Retaining ASPO as a FOA recognizes two important features; first the importance of its current mission and functions, second the fact that this organization is predominantly involved in tactical as opposed to strategic missions that SDC and ARSPACE perform.

(4) Recommendation. Reduce ARSPACE Headquarters by 10 percent and consolidate with Strategic Defense Command.

CHAPTER VI
RESTRUCTURE AND REALIGN TRAINING, COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS, AND FORCE
INTEGRATION

6.1. GENERAL

a. VANGUARD examined all aspects of institutional training. The primary effort was directed toward the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). TRADOC trains approximately 670 thousand students per year with an authorized military and civilian end strength of 90 thousand. Other MACOMs conduct individual training, but compose a relatively small portion of the training base. The team reviewed how the Army is organized to train the force and who conducts what facets of training. Organizational structures and training methodologies were examined for consolidation, streamlining, or elimination. Initiatives were developed against a smaller Army with drastically reduced resources.

b. The doctrine and combat developments process is related almost exclusively to TRADOC and therefore was the only MACOM examined closely. The force integration and documentation functions were examined from HQDA to installation level.

c. Based on VANGUARD's review, resultant initiatives are grouped into three categories: (1) Realign Combat Developments and Force Integration, (2) Realign Professional Development, (3) Realign Training.

d. TRADOC has an internal reorganization plan called FUTURE TRADOC (see Figure VI-1). TRADOC's plan creates Warfighting Centers by functionally grouping all branch schools. Inherent in this consolidation is an integrating function and a reduction in span of control. VANGUARD adopted the Warfighting Center concept. The VANGUARD vision of TRADOC reduces layering by converting the two Integrating Centers (CAC and CASCOM) to a Force Integration Center and a Professional Development Center. Warfighting Centers will be directly subordinate to HQ, TRADOC. The VANGUARD vision for TRADOC is depicted at Figure 2 and will be discussed in detail in subsequent paragraphs.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT PART VI
 TRAINING & COMBAT DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
 15 December 1990




Figure VI-1
 FUTURE TRADOC




Figure VI-2
 VANGUARD Vision -TRADOC

6.2. REALIGN COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS AND FORCE INTEGRATION (TNA08).

a. Description. Consistent with the VANGUARD vision of TRADOC, this initiative proposes the establishment of a Center for Force Integration. Concurrently, TRADOC is given a major new mission as the Army's Executive Agent for Force Integration.

b. Evaluation.

(1) Missions/Functions/Background. The combat developments and force integration processes are currently focused at HQDA, but the components are layered and decentralized within all MACOMs. There are approximately 9,000 personnel currently authorized in force integration, combat developments, documentation and related functions


**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT PART VI
TRAINING & COMBAT DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

which can be identified by unique cost codes or work center codes.

(2) Analysis.

(a) This initiative eliminates more than one-third of the manpower currently allocated to the process while providing the vehicle to fix major systemic dysfunctions. Additionally, it facilitates required reductions to the AMHA at Headquarters, DA and at the MACOM level.

(b) The current force integration process is depicted at Figure VI-3.



**Figure VI-3
Today's Force Integration Process**


**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT PART VI
 TRAINING & COMBAT DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
 15 December 1990**

1 At HQDA, multiple staff organizations develop and provide force structure, resource, and priority guidance to MACOMs at multiple points during the year. Each of the Army's 15 MACOMs and numerous separate agencies then rationalize the mission (structure) guidance to resources and return their command plans to HQDA twice annually. On approval of the command plans, each MACOM and agency then develops implementing documentation (MTOE/TDA) and forwards it to HQDA for approval.

2 The combat developments process is totally decentralized at each TRADOC school, which also function as user representative for the fighting force in the development of battle field requirements. The integration function is performed at the two Integrating Centers (CAC and CASCOM) and at HQ, TRADOC.

(c) Future Force Integration.

1 Figure IV-4 depicts the process and relationships under the VANGUARD concept.



**Figure VI-4
 Future Force Integration
 VI-4**

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT PART VI
 TRAINING & COMBAT DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
 15 December 1990

2 The central focus for policy, guidance, prioritization, and resource allocation is retained at HQDA through a Program Integrator. This concept is depicted in Figure VI-4 (see also Chapter IX, HQDA).




Figure VI-5
 HQDA PROGRAM INTEGRATOR


The HQDA Program Integrator will: build, submit, and defend the POM; own/control pertinent data bases (e.g. FAS, TAADS); develop and program the force based on DCSOPS stated priorities; and provide oversight of force program execution. Major ARSTAF changes include transferring missions and resources from ODCSOPS-FD, Manpower Directorate, ODCSPER, and DAPE to the Program Integrator. ODCSOPS will be limited to its traditional role of strategy, plans and policy; training; operations and mobilization. This removes the VCSA from his position as the de facto force integrator.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT PART VI
 TRAINING & COMBAT DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
 15 December 1990**

3 The focus of the DA force integration will be transferred to a new Force Integration Center established in TRADOC as a major subordinate command under a Deputy Commanding General. Combat developments, manpower requirements, and documentation resources will be concentrated at this center at a savings of more than 30 percent. Establishment of the FI Center enables TRADOC to become the architect of the total Army (TOE and TDA) as opposed to its current role of designing only the warfighting force. Models, similar to cellular TOE, and standards will be provided for the TDA Army as well as the warfighting force to facilitate standardization and integration of the total force. TRADOC will be designated as the DA Executive Agent for force integration, and will integrate input from all Army MACOMs.

4 Separate MACOM and installation force integration, manpower and equipment standards, and documentation offices would be significantly reduced or eliminated. USAFISA would be reduced to a small residual element to preserve the HQDA manpower survey capability and to assist the DA staff in management of, access to, and maintenance of residual DA data bases. The remaining FISA missions will be incorporated into the FI Center.

5 Although combat developments expertise will be concentrated in the FI Center, TRADOC schools will continue to function as the users' representative by a retention of a small combat developments group ranging in size from 30 to 100 personnel. Realignment and consolidation of Army analytical capability supports this concept (see Chapter XII).



**Figure VI-6
 Initiative Implementation Phasing**

6 Figure VI-6 depicts the general phasing for implementing this initiative.

(d) **Conclusion.** Significant savings can be realized through manpower reductions

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT PART VI
TRAINING & COMBAT DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

associated with a change in the combat developments, force integration, and manpower documentation processes. Consolidation of these functions establishes a critical mass oriented on future requirements, organizations, documentation, and analysis.

(e) Recommendations.

1 Reorganize TRADOC to form a Center for Force Integration.

2 Transfer the focus of Force Integration to TRADOC and reduce HQDA, MACOMs, and TRADOC schools based on reduced missions.

6.3. REALIGN PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT.

a. GENERAL. Professional development programs for officers, non-commissioned officers, and Department of Army civilians were reviewed. The majority of training is conducted by TRADOC, but other MACOMs and activities are involved in the professional development process, particularly for Department of Army civilians. VANGUARD viewed TRADOC as the Army's trainer; therefore, maximum consolidation of training and training institutions under TRADOC was established as a goal. In addition to the focus on consolidation, a major VANGUARD objective was to create cost savings by reducing the TRADOC mission load, but with the least possible degradation of leader development. Every effort was made to protect the warfighting aspects of the officer and non-commissioned officer professional education systems.

b. FORM A CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT (TNA08).

(1) Description. Consistent with the VANGUARD vision of TRADOC, this initiative proposes that a Center for Professional Development be formed. The Center would provide oversight over all warfighting and management schools.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. Currently, professional and leader development training for officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians is conducted in TRADOC schools and in Field Operating Agencies of various MACOMs/Activities. There is no activity that manages and provides oversight over all professional development schools.

(b) Analysis. A Center for Professional Development will be formed

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT PART VI
TRAINING & COMBAT DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

to provide oversight and management of leadership and management schools and centers not associated with the new Warfighting Centers. The Center will also have oversight of doctrinal and training matters at the Warfighting Centers. This Center will be directly subordinate to HQ, TRADOC and will be commanded by a TRADOC DCG. This concept brings all major military and civilian professional development schools under TRADOC, except medical. The Academy of Health Sciences was examined, but due to the unique and highly technical nature of the training, was retained in the Medical Command. The concept facilitates program integration, standardization, economies of scale, and elimination of duplication. Leader development, doctrine development, training, and training development will be fully integrated. The envisioned composition of the Professional Development Center is depicted in Figure VI-7 below.




Figure VI-7
Professional Development Center

(3) **Conclusion.** Formation of a Center for Professional Development will provide a degree of management and oversight that does not currently exist. Physical collocation of schools is not required for successful implementation.

(4) **Recommendations.**

(a) Form a Professional Development Center within TRADOC.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT PART VI
TRAINING & COMBAT DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

(b) Transfer the Army War College (DA, DCSOPS FOA) to TRADOC and assign to the Professional Development Center. As the Army's Trainer, TRADOC should oversee and manage all professional development programs from entry to senior level.

(c) Transfer the Judge Advocate General School (FOA, OTJAG) to TRADOC and assign to the Professional Development Center. Alignment under TRADOC will not affect the current technical link to the OTJAG. TRADOC provides management and oversight.

(d) Form the US Army Management College as a subordinate element of the Professional Development Center under TRADOC (a detailed discussion of this concept is in paragraph 6.2.b below).

c. CONSOLIDATE MANAGEMENT TRAINING UNDER TRADOC BY FORMING THE U.S. ARMY MANAGEMENT COLLEGE (TNA20).

(1) Description. Consolidate management training under TRADOC by forming the US Army Management College. This would serve to eliminate, as separate activities, the Army Management Staff College (DA, DCSPER FOA), the Army Logistics Management College (AMC FOA), the Army Management Engineering College (AMC FOA), and training functions performed in other FOA such as the Engineering and Housing Support Center (USACE FOA), and PERSCOM (DA, DCSPER FOA). A framework for the structure of the U.S. Army Management College is depicted at Figure VI-8.




Figure VI-8
U.S. Army Management College
VI-9

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT PART VI
TRAINING & COMBAT DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

(2) Evaluation

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. Currently, management training occurs in TRADOC schools and in schools sponsored by MACOMs. Many of these schools occupy leased space. Most students are civilians involved in the sustaining base of the Army.

(b) Analysis. This university would teach sustaining base management courses such as acquisition, engineering, housing, MWR, personnel, resource, information, materiel, and installation management courses. It would not teach courses provided by other TRADOC schools such as intelligence, transportation, communications, etc. Consolidating these schools at Fort Lee would be the optimum solution. The Army Logistics Management College (ALMC), at Fort Lee is an institution with sufficient staff and facilities to support such a school. The existing satellite and correspondence network can be expanded to accommodate the additional curricula.

(3) Conclusion. Consolidation of management training will provide the integrated faculty for BASOPS which is lacking today.

(4) Recommendation. Consolidate management training under TRADOC by forming the US Army Management College.

c. SUSPEND OPERATION OF CAS3 (TNA06).

(1) Description. Suspend operation of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3), Fort Leavenworth.

(2) Evaluation

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. Officers currently attend five different professional development schools during their careers: OBC, OAC, CAS3, CGSC, and SSC. The primary thrust of the advanced course is to prepare officers to command at the company, troop, and battery level. CAS3 prepares officers for staff duty.

(b) Assumption. Staff skills currently taught at CAS3 can be integrated into existing branch officer advanced courses.

(c) Analysis. Most company-level commanders are advanced course graduates; however, it is not uncommon for an officer to perform staff duties prior to CAS3 attendance. Timely attendance at CAS3 is difficult because of the demands placed on officers by the owning commands. Additionally, management of CAS3 attendance is

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT PART VI
TRAINING & COMBAT DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

decentralized to every Army command. Combining staff skills into existing branch OACs would ensure graduates would be prepared for both command and staff assignments. Hence, training officers once at the captain level would facilitate maximum flexibility for staff or command assignments. The Officer Advanced Course teaches combat leader skills and must be preserved. The Army should challenge the affordability of sending captains to two separate courses.

(3) Conclusion. Incorporation of staff skills training into advanced courses would not jeopardize the professional development of officers. It would better equip Army captains to meet job requirements in follow on staff or command assignments.

(4) Recommendation. Suspend CAS3; add staff skills training to branch OACs.

e. ELIMINATE THE PHYSICAL FITNESS SCHOOL (TNA15).

(1) Description. Eliminate the U.S. Army Physical Fitness School and incorporate fitness training into existing NCO and officer professional development training.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. The current mission of the Physical Fitness School is to develop physical fitness doctrine and to train soldiers to plan and conduct physical fitness training. Emphasis is placed on preparing students to meet the physical demands of war. Approximately 1000 active duty and 300 reserve components students attend the Master Fitness Trainer course each year.

(b) Assumptions. Physical fitness training is an integral part of NCO and officer responsibilities. The skills required to conduct this training can be integrated into their respective branch schools.

(c) Analysis. The responsibility for physical fitness doctrine can be transferred to the Army Fit to Win Program Office. The remaining training responsibilities can be incorporated into BNCOC, ANCOC, OBC, and OAC. TRADOC is already in the process of doing this, thereby eliminating the need for a separate school.

(3) Conclusion. Elimination of the Physical Fitness School will not adversely impact readiness.

(4) Recommendation. Eliminate the Physical Fitness School.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT PART VI
TRAINING & COMBAT DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

f. SUSPEND THE SERGEANTS MAJOR ACADEMY (TNA05).

(1) Description. Suspend operation of the Sergeants Major Academy.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. The Army sends its enlisted soldiers to six schools: BCT, AIT, PLDC, BNCOC, ANCOG, and SMA. The primary focus of most enlisted and non-commissioned officer training is on MOS and troop-leading skills. The SMA, a 22-week PCS course, trains senior NCOs for CSM/SGM positions Armywide.

(b) Analysis. The Army should protect its combat leader courses for enlisted soldiers. During a period of radically declining resources, however, the affordability of a 22-week PCS course to train enlisted leaders, who, through a series of promotion boards, have risen to senior enlisted positions based upon demonstrated competence and proven leadership skills, is challenged. This course results in two funded PCS moves in one year and is disruptive to quality of life issues. Suspending the SMA will have no impact on remaining enlisted professional development courses, will keep senior NCOs in units with soldiers, improve quality of life, and save dollars and manpower for redirection to higher priority programs.

(3) Conclusion. Suspending operations at the Sergeants Major Academy will not adversely degrade Army combat readiness.

(4) Recommendation. Suspend the Sergeants Major Academy.

6.4. REALIGN TRAINING.

a. REDUCE THE NUMBER OF BCT SITES (TNA04).

(1) Description. Eliminate one Basic Combat Training (BCT) site.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. BCT is currently conducted at 6 sites: Forts Leonard Wood, Jackson, Sill, Dix, Knox, and McClellan. Initial Entry Training (IET) in the form of OSUT is also conducted at Forts Benning, Sill, Knox, Leonard Wood, and McClellan. Reductions and resultant savings are already built into the FY92-97 POM for Dix (BRAC, FY92) and McClellan (TRADOC Initiative, FY91).

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT PART VI
TRAINING & COMBAT DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

(b) Analysis. Due to reduced training requirements associated with a smaller Army, BCT should be suspended at one additional site. This elimination will not effect conduct of OSUT or other AITs. The cost savings of this initiative capture the savings from the elimination of BCT as well as reduction in the size of the Committee Group, Reception Station, and BASOPS.

(3) Conclusion. Elimination of one additional BCT site will not adversely affect the Army's ability to meet its annual training requirements for BCT.

(4) Recommendation. Reduce one additional BCT site.

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VANGUARD FINAL REPORT PART VI
TRAINING & COMBAT DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

c. USE USAR TRAINING DIVISIONS TO CONDUCT IET (TNA03).

(1) Description. Increase the use of USAR Training Divisions to conduct IET, replacing active component training units.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. Currently 12 RC training divisions and 3 separate training brigades are in the force. They currently conduct MATCs and PROTRAIN, as well as Lateral and Vertical Displacements.

(b) Assumptions. The USAR training divisions/brigades have the capability to train more soldiers than they do currently.

(c) Analysis. Full-time active component personnel can be replaced by USAR training personnel. The PROTRAIN concept ensures continuity throughout the training cycle by using active component drill sergeants throughout the training period, supplemented with reserve component drill sergeants. By having USAR units conduct initial entry training, they would be performing their mobilization mission during peacetime. Two active component IET Battalions could be eliminated and replaced by existing USAR units.

(3) Conclusion. Replacing two active component IET battalions with USAR units will improve mobilization effectiveness without decrementing training standards.

(4) Recommendation. Eliminate two active component battalions and accomplish resulting workload through increased use of USAR training divisions.

d. RELOCATE ORDNANCE AIT FROM FT BELVOIR TO APG (TNA18).

(1) Description. Relocate MOS 52C/D/F training from Fort Belvoir to the Ordnance School at APG.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. Training for MOS 52C, 52D, and 52F is conducted only at Fort Belvoir. It is at Fort Belvoir only because CMF 52 at one time belonged to the Engineers.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT PART VI
TRAINING & COMBAT DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

(b) Assumptions. The Ordnance School can perform the mission with no additional resource requirements. Barracks, training facilities, and support facilities at APG can accommodate the move.

(c) Analysis. Consolidating overhead staff and the Battalion located at Fort Belvoir into existing Battalions at APG will save approximately 80 positions. A yearly fee of \$4M which TRADOC transfers to MDW for BASOPS support will also be saved with minimal additional cost at APG. Student load at APG, including the projected load currently trained at Fort Belvoir, will be less than the number of students trained at APG in FY90.

(3) Conclusion. This low-cost relocation will provide better control by the Ordnance School and consolidate ordnance training on one installation.

(4) Recommendation. Relocate ordnance training from Fort Belvoir to Aberdeen Proving Ground.

e. SUSPEND OPERATION OF Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTc) IN EUROPE (TNA09).

(1) Description. Suspend operation of the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTc) in Europe.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. CMTc, Hohenfels, exposes soldiers to force-on-force operations against a free-thinking, doctrinally sound opposing force. Since CMTc was elevated to a combat training center in April 1989, it has relied on USAREUR units that rotate in for three-week stints as its OPFOR.

(b) Assumptions. U.S. military presence in Europe is being significantly reduced.

(c) Analysis. All planned MCA funds for CMTc have been cut due to a moratorium on new construction in Europe. There is no live fire phase of training at CMTc due to range restrictions. No allies have expressed an interest in using CMTc. The Germans have conducted a test with one unit, but expressed no further interest. With the planned/anticipated withdrawal of a Corps plus from Europe, the training requirement will be for two divisions and an ACR. The current MTAs provide a training alternative. Competition for resources makes operation of CMTc questionable.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT PART VI
TRAINING & COMBAT DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

(3) Conclusion. Suspending the operation of CMTC will not adversely impact readiness in Europe.

(4) Recommendation. Suspend the operation of CMTC.

f. REDUCE THE ARMY MARKSMANSHIP TRAINING UNIT (TNA16) - DMRD 945E.

(1) Description. Disestablish Army Marksmanship Training Units 1, 5, and 6 at Forts Bragg, Hood, and Lewis.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. The Army Marksmanship Training Unit at Fort Benning has three field teams (1, 5, and 6), one aligned with each of the three CONUS-based Army Corps. OMA funds for the entire Army Marksmanship Training Unit amounts to approx. \$1.6M per year - of which only a portion goes for the field teams. These field teams are routinely filled with personnel who have no instructor/competitive shooting experience.

(b) Analysis. These teams provide replacements to the Army Rifle Team. There are more cost effective methods for selecting members for the Army team. Eliminating these three units will have no impact on individual marksmanship qualifications of soldiers, nor will it detract from the Army's ability to fight, because commanders have the capability to provide this training to their units.

(3) Conclusion. Elimination of these three units will have no impact on unit readiness.

(4) Recommendation. Eliminate Army Marksmanship Training Units 1, 5, and 6. (Approved as DMRD 945E)

g. ELIMINATE THE NATIONAL BOARD FOR THE PROMOTION OF RIFLE PRACTICE (TNA01) (10 U.S.C. 4307-4314; 1991 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 328).

(1) Description. Eliminate the NBPRP, the Director of Civilian Marksmanship (DCM), and the Civilian Marksmanship Program.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. Title 10, USC sections 4307-

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT PART VI
TRAINING & COMBAT DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

4313 provide for the CMP, NBPRP, and national matches. DCM is an FOA of the Office of the Under Secretary of the Army. The purpose of the program is to promote marksmanship among civilians by allowing them to use rifle ranges and obtain Army rifles and ammunition at discount prices.

(b) Analysis. GAO Report # NSIAD-90-171, "Military Preparedness: Army's Civilian Marksmanship Program is of Limited Value", May 90, notes that CMP objectives are not linked to Army mobilization and training plans. Army requirements do not exist for the program-trained personnel or instructors. Program-trained personnel are not tracked and may not be available when needed. Statutory change is required to eliminate this program.

(d) Alternatives. As provided in the FY91 Defense Authorization Act, make the program completely self-supporting.

(3) Conclusion. Eliminating the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice will have no adverse impact on Army missions.

(4) Recommendation. Seek legislative relief to allow elimination of the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice.

h. REDUCE STAFFING AT USAR TRAINING INSTITUTIONS (TNA12).

(1) Description. Streamline and consolidate USAR training institutions.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. USAR Reserve Forces Schools conduct MOSQ, NCOES, WOTS and OES at 90 schools located throughout CONUS (88), WESTCOM (1), and USAREUR (1). The parent unit for each school is the MUSARC. The schools are operational during IDT and AT. In the future, RC schools will provide CAS3 for reserve officers.

(b) Assumptions. Consolidating schools and eliminating unnecessary staff overhead positions will not adversely affect the quality or quantity of instruction.

(c) Analysis. Reduce the number of USARF schools within CONUS to a maximum of forty. This would provide two USARF schools per ARCOM, with one being in close proximity to the ARCOM HQ. The Commandant of the USARF school closest to each ARCOM HQ would serve as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training. USARF schools would have the mission of teaching MOS-producing courses, officer professional

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT PART VI
TRAINING & COMBAT DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

development, NBC training, and instructor training.

(3) Conclusion. Streamlining the duplicative staff positions will result in savings without adversely affecting readiness.

(4) Recommendation. Streamline and consolidate USAR training institutions.

i. ELIMINATE THE EUSA ITEP NON-DIVISIONAL TRAINING STANDARDS OFFICE (TNA22).

(1) Description. Eliminate the EUSA Individual Training Evaluation Program (ITEP) as an FOA of EUSA. Move the mission to EUSA J3 without additional resources.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. The EUSA ITEP office manages the ordering, receipt, accountability, storage, distribution, and destruction of test materials for MOS testing.

(b) Assumptions. Under the ongoing implementation of SDT, the ITEP workload will be reduced by 40 percent.

(c) Analysis. With the decreased workload under the SDT system and increased use of DTSOs to administer tests, the EUSA ITEP Office can be eliminated with minimal impact on MOS testing. Management can be accomplished at the MACOM level by the G3/J3.

(3) Conclusion. Eliminating the EUSA ITEP Office will not adversely impact soldier technical competence or readiness in Korea.

(4) Recommendation. Eliminate the EUSA ITEP Office.

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VANGUARD FINAL REPORT PART VI
TRAINING & COMBAT DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

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6.6 FIELD OPERATING AGENCIES (FOA).

a. Classify ARRTC as a Training Center under USAR Command.

(1) Description. Transfer the Army Reserve Readiness Training Center (ARRTC) to the USAR Command (when established) and classify it as a Training Center.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. The ARRTC provides USAR-unique, premobilization training to the Full-Time Support Force (FTS) in the areas of Operations, Administration, Automation, Budget, Finance, Logistics, Mobilization/Deployment, Planning, Movement, and Training. The Center is located at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin and is an FOA of FORSCOM J3.

(b) Assumptions. Establishment of the USAR Command will not be delayed due to budget decrements.

(c) Analysis. Since the ARRTC has a USAR-unique mission, it should be placed under the USAR Command when the latter is established.

(3) Conclusion. ARRTC performs an important function for the USAR and should be retained, but transferred to USAR Command as a Training Center.

(4) Recommendation. Retain ARRTC, but transfer to USAR Command (when established) and classify as a Training Center.

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT PART VI
TRAINING & COMBAT DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

b. Retain ATSC as a FOA of TRADOC.

(1) **Description.** The Army Training Support Center (ATSC) should remain a FOA reporting to the TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Training.

(2) **Evaluation.**

(a) **Missions/Functions/Background.** The ATSC serves as the Army's central training support manager for the planning, conduct, and integration of those processes, products, and services which support individual and collective training in the Active and Reserve Components. ATSC manages the following programs: Standards for Weapons Training; Range Modernization; TAADS; TEC Materials; Army Correspondence Courses; Individual Training Evaluation; and, Training Information Management. ATSC is currently a FOA of TRADOC (DCST).

(b) **Assumptions.** The Army will continue to need products and services provided by the Training Support Center.

(c) **Analysis.** ATSC is a separate TDA organization whose mission is Army-wide support and execution of headquarters programs. ATSC's mission is independent of, but directly related to that of HQ, TRADOC. ATSC executes training support policy established by the TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Training.

(3) **Conclusion.** ATSC provides a vital service to the total Army that is not duplicated elsewhere in the Army.

(4) **Recommendation.** Retain ATSC as a FOA of TRADOC.

c. Redesignate the CTED Student Detachment.

(1) **Description.** Continue the Civilian Training Education and Development (CTED) Student Detachment (currently called ACTEDS), but as a separate account similar to the TTHS account for military personnel.

(2) **Evaluation.**

(a) **Missions/Functions/Background.** The CTED Student Detachment is a holding account for civilian interns and long-term trainees. Part of the overall Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System (ACTEDS) which centrally fund interns, leader development, long-term training, and development of training plans for civilian career programs. Established in 1979, the CTED Student Detachment is a FOA of

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT PART VI
TRAINING & COMBAT DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

PERSCOM.

(b) Assumption. An account, similar to the TTHS, can be established to support civilian training.

(c) Analysis. This account is necessary to fund civilian leadership training and provide the means for recruiting quality college graduates for key career program positions. Without this funding, consistent, sequential, progressive training would not be available to civilians. As long as DA continues to centrally fund the DA Intern and Long-Term-Training programs, this account is required to place the trainees and pay for training expenses.

(3) Conclusion. CTED Student Detachment could be realigned into an account similar to the TTHS account.

(4) Recommendation. Realign the CTED Student Detachment into a TTHS-type account.

d. Eliminate the National Science Center (NSC).

(1) Description. The National Science Center for Communications-Electronics should be eliminated.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. The NSC offers military applications to the American Educational system as an outreach program to increase the nation's technical literacy. It is currently a FOA of the Office of the Secretary of the Army. TRADOC is the Executive Agent. The National Science Center is a result of Defense Authorization Act 1986, Public Law No. 99-145.

(b) Assumption. The Army will initiate necessary legislative action.

(c) Analysis. The National Science Center for Communications-Electronics makes little meaningful contributions to Army missions. It is largely a center designed for information exchange between DOD and civilian educational systems.

(d) Alternatives. Transfer NSC from DOD to the Department of Education.

(3) Conclusion. The elimination of NSC as a TRADOC FOA is congruent

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT PART VI
TRAINING & COMBAT DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

with the vision of TRADOC as a smaller, mission-oriented command. NSC contributes little to TRADOC or to the Army.

(4) **Recommendation.** Seek legislative relief and eliminate this FOA. Failing legislative relief, recommend the Army seek to relocate this FOA from DOD to the Department of Education.

e. Maintain USASAFA as a FOA under TRADOC.

(1) **Description.** The US Army Security Assistance Field Activity (USASAFA) should be retained as a TRADOC FOA.

(2) **Evaluation.**

(a) **Missions/Functions/Background.** USASAFA acts as the DA Executive Agent for Security Assistance training; the regional operations central financial manager; the Army-wide distributor of Security Assistance training funds; the supervisor of manpower utilization, information and program support; and the supporter of OCONUS teams. USASAFA is an FOA of TRADOC.

(b) **Assumptions.** The Army will continue its Security Assistance Program.

(c) **Analysis.** USASAFA performs a unique and vital function for the Army. It is properly aligned under TRADOC. All USASAFA funds, including salaries, come from Security Assistance (FMS) funds.

(3) **Conclusion.** USASAFA should remain a FOA under TRADOC.

(4) **Recommendation.** Retain USASAFA as a TRADOC FOA.

CHAPTER VII RESTRUCTURE AND REALIGN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS

7.1. GENERAL

a. At present three organizations exist to manage personnel in the Total Force, PERSCOM for Regular Army personnel, ARPERCEN for Army Reserve personnel, and GuardPERCEN for Army National Guard personnel. Although the missions of each organization differ somewhat due to the different requirements of each type of soldier, the primary mission of providing life cycle personnel management for each component is similar.

(1) PERSCOM, located in Alexandria, VA, distributes, manages, and develops soldiers to ensure current and future combat readiness by executing and recommending Army military personnel policies, systems and programs. It also develops and supervises implementation of procedures applicable to military personnel management and the development of personnel support services. The structure consists of a command group with staff, Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management Directorates, a Mobilization and Operations Directorate, a Civilian Personnel Management Directorate, and an Adjutant General Directorate. Personnel Information Systems Command (PERSINSCOM) provides automation support.

(2) ARPERCEN, located in St. Louis, MO, provides life cycle personnel management services for USAR soldiers to support defined readiness requirements. With total mobilization assets of 1.1 million soldiers, ARPERCEN manages the transition of citizen soldiers to active status and active soldiers to reserve status. To accomplish these tasks it maintains liaison with PERSCOM to effect transition of mobilized and de-mobilized soldiers.

(3) GuardPERCEN, located in Alexandria, VA, performs those personnel services required of the NGB as the channel of communication between the Department of the Army and the States. In consonance with the dual Federal-State status of the National Guard, it maintains Official Military Personnel Files (OPMF) for active and inactive ARNG commissioned and warrant officers, processes Line of Duty investigations, manages the assignments and careers of Title 10 Active Guard/Reserve soldiers, and maintains a PAC responsible for personnel and financial support for all soldiers assigned or attached to NGB.

b. The original VANGUARD Vision proposed a "People Command" (Figure VII-1), a new Army MACOM responsible for all aspects of personnel life cycle management. This concept would establish a MACOM that includes all personnel accessions, personnel readiness (management), personnel support, law enforcement and medical support activities.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER VII
 PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
 15 December 1990




Figure VII-1
 PEOPLE COMMAND ORIGINAL CONCEPT

(1) Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) and Army National Guard Personnel Center (GuardPERCEN) would be merged with the current PERSCOM to form a new organization, Army Personnel Command, located in St. Louis, Missouri.

(2) US Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) and US Army ROTC Cadet Command would merge to form the Accessions Command at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana.

(3) The command would include the special branches (JAG and Chaplains). The Surgeon General would be dual hatted as the Commander, Personnel Medical Command. The USMA Preparatory School would be disestablished.

c. VANGUARD revised the original concept as follows:

(1) USMA will remain a Field Operating Agency (FOA) of the DCSPER. DMRD 962 which would merge USMA, USNA and USAFA preparatory schools is still being staffed.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER VII
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

(2) The DCSPER directed USAREC and Cadet Command to convene a work group to determine how they would combine their organizations into an Accessions Command. The work group concluded that the commands could merge but they recommended that they not be combined because of the dissimilar missions of USAREC (recruiting, accessing) and Cadet Command (training), the risk to the recruiting mission at a critical stage of the Army build-down, and projected savings not justifying the up-front cost of conversion.

(3) The Surgeon General (TSG) is developing a Command and Control (C2) Study designed to determine the most efficient and effective command and control structure for AMEDD organizations and activities in the United States. The concept of the study has been endorsed by the Secretary of the Army. Because little or no savings would result by placing this command under the Personnel Command, VANGUARD has removed it as a subordinate command.

(4) The VANGUARD Vision (revised) (Figure VII-2) now expands the current PERSCOM to include the missions, functions and resources of ARPERCEN and GuardPERCEN, as well as the following Field Operating Agencies: U.S. Army Recruiting Command Enlistment Records and Evaluation Center, USA Central Personnel Clearance Facility, USA Enlistment Eligibility Activity, Physical Disability Agency, Personnel Assistance Points, USA Military Police Operations Agency, USA Research Institute, USA Drug and Alcohol Operations Agency, USA Central Identification Laboratory (Hawaii), the USA Escort Detachment, and USA Community and Family Support Center. The new organization would be located in St. Louis, MO.




Figure VII-2
PERSONNEL COMMAND - REVISED CONCEPT
VII-3

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER VII
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

d. In summary, the new personnel command will merge the two reserve component personnel centers with the US Total Army Personnel Command, incorporating most personnel related FOA's. As a result of efficiencies and consolidations, manpower savings of about 18 percent are achieved in the affected organizations.

7.2 RESTRUCTURE THE PERSONNEL CENTERS AND COMMAND.

a. **COMBINE US ARMY PERSONNEL COMMAND (PERSCOM) WITH US ARMY RESERVE PERSONNEL CENTER (ARPERCEN) (SMA44 & SMA46).**

(1) Description. VANGUARD initiatives SMA44 and SMA46 identify savings made possible by merging The U. S. Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) with the U. S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) to form the Army Personnel Command located in St. Louis, Missouri.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. Both PERSCOM and ARPERCEN provide "Life Cycle" personnel services. PERSCOM--Direct, integrate, and coordinate Total Army personnel systems to develop and optimize use of the Army's human resources in peace and war. ARPERCEN--Support Total Army mobilization: personnel management of USAR career force, administer the AGR and IMA programs, services to retirees, veterans and others, support Total Army mobilization and other crises through MOBPERs, command the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and the Stand-by Reserve.

(b) Assumptions. Critical to successful implementation of initiative is adopting a fundamental change in operating procedures. VANGUARD proposes that savings of 25 percent (PERSCOM) and 20 percent (ARPERCEN) could be realized by merging common functions, combining overhead activities and the reduced workload (Active Component only).

(c) Analysis. From a functional perspective a merger is feasible. The greatest savings would be in the headquarters and overhead accounts. Over time, the down-sizing of the Army will positively affect the efficiencies and enhancement of the Total Army concept. Co-location is essential to gain significant savings. The organization should be located in a low cost area.

(d) Alternatives. PERSCOM has identified savings of about 15 percent by FY97, based solely on reduced workload.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER VII
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

(3) Conclusions. Savings proposed by VANGUARD cannot be achieved without co-location and fundamental changes in operating procedures.

(4) Recommendation. Merge PERSCOM and ARPERCEN in FY 94. Co-locate the organization in St. Louis, Missouri. This recommendation is contingent on the legality of divesting ARPERCEN of command over the IRR and the Standby Reserve, and transferring command to the USAR Command. Additionally, the merger will trigger the Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. The Army must comply with the legislation before co-locating the centers.

b. COMBINE U.S. ARMY PERSONNEL COMMAND (PERSCOM) WITH U.S. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL CENTER (GUARDPERCEN) (SMA43).

(1) Description. VANGUARD initiative SMA43 identifies savings made possible by merging The U. S. Army National Guard Personnel Center (GuardPERCEN) with the U. S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) as components of a co-located Army Personnel Command located in St. Louis, Missouri.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. Both provide "Life Cycle" personnel services. PERSCOM--Direct, integrate, and coordinate Total Army personnel systems to develop and optimize use of the Army's human resources in peace and war. GuardPERCEN--Provide life cycle management for officers assigned to ARNG including issuance and withdrawal of Federal recognition, and management of Title 10 programs.

(b) Assumptions. Critical to successful implementation of initiative is adopting a fundamental change in operating procedures. VANGUARD proposes that savings could be realized by merging common functions and combining overhead activities.

(c) Analysis. From a functional perspective a merger is feasible. Over time, the down-sizing of the Army will positively affect the efficiencies and enhancement of the Total Army concept by this merger. Co-location is essential to gain significant savings. The organization should be located in a low cost area.

(3) Conclusions. Savings proposed by VANGUARD cannot be achieved without co-location and fundamental changes in operating procedures.

(4) Recommendation. Merge PERSCOM and GuardPERCEN in FY94. Co-locate the organization in St. Louis, Missouri. If this action triggers the Base Closure and

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER VII
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

Realignment Act of 1990, the Army must comply with the legislation before co-locating the centers.

c. REALIGN FIELD OPERATING AGENCIES AND ACTIVITIES UNDER THE US ARMY PERSONNEL COMMAND (APC).

(1) Description. VANGUARD's concept for the new Army Personnel Command (APC) included an assessment of all personnel related Field Operating Agencies (FOAs). The review included an analysis of the mission and functions of each FOA, and the impact of the down-sizing of the Army on their personnel and resource requirements.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. VANGUARD reviewed twenty-seven personnel-related FOAs, with a variety of life-cycle personnel missions for inclusion in the new APC.

(b) Analysis. Personnel related FOAs were examined on the premise that, if there was not a clear and convincing reason for them to be separate from the Army Personnel Command, then they were to be eliminated and their functions absorbed by the APC. Manpower and dollar reductions were based on the benefits of any consolidation or eliminations of FOAs and on reduced workload attendant to the overall downsizing of the Army. FOAs fell into two main categories: The majority were eliminated, their manpower authorizations reduced, and their missions transferred to the new APC. The other FOAs, for various reasons (e.g., directive authorities over other MACOMs, unique missions (USMA), etc.), retained their FOA status with or without manpower reductions.

(3) Conclusions.

(a) Most personnel FOAs can be absorbed into the structure of the APC. They are: USA Community and Family Support Center, USA Central Personnel Clearance Facility, Enlistment Records and Evaluation Center, USA Enlistment Eligibility Activity, Physical Disability Agency, Personnel Assistance Points, USA Military Police Operations Agency, USA Reserve Personnel Center, National Guard Personnel Center, USA Research Institute, USA Central Identification Laboratory (Hawaii), USA Escort Detachment, and USA Drug and Alcohol Operations Agency (USADAOA). (NOTE: While studying USADAOA, VANGUARD recommended changing policies governing substance abuse treatment (SMA05). This initiative was not approved by the first VANGUARD SELCOM because of legal concerns and DOD funding prerogatives).

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER VII
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

(b) Other FOAs due to their oversight responsibilities, policy making functions or unique missions remain FOAs of HQDA. They are: Equal Employment, Opportunity Agency, USA Compliance and Complaint Review Agency, USA Civilian Personnel Evaluation Agency, USA Military Review Boards Agency, US Military Entrance Processing Command, United States Military Academy, United States Military Academy Preparatory School, and USA Recruiting Command.

(c) Two operating civilian personnel offices, Personnel and Employment Services-Washington (PESW) and Peninsula Civilian Personnel Support Activity (PCPSA), were determined not to be FOAs.

(d) The Golden Knights were eliminated as a FOA of FORSCOM and transferred to the XVIII Airborne Corps.

(e) The elimination of the US Army Community and Family Support Center was approved as DMRD 945b.

(4) Recommendation. Absorb all FOAs (cited above less those determined not to be FOAs and already eliminated) into the Army Personnel Command.

d. REDUCE CADET COMMAND AND REGION HEADQUARTERS (SMA76).

(1) Description. VANGUARD initiative SMA76 describes savings made possible by reducing Cadet Command at the Headquarters and the Regions.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. The original VANGUARD Vision proposed merging Cadet Command and USAREC into an Accessions Command. The mission of Cadet Command is to commission the future officer leadership of the US Army through the Reserve Officer Training Corps program on college campuses. The functions performed in execution of this mission are marketing, recruiting, training, motivating, retaining, evaluating, accessing, and commissioning. The mission of USAREC is access enlisted soldiers into the US Army. The functions performed are marketing, recruiting, evaluating, and accessing.

(b) Assumptions. The missions of the two organizations are similar enough to combine the upper two levels of management.

(c) Analysis. Efficiencies gained through such a combination were

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER VII
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**

proposed at 25 percent in the headquarters' accounts. The DCSPER tasked the two commands to do their own analysis. Their analysis reported that, if merged, a savings of 8 percent would be obtained. It further stated that the organizations missions and annual activity cycles would not lend themselves to effective combination.

(3) Conclusions. Accessions Command should not be formed. However, Cadet Command can support their reduced structure with less overhead.

(4) Recommendation. Reduce Cadet Command headquarters and region headquarters by approximately 25 percent.

e. REDUCE US ARMY PERSONNEL INTEGRATION COMMAND AND TRANSFER ACTIVITY FROM TRADOC TO PERSCOM (SMA45).

(1) Description. VANGUARD Initiative SMA45 identifies savings by eliminating the US Army Personnel Integration Command (USAPIC) and merging its remaining functions with the Army Personnel Command (APC). The Army can reduce USAPIC consistent with enhanced automation and workload reductions caused by the down-sizing of the Army.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. USAPIC performs personnel integration missions and supports proponents, TRADOC, HQDA, and its FOAs, in the execution of Life-Cycle Personnel Management and the Force Integration Program.

(b) Assumptions. APC can assume essential functions. PMAD function can be reduced to a "monitor" status when TAADS-R and Force Builder are "on-line."

(c) Analysis. Manpower reductions can be made to USAPIC in conjunction with the takedown of the Army and the fielding of TAADS-R and Force Builder.

(3) Conclusions. USAPIC can be eliminated and its functions absorbed by the APC without detriment to the Army's Life-Cycle Personnel Management and Force Integration Program.

(4) Recommendation. Eliminate USAPIC. Transfer functions and remaining personnel to the Army Personnel Command.

f. RESTRUCTURE MEDICAL ACTIVITIES (SMA60 through SMA72) (DMRD 970),

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER VII
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

(1) Description. Army Medical Department (AMEDD) field operating agencies (FOA) and headquarters will be decremented and reorganized, with manpower savings applied to direct patient care. This requirement was generated by the FY91 Authorizations and Appropriations Acts to control CHAMPUS costs. As interpreted by TJAG, the acts prohibit the Army from:

(a) Reducing military and civilian medical personnel below the number serving on 30 September 1989.

(b) Reducing military or civilian work force, or level of care, at medical treatment or support facilities below the level maintained in FY90, except authorized base closures, drawdowns, or operational deployments.

The law applies to all officer branches of the AMEDD, enlisted personnel engaged in or supporting medically related activities, and civilian employees assigned to military medical facilities.

(2) Evaluation.


(a) Mission/Functions/Background. Thirteen AMEDD FOAs, with specific missions as shown in paragraph 14a, and HQ, U.S. Army Health Services Command (HSC), contribute to the overall AMEDD mission of providing health care and training to designated populations.

(b) Assumptions. The command structure of the new Medical Command will be consistent with the concept approved by the Secretary of the Army. VANGUARD identified savings will be used by the AMEDD as a goal to be attained in the FY95 completion of the AMEDD Command and Control (C2) study. Finally, planned force structure decrements will occur, allowing decrements in medical personnel over the POM.


(c) Analysis.

1 Initially, Medical Command was envisioned to be subordinate to the Army Personnel Command; however, VANGUARD revised the recommendation, favoring the AMEDD C2 concept of a medical MACOM with The Surgeon General dual hatted as the MACOM commander (for current organization, see figure VII-3; for proposed organization, see figure VII-4).

**VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER VII
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990**



**Figure VII-3
CURRENT ORGANIZATION**



**Figure VII-4
PROPOSED ORGANIZATION**

2 OTSG identified savings from the C2 reorganization of 245 authorizations. These savings would be claimed as the Army's share of DMRD 970 (Management of DOD Health Care). The DMRD has not been approved, pending resolution of the status of savings, based on public law and Congressional intent.

3 VANGUARD proposed that AMEDD FOAs and HQ, HSC be decremented 10-25 percent, consistent with the average medical end strength losses over

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER VII
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

the 92-97 POM and the programmed 25 percent reduction of the total Army. No decrements were proposed against two medical FOA: the Institute of Surgical Research (also known as the Burn Unit), which has a patient care mission, and the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, controlled by the Defense Intelligence Agency and funded by National Foreign Intelligence Program funds.

4 Approximately 600 authorizations have been identified by VANGUARD for application to direct patient care; this has been provided to, and acknowledged by OTSG.

(3) Conclusions. The exact savings to be gained from reorganization of the AMEDD have yet to be determined; savings of about 600 spaces should be achieved.

(4) Recommendation. 600 authorizations are the minimum savings to be identified by the C2 study for application to direct patient care.

7.3. REDUCE TDA AUGMENTATION TO OVERSEAS MACOMS.

a. REDUCE THE TDA AUGMENTATION TO THE 1ST PERSCOM (USAREUR) (SMA26).

(1) Description. VANGUARD initiative SMA26 identifies savings made possible by proposed troop reductions in United States Army, Europe. The Army can reduce the 1st PERSCOM TDA Augmentation consistent with reductions associated with the down-sizing of the Army.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. The PERSCOM TOE structure is staffed to do theater level wartime personnel tasks. The TDA Augmentation provides staffing for peacetime personnel tasks to include family member support.

(b) Assumptions. PERSCOM will be able to assume some of the workload not performed in theater. Withdrawal of forces from USAREUR will diminish 1st PERSCOM's workload as troops depart. Smaller overseas units will be easier to supply with manpower from PERSCOM than the large forces now deployed.

(c) Analysis. Reductions can be made in conjunction with the withdrawal of forces, lagging by about one year per increment. The mix of TOE and TDA spaces has been taken into account.

VANGUARD FINAL REPORT CHAPTER VII
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
15 December 1990

(3) Conclusions. Manpower reductions can be taken that will not detract from combat readiness throughout the theater nor significantly lessen or eliminate the ability to provide personnel service support to soldiers, their families, and other authorized customers.

(4) Recommendation. Reduce 1st PERSCOM TDA Augmentation in concert with USAREUR troop reductions.

b. REDUCE TDA AUGMENTATION TO 8TH PERSCOM (EUSA) (SMA26).

(1) Description. VANGUARD initiative SMA26 identifies savings made possible by proposed troop reductions in Eighth U. S. Army. The Army can reduce 8th PERSCOM TDA Augmentation consistent with reductions associated with the down-sizing of the Army.

(2) Evaluation.

(a) Missions/Functions/Background. The PERSCOM TOE structure is staffed to do theater level wartime personnel tasks. The TDA Augmentation provides staffing for peacetime personnel tasks to include family member support. An example of unique missions is the KATUSA training program managed by 8th PERSCOM with TDA Augmentation resources.

(b) Assumptions. PERSCOM will be able to assume some of the workload not performed in theater. Withdrawal of forces from EUSA will diminish 8th PERSCOM's workload as troops depart. Smaller overseas units will be easier to supply with manpower from PERSCOM than the large forces now deployed.

(c) Analysis. Reductions can be made in conjunction with the withdrawal of forces, lagging by about one year per increment. The mix of TOE and TDA spaces has been taken into account.

(3) Conclusions. Manpower reductions can be taken that will not detract from combat readiness throughout the theater nor significantly lessen or eliminate the ability to provide personnel service support to soldiers, their families, and other authorized customers.

(4) Recommendation. Reduce 8th PERSCOM TDA Augmentation in concert with EUSA troop reductions.